



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>





600099082Y



A COMMENTARY
ON
ST. PAUL'S EPISTLE TO THE GALATIANS.

A COMMENTARY,
CRITICAL, EXEGETICAL, AND DOCTRINAL,
ON
ST. PAUL'S EPISTLE TO THE GALATIANS:
WITH
A Revised Translation.

BY
GEORGE JOHN GWYNNE, A.B., EX-SCHOL. T.C.D.,
RECTOR AND VICAR OF WALLSTOWN, DIOCESE OF CLOYNE.

Καὶ πατέρα μὴ καλέσητε ὑμῶν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς· εἰς γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν, ὁ ἐν
τοῖς οὐρανοῖς.—ΜΑΤΤ. xxiii. 9.

DUBLIN:
GEORGE HERBERT, 117, GRAFTON-STREET.
1863.

~~100. w. 48.~~

101. c. 90.

DUBLIN:
Printed at the University Press,
BY M. H. GILL.



TO
THE REV. RICHARD HASTINGS GRAVES, D.D.,
PREBENDARY AND RECTOR OF BRIGOWN,
DIOCESE OF CLOYNE,
This Commentary,
UNDERTAKEN AT HIS SUGGESTION,
IS INSCRIBED,
IN TESTIMONY OF THE AUTHOR'S
ENDURING AFFECTION AND RESPECT.

.

.

.

.

.

.

P R E F A C E .

THE following attempt to exhibit in an improved translation, and to elucidate with notes, one of the most important and, as it is generally considered, one of the most difficult, of the doctrinal Epistles of St. Paul, is the work of a country clergyman, who for a series of years has devoted his leisure hours to the pleasing and profitable duty of studying the New Testament in the Greek text.

It was at first, in a more compendious form, designed as an exercise for his own mind, or at most for limited circulation amongst a few particular friends. But from the favourable reception which it met with at the hands of some upon whose judgment and candour the Author reposes the most implicit reliance, he was induced, by a careful revision of its contents, and a comparison of them with the expositions of other writers, and by the addition of some supplementary matter, to render it less unworthy, as he hoped, of a more extended circulation.

With this object in view, the Author procured, and studied with considerable interest and improvement, some of the most esteemed treatises upon the Epistle, especially the commentaries of Dr. Bloomfield, Deans Ellicott and Alford, who have attained such pre-eminent distinction in the schools of Biblical literature.*

* While this work was passing through the press, the designation of the Dean of Exeter to the vacant See of Gloucester and Bristol was announced in the public journals—an announcement which has given such unmixed satisfaction to those who earnestly desire to see the word of God treated with that grammatical accuracy, and with that deep and reverential regard, which its investigation so imperatively demands.

At the same time he availed himself of the opportunity of consulting many other authorities, both ancient and modern, which the kindness of a much-valued friend placed at his disposal.

In comparing the conclusions at which he himself had arrived with those set forth and maintained in the books to which he referred, the Author was struck with the numerous and important discrepancies existing between them, not only in the general conception of the Apostle's argument, but also as to the meaning to be ascribed to particular phrases and words, and not seldom, even as to the grammatical construction of the language itself.

Impressed with a deep sense of the value of divine truth, and of the duty incumbent upon every educated person, much more upon an ordained minister of religion, to use the faculties which God hath given him to the attainment of an exact knowledge of *the letter*, in order that he may drink at the fountain-head of *the spirit*, of Holy Scripture—sensible also of the injurious effects of the smallest admixture of error in the apprehension of divine things, and the difficulty of expelling it from the mind, when once it has taken possession under the sanction of illustrious names—the Author has felt himself called upon, while presenting candidly and fearlessly the conclusions which have commended themselves to his own judgment, to canvass with all Christian fidelity, and to expose with uncompromising boldness, the errors (as he conceives) in doctrine or exegesis of those distinguished writers who exercise so large an influence upon the formation of public opinion. In the course of such a procedure the work has assumed dimensions hardly contemplated at first; but it is hoped that, with the aid of the matter thus unexpectedly introduced, it will be found to have acquired an amount of usefulness, and interest in the sight of the student, to which it could not previously have laid claim.

Aware of the arduous and, to him uninteresting, nature of the task, and not ignorant, moreover, of his own deficiency, both in the qualifications and the means requisite for the construction of an original text, the Author has felt it to be the wiser, the safer, and certainly the more agreeable course, to avail himself of

the labours of others, who, with undivided and well-circumstanced attention, have devoted themselves to this peculiar branch of bibliographical research. Under the influence of this feeling he has selected, and used as the basis of his annotations, the improved text of Griesbach, without binding himself at the same time to a servile adherence to the letter, the deviations from it (which are not numerous) being dictated by considerations of internal propriety rather than by the mere weight of external authority. But in no instance has any alteration been admitted into the text which had not, upon independent grounds, received the approval of some editor of established repute.

Divinely informed that *all Holy "Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness; that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works;"* the Author is consequently assured that no proposition contained in the sacred record can be in itself of ambiguous import, no adjunct or connecting particle superfluous, no peculiarity of expression or departure from established usage without its definite and determinable object. Impressed with this conviction, he has set himself by prayerful and assiduous application, and reference to the highest authorities which lay within his reach, to inquire and to search out the meaning of each particular word, to assign to every particle its distinct and ordinary force, and to give to every sentence its natural and grammatical construction; but, above all, by analysing, comparing and contrasting the several parts of the Epistle, to trace out the connexion (sometimes exquisitely fine) subsisting between them, and thus to present the Apostle's reasoning with somewhat of its original unity of design and consistency of arrangement, as one harmonious whole, enunciated in terms the most suitable, the most intelligible, and the most logically exact.

Such an estimate of the Apostle's argument and style, the Author is well aware, is diametrically opposed to that of some writers of the modern school, who would fain persuade us that—"his writings are full of confusion"—that "he did not understand the distinction between argument and illustration"—"was not

capable of weighing evidence, and of distinguishing between the working of the Spirit and his own mind"—that "want of point" and "the unnecessary use of emphatic expressions are characteristics of his style"—that "he often employs an antithesis of words where there is none of meaning"—"inverting the modes of thought, unconscious of logical consistency, and the distinction between the moral and ceremonial law."*

Should the volume before us contribute only a little to the exposure of the rashness, the absurdity, the fatuity of such charges, it will have accomplished in the eyes of its Author no mean or undesirable result. The highest encomium to which he would aspire for his work is the acknowledgment that, without turning his back upon a single difficulty, passing over unnoticed or unexplained the most trivial word, or wresting one sentence from its just and legitimate meaning, he has succeeded in placing before the mind of the reader such a continuous chain of thought, of luminous and well-digested dissertation, as might be reasonably expected to flow from the pen of an inspired writer; and such as (he doubts not) was indeed exhibited by the genuine missive to those to whom it was addressed, who, through an exact acquaintance with the circumstances under which it was written, and the precise object to which it referred, must have had the clearest apprehension of the meaning of every sentence, and the point of every argument and allusion which it contains.

Seeking information directly at the source of all spiritual wisdom and knowledge, and in the use of every appointed means of attainment, the Author has pursued his course untrammelled by any human system. His object has invariably been to explore the deep treasure-house of revealed truth, and to communicate the results attained with the utmost simplicity of language, as well as exactness of interpretation. Upon this ground he ventures to hope that the commentary introduced by these remarks will be found not only truthful and accurate in its expositions, but more accessible to the ordinary reader, and more available for

* Jowett's "Lex Evangelica," p. 48.

general purposes than such productions commonly are. During the progress of the work, the Author has discovered that many of those grammatical niceties of construction, and developments of obscure connexions, which he had fancied exclusively his own, have been anticipated and given to the public by some who have preceded him in the path of Scripture elucidation. Such discovery, however, has not taken him by surprise, the wonder being that in a field of literary labour, swept by so many hands, so much remained to be gleaned.

The Author acknowledges it as a source of unspeakable gratification to himself, and unfeigned thankfulness to God, that when called upon (as sometimes he is), in the exercise of an unfettered judgment, to dissent upon doctrinal subjects from those who are reputed "Masters in Israel," such departures from received opinions, so far from obscuring or lowering the standard of the Christian faith—so far from approximating either to Popery or Puseyism on the one hand, or to Rationalism or Latitudinarianism on the other—have invariably tended to display more brightly and more distinctly the glory and the perfection of the Christian covenant, to exalt the views of the believer in reference to the person and the work of the Redeemer, and the privileges and the responsibilities devolving upon himself by reason of the closeness and intimacy of his union with Christ. Such a result he cannot but hail as an indirect testimony in favour of the general correctness and salutariness of his system.

Deeply grateful to the Giver of every blessing for the comfort and edification vouchsafed to himself in the preparation of these pages, the Author, in humble yet confident reliance upon the continuance and extension of the Divine favour, commits his now completed work to the hands of an enlightened Christian public. The cherished object and desire of his heart is, that through the blessing of Almighty God, without which he is conscious that no success can be achieved, it may lead unto a deeper and more experimental knowledge of the mysteries of revealed religion, to a juster and more established appreciation of the force and perspicuity of the sacred text, at least of that

important portion of it which is treated in this work, and to the general edification and comfort of every individual who shall devote his time and his thought to its perusal.

Should this treatise be blessed by a kind Providence to the removal of one stumbling-block to the full belief in the inspiration of Holy Scripture, cast in the student's path by the infidel productions that abound; or to the shedding of one ray of heaven-born light upon doctrines hitherto erroneously or but imperfectly understood; above all, should it be made the honoured instrument of attracting one sinner to the Saviour, or of building up one weak believer in His most holy faith, by drawing him into closer and more sensible communion with Christ, the Author will feel that he has been abundantly compensated for all the pains which he has bestowed upon it,—he has had a full and an overflowing reward.

WALLSTOWN GLEBE,

Feb. 23, 1863.

SUBSCRIBERS' NAMES.

	Copies.		Copies.
Abbott, Rev. T. K., F. T. C. D.,	1	Brereton, William W., Esq., Q. C.,	1
Adams, John, Esq.,	1	Bridge, P. S., Esq.,	1
Adams, Rev. Anthony,	1	Briscoe, Robert, Esq.,	1
Agar, Rev. William,	1	Briscoe, Miss,	1
Alcock, Rev. John,	1	Briscoe, Fetherstone H., Esq.,	1
Aldworth, Rev. John,	1	Browne, Rev. J., LL. D.,	1
Alexander, Rev. William,	1	Buchanan, Richard W., Esq.,	1
Armstrong, W., Esq., Q. C.,	1	Burke, Michael, Esq.,	1
Armstrong, Mrs.,	1	Butcher, Rev. Samuel, D. D.,	1
Atkinson, Rev. Thomas,	1	S. F. T. C. D.,	1
Babington, Rev. Hume,	1	Butler, Rev. Hans,	1
Barry, Rev. David,	1	Campion, Rev. Robert,	1
Beatty, Thomas E., Esq., M. D.,	1	Campion, Rev. Millianus,	1
Beaufort, Rev. William,	1	Carpenter, Rev. William, D. D.,	1
Bell, Ven. Robert, Archdeacon of	1	Chester, Rev. Richard,	1
Waterford,	1	Chester, Rev. William,	1
Bellis, Sandes, Esq., J. P.,	1	Clare, Rev. Mervyn A.,	1
Bernard, Hon. and Rev. Charles,	1	Coghlan, Mr. James,	1
Blackburne, Right. Hon. Francis,	1	Collis, Rev. M. A. C., D. D.,	10
Lord Justice of Appeal,	5	Collis, William Cooke, Esq., J. P.,	1
Blackburne, Rev. Anthony,	1	Colles, Henry, Esq.,	1
Blackburne, the Misses,	1	Conolly, Rev. John,	1
Bleakley, Rev. John,	1	Connor, Rev. Francis,	2
Bolster, Rev. John,	1	Cooke, Rev. John,	1
Bolster, Francis, Esq.,	1	Cork, Right Rev. the Lord Bishop	1
Boyd, Mrs.,	1	of,	1
Bowen, Robert Cole, Esq., J. P.,	1	Cosgrave, Rev. Thomas,	1
Brady, Miss,	1	Cotton, Ven. Henry, LL. D.,	1
Brady, Rev. Francis,	6	Archdeacon of Cashel,	1

	Copies.		Copies.
Cotter, Rev. Joseph R.,	1	Gage, Rev. Robert,	2
Cotter, Rev. George,	1	Gervais, Francis T., Esq., D. L.,	1
Craig, Rev. George,	1	Gervais, Miss,	2
Craig, Rev. William,	2	Giles, Miss,	2
Craig, John, Esq.,	1	Gollock, Rev. James,	1
Crofts, Rev. William,	1	Gordon, Rev. John,	1
Croker, Miss,	1	Grant, Rev. Jasper,	2
Crone, Mrs. Robert,	1	Grant, Thomas St. John, Esq.,	
		D. L.,	1
Davidson, Mrs.,	1	Graves, Rev. Richard Hastings,	
Daunt, Rev. Achilles,	1	D. D.,	5
Darley, Rev. John,	1	Gregg, Verling, Esq.,	1
Dawson, Yelverton, Esq.,	1	Gwynne, Mrs.,	2
Day, Rev. William,	1	Gwynn, Rev. John, F. T. C. D.,	2
De Freyne, Rev. Lord,	2	Gwynn, Rev. James,	1
Dickson, Rev. B., D.D., F.T.C.D.,	1	Gwynn, William James, Esq., .	1
Dobbin, Rev. F.,	1		
Dowling, Rev. Frederick,	1	Hacket, Rev. John W.,	1
Drew, Rev. Pierce W.,	1	Halloran, Rev. William,	1
Drew, Francis, Esq., M. D.,	1	Halloran, Rev. Thomas,	1
Duncan, James, Esq., M. D.,	2	Hamilton, James Hans, Esq.,	
Dunscombe, Rev. Nicholas,	1	M. P.,	1
Dysart, Rev. William,	1	Harris, Rev. Robert,	1
		Hardy, Miss,	1
Egerton, Colonel,	1	Harrison, Rev. William,	1
Ellicott, W. Armstrong, Esq.,		Hayes, Hon. Mr. Justice,	1
M. D.,	1	Hayman, Rev. Samuel,	1
Evans, Ven. R., Archdeacon of		Head, Very Rev. John, D. D.,	
Cloyne,	1	Dean of Killaloe,	1
Evans, Nicholas, Esq., J. P.,	1	Henderson, W. Carlisle, Esq.,	
Everard, Rev. George,	2	Q. C.,	1
		Henly, Matthias, Esq., J. P.,	1
Fawcett, Rev. John,	1	Hewett, Hon. and Rev. J. P.,	1
Ferrar, Rev. Wm. H., F.T.C.D.,	1	Hill, Rev. Arundel,	2
Finney, Rev. Thomas,	1	Hoare, Edward, Esq.,	1
Firth, Rev. R.,	1	Howie, Very Rev. James, Dean	
Fitzgerald, Rev. W.,	1	of Cloyne,	1
Fitzgibbon, Gerald, Esq., M. C.,	1	Hopkins, Thomas, Esq.,	3
Fleming, Rev. Horace,	1	Hunt, James, Esq.,	1
Forest, Rev. Robert,	1	Hyde, John, Esq., D. L.,	1
Forsyth, Thomas, Esq., Recorder			
of Cork,	1	Irwin, Rev. Charles King,	1
Furlong, John, Esq.,	2		

SUBSCRIBERS' NAMES.

xv

	Copies.		Copies.
Jackson, Rev. John,	1	Meyrick, Rev. Samuel,	1
Johnson, Rev. B.,	1	Molesworth, Rev. William,	1
Kilmore, Right Rev. Lord Bishop of,	1	Mooney, Rev. Daniel,	1
Kirkpatrick, Alex., Esq., J. P., .	2	Montgomery, Rev. Samuel,	1
Kirkpatrick, Rev. Francis, . . .	1	Moore, Colonel,	1
Kyle, Ven. Samuel M., Archdea- con of Cork,	1	Morton, Rev. James,	1
Langley, Rev. Charles S.,	1	Mountmorres, Rev. Viscount, Dean of Achonry,	1
Lawe, Colonel,	1	Napier, Right Hon. Joseph,	1
Lawrence, Rev. R. F., Treasurer of Cashel,	1	Nason, Rev. William,	10
Lee, Rev. William, F. T. C. D., .	1	Nason, John George, Esq., J. P., .	1
Leech, Rev. John,	4	Nelson, Rev. E.,	1
Leech, Rev. A. H.,	1	Newenham, Rev. Edward,	2
Le Pan, Rev. Louis,	1	Newman, Very Rev. Horace J., Dean of Cork,	1
Leslie, Henry, Esq.,	1	Newman, Mrs.,	1
Leslie, James, Esq.,	1	Norcott, Thomas, Esq.,	1
Lombard, Rev. Edmond,	1	Ogilby, James, Esq.,	1
Longfield, Hon. Judge,	1	O'Halloran, Rev. Stephen,	1
Longfield, Rev. George, F. T. C. D.,	1	Oliver, Mrs.,	1
Longfield, Rev. James,	1	Ormsby, Rev. H. N.,	1
Lucas, Mrs.,	1	O'Sullivan, Rev. D.,	1
M'Carthy, William, Esq.,	1	Peard, Mrs. Frederick,	2
M'Cheane, Rev. J. C.,	1	Penrose, Rev. John,	1
M'Clellan, Rev. Thomas,	1	Perrin, Rev. Louis,	2
M'Clellan, John M., Esq.,	1	Perrot, John, Esq.,	1
MacDonnell, Very Rev. J. C., Dean of Cashel,	1	Perrott, Thomas, Esq.,	1
MacDonnell, Rev. Ronald,	1	Perrott, John, Esq.,	1
M'Neece, Rev. Thomas, D. D., .	1	Perrott, Charles L., Esq.,	1
M'Cormick, Rev. Charles,	1	Phayre, Rev. R.,	1
M'Creery, Rev. Thomas,	1	Poer, Rev. Henry B.,	2
M'Gusty, George, Esq.,	1	Pollock, Rev. William,	1
Maginn, Rev. Charles A.,	1	Pomeroy, Hon. and Rev. A.,	1
Malet, Rev. J. A., D. D., F. T. C. D.	1	Porter, Charles, Esq., LL. D., .	1
Mannix, Henry, Esq., J. P., . .	6	Power, Ven. Ambrose, Archdea- con of Lismore,	1
Maunsell, Rev. Richard,	1	Provost, Rev. The, T. C. D., . . .	1
Meath, Right Hon. and Right Rev. Lord Bishop of,	1	Reeves, Rev. Isaac,	1
		Reeves, Edward, Esq., J. P., . .	1

SUBSCRIBERS' NAMES.

	Copies.		Copies.
Reynolds, J., Esq.,	1	Tatlow, William, Esq.,	1
Ringwood, Rev. F. H.,	1	Thacker, Ven. Joseph, Archdea-	
Rollestone, Charles, Esq., Q. C., .	1	con of Ossory,	1
Round, Mrs.,	1	Townsend, Rev. R., F. T. C. D.,	1
Russell, George, Esq., M. D., . .	1	Townsend, Edward, Esq., M. D.,	1
Sadleir, Rev. Henry,	1	Tuckey, Charles, Esq.,	1
Sadleir, Rev. A. H.,	1	Vowel, Rev. William,	1
Salmon, Rev. George, D. D.,			
F. T. C. D.,	1	Wakeham, Rev. Thomas,	1
Saunderson, Miss,	1	Walker, Rev. William,	1
Saunderson, Rev. Francis,	1	Walker, Mrs. T.,	1
Seaton, Field-Marshal Lord, . . .	1	Wall, James, Esq., Q. C.,	1
Shaw, Right Hon. F., Recorder		Wall, Rev. Dr.,	1
of Dublin,	1	Warren, Robert R., Esq., Q. C., .	1
Sherlock, George, Esq.,	6	Watson, William, Esq.,	1
Sherrard, Rev. William,	1	Webb, Rev. Francis,	1
Smith, Mrs.,	1	Welsted, Richard, Esq., J. P., .	1
Smith, Rev. Godfrey,	1	White, Rev. James,	1
Smith, Rev. George Sidney, D. D.,	1	Whittle, Mrs.,	1
Smith, Rev. James,	1	Wilcox, Rev. William,	1
Stanford, Rev. Charles, D. D., . .	1	Wilson, Mrs.,	1
Stanley, Hugh, Esq.,	1	Woodroofe, Rev. John,	1
Stawell, Rev. Francis,	4	Woodroofe, Rev. Henry,	1
Steele, Rev. William,	1	Wright, Mrs.,	2
Stewart, J., Esq.,	1	Wright, Edward, Esq.,	3
Stoute, Rev. J. Purdon,	1	Wright, Rev. C.,	2
Stoute, Nicholas P., Esq.,	1		
Stubbs, Rev. J. W., F. T. C. D.,	1	Yelverton, Mrs.,	2
Swansey, Rev. Henry,	1	Young, Rev. S. B.,	1

THE EPISTLE TO THE GALATIANS.

CHAPTER I.

1 ^αΠΑΥΛΟΣ ἀπόστολος (^βοὐκ ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων ^γοὐδὲ δι' ἀνθρώπου, ^δἀλλὰ διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ ^εΘεοῦ πατρὸς ^ςτοῦ ἐγείραντος αὐτὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν),

2 Καὶ ^αοἱ σὺν ἐμοὶ πάντες ἀδελφοί, ^βταῖς ἐκκλησίαις τῆς Γαλατίας.

3 ^αΧάρις ὑμῖν καὶ εἰρήνη ^βἀπὸ Θεοῦ πατρὸς καὶ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ,

4 ^αΤοῦ δόντος ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν, ^βὅπως ἐξέλῃται ἡμᾶς ἐκ τοῦ ἐνεστώτος αἰῶνος πονηροῦ ^γκατὰ τὸ θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ πατρὸς ἡμῶν,

5 ^αὩ ἡ δόξα εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων. ἀμήν.

6 ^αΘαυμάζω ὅτι οὕτω ^βταχέως ^γμετατίθεσθε ^δἀπὸ τοῦ καλέσαντος ὑμᾶς ^εἐν χάριτι Χριστοῦ ^ςεἰς ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον,

7 ^αὍ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο, εἰ μὴ τινές εἰσιν ^βοἱ ταρασσόντες ὑμᾶς καὶ θέλοντες ^γμεταστρέψαι ^δτὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Χριστοῦ.

8 ^αἈλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ἡμεῖς ^βἢ ἄγγελος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ εὐαγγελίζηται ὑμῖν ^γπαρ' ὃ εὐηγγελισάμεθα ὑμῖν, ^δἀνάθεμα ἔστω.

1 PAUL an apostle (not *sent forth* from men, neither *commissioned* by man, but by Jesus Christ, and God the Father who raised him from the dead, and *invested him with all power both in heaven and in earth*),

2 And all the brethren in Christ who are with me *while I write*, unto the churches of Galatia.

3 Grace *be* unto you and peace from God the Father, and *from* our Lord Jesus Christ,

4 Who gave Himself for our sins, that He might deliver us out of the present evil dispensation *of wardship under the rudiments of the world*, according to the will of God *the Sovereign Disposer of all things*, and, as our Father, *the Appointer of the time of our majority* :

5 To whom *be* the glory for ever and ever. Amen.

6 I marvel that ye are so quickly changing about from him (*Paul*) who called you in the grace of Christ, unto a different gospel :

7 Which is nothing else save that there are some who disturb you, and desire to alter the gospel *which proceedeth* from Christ.

8 But even if we *apostles should*, or, *to put a stronger case still*, if an angel from heaven should preach unto you a gospel other than we preached unto you, let him be accursed *of God*

9 ^aὩς προειρήκαμεν, καὶ ἄρτι πάλιν λέγω, εἴ τις ὑμᾶς εὐαγγελίζεται παρ' ὃ παρελάβετε, ἀνάθεμα ἔστω.

10 ^aἌρτι γὰρ ἀνθρώπους πείθω ἢ τὸν Θεόν; ^bἢ ζητῶ ἀνθρώποις ἀρέσκειν; ^cεἰ γὰρ ^dἔτι ἀνθρώποις ἤρεσκον, Χριστοῦ δοῦλος οὐκ ἂν ἦμην.

11 ^aΓνωρίζω δὲ ὑμῖν, ἀδελφοί, τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τὸ εὐαγγελισθὲν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ^bκατὰ ἄνθρωπον.

12 ^aΟὐδὲ ^bγὰρ ἐγὼ ^cπαρὰ ἀνθρώπου παρέλαβον αὐτὸ, οὔτε ἐδιδάχθην, ἀλλὰ ^dδι' ἀποκαλύψεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.

13 ^aἨκούσατε γὰρ τὴν ἐμὴν ἀναστροφήν ^bποτε ^cἐν τῷ Ἰουδαϊσμῷ, ὅτι καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ^dἐδίωκον ^eτὴν ἐκκλησίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ ἐπόρθουν αὐτήν.

14 Καὶ ^aπροέκοπτον ἐν τῷ Ἰουδαϊσμῷ ὑπὲρ πολλοὺς συνηλικιώτας ἐν τῷ γένει μου, ^bπερισσοτέρως ζηλωτὴς ὑπάρχων ^cτῶν πατρικῶν μου παραδόσεων.

15 ^aὍτε δὲ ^bεὐδόκησεν ὁ Θεός, ^cὁ ἀφορίσας με ^dἐκ κοιλίας μητρός μου ^eκαὶ καλέσας ^fδιὰ τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ,

16 Ἀποκαλύψαι τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ^aἐν ἐμοί, ἵνα εὐαγγελίζωμαι αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν, ^bεὐθέως ^cοὐ προσανεθέμην ^dσαρκὶ καὶ αἵματι,

17 Οὐδὲ ἀνῆλθον εἰς Ἱεροσόλυμα πρὸς τοὺς πρὸ ἐμοῦ ἀπο-

9 As we have said before, so now I repeat, if any *being* preacheth to you a gospel other (*I will not say than we preached, but, to put it beyond the reach of cavil,*) than ye received, let him be accursed of God.

10 Now then, *after this denunciation of all who preach unto you a gospel different from what we preached*, am I endeavouring to commend myself to the favour of men, or *not rather to the favour of God?* or, *in respect to the subject-matter of my preaching*, am I seeking to please men? *Nay*, for if I were still (*as in the days of my Judaism*) pleasing men, I should not be the servant of Christ.

11 But I apprise you, brethren, as touching the gospel preached by me, that it is not after *the liking of man*.

12 For neither did I (*any more than the rest of the apostles*) receive it from *the imagination of man*, neither was I taught it *by men*, but *I received it* by revelation from Jesus Christ.

13 For ye heard (*doubtless*) of my conversation in time past in Judaism, how that beyond measure I was persecuting the church of God, and laying it waste, (*no evidence of predilection for the gospel of Christ*);

14 And was going ahead in Judaism above many of my cotemporaries in mine own nation, being more especially zealous for the traditions handed down from my fathers (*no sign of aversion or indifference to Jewish ordinances*).

15 But when it pleased God, who set me apart *to the apostolic office* from my mother's womb, and *afterwards* called me through His grace,

16 To reveal His Son within me that I might preach Him among the Gentiles; straightway I held no conference with flesh and blood:

17 Neither went I up to Jerusalem *to confer with them* which were apos-

στόλους, ἀλλ' ἀπῆλθον ^α εἰς Ἀραβίαν, καὶ πάλιν ὑπέστρεψα εἰς Δαμασκόν.

18 Ἐπειτα ^α μετὰ ἔτη τρία ἀνῆλθον εἰς Ἱεροσόλυμα ^β ἵστορησαι Κηφᾶν, καὶ ἐπέμεινα πρὸς αὐτὸν ^γ ἡμέρας δεκαπέντε.

19 Ἐτερον δὲ τῶν ἀποστόλων οὐκ εἶδον ^α εἰ μὴ Ἰάκωβον τὸν ἀδελφὸν τοῦ Κυρίου.

20 Ἄ δὲ γράφω ὑμῖν, ^α ἰδοὺ ἐνώπιον τοῦ Θεοῦ ^β ὅτι οὐ ψεύδομαι.

21 Ἐπειτα ἦλθον ^α εἰς τὰ κλίματα τῆς Συρίας καὶ τῆς Κιλικίας.

22 Ἡμην δὲ ^α ἀγνοούμενος τῷ προσώπῳ ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις τῆς Ἰουδαίας ^β ταῖς ἐν Χριστῷ,

23 ^α Μόνον δὲ ^β ἀκούοντες ἦσαν ^γ ὅτι ^δ ὁ διώκων ἡμᾶς ^ε ποτε νῦν εὐαγγελίζεται τὴν πίστιν ἣν ποτε ἐπόρθει.

24 Καὶ ἐδόξαζον ^α ἐν ἐμοὶ τὸν Θεόν.

ties before me; but I departed into Arabia, and returned again to Damascus.

18 Then, after three years *from my appointment*, I went up to Jerusalem *with no other object than* to make the acquaintance of Cephas, and I tarried with him fifteen days.

19 But other of the apostles saw I none, save James the brother of the Lord.

20 Now, as touching the things which I write unto you, behold, before God, that I lie not.

21 Afterwards I came into the regions of Syria and Cilicia;

22 And I was all the while unknown by appearance, unto the churches of Judæa which were in Christ:

23 But only they were hearing *from time to time*, That our former persecutor now preacheth the faith which once he destroyed.

24 And they glorified God in me.

CHAPTER II.

1 ἘΠΕΙΤΑ ^α διὰ δεκατεσσάρων ἐτῶν ^β πάλιν ἀνέβην εἰς Ἱεροσόλυμα μετὰ Βαρνάβαν, συμπαραλαβὼν ^γ καὶ Τίτον.

2 Ἀνέβην δὲ ^β κατὰ ἀποκάλυψιν, καὶ ^γ ἀνεθέμην ^δ αὐτοῖς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ὃ κηρύσσω ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν, (^ε κατ' ἰδίαν δὲ ^ς τοῖς δοκοῦσιν,) ^ζ μήπως εἰς κενὸν ^η τρέχω, ἢ ἔδραμον.

3 Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ Τίτος ^β ὁ σὺν

1 THEN, after fourteen years (*from the date of my apostleship*), I again went up to Jerusalem with Barnabas, having taken with me Titus also.

2 And I went up, *not at mine own suggestion, but* in accordance with a revelation made to the church at Antioch, and I communicated unto them the same gospel *identically* which now I preach among the Gentiles (privately, however, to those who are in repute), so that I run not now, nor was *then* running, in vain.

3 But so far was I from advocating

ἐμοὶ, ^cἙλλήνων, ^dἠναγκάσθη
περιτμηθῆναι·

4 ¹ Διὰ δὲ τοὺς ^aπαρεισάκτους
^bψευδαδέλφους, ^cοἵτινες παρεισ-
ῆλθον ^dκατασκοπῆσαι τὴν ἐλευ-
θερίαν ἡμῶν ἣν ἔχομεν ἐν Χρισ-
τῷ Ἰησοῦ, ἵνα ἡμᾶς ^eκαταδουλώ-
σωνται·

5 ^aΟἷς οὐδὲ πρὸς ὥραν ἐixa-
μεν ^bτῇ ὑποταγῇ, ἵνα ^cἡ ἀλήθεια
τοῦ εὐαγγελίου ^dδιαμείνῃ πρὸς
ὑμᾶς.

6 ^aἈπὸ δὲ τῶν δοκούντων
εἶναί τι ^bὅποιοί ^cποτε ἦσαν
^dοὐδὲν μοι διαφέρει· (^eπρόσωπον
Θεὸς ἀνθρώπου οὐ λαμβάνει)
ἐμοὶ γὰρ οἱ δοκοῦντες ^fοὐδὲν
προσανέθεντο,

7 ^aἈλλὰ τοῦναντίον ἰδόντες
ὅτι πεπίστευμαι ^bτὸ εὐαγγέλιον
τῆς ἀκροβυστίας καθὼς Πέτρος
τῆς περιτομῆς·

8 (^aὉ γὰρ ἐνεργήσας Πέτρῳ
εἰς ἀποστολὴν τῆς περιτομῆς
ἐνήργησεν καὶ ἐμοὶ εἰς τὰ ἔθνη),

9 Καὶ γνόντες ^aτὴν χάριν τὴν
δοθεῖσάν μοι, Ἰάκωβος καὶ Κη-
φᾶς καὶ Ἰωάννης, οἱ δοκοῦντες
στῦλοι εἶναι, ^bδεξιὰς ἔδωκαν ἐμοὶ
καὶ Βαρνάβᾳ ^cκοινωνίας· ἵνα
ἡμεῖς εἰς τὰ ἔθνη, αὐτοὶ δὲ εἰς
τὴν περιτομήν·

10 ^aΜόνον τῶν πτωχῶν ἵνα
μνημονεύωμεν, ^bὃ καὶ ἐσπού-
δασα, αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ποιῆσαι.

11 ^aὍτε δὲ ἦλθε Κηφᾶς εἰς
Ἀντιόχειαν, κατὰ πρόσωπον αὐ-

*circumcision at that time, that not even
was Titus who was with me, because
he was a Greek (though much influ-
ence was used to effect it), compelled
to be circumcised:*

4 And *I went up* on occasion of the
false brethren craftily introduced, who
came in stealthily to spy out our li-
berty which we have in Christ Jesus,
that they might bring us into subjec-
tion to themselves:

5 To whom we gave place by sub-
mission, not even for an hour, that
THE TRUTH of the gospel might con-
tinue *unimpaired* with you *Gentiles*.

6 But what sort (*as to their views
or their practices*) some of them who
are in repute once were, maketh no
difference to me, (God, *by whose in-
spiration I write*, accepteth not the
person of man, *that I should affect a
concealment of their errors*;) for they
who are in repute enjoined nothing
upon me:

7 But contrariwise, when they saw
*from the evidence that was laid before
them*, that I have been entrusted with
the gospel belonging to the uncircum-
cision, even as Peter with that of the
circumcision,

8 (For He that wrought effectually
for Peter towards the apostleship of
the circumcision, wrought effectually
for me also towards the Gentiles:)

9 And when they became aware of
the grace (*of apostleship*) that was
given unto me, James, and Cephas,
and John, who are accounted pillars
of the Church, gave to me and to Bar-
nabas right hands of fellowship; *with
the understanding that we should di-
rect our attention towards the Gen-
tiles, and they towards the circum-
cision*;

10 Only *this much indeed they did
enjoin*, that we should remember the
poor saints at Jerusalem, which I was
also forward, that same, *little as it was*,
to do.

11 But when Cephas came to An-
tioch, I withstood him to the face, be-

τῷ ἀντέστην, ὅτι ^βκατεγνωσμένος ἦν.

12 Πρὸ τοῦ γὰρ ἐλθεῖν ^ατινας ἀπὸ Ἰακώβου ^βμετὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν συνήσθιεν· ὅτε δὲ ἦλθον, ^γὑπέσ-
τελλεν καὶ ἀφώριζεν ἑαυτὸν, φο-
βούμενος ^δτοὺς ἐκ περιτομῆς·

13 Καὶ ^ασυννυπεκρίθησαν αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ Ἰουδαῖοι, ^βὥστε καὶ Βαρνάβας ^γσυναπήχθη αὐτῶν τῇ ὑποκρίσει.

14 Ἀλλ' ὅτε εἶδον ^αὅτι οὐκ ὀρθοποδοῦσιν πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ εὐαγγελίου, εἶπον τῷ Κηφᾷ ^βἐμπροσθεν πάντων, Εἰ σὺ Ἰου-
δαῖος ὑπάρχων ^γἐθνικῶς ζῇς καὶ οὐκ Ἰουδαϊκῶς, τί τὰ ἔθνη ^δἀναγ-
κάζεις ^εἸουδαΐζειν;

15 ^αἩμεῖς ^βφύσει ^γἸουδαῖοι καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἐθνῶν ^δἁμαρτωλοί·

16 Εἰδότες ὅτι οὐ δικαιοῦται ἄνθρωπος ^αἐξ ἔργων νόμου ^βἐὰν μὴ ^γδιὰ πίστεως ^δἸησοῦ Χριστοῦ, ^εκαὶ ἡμεῖς ^ςεἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν ἐπιστεύσαμεν, ἵνα δικαιωθῶμεν ἐκ πίστεως Χριστοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων νόμου, ^ςδιότι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου οὐ ^βδικαιωθήσεται πᾶσα σὰρξ.

17 ^αΕἰ δὲ ζητοῦντες δικαιω-
θῆναι ^βἐν Χριστῷ ^γεὐρέθημεν ^δκαὶ αὐτοὶ ^ςἁμαρτωλοί, ^εἄρα Χρισ-
τὸς ^ςἁμαρτίας διάκονος; μὴ γέ-
νοιτο.

18 ^αΕἰ γὰρ ^βἡ κατέλυσα, ταῦτα πάλιν οἰκοδομῶ, ^γπαραβάτην ἑμαυτὸν συνίστημι.

cause by his own acts he had been con-
demned.

12 For before that certain persons came from James, he used to eat with the Gentiles: but when they came, he pusillanimously drew back and separated himself from them, fearing the circumcision party.

13 And the rest of the Jews also played the hypocrite together with him; insomuch that even Barnabas himself was carried away by their dissimulation.

14 But when I saw that they are not taking right steps towards the establishment of THE TRUTH of the gospel, I said to Cephas in the presence of them all, If thou, being a Jew, livest after the manner of the Gentiles, and not after the manner of the Jews, why compellest thou the Gentiles to become Jews?

15 The case is simply this: We Jews by birth, and not (as we call them) 'sinners,' of Gentile extraction,

16 Knowing that a man is not justified out of legal works, nor otherwise save only by the faith which is of Jesus Christ, even we (Jews though we be) believed into Christ Jesus, in order that we might be justified out of the faith which is of Christ, and not out of legal works; because, Out of legal works shall no flesh be justified.

17 But if, while seeking to be justified in Christ, we are found even ourselves (through disuse of Mosaic ordinances) 'sinners' (i.e. upon the assumption that the law is essential to salvation), then Christ, by whose authority we act, is the minister of sin? God forbid that by any inconsistency of ours we should cast such a reflection upon the character of Christ!

18 If then (such being my argument with Cephas) the things which I then pulled down, these I again build up, I establish myself a transgressor of law; for I assert the validity of that system which I then so unscrupulously assailed.

19 ^aἘγὼ γὰρ ^cδιὰ νόμου
^bνόμῳ ἀπέθανον, ^dἵνα Θεῷ
ζήσω.

20 ^aΧριστῷ συνεσταύρωμαι·
^bζῶ δὲ, ^cοὐκ ἔτι ἐγὼ, ^dζῇ δὲ ἐν
ἐμοὶ Χριστός. ^eὁ δὲ νῦν ζῶ ^fἐν
σαρκί, ^gἐν πίστει ζῶ ^hτῇ τοῦ υἱοῦ
τοῦ Θεοῦ, ⁱτοῦ ἀγαπήσαντός με,
καὶ παραδόντος ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ
ἐμοῦ.

21 Οὐκ ἀθετῶ ^aτὴν χάριν τοῦ
Θεοῦ· ^bεἰ γὰρ διὰ νόμου δικαιο-
σύνη, ἄρα Χριστὸς ^cδωρεὰν
ἀπέθανεν.

19 *But I do no such thing, for I by law am dead to law by the body of Christ, in order that I may live unto God.*

20 I have been crucified with Christ; nevertheless I live: no longer I *the natural man*, but Christ liveth in me; but the *course of life* which I now live in the flesh, I live, *not in an element of legality*, but in the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave Himself for me, *that He might deliver me from the yoke of the law.*

21 I do not make void the atoning grace of God *by seeking to justify myself*; for if righteousness come by law, then *indeed* Christ died needlessly, and the grace of God is made of none effect.

CHAPTER III.

1 ^aὦ ἄνοητοὶ Γαλάται,
τίς ὑμᾶς ^bἐβάσκανεν [^cτῇ ἀλη-
θείᾳ μὴ πείθεσθαι]; οἷς ^eκατ' ὁφ-
θαλμοὺς Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ^dπροε-
γράφη ^fἐν ὑμῖν, ἐσταυρωμένος;

2 Τοῦτο μόνον θέλω ^aμαθεῖν
ἀφ' ὑμῶν, ^bἐξ ἔργων νόμου ^cτὸ
Πνεῦμα ἐλάβετε ἢ ^dἐξ ἀκοῆς πίσ-
τεως;

3 ^aΟὕτως ἀνόητοί ἐστε; ἐναρ-
ξάμενοι ^bΠνεύματι, νῦν σαρκὶ
^cἐπιτελείσθε;

4 Τοσαῦτα ^aἐπάθετε εἰκῇ; ^bἔι-
γε καὶ εἰκῇ.

5 Ὁ ^aοὖν ^bἐπιχορηγῶν ὑμῖν
τὸ Πνεῦμα, καὶ ἐνεργῶν ^cδυνά-
μεις ^dἐν ὑμῖν, ^eἐξ ἔργων νόμου,
ἢ ἐξ ἀκοῆς πίστεως;

6 ^aΚαθὼς Ἀβραὰμ ἐπίστευσεν

1 O THOUGHTLESS Galatians, who did bewitch you, that ye do not obey THE TRUTH, to whom Jesus Christ was evidently set forth among you—crucified?

2 This only would I learn of you, received ye the Spirit out of legal works, or out of faithful hearing of the gospel of Christ?

3 Are ye so thoughtless? having begun the *divine life* with the Spirit (assuming that ye have so begun it), are ye now seeking to perfect yourselves with the flesh?

4 Did ye suffer so many things to no purpose? if indeed it be only to no purpose.

5 To repeat the question (with a view to an elaborate discussion of the point), He (God) that ministereth unto you the Spirit, and worketh supernatural powers within you, doeth He it out of legal works upon your part, or out of faithful hearing of the gospel of Christ?

6 To the law and to the testimony

τῷ Θεῷ, καὶ ^βἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ ^γεἰς δικαιοσύνην,

7 ^αΓινώσκετε ἄρα, ὅτι ^βοἱ ἐκ πίστεως, ^γοὗτοί εἰσιν υἱοὶ Ἀβραάμ.

8 ^αΠροϊδοῦσα ^βδὲ ἡ γραφή, ὅτι ^γἐκ πίστεως ^δδικαιοῖ τὰ ἔθνη ὁ Θεός, ^επροεuhnγγελίσατο τῷ Ἀβραάμ ὅτι ^ςεὐλογηθήσονται ^ιἐν σοὶ πάντα ^ςτὰ ἔθνη.

9 ^αὩστε οἱ ἐκ πίστεως, ^βεὐλογοῦνται ^γσὺν τῷ πιστῷ Ἀβραάμ.

10 ^βὍσοι ^αγὰρ ἐξ ἔργων νόμου εἰσὶν, ὑπὸ κατάραν εἰσὶν· γέγραπται γάρ ὅτι ἐπικατάρατος πᾶς ὃς οὐκ ἐμμένει ἐν πᾶσιν τοῖς γεγραμμένοις ἐν τῷ βιβλίῳ τοῦ νόμου, τοῦ ποιῆσαι αὐτά.

11 Ὅτι ^αδὲ ^βἐν νόμῳ οὐδεὶς δικαιοῦται παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ δῆλον, ὅτι ^γὁ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται·

12 Ὁ δὲ νόμος οὐκ ἔστιν ^αἐκ πίστεως, ἀλλ' Ὁ ποιήσας αὐτὰ [ἄνθρωπος], ζήσεται ἐν αὐτοῖς.

13 Χριστὸς ^αἡμᾶς ἐξηγόρασεν ^βἐκ τῆς κατάρας τοῦ νόμου ^γγενόμενος ^δὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ^εκατάρα, ^ςγέγραπται γάρ Ἐπικατάρατος πᾶς ὁ κρεμᾶμενος ἐπὶ ξύλου,

14 ^αἵνα ^βεἰς τὰ ἔθνη ^γἡ εὐλογία τοῦ Ἀβραάμ γένηται ^δἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, ^εἵνα ^ςτὴν ἐπαγγελίαν τοῦ Πνεύματος λάβωμεν ^ςδιὰ τῆς πίστεως.

15 Ἀδελφοί, ^ακατὰ ἄνθρωπον λέγω· ^βὅμως ἀνθρώπου κεκυρωμένην ^γδιαθήκην οὐδεὶς ἀθετεῖ ἢ ἐπιδιατάσσεται.

16 ^αΤῷ δὲ Ἀβραάμ ἐρρήθησαν ^βαἱ ἐπαγγελίαι, ^γκαὶ τῷ σπέρματι αὐτοῦ. ^δοὐ λέγει Καὶ τοῖς σπέρ-

for a reply, Inasmuch as Abraham believed God, and it was accounted to him for righteousness,

7 Know ye, therefore, that they which are of faith, the same are the sons of Abraham.

8 But the Scripture, foreseeing that God justifieth the nations out of faith, announced beforehand the good tidings unto Abraham, saying, In thee shall all the nations be blessed.

9 So then they which are of faith, are blessed together with faithful Abraham.

10 And only they; for as many as are of legal works, are under a curse; for it is written, Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law to do them.

11 But that no man under law is justified in the sight of God, is evident; because The just shall live out of FAITH.

12 But the law is not to this effect, The just shall live out of FAITH, but The man that hath done them (*viz. the statutes and ordinances aforementioned, Lev. xviii. 5*), shall live in them.

13 Christ redeemed us (*Jews*) from the curse of the law, having become A CURSE for us; for it is written, Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree;

14 In order that the blessing of Abraham might come unto the nations (*indiscriminately*) in Christ Jesus; that is, that we might receive the promised Spirit through THE FAITH of Jesus Christ.

15 Brethren, I speak after the manner of men; Even a MAN'S covenant when ratified, no man annulleth nor addeth thereto.

16 But to Abraham were the promises spoken, AND TO HIS SEED. He saith not, And to seeds, as of many;

μασιν, ὡς ἐπὶ πολλῶν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐφ' ἐνός ^αΚαὶ τῷ σπέρματί σου, ὃς ἐστὶν Χριστός.

17 ^αΤοῦτο δὲ λέγω, ^βδιαθήκην προκεκυρωμένην ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ ^γεἰς Χριστὸν, ὃ ^δμετὰ τετρακόσια καὶ τριάκοντα ἔτη γεγυνώς νόμος ^εοὐκ ἀκυροῖ, ^ςεἰς τὸ καταργῆσαι τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν.

18 ^αΕἰ γὰρ ^βἐκ νόμου ^γἡ κληρονομία, ^δοὐκ ἔτι ἐξ ἐπαγγελίας· τῷ δὲ Ἀβραὰμ δι' ἐπαγγελίας ^εκεχάριται ὁ Θεός.

19 ^αΤί οὖν ὁ νόμος; ^βτῶν παραβάσεων χάριν ^γπροσετέθη, ἄχρις οὗ ἔλθῃ τὸ σπέρμα ᾧ ἐπὶγγελλται, ^δδιαταγείς ^εδι' ἀγγέλων, ^ςἐν χειρὶ μεσίτου.

20 Ὁ δὲ μεσίτης ἐνός οὐκ ἐστὶν, ὃ δὲ Θεός, εἷς ἐστὶν.

21 ^αὉ οὖν νόμος κατὰ ^βτῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν ^γτοῦ Θεοῦ; μὴ γένοιτο. ^δεἰ γὰρ ἐδόθη νόμος ὁ δυνάμενος ^εζωοποιῆσαι, ὅντως ἂν ἐκ νόμου ἦν ἡ δικαιοσύνη·

22 ^αἈλλὰ ^γσυνέκλεισεν ^βἡ γραφὴ ^δτὰ πάντα ὑπὸ ἁμαρτίαν, ^εἵνα ^ςἡ ἐπαγγελία ^ζἐκ πίστεως ^ηἸησοῦ Χριστοῦ ^θδοθῇ ^ιτοῖς πιστεύουσιν.

23 Πρὸ τοῦ ^αδὲ ἐλθεῖν ^βτὴν πίστιν, ^γὑπὸ νόμον ^δἐφρουρού-

but, AND TO THY SEED, as of one, which seed is Christ.

17 Now this I affirm, A covenant previously ratified by God, in favour of Christ, the law which was four hundred and thirty years after, doth not invalidate, so as to render the promise (*that is, the covenant*) of none effect.

18 *I say advisedly of none effect; for if the inheritance (the subject of inquiry here) come out of law, then is it no more of promise: but to Abraham God hath given it freely—BY PROMISE; which promise would consequently be made of none effect.*

19 To what purpose, then, is the Law, to which we have been used to look for justification? It was super-added on behalf of transgressions, to continue only until the Seed should come unto whom the promise hath been made: a condition apparent upon the face of it, seeing that it was ordained, through the intervention of angels, in the hand of a MEDIATOR.

20 But a mediator is not a mediator of one party only, but of two; but God is but one, consequently the mediator (to wit, the High Priest) is but a type, and, the antitype having come, to disappear, and with him the law which he administers.

21 The law, then, we are to understand, was against the promises of God? God forbid! it was quite the contrary; for if a law had been given capable to impart life, verily such a law would be against the promises of God, for righteousness would be out of law, and not, according to the promise, out of faith.

22 But as things are at present constituted, the Scripture concluded all (declaratorily, to wit) under sin, that the subject of promise, which is to come out of the faith of Jesus Christ, might be given to them that believe.

23 But, before that the faith of Jesus Christ came, we (Jews) were guarded under law, being concluded

μεθα, ^ο συγκεκλεισμένοι ^ι εἰς ^ε τὴν μέλλουσαν πίστιν ^η ἀποκαλυφθῆναι.

24 ^α Ὅστε ^β ὁ νόμος ^ο παιδαγωγὸς ἡμῶν γέγονεν ^δ εἰς Χριστὸν, ^ε ἵνα ἐκ πίστεως δικαιωθῶμεν.

25 ^α Ἐλθούσης δὲ τῆς πίστεως, οὐκέτι ^β ὑπὸ παιδαγωγὸν ἐσμεν.

26 ^α Πάντες γὰρ ^β υἱοὶ Θεοῦ ^ο ἐστε ^δ διὰ τῆς πίστεως ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ.

27 ^α Ὅσοι γὰρ ^β εἰς Χριστὸν ἐβαπτίσθητε, ^ο Χριστὸν ἐνεδύσασθε.

28 ^α Οὐκ ἔστι Ἰουδαῖος οὐδὲ Ἕλλην· οὐκ ἔστι δοῦλος, οὐδὲ ἐλεύθερος· οὐκ ἔστι ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ· πάντες γὰρ ὑμεῖς ^β εἰς ἐστε ^ο ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ.

29 Εἰ δὲ ^α ὑμεῖς ^β Χριστοῦ, ἄρα ^ο τοῦ Ἀβραάμ σπέρμα ἐστὲ, καὶ ^ο κατ' ἐπαγγελίαν ^δ κληρονόμοι.

(as aforesaid) under sin, in order to the reception of the about-to-be revealed faith.

24 So that the law, so far from being against the promises of God, was our pedagogue to lead us into Christ, in order that we might be justified—OUT OF FAITH.

25 But the faith (i. e. of Christ) having come, we are no longer under pedagogue rule.

26 For ye (not to say WE, the middle wall of partition being broken down,) are all sons of God (i. e. of full age) through the faith which is exercised in union with Christ Jesus.

27 For as many of you as were baptized into Christ, put on Christ.

28 There is neither Jew nor Greek; there is neither bond nor free; there is not male and female: for ye are all one, in Christ Jesus.

29 But if ye (Galatians) be members of Christ, then are ye Abraham's seed, and without any more to do heirs according to promise.

CHAPTER IV.

1 ^α ΛΕΓΩ δὲ, ἐφ' ὅσον χρόνον ^β ὁ κληρονόμος ^ο νήπιός ἐστιν, οὐδὲν διαφέρει δούλου, κύριος πάντων ὢν.

2 Ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ^α ἐπιτρόπους ἐστὶν καὶ οἰκονόμους, ἄχρι ^β τῆς προθεσμίας τοῦ πατρὸς.

3 Ὅτως καὶ ἡμεῖς, ὅτε ἦμεν ^β νήπιοι, ὑπὸ ^ο τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου ^δ ἦμεν ^ο δεδουλωμένοι.

4 Ὅτε δὲ ἦλθεν ^α τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ χρόνου, ἐξαπέστειλεν ὁ Θεὸς τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ, ^β γενόμενον ἐκ γυναικὸς, γενόμενον ^ο ὑπὸ νόμον,

1 BUT I say, that the heir, so long as he is an infant, differeth in no respect from a servant, though he be lord of all;

2 But is under guardians and stewards until the time appointed of the father.

3 Even so we (Jews and Gentiles alike), when we were infants, were under the rudiments of the world—enslaved.

4 But when the fulness of the time (appointed by the Father) came, God sent forth his Son, born of a woman (born under law,

δ ἵνα ^ατοὺς ὑπὸ νόμον ἐξαγοράσῃ, ἵνα ^βτὴν υἰοθεσίαν ^γἀπολάβωμεν.

6 ^αὍτι δὲ ἐστε υἱοί, ἐξαπέστειλεν ὁ Θεὸς ^βτὸ Πνεῦμα τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὰς καρδίας ὑμῶν, κράζον ^γἈββᾶ ὁ πατήρ.

7 ^αὩστε ^βοὐκέτι εἶ δοῦλος ἀλλὰ υἱός· ^γεἰ δὲ υἱός, καὶ ^δκληρονόμος Θεοῦ ^εδιὰ Χριστοῦ.

8 ^αἈλλὰ τότε μὲν ^βοὐκ εἰδότες Θεὸν, ἐδουλεύσατε ^γτοῖς μὴ φύσει οὖσιν θεοῖς·

9 Νῦν δὲ ^αγνόντες Θεὸν, ^βμᾶλλον δὲ γνωσθέντες ὑπὸ Θεοῦ, πῶς ^γἐπιστρέφετε πάλιν ἐπὶ τὰ ^δἀσθενῆ καὶ πτωχὰ στοιχεῖα, οἷς ^επάλιν ἄνωθεν ἴδουλεύειν θέλετε;

10 ^αἩμέρας ^βπαρατηρεῖσθε καὶ μῆνας καὶ καιροὺς καὶ ἐνιαυτούς.

11 ^αΦοβοῦμαι ὑμᾶς ^βμήπως εἰκὴ κεκοπίακα εἰς ὑμᾶς.

12 ^αΓίνεσθε ὡς ἐγὼ, ὅτι καὶ γὰρ ὡς ὑμεῖς, ^βἀδελφοί, δέομαι ὑμῶν· ^γοὐδὲν με ἠδικήσατε·

13 ^αΟἶδατε δὲ ὅτι ^βδι' ἀσθενειαν τῆς σαρκὸς εὐηγγελισάμην ὑμῖν ^γτὸ πρότερον,

14 Καὶ ^ατὸν πειρασμὸν μου τὸν ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου ^βοὐκ ἐξουθενήσατε οὐδὲ ἐξεπτύσατε, ἀλλὰ ^γὡς ἄγγελον Θεοῦ ἐδέξασθέ με, ὡς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν.

15 ^αΤίς οὖν ἦν ὁ μακαρισμὸς ὑμῶν; ^βμαρτυρῶ γὰρ ὑμῖν ὅτι εἰ δυνατόν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ὑμῶν ἐξορύξαντες ἐδώκατέ μοι.

16 ^αὩστε ^βἐχθρὸς ὑμῶν γέγονα ^γἀληθεύων ὑμῖν;

17 ^αΖηλοῦσιν ὑμᾶς ^βοὐ κα-

5 That He might redeem them *who were under law*), that we might receive the adoption of sons.

6 But that ye are sons, *is manifest, inasmuch as* God sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying, 'Abba, the Father.'

7 So then thou art no more *in the condition of* a servant, but *of* a son; and if a son, an heir also of God through Christ.

8 But then, indeed, not knowing God, ye were in bondage unto them which are not by nature gods.

9 But now that ye have known God, or rather that ye have been known by God, how turn ye back again to the weak and beggarly rudiments, whereunto ye desire to be in bondage again anew?

10 Ye are carefully observing days, and months, and seasons, and years.

11 I am afraid of you, lest haply I have expended upon you labour in vain.

12 Brethren, I entreat of you, become kindly disposed towards me; for I am kindly disposed towards you (*as why indeed should I be otherwise?*); ye injured me in no respect.

13 But *on the contrary*, ye know that through a season of bodily infirmity I preached the gospel unto you the first time.

14 And my temptation which was in my flesh ye despised not, neither loathed; but ye received me as an angel of God, yea, as Christ Jesus.

15 How great, then, was your ascription of happiness *to yourselves?* for I bear you record, that, if *it had been* possible, ye had plucked out your eyes, and given them unto me.

16 So then I am become your enemy, *forsooth*, because I speak unto you the truth!

17 They earnestly desire you, *but*

λῶς, ^α ἀλλὰ ^α ἐκκλεῖσαι ὑμᾶς θέλουσιν, ^ο ἵνα αὐτοὺς ζηλοῦτε.

18 ^α Καλὸν δὲ τὸ ζηλοῦσθαι ἐν καλῷ πάντοτε, καὶ μὴ μόνον ἐν τῷ παρεῖναι με πρὸς ὑμᾶς.

19 ^α Τεκνία μου, οὓς ^α πάλιν ^β ὠδίνω ^α ἄχρις οὗ ^ο μορφωθῇ Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν,

20 ^α Ἦθελον δὲ παρεῖναι πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἄρτι ^β καὶ ἀλλάξαι τὴν φωνήν μου, ὅτι ^α ἀποροῦμαι ἐν ὑμῖν.

21 ^α Λέγετέ μοι, οἱ ὑπὸ νόμον ^β θέλοντες εἶναι, ^α τὸν νόμον οὐκ ^α ἀκούετε;

22 ^α Γέγραπται γὰρ ὅτι Ἀβραὰμ δύο υἱοὺς ἔσχευ, ἓνα ἐκ ^β τῆς παιδίσκης καὶ ἓνα ἐκ τῆς ἐλευθέρας,

23 ^α Ἀλλὰ ὁ μὲν ἐκ τῆς παιδίσκης ^β κατὰ σάρκα γεγέννηται, ὁ δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἐλευθέρας ^α διὰ τῆς ἐπαγγελίας.

24 ^α Ἀτινά ἐστιν ^α ἀλληγορούμενα ^β αὗται γάρ εἰσιν δύο διαθήκαι· μία μὲν ἀπὸ ὄρους Σινᾶ, ^α εἰς δουλείαν γεννῶσα, ^α ἥτις ἐστὶν Ἀγαρ.

25 ^α Τὸ γὰρ Ἀγαρ Σινᾶ ὄρος ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ Ἀραβίᾳ, ^β συστοιχεῖ δὲ τῇ νῦν Ἱερουσαλὴμ, ^α δουλεύει γὰρ μετὰ τῶν τέκνων αὐτῆς.

26 ^α Ἡ δὲ ἄνω Ἱερουσαλὴμ ἐλευθέρη ἐστίν, ^β ἥτις ἐστὶν μήτηρ ^α [πάντων] ἡμῶν.

27 ^α Γέγραπται γὰρ, Εὐφράνητι στεῖρα ἢ οὐ τίκτουσα, ῥῆξον καὶ βόησον ἢ οὐκ ὠδίνουσα, ὅτι πολλὰ τὰ τέκνα τῆς ἐρήμου μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς ἐχούσης τὸν ἄνδρα.

not honourably, *who would persuade you to this effect*; but they wish to exclude you *from me*, that ye may earnestly desire them.

18 But it is an honourable thing, *I admit, for a teacher to be earnestly desired by his people, provided it be attained in an honourable way, at all times, and not only (as it has happened to me) when I am present with you.*

19 (My dear children, with whom I travail again until Christ be formed within you!)

20 And I could wish that I were present with you at this very moment, and had changed my tone, for I am in great doubt concerning you.

21 Tell me, ye that desire to be under law, do ye not give heed unto the law?

22 For (*assuming that ye do*) it is written, that Abraham had two sons; one of the bondmaid, and one of the freewoman.

23 But he *that was* of the bondmaid was born after the flesh; but he *that was* of the freewoman, by *virtue of* the promise.

24 Which things are an allegory; for these *women* represent two covenants: one (*covenant*) indeed from Mount Sinai, bearing children unto bondage; this *covenant* is Hagar.

25 (For *the word* Hagar in Arabia denoteth Mount Sinai), and corresponds with the now existing Jerusalem; for (*like Jerusalem*) she is in bondage with her children.

26 But the Jerusalem which is above (*corresponding with the other covenant*) is free; this is the mother of us all (*i.e. Christians*).

27 For it is written, Rejoice, *thou* barren that bearest not; break forth and cry, *thou* that travailest not; for many are the children of the desolate one more than of her who hath the husband.

28 ^aἩμεῖς δὲ, ἀδελφοὶ, κατὰ Ἰσαὰκ ^bἐπαγγελίας τέκνα ἐσμέν.

29 ^aἈλλ' ὥσπερ τότε ὁ κατὰ σάρκα γεννηθεὶς, ^bἐδίωκεν τὸν ^cκατὰ Πνεῦμα, οὕτως καὶ νῦν.

30 ^aἈλλὰ τί λέγει ^bἡ γραφή; Ἐκβάλε τὴν παιδίσκην καὶ τὸν υἱὸν αὐτῆς· οὐ γὰρ μὴ κληρονομήσῃ ὁ υἱὸς τῆς παιδίσκης μετὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ τῆς ἐλευθέρας.

28 But we, brethren, as Isaac was, are children *not after the flesh, but* of promise.

29 But as *it was* then, he that was born after the flesh persecuted him *that was born* after the Spirit (*i. e. by promise*), even so is it now.

30 But what saith the Scripture? Cast out the bondmaid and her son; for the son of the bondmaid shall in no wise inherit with the son of the free-woman.

CHAPTER V.

CH. IV.—31 ^aἌΡΑ, ἀδελφοὶ, οὐκ ἐσμέν ^bπαιδίσκης τέκνα, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐλευθέρας.

CH. V.—1 ^aΤῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ οὖν ^bἣ Χριστὸς ἡμᾶς ἠλευθέρωσεν ^cστήκετε, καὶ μὴ ^eπάλιν ἰζυγῶ δουλείας ^dἐνέχεσθε.

2 ^aἸδὲ ^bἐγὼ Παῦλος ^cλέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι ^dἐὰν περιτέμνησθε, Χριστὸς ὑμᾶς ^eοὐδὲν ὠφελήσει·

3 ^aΜαρτύρομαι δὲ πάλιν παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ^bπεριτεμνομένῳ, ὅτι ^cὀφειλέτης ἐστὶν ^dὅλον τὸν νόμον ποιῆσαι.

4 ^aΚατηργήθητε ἀπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ^bοἵτινες ^cἐν νόμῳ ^dδικαιοῦσθε, ^eτῆς χάριτος ἐξεπέσατε.

5 ^aἩμεῖς γὰρ ^cΠνεύματι ἐκ πίστεως ^bἐλπίδα δικαιοσύνης ἀπεκδεχόμεθα.

6 ^aἘν γὰρ Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ οὔτε περιτομή τι ^bἰσχύει, οὔτε ἀκροβυστία, ἀλλὰ πίστις ^cδι' ἀγάπης ἐνεργουμένη.

7 ^aἘτρέχετε καλῶς· ^bτίς ὑμᾶς ἐνέκοψεν ^cτῇ ἀληθείᾳ μὴ πείθεσθαι;

CH. IV.—31 SO then, brethren, we are not children of a bondmaid, but of the freewoman.

CH. V.—1 Stand, therefore, to the freedom whereunto Christ hath made us free, and be not again entangled in a yoke of bondage.

2 Behold, I Paul say unto you, that if ye submit to circumcision, Christ will profit you nothing.

3 And I repeat my testimony to every man who submitteth to circumcision, that he is a debtor to do the whole law.

4 Ye are undone from Christ whosoever ye be, who are seeking justification under law; ye are fallen from grace.

5 For we, *who are of Christ*, expect to attain the hoped for righteousness, *not by the flesh, out of works, but* by the Spirit, out of faith.

6 For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything *unto righteousness*, nor uncircumcision, but faith working by love.

7 Ye were running well *at one time*; who did hinder you that ye do not obey THE TRUTH?

8 ^αἩ πεισμονὴ οὐκ ^βἐκ τοῦ καλοῦντος ὑμᾶς.

9 ^αΜικρὰ ζύμη ὅλον τὸ φύ-
ραμα ζυμοῖ.

10 ^αἘγὼ πέποιθα εἰς ὑμᾶς
^βἐν Κυρίῳ ὅτι ^γοὐδὲν ἄλλο φρο-
νήσετε· ^δὁ δὲ ταρασσὼν ὑμᾶς
^εβαστάσει τὸ κρίμα, ὅστις ἂν ᾖ.

11 ^αἘγὼ δὲ, ἀδελφοί, ^βεἰ
περιτομὴν ἔτι κηρύσσω, ^γτί ἔτι
διώκομαι; ^δἄρα κατήργηται τὸ
σκάνδαλον τοῦ σταυροῦ.

12 ^αὍφελον ^βκαὶ ἀποκόψον-
ται ^γοἱ ἀναστατοῦντες ὑμᾶς.

13 ^αὑμεῖς γὰρ ^βἐπ' ἐλευθερίᾳ
ἐκλήθητε, ἀδελφοί· ^γμόνον μὴ
τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ^δεἰς ἀφορμὴν τῇ
σαρκί, ἀλλὰ ^εδιὰ τῆς ἀγάπης
^ςδουλεύετε ἀλλήλοις.

14 ^αὉ γὰρ πᾶς νόμος ἐν ἐνὶ
λόγῳ ^βπληροῦται, ἐν τῷ· Ἀγα-
πήσεις ^γτὸν πλησίον σου ^δὡς
σεαυτόν·

15 Εἰ δὲ ἀλλήλους ^αδάκνετε
καὶ κατεσθίετε, ^ββλέπετε μὴ ὑπὸ
ἀλλήλων ἀναλωθῆτε.

16 ^αΛέγω δὲ, ^βΠνεύματι περι-
πατεῖτε καὶ ^γἐπιθυμίαν σαρκὸς
^δοὐ μὴ τελέσητε.

17 ^αἩ γὰρ σὰρξ ^βἐπιθυμεῖ
κατὰ τοῦ Πνεύματος, τὸ δὲ
Πνεῦμα κατὰ τῆς σαρκὸς· ταῦτα
δὲ ἀλλήλοις ^γἀντίκειται, ἵνα μὴ
^δἂν θέλητε ταῦτα ποιῆτε.

18 ^αΕἰ δὲ ^βΠνεύματι ἄγεσθε,
^γοὐκ ἐστὲ ὑπὸ νόμον.

19 ^αΦανερά δὲ ἐστὶν ^βτὰ ἔργα
τῆς σαρκὸς, ^γἅτινα ἐστὶν ^δπορ-
νεία, ^εἀκαθαρσία, ἀσέλγεια,

20 ^αΕἰδωλολατρεία, ^βφαρμα-

8 This persuasion (*namely, to look to circumcision for righteousness,*) com-
eth not from Him (*God*) that calleth
you.

9 A little leaven leaveneth the
whole lump.

10 I, *for my part*, put my trust in
the Lord concerning you, that ye will
be none otherwise minded *than ye were
at the first*; but that he that distur-
beth you shall bear the judgment *be-
fitting his offence*, whosoever he be.

11 But I, brethren, if I still preach
circumcision (*as some affirm that I
do*), why am I still persecuted? then
is the offence of the cross done away
with.

12 Would that they would even cut
themselves off who unsettle you.

13 Ye then (*to resume my argument*)
were called unto liberty, brethren; only
use not your liberty for an occasion to
the flesh, but through the love (*afore-
mentioned, v. 6*) serve one another.

14 For the whole law is fulfilled in
one word, *even* in this, Thou shalt
love thy neighbour as thyself.

15 But if ye bite and devour one
another, take heed that ye be not con-
sumed one of another.

16 But I say, Walk by the Spirit,
and ye shall not fulfil the lust of the
flesh.

17 For (*to show the need of the in-
junction*) the flesh lusteth contrariwise
to the Spirit, and the Spirit contrariwise
to the flesh; and these (*lustings*) are
set one against the other, so that the
good things that ye would these ye
cannot do.

18 But if (*following my injunction*)
ye be led by the Spirit, ye are not un-
der law (*and consequently are deli-
vered from the tyranny of the flesh*).

19 Now the works of the flesh are
manifest, of which kind are: Forni-
cation, uncleanness, wantonness,

20 Idolatry, sorcery, hatreds, strifes,

κεία, ^cἔχθραι, ἔρεις, ζῆλοι, θυμοί,
^dἐριθείαι, ^eδιχοστασίαι, ^fαἰρέσεις,

21 ^aΦθόνοι, φόνοι, ^bμέθαι,
κῶμοι, καὶ τὰ ὅμοια τούτοις· ^cἃ
προλέγω ὑμῖν, καθὼς καὶ προεῖ-
πον, ὅτι οἱ ^dτὰ τοιαῦτα πράσ-
σοντες ^eβασιλείαν Θεοῦ οὐ κλη-
ρονομήσουσιν·

22 ^aὉ δὲ καρπὸς τοῦ Πνεύ-
ματός ἐστιν ^bἀγάπη, ^cχαρὰ,
εἰρήνη, ^dμακροθυμία, ^eχρηστό-
της, ἀγαθωσύνη, ^fπίστις, ^gπρα-
ότης, ἐγκράτεια.

23 ^aΚατὰ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ
ἔστιν νόμος.

24 Οἱ ^aδὲ ^bτοῦ Χριστοῦ ^cτὴν
σάρκα ἐσταύρωσαν ^dσὺν τοῖς
παθήμασιν καὶ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις.

25 ^aΕἰ ζῶμεν Πνεύματι, ^bΠνεύ-
ματι καὶ στοιχῶμεν.

26 ^aΜὴ γινώμεθα κενόδοξοι,
^bἀλλήλους προκαλούμενοι, ^cἀλ-
λήλοις φθονοῦντες.

jealousies, heats of passion, caballings,
dissensions, factions,

21 Envyings, murders, drunken-
ness, revellings, and such like; of the
which I tell you beforehand, as I also
told *you* beforehand, that they which
do such things shall not inherit the
kingdom of God.

22 But the fruit of the Spirit is
love, joy, peace, longsuffering, bene-
volence, goodness, trustfulness, meek-
ness, moderation.

23 Against *the doers* of such things
law is not (*and the flesh hath conse-
quently no dominion over them*).

24 But *on the contrary*, they
that are Christ's have crucified the
flesh with the affections and lusts.

25 If we have life by the Spirit (*as
I have already proved that we have*),
let us also walk by the Spirit.

26 Let us not become vainglorious,
provoking one another, envying one
another.

CHAPTER VI.

1 ^aἈΔΕΛΦΟΙ, ^bἐὰν καὶ προ-
ληφθῇ ἄνθρωπος ^cἐν τινὶ παρα-
πτώματι, ^dὕμεῖς οἱ πνευματικοὶ
^eκαταρτίζετε τὸν τοιοῦτον ^fἐν
πνεύματι πραότητος, ^gσκοπῶν
σεαυτὸν, ^hμὴ καὶ σὺ πειρασθῇς.

2 ^aἈλλήλων ^bτὰ βάρη βασ-
τάζετε, ^cκαὶ οὕτως ἀναπληρώ-
σατε ^dτὸν νόμον τοῦ Χριστοῦ.

3 ^aΕἰ γὰρ δοκεῖ τις εἶναι τι
^bμηδὲν ὦν, ἐαυτὸν ^cφρεναπατᾷ.

4 ^aΤὸ δὲ ἔργον ἐαυτοῦ ^bδοκι-
μαζέτω ἕκαστος, καὶ τότε ^dεἰς

1 BRETHREN, if a man *who is a
believer* be so far neglectful of his pri-
vilege as to be even overtaken in any
fault, ye which are spiritual restore
such an one in a spirit of meekness,
looking *each of you* to thyself, lest that
even thou be tempted.

2 Bear ye one another's burdens,
and so *doing* fulfil the law of Christ.

3 For if a man thinketh himself to
be something, while *in truth* he is no-
thing, he deceiveth himself.

4 But let each *man* test his work,
and then (*if approved*) he shall have
the ground of rejoicing (*whatever it
may be*) in respect to himself alone, and

ἑαυτὸν μόνον ^ετὸ καύχημα ἔξει,
καὶ οὐκ εἰς τὸν ἕτερον·

5 ^εἘκαστος ^αγὰρ ^βτὸ ἴδιον
φορτίον βαστάσει.

6 ^βΚοινωνεῖτω ^αδὲ ὁ ^εκατη-
χούμενος ^δτὸν λόγον τῷ κατη-
χοῦντι ^εἐν πᾶσιν ἀγαθοῖς.

7 ^αΜὴ πλανᾶσθε, Θεὸς ^βοὐ
μυκτηρίζεται. ὁ ^εγὰρ ἐὰν σπείρῃ
ἄνθρωπος, ^δτοῦτο καὶ θερίσει·

8 ^αὍτι ὁ σπείρων εἰς τὴν
σάρκα ^βἑαυτοῦ, ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς
θερίσει ^εφθοράν, ὁ δὲ σπείρων
εἰς τὸ Πνεῦμα, ἐκ τοῦ Πνεύματος
θερίσει ^δζωὴν αἰώνιον.

9 ^αΤὸ δὲ καλὸν ποιοῦντες ^βμὴ
ἐγκακῶμεν· ^εκαιρῷ γὰρ ἰδίῳ θε-
ρίσομεν ^δμὴ ἐκλυόμενοι.

10 ^αἌρα οὖν, ^βὥς καιρὸν
ἔχομεν, ἐργαζώμεθα ^ετὸ ἀγαθὸν
πρὸς πάντας, μάλιστα δὲ ^δπρὸς
τοὺς οἰκείους τῆς πίστεως.

11 ^αἸδετε ^βπηλίκους ὑμῖν
γράμμασιν ^εἔγραψα τῇ ἐμῇ
χειρί.

12 ^αὍσοι θέλουσιν ^βεὐπροσ-
ωπῆσαι ^εἐν σαρκί, οὗτοι ^δἀναγ-
κάζουσιν ὑμᾶς περιτέμνεσθαι,
μόνον ^εἵνα τῷ σταυρῷ τοῦ Χρι-
στοῦ μὴ διώκωνται.

13 ^αΟὐδὲ γὰρ ^βοἱ περιτεμνό-
μενοι αὐτοὶ ^ενόμον φυλάσσουν, ἀλλὰ
θέλουσιν ὑμᾶς περιτέμνε-
σθαι ἵνα ^δἐν τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ σαρκί
καυχῶνται.

14 ^αἘμοὶ δὲ μὴ γένοιτο καυ-
χᾶσθαι εἰ μὴ ^βἐν τῷ σταυρῷ τοῦ
Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ,
^εδι' οὗ ἔμοι ^δκόσμος ^εἐσταύρω-
ται, ^ικαὶ γὰρ τῷ κόσμῳ·

15 ^αἘν γὰρ Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ
οὔτε περιτομή τι ἰσχύει, οὔτε
ἀκροβυστία, ἀλλὰ ^βκαινὴ κτίσις.

not in respect to the other (*i. e. with whom comparison is supposed to be instituted*).

5 For each *man* shall bear his own load of responsibility in the sight of God.

6 Furthermore, let him that is taught in the word be a partaker with him that teacheth in all good *things*.

7 Deceive not yourselves; God is not mocked: for whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap.

8 For he that soweth *with a view* to his flesh shall of the flesh reap corrup- tion; but he that soweth *with a view* to the Spirit shall of the Spirit reap life eternal.

9 But in well doing let us not be faint-hearted; for in due season we shall reap, if we relax not.

10 So, then, accordingly as we have opportunity, let us act kindly unto all men, but especially unto them who are of the household of the faith.

11 Behold with what large letters I have written to you with mine own hand.

12 As many as desire to make a fair show in the flesh, these constrain you to be circumcised; only that they should not suffer persecution for the cross of Christ.

13 For not even do the circumcisers themselves observe law; but they wish you to be circumcised, that they may glory in your flesh.

14 But far be it from ME to glory, save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, by which the world is crucified unto me, and I unto the world.

15 For in Christ Jesus neither cir- cumcision availeth anything, nor un- circumcison, but *only* a new creature.

16 ^aΚαὶ ὅσοι ^bτῷ κανόνι τού-
τῳ στοιχήσουσιν, ^cεἰρήνη ἐπ'
αὐτοὺς καὶ ἔλεος, ^dκαὶ ἐπὶ τὸν
Ἰσραὴλ τοῦ Θεοῦ.

17 ^aΤοῦ λοιποῦ ^bκόπους μοι
μηδεὶς παρεχέτω· ^cἐγὼ γὰρ ^dτὰ
στίγματα τοῦ Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ ἐν
τῷ σώματί μου ^eβαστάζω.

18 ^aἩ χάρις τοῦ Κυρίου
ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ^bμετὰ τοῦ
πνεύματος ὑμῶν, ^cἀδελφοί·
^dἈμήν.

16 And as many (*of your teachers*)
as shall walk according to this rule,
peace be upon them, and mercy, and
upon the Israel (*not of man's making,*
but) of God.

17 Henceforth let no man trouble
me (*laying the preaching of circumci-*
sion at my door); for I bear in my
body the marks of *my devotedness* to
the Lord Jesus.

18 The grace of our Lord Jesus
Christ *be* with your spirit, brethren.
Amen.

COMMENTARY.

CHAPTER I.

THE five opening verses contain, the inscription of the Epistle, setting forth the name and style of the author—the parties to whom it is addressed—the usual apostolical salutation, with an accompanying allusion to the mediatorial work of Christ which is not found in the same connexion elsewhere, induced by the peculiar circumstances of the case, and concluding with a doxology, “to whom be the glory for ever and ever. Amen.”

VERSE 1.—^a ΠΑΥΛΟΣ ἀπόστολος, ‘PAUL an apostle.’ It is customary for an author, especially if he challenges any peculiar deference for his opinions, to intimate the capacity in which he writes. This custom St. Paul invariably pursues, setting forth his pretensions usually as “an apostle of Jesus Christ;” occasionally, when writing in conjunction with others, styling himself “a servant of Jesus Christ.” But in addressing the Galatian church, where his mission was called in question, and his authority impugned, it was more than ordinarily requisite that he should not deviate from his practice, but present himself to his readers, not as ‘Paul the elder,’ or ‘Paul the servant of Jesus Christ,’ but as “Paul an apostle,” in the highest and strictest acceptance of the term—an ambassador of Jesus Christ,* “which,” as Martin Luther quaintly observes, “he doth of necessity to maintain his authority, that the people, hearing this, might be the more intent and willing to give ear unto him; for they hear not only Paul, but in Paul Christ himself, and God the Father sending Him out in His message, whose authority and majesty, like as men ought religiously to honour, so ought they with great reverence to receive and hear His messengers, bringing His word and message.”

^b Οὐκ ἀπ’ ἀνθρώπων, ‘not from men.’ It is manifest that some word is here wanted to complete the sense: ἀποστελλόμενος, supplied from ἀπόστολος, the suggestion of Bloomfield, is plainly inadmissible, inasmuch as it does not accord with the several members of the sentence. Ἀποστελλόμενος ἀπ’ ἀνθρώπων is an expression congruous in

* ἀπόστολος answers to the Latin *legatus*, and means simply one sent by and in the name of another, and therefore representing the person of the sender; as the result of which it is said, “He that receiveth you receiveth me.”—BAGGE.

itself, the same idea, namely, 'remotion' or 'separation from,' being presented throughout; but 'ἈΠΟΣΤΕΛΛΟΜΕΝΟΣ ΔΙ' ἀνθρώπου, or ΔΙ' Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, is unexampled in the New Testament,* and incongruous; 'detachment,' or 'separation from,' being simply denoted in the first clause, whereas 'appointment,' or 'calling to the apostolic office,' is plainly intimated in the second. It is apprehended that a suitable word not presenting itself, the Apostle has here, as in many similar cases in his Epistles (see Rom. v. 18, vi. 5, xii. 6-8, al.), to avoid diffuseness, intentionally left a blank.

It was the fashion of the false teachers in the Galatian church (as may be collected from many passages in this Epistle), themselves of the circumcision, and for the most part of the sect of the Pharisees, bitter opponents of the pure faith of the gospel, with a view to undermine his authority, and to disparage the doctrine which he taught, to originate reports prejudicial to the character of St. Paul. He had never seen the Lord Jesus Christ; had not received his commission, as the rest of the apostles did, at His hands; if he had any position in the church, it was delegated to him by others; whatever knowledge of the gospel he possessed had been derived from the instruction of men, and consequently his testimony, should any difference of opinion arise, should be accounted of no value, if found in opposition to theirs. To meet this and every kindred species of defamation, the Apostle felt called upon *in limine* to establish the divine origin of his mission, which he does, negatively and affirmatively, in the passage before us.

οὐδὲ δι' ἀνθρώπου, 'neither by man.' Some commentators have regarded the expressions, "not from men," "nor by man," as simply synonymous—an assumption not very flattering to the Apostle's reputation as a writer, and very little, I must say, merited by him; for I am acquainted with no writer less addicted to multiply words without meaning than St. Paul, being much more open to the imputation of obscurity from conciseness, than of weakness from prolixity. However, it is generally acknowledged that a distinction does exist: but the stream of authority has set in, without any interruption that I am aware of, in favour of one which I am persuaded will not stand the test of criticism.

The exposition to which I refer is founded upon an assumed distinction, in this place, between the force of the prepositions ἀπὸ and διὰ; the former, as it is alleged, denoting *origin*, the latter *intermediate agency*: 'not from men, as the originators of his apostolate, nor from God, through the intervention of men'—"the preposition ἀπὸ here correctly denoting the *causa remotior*, διὰ the *causa medians*."—ELLICOTT. But, although it must be admitted that ἀπὸ does, and not unfrequently, designate the *remote or ultimate cause*, yet it does so, not

* The association of the prepositions to be met with in Rev. i. 1 (ἀποστείλας διὰ τοῦ ἀγγέλου) is no exception to this statement; for it is to be observed that they are not used in reference to the same party, the former being referred to Jesus Christ, the latter to the angel by whose hands the revelation was conveyed.

by virtue of any inherent power in the word itself, but from the force of the context in which it stands; the simple idea presented by the preposition *ἀπὸ* being no more than ‘remotion or procession from,’ without any expression whatsoever of ‘origination or independent causality.’ Yet, as it is admittedly capable of modification by circumstances, if, in the present instance, it could be shown that *διὰ* denotes *intermediate agency*, then, possibly, from the force of contrast, we might be disposed to admit that *ἀπὸ* should point to *the ultimate or final cause*. But *διὰ* does not always represent intermediate agency, but, on the contrary, is frequently employed in the New Testament to designate the author, or final cause (as may be seen, Rom. xi. 36; Heb. ii. 10; 1 Cor. i. 9; and elsewhere). And in this sense it must be taken here; for in the very same sentence, and manifestly in the same mode of construction, we find it in conjunction with *Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ Θεοῦ Πατρὸς*, where, whatever may be thought of its force with *Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, there can be no manner of doubt that, with *Θεοῦ Πατρὸς*, it must denote the *final cause*; and, consequently, any distinction between the expressions “from men” and “by man,” founded upon the force of the prepositions *ἀπὸ* and *διὰ*, as representing respectively ‘origin’ and ‘intermediate agency,’ must at once fall to the ground.

But, even granting that the prepositions *ἀπὸ* and *διὰ* were capable *ex vi propria* of marking the distinction assumed (origin and intervention), if it was the Apostle’s object to present such a distinction to the mind of the reader, I will venture to assert that that object could have been more simply and more effectually attained by using *ἀνθρώπων* in both members of the sentence, and depending upon the force of the prepositions themselves to mark the contrast required, than by presenting *ἀνθρώπων* in a new form (*scil. ἀνθρώπου*) in the second clause, to introduce an element of uncertainty into the passage, leaving it a matter of difficulty to pronounce upon what words, whether the prepositions themselves, or the substantives to which they are annexed, the emphasis is intended to be laid; it would, I say, have been more natural, and more exact, with that object in view, to have written the passage thus: *ἀπόστολος οὐκ ἀπ’ ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲ δι’ ἀνθρώπων*, ‘neither *from* men (ultimately) nor *by* men (mediately)’—a mode of expression which would have had the merit of being at the same time adequate, and not liable to misapprehension.

But, seeing that the alleged distinction does not exist in the prepositions themselves, and that a change of structure has been advertently introduced into the sentence, which, upon any other supposition, would be both uncalled for and inconvenient, is it too much to presume that it is upon this very change of structure the apostle has relied for the establishment of his contrast, and that it is to the difference between *ἀνθρώπων* and *ἀνθρώπου*, and not, as has been invariably assumed, between *ἀπὸ* and *διὰ*, we are to look for the discovery of his meaning? If this assumption be well founded, the explication is not difficult: *ἀνθρώπων* signifies, and can signify nothing else than ‘*man in the concrete*,’ individuals of the human race: whereas *ἀνθρώπου*, without re-

ference to any particular man expressed or understood, as certainly denotes '*man in the abstract*,' the nature of man. And the extent of the Apostle's negation amounts simply to this, that his apostleship was not a commission (as it was craftily alleged to be) entrusted to him by men, nor an independent authority originating with mere *humanity*, but, as we shall presently see, with God. To what has been already observed I shall only add, that in verse 11 of this chapter the same negation is insisted upon in respect to his *doctrine* which is here made with respect to his *mission*; and, if I am not mistaken, we shall be bound by the exigency of the case, there also as here, to accept *ἄνθρωπος* as man in the abstract.

^d Ἀλλὰ διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ Θεοῦ Πατρὸς, 'but by Jesus Christ and God the Father.' The contemplation of the reader being elevated (by the use of the preposition *διὰ*) to the level of 'origin,' which clearly it had not attained in the antecedent phrase *ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων*, the Apostle now proceeds to exhibit upon that platform the true character of his appointment, not only as to *what it was not*, but as to *what it was*, not of *human origin*, but of *divine*, οὐ δι' ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλὰ διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, καὶ Θεοῦ Πατρὸς (not by man, but by Jesus Christ, and God the Father), where the two clauses are antithetically opposed, and most correctly, under the same preposition *διὰ*.

Ellicott, who is one of the latest, and certainly not the least reliable grammatical authority upon the Epistle, says, "We might here not unnaturally have expected *καὶ ἀπὸ Θεοῦ Πατρὸς* as forming a more exact antithesis to what precedes, and also as obviating a reference of *διὰ* to the *causa principalis*." But this observation proceeds upon the mistaken notion, that *ἀπὸ* in the preceding clause denotes 'origin;' and, consequently, consistency would seem to demand that the same relation should be presented by the same preposition here. But surely nothing could more notably demonstrate the fallacy of the preceding exposition than the fact that, in order to harmonize with it, such a departure from the original text should be deemed desirable here. The introduction of *ἀπὸ* in the place proposed would materially injure the force of the passage, by disuniting in the most pointed manner 'God the Father, and Jesus Christ,' in the matter of the apostolic appointment; whereas, in the sentence as now constituted, they are linked together in the most close and suggestive association.

The calling of Paul to the apostolic office, by "*Jesus Christ*," took place on the road to Damascus, and is recorded at length in the ninth chapter of the Acts of the Apostles, and is repeatedly adverted to in other parts of Scripture; but we have no account on record of any distinct appointment by "*God the Father*;" and from the nature of the construction here we have no reason to expect one, or, rather, we have good grounds for concluding that none such should be forthcoming. The placing of the Father and the Son under a common vinculum (*διὰ*), which was relied upon by the early fathers as a proof of homogeneity, is an evidence, to say the least of it, of the most complete unity of purpose and unity of action in the work ascribed to them. To appreciate the effect of the absence of the preposition *διὰ* (repeated) before Θεοῦ

Πατὴρ in establishing this unity, we have only to supply it *pro tem.*, to become sensible of the effect which it would produce in dissociating the Father and the Son, in the matter of the apostolic appointment, and leading us to expect a distinct and several call.

* Θεοῦ Πατρός, 'God the Father.' "Not in the ordinary inclusive reference to all men (Alford), nor with more particular reference to Christians, *scil.*, 'Our Father' (Ust., al.), but, as the associated clause seems rather to suggest, with special and exclusive reference to the preceding subject, our Lord Jesus Christ."—ELLICOTT. But Θεοῦ Πατρός is an expression of too ordinary occurrence, and too comprehensive meaning, to admit, without some qualifying adjunct, of so limited an application: it resembles rather the Ζεὺς Πατήρ of the ancients—the universal parent—not only the Father of gods and men, but the creative Source and efficient Disposer of all things. In this usage, the term Πατήρ partakes more of the nature of an epithet bestowed upon deity than of a sign of any specific relationship.

† Τοῦ ἐγείραντος αὐτὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν, 'Who raised him from the dead.' The introduction of this clause has given occasion to a variety of conjectures, and not a little diversity of opinion. Ellicott observes that "the context seems clearly to suggest that the more immediate reference is to the fact, that the Apostle's call was received from Christ, in his exalted and glorified position," quoting in support of his observation the saying of St. Augustine—"Verax etiam novissimus Apostolus qui per Jesum Christum, totum jam Deum post resurrectionem ejus, missus est." A critical examination of the structure of the sentence will quickly satisfy us that τοῦ ἐγείραντος αὐτὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν (who raised him from the dead) is no ordinary adjunct, nor casually introduced, but a participial clause artistically arranged, to reflect light upon the antecedent context, that context being Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ Θεοῦ Πατρός, linked together under the common vinculum διὰ, an association so remarkable in itself as loudly to call for explanation, which explanation precisely (as from the laws of syntax we had reason to expect) is furnished in the participial clause—the raising of Jesus Christ from the dead by God the Father, being virtually the investiture of Him with supreme dignity and unlimited authority.

St. Paul, in his Epistle to the Philippians (ch. ii. 9), distinctly affirms that "God hath *highly exalted Him*, and given Him a name which is above every name; that at the name of Jesus every knee shall bow, of things in heaven and things in earth, and things under the earth, and that every tongue shall confess that *Jesus Christ is Lord*, to the glory of God the Father." And that *his resurrection was the immediate precursor of this exaltation* is plain from another passage, where it is said, "*He raised Him from the dead, and set Him at his own right hand*, in the heavenly places, far above all principality, and power, and might, and dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this world, but in that which is to come, and hath put all things under his feet."—Eph. i. 20. Which truth is more concisely repeated in the Epistle to the Hebrews: "When he bringeth the first-begotten a second time (the

true version of *πάλιν*) into the world (*scil.*, at the resurrection), he saith, And let all the angels of God *worship him.*"—Heb. i. 6. Accordingly, after the resurrection, Jesus Christ exercised all the functions of Deity—the Father committed all power and authority into his hands—he doeth nothing thenceforth but by him and through him, the beneficent designs of the former being carried into effect through the active co-operation of the latter. When, therefore, St. Paul would apprise his readers that his mission was not of human origin, but of divine, "by Jesus Christ and God the Father," he needed but to add, "who raised him from the dead," to intimate, not only *the ground of the association*, but farther, and principally, *the mode of the Father's interposition*, not directly and independently, but *through the calling of Christ.*

Alford is plainly mistaken when he asserts that "the mission of Paul to the actual work of the ministry was by the command of *the Holy Spirit*, Acts, xiii. 2;" for that was evidently a special errand, which when "they had fulfilled," they returned again to Antioch, and gave an account of their mission.—See Acts, xiv. 27, 28. Nor did it take place for a considerable time after the commencement (upon the call recorded Acts, ix.) of his apostolic labours.—See Acts, xxvi. 16–20. But such a statement was indispensable to *his* exposition of the passage; for, overlooking, as he has done, the force of *ἐγείραντος*, κ. τ. λ. (who raised him from the dead) in establishing a calling of the Father, with and through the Son, it was incumbent upon him, in order to mark the concurrence of the two parties, to attribute the calling to "the Spirit proceeding from and expressing *the will of the Father and of the Son.*"

Nor is he more successful in his attempt to account for the allusion in this place to 'the resurrection from the dead;' "because (he informs us) the resurrection, including and implying the ascension, was the Father's bestowal on Christ of gifts for men, by virtue of which (*ἔδωκεν, τοὺς μὲν, ἀπόστολους*, κ. τ. λ., Eph. iv. 11) Paul's apostleship had been received;" for, however our Lord may have *qualified* his chief apostles for the discharge of their onerous duties by the outpouring of the Holy Ghost, he certainly did not *appoint* them thereby, but selected them in person before his ascension into heaven, with the exception of St. Paul, to whom he subsequently appeared in bodily presence on the way to Damascus, and commissioned him, in like manner as the rest, with his own lips. The introduction, then, of the adjunct "who raised him from the dead," is to be accounted for upon other and more satisfactory ground than that relied upon by Alford.*

* As affording a brief synopsis of the variety of opinions which have been offered upon this obscure subject, it may not be uninteresting to append Alford's note in full:—"Τοῦ ἐγείραντος αὐτόν. Why specified here? Not, I think, because (Meyer) Paul was called to be an Apostle *by the risen Saviour*, nor merely (De W.) to identify the Father as the originator of the Son's work of redemption (which is so in Rom. iv. 24, but here would not immediately concern Paul's calling to be an Apostle); nor (Calvin, al.) to meet the objection that he had never seen Christ, and turn it into an advantage in that (Aug., Erasm., Beza, al.) he alone had seen the

VERSE 2.—^a Οἱ σὺν ἐμοὶ πάντες ἀδελφοί, ‘All the brethren who are with me.’ As there is nothing in the epistle before us, nor indeed in any historical record which has descended to our times, to enable us to determine with precision the parties to whom allusion is made, whether they are to be regarded as lay or clerical—whether as the whole church in the place whence he wrote, or only a portion of it—we are left to the exercise of our own reason to conjecture: and it is not unreasonable to surmise that the brethren in Christ, of whatever denomination they might be, who happened to be present at the time when he wrote, who would, doubtless, be informed of the occasion of his writing, and the subject to which the letter referred—who, being of one heart and one mind with the Apostle upon the vital question of ‘justification by faith,’ would cordially unite with him in dissuading the Galatian churches from the perilous step which they were taking—were the brethren who are here contemplated. The οἱ σὺν ἐμοὶ πάντες of the Apostle, in the absence of any qualifying declaration, would seem to warrant so much, and possibly to preclude any further application of the terms. Had they been intended to apply to “the whole Christian community of the place from which the Epistle was written, we should certainly have expected (Ellicott observes) ‘with whom I am,’ rather than ‘who are with me.’”*

^b Ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις τῆς Γαλατίας, ‘To the churches of Galatia.’ That this is an encyclical letter, addressed to all the churches of the province, is plain: hence we infer that the Judaizing heresy had already made considerable progress amongst them. No stress can safely be laid upon

risen Jesus; for in this case we should not find τοῦ ἐγείραντος, κ. τ. λ., stated as a predicate of the Father; but τοῦ ἐγερθέντος, κ. τ. λ., as one of the Son; nor as asserting the Resurrection against the Jews and Judaizing Galatians (Chrys., Luther), which is far-fetched: nor again (Jowett) as expressing an attribute of the Father, without which he can hardly be thought of by the believer; for this is too loose a relevancy for a sentence so pointed as the present, but because the resurrection, including and implying the ascension, was the Father’s bestowal on Christ of gifts for men, by virtue of which (ἔδωκεν, τοὺς μὲν, ἀποστόλους, κ. τ. λ., Eph. iv. 11) Paul’s apostleship had been received.”—ALFORD, *in loco*.

* M’Knight, while maintaining that this Epistle was written from Antioch, rests his argument in a great measure upon the authority of this verse. The only view with which any of the brethren, he conceives, could be joined with the Apostle in writing to the Galatians, was to attest *the facts* advanced in the first and second chapters in proof of his apostleship; and that the people of Antioch, from their close intercourse with those of Jerusalem, would be as well acquainted with what happened to St. Paul there as with what occurred to him in their own city. But there is nothing in the manner in which “the brethren” are introduced to lead us to apprehend that they were associated simply with a view to the attestation of *facts*; nor can we see how, with the exception of the controversy with St. Peter at Antioch, they could be in a better position to attest the facts referred to by St. Paul than the inhabitants of Corinth or Ephesus, or of any other city from which the letter may be supposed to be written. It is more natural to assume that, being addressed to the Galatians, whose confidence in the Apostle had been shaken by the calumnies and misrepresentations of the false teachers, he had recourse to the testimony of others, to supply what, in the estimation of his readers, might be lacking in the authority of his own.

the use of the word 'churches' in the plural number as denoting severance from catholic unity, for we have numerous instances in the New Testament of the use of the same word where, unquestionably, no want of fellowship is imputed.—See Acts, xvi. 5; Rom. xvi. 16; 1 Cor. xi. 16; xiv. 33, and many others. At the same time it must be admitted that there is a marked peculiarity in the mode of address to the Galatian churches, without any of those familiar greetings or affectionate remembrances which constitute so graceful an appendage to his other Epistles, or even the ordinary acknowledgment of their being a 'church in Christ,' or 'in God the Father,' which in no other instance is omitted. There can be little question, as Chrysostom justly observes, that the omission is intentional. The Apostle either thought that their defection from the catholic faith was too marked and too material to admit of their being recognised as a church in Christ; or, by withholding the customary tokens of approval, he desired to awaken in their breasts a solicitude about their spiritual welfare, and stimulate them to renewed zeal and exertion in "making their calling and election sure." With respect to one portion of the church (as appears from the strong asseverations in the commencement of the fifth chapter), the former reason may have prevailed; with respect to the other, the latter: as to both, we may be well assured that it was with deep concern and unfeigned grief of heart that the Apostle so addressed them; gladly would he have "changed his tone towards them, for he was in great doubt concerning them."—Ch. iv. 20.

VERSE 3.—^a *Χάρις ὑμῖν καὶ εἰρήνη*, 'Grace be unto you and peace.' "A greeting full of spiritual significance, *Χάρις*, as Olsh. observes, being the divine love manifesting itself to man; *εἰρήνη* the state that results from the reception of it."—ELLICOTT; and both entreated for them from "God the Father and our Lord Jesus Christ."

^b *Ἀπὸ Θεοῦ πατρὸς καὶ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, 'From God the Father, and our Lord Jesus Christ.' We have already noticed (v. 1,) God the Father and Jesus Christ associated under the common regimen of *διὰ*, as joint appointers to the apostolic office; we now find them in similar association under the preposition *ἀπὸ*, as the joint bestowers of spiritual favours. In contemplating the position, originally, of 'the Father,' and of 'his Son Jesus Christ,' we are forced to recognise the scriptural distinction of "Lord" and "the servant whom he upholdeth," Isai. xlii. 1. But from the period of the resurrection, the momentous task for which he was sent into the world being accomplished, it pleased the Father that the now triumphant Redeemer should "sit down at the right hand of the majesty on high." Thenceforth all things are represented as proceeding conjointly from both, that "all men should honour the Son, even as they honour the Father."

VERSE 4.—^a *Τοῦ δόντος ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν*, 'who gave Himself (i. e. to death) for our sins,'—an atonement for sin (Eph. v. 2.), appropriately introduced here as that satisfaction to the claims of the law, without which there could be no deliverance from the covenant of works, and, consequently, no susceptibility of the privileges of grace.

That the death of Christ was a propitiatory offering for sin is the fundamental Truth of the Bible, and it is clearly inferrible from these words. It was 'a gift' (δῶντος), an offering alike unmerited by us, and unexact from him: it originated in the eternal purpose of God, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost—an emanation from that unfathomable love, the length and breadth, the depth and height whereof, no man knoweth. Be it ours to wonder, and to adore, and with the Apostle to exclaim, "He loved us, and gave himself for us."

^b Ὅπως ἐξέληται ἡμᾶς, κ. τ. λ., 'in order that he might take us,' &c. That no objection, logical or theological, can be raised to the received interpretation of this passage, *per se*, must be freely conceded—"Who gave himself for our sins, that he might deliver us from the present evil world," meaning thereby 'this present constitution of things, marked by sin, and misery, and corruption.' The words in the original bear this meaning well, and it is amply sustained by Scripture—"Who gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify to himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works."—Tit. ii. 14. And again, "Who bare our sins in his own body upon the tree, that we, being dead to sins, should live unto righteousness."—1 Pet. ii. 24.

Nevertheless, with so much to commend it, an objection, and no trivial one either, does lie against it, namely—that, contrary to Pauline usage, no satisfactory connexion can be traced between it and the peculiar subject of the Epistle, which is eminently doctrinal, and to which fewer moral precepts are appended than perhaps to any other Epistle emanating from the same pen. Nor is it more in accordance with the immediate context, the salutation of the preceding verse, with which alone it is to be compared, that which follows being effectually shut out by the intervening doxology: and yet, from its exceptional introduction, in this connexion, one might be prepared to find it more than ordinarily instructive. Upon these grounds we are justified in entertaining a doubt of the correctness of the received version, and setting ourselves to inquire whether another and more appropriate interpretation may not be forthcoming. Let us see, then, what a closer investigation may do.

Αἰῶν, which is unquestionably the important word in the sentence, as giving colour to the rest, in its primary signification imports 'duration, or the course of time,' in various relations, to be determined always by the context in which it is found. But αἰῶν did not long retain its primitive signification, but came afterwards to include 'duration with its concomitant circumstances, the principles, customs, habits, morals, &c. &c., which constitute the character of the time,' in which complex sense it has ordinarily been taken here to denote 'the world with all its frailty, transientness, care, corruption, sin,' which may indeed emphatically be styled "this present evil world."

But αἰῶν, as before observed, is capable of representing duration in diverse aspects. Another of these aspects in which it sometimes occurs in the New Testament is 'duration as connected with the law of Moses,' in which sense (taken always in its complex mode, wherein the state of things occupies a much more conspicuous place in the conception

than the period during which they exist) it represents 'the order of things prevailing amongst the Jews during the continuance of the Mosaic institute;' and then it is 'the present age,' as contrasted with 'the gospel age,' or with the Messianic age, which, in reference to it, is styled 'the age to come' (οὐτε ἐν τούτῳ τῷ αἰῶνι, οὐτε ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι, Matt. xii. 32).

Now, with such a clue to the interpretation, is it not possible that we may have the means at hand to resolve the present difficulty? An able and discerning writer thinks that we have, and has anticipated us in the attempt. Mr. Locke, in his Commentary upon this place, observes, from the use of the word αἰῶν in several passages in the New Testament, "Christ's taking them out of the present world may, without any violence to the words, be understood to signify his setting them free from the Mosaical constitution." And if any persons object to this exposition, the inappropriateness of the epithet 'evil' as applied to the Mosaical constitution, "that scruple (he says) will be removed, if we take ἐνεστῶς αἰῶν here for the 'Jewish constitution and nation together,' in which sense it may well be called 'evil.'" Impressed with the general correctness of his notion, but overestimating, as I believe, the force of argument which may be brought to bear against it, he has, in the maintenance of his theory, outstepped the bounds of reasonable exegesis. Not to speak of the violence done to αἰῶν, by making it to include not only the system of things, but also the people themselves who are subject to that system, he has impaled himself on the horns of a dilemma; for if the *Jews* be the subjects of deliverance, then is Christ (according to this interpretation) represented as giving himself unto death in order to deliver the Jews out of the hands of the Jewish nation; and if the *Gentiles* be the party in question, then is he open to the objection of Whitby, of "making the Gentiles to be delivered from a constitution and people to which they were never subject." But, availing ourselves of the suggestion in part, we are not bound to follow it in extremes.

If there be any weight in the objection raised to πονηρός in its strongest and most unfavourable sense, as applicable to the Mosaic αἰῶν (which I am far from being disposed to concede, αἰῶν including not only the Mosaical law, but the entire system of things prevailing in connexion with it, namely, the pride, arrogance, self-righteousness, and, above all, the hostility which it engendered to the gospel of the grace of God), that objection might be more simply and more satisfactorily removed by adverting to the fact, that πονηρός does not necessarily imply 'moral evil or pravity,' but sometimes only 'physical defect,' as we find it in Matt. v. 23—"If thine eye be evil (πονηρός), thy whole body shall be full of darkness," where no one ever thought of imputing more than 'defect of vision' to the eye. In this sense, what epithet could be more just or more appropriate than πονηρός applied to a system which "could make nothing perfect," Heb. vii. 9, which was "weak through the flesh," Rom. viii. 3, which was 'to be blamed,' Heb. viii. 7, and to

which the terms "weak and beggarly elements" have been so unsparingly applied (ch. iv. 9) by the Apostle himself?

So far, then, as the Jew is concerned, we need feel no difficulty whatever in understanding the expression, of that elementary, disciplinary system under which he was by nature placed—a system which, from its weakness and inutility, was abolished, and in reference to which God himself has declared, "I gave them statutes which *were not good*," Ezek. xx. 25—a system from which, when the fulness of time was come, "God sent forth his Son, made of a woman, made under the law, to redeem" those who were subject to it, that they "might receive the adoption of sons," ch. iv. 4, 5. What, I ask, could be more consistent with the real facts of the case, or with the peculiar phraseology of Scripture, than to affirm of the Jew that Jesus Christ gave himself for him, that he might deliver him from the present *πονηρός αἰῶν*, meaning thereby (if the term 'evil' be deemed too strong, which I confidently submit that it is not), the *defective* and *unsatisfactory state of things* which prevailed under the Jewish dispensation?

And if the Jews were the only parties to whom the expression referred, I might consider that my task was accomplished for the elucidation of the passage before us. But, how are we to meet the objection of Whitby—"Did Christ die to deliver the Galatians and other Gentiles from a constitution which they were never under?" Unhesitatingly we answer—no. But, having ascertained the direction in which the expression tends, what is there to hinder a further extension of the term *αἰῶν* to embrace not only the Jewish law, but that kindred system of legality under which the whole Gentile world was enslaved—a system so similar in constitution to the Jewish ritual, that they are not unfrequently described in Scripture under one common designation—"weak and beggarly elements"—to which, from a more exalted position in Christ, the Galatians are distinctly charged with a desire again to return, and from which *they were delivered*, in common with the Jewish people, by *the sacrifice of the death of Christ*?—(See the argument, ch. iv. 1–5.) For my part, I see no reasonable objection to this interpretation; it involves no straining of scriptural language beyond its ordinary and legitimate signification: it harmonizes well with the scope of the Epistle generally, and, as we shall presently see, with the immediate context in particular; and differs from the commonly received version only in this, that it restrains the application of *αἰῶν* from 'the world at large, with all its sin, and misery, and corruption,' to 'that peculiar phase of it' with which, throughout the entire of the Epistle, the Apostle had specifically to deal, imparting a force and propriety to the introduction of the subject here, which upon any other theory which has been offered it manifestly and exceptionally wants.

Ἐκτὸς τοῦ θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ πατρὸς ἡμῶν, 'according to the will of God and our Father,' καὶ to be regarded as a simple copulative, 'and (i. e. at the same time) our Father.' It is to be noted that the Greek fathers concur in making the defining genitive (ἡμῶν) to apply exclusively to the latter of the two nouns; and though no rule of grammar

that I am aware of bears authoritatively upon the point, yet the general consent of commentators appears in favour of this construction. Elliott indeed suggests, with much plausibility, "that as the term *πατήρ* conveys necessarily a *relative* idea, which in theological language admits of many applications, while *Θεός* conveys only one *absolute* idea, it would not seem improbable that the connexion of thought in the mind of the inspired writer might lead him in some passages to add a defining genitive to *πατήρ*, which he did not intend necessarily to be referred to *Θεός*." I would further observe, that though 'the will of God,' as the originating cause of man's mercies, is brought under notice some eight or nine times in the New Testament, this is the only occasion on which the words *καὶ πατρὸς ἡμῶν* (and our Father) are subjoined. Are we, I ask, to attach no importance to this circumstance? May there not be a cause, and an assignable one too, for their peculiar adaptation in this place which does not apply elsewhere? I submit that there is, and that it is as follows:—

The Apostle had just intimated that the object of Christ's death was to deliver both Jew and Gentile from the defective rudimental dispensation under which they lived. And had he merely gone on to say "according to the will of God," we should have fully recognised the gracious concurrence of God with his Son Jesus Christ in their happy deliverance. But he does not stop there, but immediately subjoins "and our Father," words which can be introduced for no conceivable purpose but to show that the paternal relation in which God stood towards the parties was in some manner implicated in their deliverance. So far it might be conceded, but how implicated? would be the question. To which inquiry a more direct, or, to my mind, a more conclusive response need not be required than that set forth by the Apostle himself, in the fourth chapter of this Epistle, where we read that "as an heir is subject to tutors and governors *until the time appointed by the father*," even so we (Jews and Gentiles alike, as in its own place will appear) were in bondage under that general denomination, "the elements of the world," *until the fulness of time was come, when God sent forth his Son, in the form of a servant, that he might deliver us from the condition of servants*, and confer upon us the adoption of sons. This deliverance, then, according to the explanation thus given, was, on the part of God, an exercise of paternal authority in behalf of his predestinated children, now to be admitted into the adopted family, by Christ, a point which, though a complete and striking elucidation of the unprecedented introduction in this connexion of the words "and our Father," is incapable of being brought out and exhibited, with anything like the same force and perspicuity consistently with the commonly received version, "from the present evil world;" a supplementary argument, it must be admitted, in favour of the exposition preferred.

One step more, and the exegesis is complete. We commenced our observations by stating that no objection whatever lay to the ordinary interpretation, except upon the ground of the absence of any assignable connexion with the proper subject of the Epistle, and more especially

with that portion of it with which it is contextually allied, namely, the salutation to the churches. And if a similar exception can be taken to the interpretation now offered, it will be freely conceded that it has no claim whatever to a preference. That point alone remains to be considered. And if justification by faith only, independently of ritualistic observances, be the subject-matter of the Epistle to the Galatians, nothing more in accordance with that subject ever proceeded from the pen of man than a distinct allusion to the sacrifice of the death of Christ, as the instrumentality whereby we are delivered from the claims of the law, and translated into the covenant of grace. But, after all, it is by comparison with the immediate context that it must either stand or fall.

The Apostle had, in the preceding verse, addressed to the Galatian churches the ordinary apostolic greeting, "grace unto you, and peace, from God the Father, and our Lord Jesus Christ," a greeting so essentially evangelical that it cannot be understood or appreciated, much less be appropriated by any person subject to legal responsibility and control. Now, it must be borne in mind, that of the Galatian churches one section had already seceded from the grace of Christ, and the remainder were, in the apprehension of the Apostle, on the high road to secession: consequently they needed to be taught over again what are the first principles of the religion of Christ. Under such circumstances, what could be more judicious, what more needed, when desiring for them "grace and peace from God the Father, and our Lord Jesus Christ," than to remind them that they are blessings incompatible with legal subjection; that in order to our participation in them, Jesus Christ gave himself an offering unto death, that he might deliver us from the present evil state of things subsisting under law, not indeed (as was blasphemously asserted by some) in *opposition to the will of God*, but with *the full concurrence of God*, the Sovereign Disposer of all things, but more especially as *our Father in Christ, the appointer of the time and mode of our deliverance*. The existence of such a connexion, when once it is pointed out, will hardly be disputed by any; it seems so obvious, so suitable, and so naturally inferrible from the manner in which the clause is introduced—"the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, of him (τοῦ δόντος) who gave himself for us"—where the participial form of expression must properly be regarded as explanatory of the preceding salutation (see ch. ii. 20, 21, Com.). With such authority for the exposition as has been adduced, and such singular adaptation to the immediate context, as well as to the general scope of the Epistle, it certainly comes before us with no ordinary claims upon our attention.

VERSE 5.—"Ὡς ἡ δόξα εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας, κ. τ. λ., 'To whom be the glory for ever,' &c. In contemplation of so inestimable a benefit, acquired by so costly a sacrifice, originating in and flowing from Him "who so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have everlasting life," is it to be admired that the Apostle should break forth into the exulting strain of gratitude and praise which closes 'the introductory portion' of

this epistle, “to whom be the glory for ever and ever: Amen”?—a strain to which the heart of every true believer responds on earth, and, when earth shall be exchanged for heaven, still will he join the heavenly host in singing, “Blessing, and glory, and wisdom, and thanksgiving, and honour, and power, and might, be unto our God for ever and ever. Amen.”

VERSE 6.—We now enter upon what may be styled ‘the apologetic or defensive portion’ of the Epistle, in which the Apostle, having briefly glanced at the occasion of his writing—namely, the progressive defection of the Galatian converts from him who called them in Christ, into a corrupt system of Christianity, at the instigation of certain false teachers, who desired to alter the gospel of Jesus Christ—proceeds, in vindication of his own character, to establish the divine origin of his doctrine, the consistency and pertinacity with which he maintained it throughout the whole course of his ministry, and concludes with an animated description of the life of faith which he now lives, as contrasted with the legality which was attributed to him by his opponents—a series of argumentation which only terminates with the concluding verse of the following chapter.

^a Θαυμάζω, ‘I marvel.’ “A word of mildness, insomuch as it imports that better things were expected from them, and of condescension, as letting down the writer to the level of his readers, and even challenging explanation from them. Still, like many other such mild words, it carries to the guilty conscience even sharper rebuke than a harsher one would.”—ALFORD. The favourable reception which he met with at first (ch. iv. 14, 15) might well afford a ground of *wonder* at their hasty defection.

^b Ταχέως, ‘quickly,’ properly an adverb of *motion*, not of *time*—‘quickly, speedily,’—and is only applied to *time* as it might be to any other object supposed to be in motion; and consequently not to be understood of *time*, except there be some circumstances in the case plainly attracting the application, as will be found in those instances where it is so taken in the New Testament. See 1 Cor. iv. 19; Phil. ii. 19, 24. That nothing of that kind here exists, may be inferred from the variety of responses which have been given to the simple query, ‘Quickly from what?’ Ellicott admits that, “in our ignorance of the exact time when the Galatians were converted, as well as the circumstances of their defection, this question cannot be satisfactorily answered.” Nevertheless he arrives at the conclusion that, “at any rate, the reference of the adverb seems decidedly rather to *time* than *manner*, however that time be defined.” But it is submitted that the absence of any specific point from which the course of time can be computed, should properly incline to the acceptance of the adverb here in its primary application to *motion*, that is, ‘speedily,’ and, hence, *possibly*, inferentially, ‘hastily, inconsiderately, rashly.’ See 2 Thess. ii. 2; 1 Tim. v. 22. It may be farther observed that “soon,” the favourite translation here, is just as plainly a *deduction* from ταχέως, as ‘hastily, inconsiderately,’—the one being the result of the rapid flight of time, the other of the

quick, and consequently unconsidered, succession of ideas in the mind.*

* Μετατίθεσθε, μετατίθημι, literally signifies 'to transpose, transfer;' in the middle voice, 'to transfer oneself;' here (pres. mid.), 'ye are transferring yourselves,' 'ye are changing about:' by which form the defection is represented as only in progress, not finally consummated.†

† Ἀπὸ τοῦ καλέσαντος ὑμᾶς, 'from him who called you.' The calling of the saints to salvation is in Scripture invariably ascribed to God, generally to God the Father (Rom. viii. 30, ix. 24, 25; 1 Cor. i. 9, vii. 15, 17; 1 Thess. ii. 12; 2 Thess. ii. 14; 2 Tim. i. 9), in some instances to God the Son (Rom. i. 6; 1 Cor. vii. 17). But the calling in contemplation here seems rather to be of a ministerial and subordinate character, and more properly assignable to Paul than to God. In the first place, the parties who are the objects of this calling are represented as '*changing about from him who called them*'—a statement hardly reconcilable, if understood of that high and holy and effectual calling of which God Himself is the author.—Rom. xi. 29. Again, they are represented as '*changing about into another gospel*,' other, it would seem, than that "form of sound words" which they had heard from Paul, and to which they had been called by him; whereas 'the calling of God' is "to His kingdom and glory"—1 Thess. ii. 12. Again, it is asserted, *without qualification and without proof*, that '*they are changing about from him who called them*'—an assertion not likely to have been volunteered at this early stage of the Epistle, if conveying the grave imputation of "apostasy from the living God."‡

Further, that the Apostle himself was the subject of a desertion such as is here described, is plainly inferrible from many passages to be met with in the Epistle, especially chapter iv. 12–17, where he contrasts their former devoted attachment to his person, and their present alienation and dislike, and attributes it to the machinations of *certain interested parties*, who 'zealously affected them, but not honourably;

* A safe rule in the translation of Scripture is, to adhere as closely as possible to the primary meaning of words, leaving it open to the reader to draw his own conclusions from the text.

† "Jerome observes:—'Sapientes quoque sæculi eos qui de dogmate transferuntur ad dogmata, *translatos* vocant; ut Dionysius ille cujus fuit ante sententia, dolorem non esse malum; postquam oppressus calamitatibus et dolore cruciatus, cœpit affirmare quod dolor esset summum omnium malorum, ab his appellatus est *transpositus* sive *translatus*, quod scilicet a priori decreto recedens, in contrarium recedisset.'"—BAGGE.

‡ The first direct impeachment which we meet with of the Galatian heresy occurs no earlier than the commencement of the third chapter ("O foolish Galatians"), and even then not without many mitigatory suggestions. Nor is it until the result of two farther chapters of close reasoning that the startling declaration is advanced, "Behold, I Paul say unto you, that if ye be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing; ye have fallen from grace." The two first chapters being devoted to the establishment of his apostolic authority, and the consistency and faithfulness with which he discharged his duties, form no unmeaning appendix (in the sense here attributed to it) to the exclamation of the Apostle, 'I marvel that ye are so quickly changing about *from him who called you*.'

yea, *who would shut them out* (from the Apostle, to wit), that they might zealously affect them,' the identical reason which is here assigned for their departure "from him who called them," "*which is nothing else, save that there are some who trouble you*, and would pervert the gospel of Christ"—a coincidence so striking, that it cannot properly be overlooked in the determining of this point. Upon these grounds, I feel justified in dissenting from the prevailing opinion; and understanding 'the calling' in this place in the ministerial sense which it bears in Matt. xx. 16, "Many be called, but few chosen," and referring it to the Apostle Paul, and not to God—a conclusion which is strongly confirmed by the words immediately annexed: *ἐν χάριτι Χριστοῦ*.

* *Ἐν χάριτι Χριστοῦ*, 'in the grace of Christ.' The rendering of the Authorized Version, "into the grace of Christ," is plainly objectionable, not, indeed, upon the ground usually assigned, that *καλέω* is not a verb of motion, and consequently that *ἐν* cannot be admitted in this place, in its ordinary acceptation after such verbs, denoting 'motion to a place, in order to subsequent rest therein'—for *καλέω*, though not essentially a verb of motion, is evidently (from the ethical nature of the calling) so regarded here, which brings it distinctly within the condition of such verbs;*—but upon the distinct ground that *χάρις*, without the article, or any qualifying adjunct, is never used in the New Testament to represent 'the state or condition of grace.' The instrumental force of the preposition (*ἐν*) upon dogmatical considerations adopted by Ellicott (though *he* attributes 'the calling' to God), unquestionably yields a good and intelligible sense, intimating that the Apostle's calling of the Galatians was through the grace of Christ, instrumentally. But no reason can be assigned why we should reject, or pass over, the *primary* signification of the preposition, as denoting '*the sphere or element in which* a thing is done:' as, when Paul is said "to long after the Philippians (*ἐν σπλάγχνοις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*) *in* the bowels of Jesus Christ," Phil. i. 8—that is, moved by the compassion and tenderness of Jesus,—so here he is said 'to have called the Galatians' (*ἐν χάριτι Χριστοῦ*) "*in* (or under the influence of) the grace of Christ."

The introduction of these words is a strong confirmation of the alleged propriety of ascribing 'the calling' in this instance to Paul, and not to God; for, though it is admittedly predicable of God that He 'calleth *in* the grace of Christ'—indicating thereby 'the element in which he worketh' (the grace of Christ being, to all intents and purposes, 'the grace of God'),—yet, inasmuch as, in the preceding context (v. 1), where it was absolutely essential to the subject in hand, that he should appear to be the Apostle as well of the Father as of the Son, it

* For this use of *καλέω* (viz., 'a calling whereby *we come*') see 1 Cor. vii. 15: *ἐν δὲ εἰρήνῃ κέκληκεν ἡμᾶς ὁ Θεός* (but God hath called us unto peace); Eph. iv. 4: *ἐκκληήθητε ἐν μιᾷ ἐλπίδι* (ye were called into one hope). Ellicott, indeed, insists that in both these instances "the preposition retains its simple and primary force 'of permanence in,' and marks, as it were, the element *in which* we are called to move." Assuredly, so it does, but only as the result of a previous entry *into* that element which is there ascribed to 'calling.'

had been *assumed* (not stated) of Paul, that he was called by the Father ‘in the grace of Christ,’ it is not probable that here, with reference to the calling of the Galatians, where no such importance attaches to it, it should be *formally averred* that they were called by God ‘*in the grace of Christ* ;’ whereas, understanding the expression of Paul, it is a new and pregnant feature in the case, highly in aggravation of their imputed folly, that they were seceding from one who called them under such high and holy influence—‘in the grace of Christ.’ By ‘the grace of Christ’ we are to understand here, not that *gift of grace* which had been formally bestowed upon the Apostle, “in order to the obedience of the faith amongst all nations,” which would require the specializing force of the article to give it expression, but ‘*the grace of Christ*’ (abstractedly)—that gracious energy of Christ (ἐνέργειαν αὐτοῦ), which worked in him (Paul) mightily (see Col. i. 29) to the preaching of the gospel (compare also 1 Cor. xv. 10)—a circumstance introduced here, not so much in attestation of his apostolic authority (already asserted in the opening verses), as an indirect appeal to the good sense of the Galatians, and to the respect which they bore to Him through whose grace they were called.

‘Εἰς ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον, ‘unto a different gospel,’ one differing in kind from that which had been delivered. As constituting ‘a different gospel,’ we are not to conceive of a new and totally distinct system of religious belief; any material alteration of the old would render it in effect ‘a different gospel.’ In the present instance, the insisting on circumcision, and the observance of Jewish rites, as supplemental to faith in Jesus Christ, constituted the doctrine of the false teachers, in the estimation of the Apostle ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον.* No idea of *quality*, good, bad, or indifferent, enters into the primary conception of ἕτερον; but it is to be inferred (if at all) from the nature of the context. Here, where joined to εὐαγγέλιον, it must be understood in an unfavourable sense, for, being diverse, it must be for better or for worse; and improvement on the system of divine truth propounded by an inspired Apostle being inconceivable, any departure therefrom must of necessity result in deterioration.

VERSE 7.—^a “Ὁ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο’ εἰ μή, ‘which is nothing else save that.’ It is universally admitted that there is considerable difficulty in determining the precise meaning of this sentence. The whole difficulty, however, consists in the deciding upon the proper antecedent to ὁ: that being ascertained, everything else follows as matter of course. Three principal modes of construction are represented by Ellicott as having suggested themselves to commentators. The first takes “the preceding compound expression, ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον” as the antecedent to ὁ (Meyer), which Ellicott thinks is the one “clearly to be preferred, as

* “Schoettgen remarks:—‘Inter primas Christianorum sectas, erant etiam Hebræi et Nazareni, qui Jesum Messiam esse statuebant, et tamen ceremonias Judæorum simul retinebant. Et hi singulare aliquod Evangelium habebant, a nostris diversissimum.’ ”—BAGGE.

best preserving the natural and grammatical sequence of the words, and the distinction between ἕτερος and ἄλλος;" and he presents his view of it in the following terms:—"To prevent the words ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον being misconstrued into the admission that there could *really* be any other gospel than the one preached to them, St. Paul more fully explains himself, using ἄλλος rather than the ambiguous ἕτερος, and throwing the emphasis on οὐκ, 'which (ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον) is *not* another (a second) gospel, except (only in this sense, that) there are some who trouble you,' i. e. the Judaists bring you another gospel, but it is really no gospel at all"—an explanation which amounts simply to this, 'which (ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον) is *not* another (a second) gospel, except only in this sense, that it is no gospel at all:' a vague and unsatisfactory solution.

A second mode is, to make the preceding εὐαγγέλιον the antecedent to ὅ (De W. and, apparently, the majority of expositors); and the sense is this—"Which gospel is (admits of being) no other, but there are some," &c.—a construction which differs not very materially in sense from the one preceding; but it assumes εἰ μὴ boldly and straightforwardly in the controverted sense of ἀλλὰ, which the other endeavouring to evade, becomes obscure. Bloomfield, in referring to this latter construction, says "that the ancient and most modern commentators, supposing ὅ to refer to εὐαγγέλιον, take εἰ μὴ as put for ἀλλὰ, *attamen*." "This interpretation, however," he says, "is rejected by Schott and Olsh., on the ground that εἰ μὴ is nowhere else put for ἀλλὰ, nor used in any other sense than *nisi*." And in this opinion he is supported by Ellicott, who affirms "the gloss of εἰ μὴ = ἀλλὰ can be distinctly impugned in even what seem the strongest passages, e. g. Matt. xii. 4; 1 Cor. vii. 7," appending at the same time a list of authorities in confirmation of his dictum. This second exposition, then, though perfectly intelligible in itself, and not wholly unsuitable to the context, must be abandoned on the score of lexical impropriety.

But a third construction demands our attention, which puts the whole sentence commencing with ὅτι and concluding with εὐαγγέλιον as the antecedent to ὅ (Winer), or, more properly, perhaps, which makes πρᾶγμα, understood, the antecedent, which πρᾶγμα represents the substance of the foregoing sentence, 'which thing, namely, that ye are so hastily changing about from him who called you,' &c. &c., is nothing else (i. e. attributable to no other cause) εἰ μὴ, in its proper signification 'nisi,' save or except that there are disturbers amongst you.' The assurance that the gospel preached by the false teachers was no 'other' (ἄλλο) or 'several gospel' would be a piece of information perhaps uncalled for in the Galatian church; whereas the intimation that their secession was attributable to the interference of certain parties who had it in contemplation to alter the gospel of Jesus Christ, was not only a fact in itself, but its introduction here admirably in keeping with the acknowledged policy of Paul, who affects, throughout the entire of this Epistle, to throw the blame, not on the parties duped, but upon those who duped them.—See observations, ch. iii. 1^b. The exposition here

stated is unexceptionally grammatical, assigns to ἕτερον and ἄλλο their respective meanings, and has the farther recommendation of doing no violence to εἰ μὴ, which, in each of the rival versions (not excepting that adopted by Ellicott) is unavoidably done. It would seem as though this exposition has been passed over by the learned critics upon no better ground than that of its extreme simplicity, it demanding no especial amount of scholarship to detect or expound it.*

^b Οἱ ταρασσόντες, 'they who disturb,' 'disturbers.' The verb ταρασσω signifies 'to agitate,' 'to disturb,' as water is disturbed in a pool (see John, v. 4), and may of course be applied to anything which is susceptible of agitation. Here οἱ ταρασσόντες is to be understood of those who disturbed and disquieted the Galatian church upon the subject of circumcision, and is better translated 'who disturb,' than 'who trouble,' a term which is more commonly applied to the emotions of grief and anxiety than to mere mental excitement. Ellicott justly observes that "the definite article might at first sight seem inconsistent with the indefinite τινές: when thus used, however, it serves to particularise, and in the present case specifies, the τινές as those whose *characteristic* was troubling the Galatians, 'some who are your troublers.'"

^c Μεταστρέψαι, 'to change,' 'to alter.' I am of opinion that we are not justified in rendering this word 'pervert,' as is done in our Authorized Version, with the general consent, I believe, of translators, 'pervert' being rather a *deduction from* what is stated than *what is stated itself*. The force of μεταστρέφω is literally 'to change,' in which sense it is uniformly employed in the New Testament—Acts, ii. 20; James, iv. 9. And I rather think that, with a view to impressiveness, we considerably abate the force of the passage when we give it any other interpretation here. It seems far more suggestive to say 'who would alter' than 'who would *pervert*' the gospel of Christ; showing that whether done with a view to, or even with a consciousness of, perversion, or not, any tampering with God's holy word is of itself a subject for animadversion and rebuke. It might be a question even whether it could be fairly predicated of the false teachers in Galatia, that "they *were desirous* (however they might do it in effect) *to pervert the gospel of Christ*," though unquestionably they were *to change or alter* it.

^d Τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Χριστοῦ, 'the gospel of Christ,' i. e. proceeding from Christ (*gen. subjecti*)—"the gospel of which Christ was the author and publisher" (see reasons for this construction stated, ch. ii. 16^d). But while strenuously advocating this, which is the primary and peculiar force of the genitive, we do by no means intend to exclude, nor is it perhaps possible altogether to exclude, from our conception the notion of *objectiveness* as presented by this expression. "The gospel of (or from) Christ" is essentially 'the gospel of (or concerning) Christ,' who is the Alpha and

* "Aristophanes uses a similar construction, Eq. 615: Τί δ' ἄλλο γ' εἰ μὴ νικόβουλος ἐγενόμην."—BAGGE.

the Omega of the gospel. If it be called "the gospel of salvation," because salvation is the theme and burden of the gospel, with equal truth and propriety may it be styled 'the gospel of Christ,' for the same reason. But what we do say and insist upon is this, that that which is a secondary sense is by no means to usurp the place, to the exclusion of that which is primary, especially when it might have been written with more exactitude had such been the apostle's intention (as upon one occasion, Rom. i. 12, it has been), "the gospel of God concerning his Son Jesus Christ," where the expression is at the same time grammatical and unambiguous.*

We may observe that the error into which the agitators in the Galatian church had fallen was the advocacy of ceremonial observances as supplemental to the work of Christ—an error which was charged upon them as an attempt to alter, and consequently to pervert, the gospel of Christ. And in all ages, and in every department of the church, such 'disturbers' have occasionally intruded themselves. We may teach in the fullest manner the divinity and the humanity of our blessed Lord—we may publish in his name the most perfect code of morality, and the most exalted system of ethics which the world has ever received—we may insist upon the strictest observance of religious duties in every one who assumes the name of Christ: yet if we withhold in our ministrations the doctrine of the atonement, or proclaim it not fully and distinctly, without any reservation or equivocation whatsoever, that doctrine which ascribes the satisfaction of the law unparticipatingly to Christ, and not to man, leaving man absolutely nothing whatsoever to *do* in order to justification, but only to *believe* (John, vi. 29; Acts, xvi. 30, 31)—if we lead them to place the most infinitesimal reliance on their own works (done either before or after the grace of God) for salvation, we do, as surely as they did, alter, and consequently pervert, the gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ, and expose ourselves to the bitter consequences of a ruthless anathema.

VERSE 8.—* Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ἡμεῖς, 'But even if we.' Some understand ἡμεῖς of St. Paul individually; others, of St. Paul in association with the οἱ σὺν ἐμοὶ ("they who are with me") of the second verse: but it would seem more natural and more agreeable to the circumstances of the case to understand it of Paul and his brother apostles, of whom he himself was directly charged with preaching the doctrine of circumcision; and St. Peter was open to the imputation, to say the

* I would observe, that the consideration which induced Winer, in his dissertation (Winer, Gr. § xxx. 1) on εὐαγγέλιον Χριστοῦ, whether to be regarded as gen. subj. or gen. obj., to give the preference to the latter construction, (to wit, because "in various passages we find the entire expression εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Θεοῦ περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ"), is the reason precisely why I am led to a contrary conclusion. When it suited the Apostle's purpose to present Christ *objectively* to his readers, we find that he did so effectively and unambiguously; consequently, when he has not resorted to the use of such means, we have a right to conclude that he has left the genitive designedly in possession of its native force, "the whence case," as he himself has not inaptly styled it.

least of it, of conniving at such teaching, through his prevarication at Antioch. The order of the words here is deserving of notice—*καὶ ἐὰν ἡμεῖς*, not *ἐὰν καὶ ἡμεῖς*. The passage to be read thus: ‘even if (improbable as the case may seem; or better, perhaps, ‘as it has been commonly imputed to us’) we apostles should preach differently from what we once did’—not ‘if even we (gifted as we be, or exalted as our position in the church may be) should so preach.’ By the former construction the emphasis is thrown unmistakably upon *the circumstance* of preaching in the manner proscribed; by the latter upon *the dignity*, or the *qualifications* of the persons who preach. It is manifest from the arrangement of the words that *καὶ* belongs not to *ἡμεῖς*, or to the sentence of which it forms a part, but only to *ἐὰν*. According to Ellicott, the compound *καὶ ἐὰν* conveys “the idea of condition with the assumption of objective possibility.” According to Alford, it supposes “a case which has never occurred.” But the proper force of *καὶ ἐὰν* is neither so little as is represented by the one, nor so much as by the other. It is not simply ‘condition with objective possibility’ (Ellicott); for *καὶ* imparts to it intensiveness: nor is it so intensely hypothetical as to preclude the idea of occurrence in time past (Alford), but simply indicates what may be denominated ‘an extreme case,’ which, if ever it occurred, was not likely to occur again.

^b *Ἡ ἄγγελος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, ‘or an angel from heaven.’ The hypothetical proposition, an angel from heaven preaching a supposititious gospel, is introduced here, not only to add weight and solemnity to the denunciation which follows, but possibly it may be to render the vehemence with which it is pronounced less unpalatable to the false teacher and his friends, being applied to them in so august an association. From many hints discoverable in the Epistle, we have reason to apprehend that ‘the agitators’ in the Galatian church were not numerous—at least that there were a few amongst them pre-eminently mischievous, and occupying a distinguished position in the estimation of the church. “*A little leaven leaveneth the whole lump;*” and “*he that troubleth you shall bear his burden, whosoever he be.*” In reference to such characters, the Apostle’s admonition would not be without point—“even if we, *or an angel from heaven*, should preach otherwise than we preached, let him be accursed.” Apparent zeal, or high pretensions to piety, are not always reliable indications of the faithful minister of the Lord Jesus Christ: it is sad to reflect that some of the greatest disturbers of the church’s peace—the most pernicious heretics whom the world ever saw—were men of undoubted zeal, moral conduct, and self-denying habits. It is not merely to outward character we must look for the faithful minister of the gospel, but to character combined with doctrine. A man may assume a religious garb for a deceptive purpose: “Satan himself is transformed into an angel of light; it is no great thing, therefore, if his ministers also be transformed as the ministers of righteousness.” It is very true that no man can be a good Christian who “is not careful to maintain good works;” but it is equally certain, and no less worthy to be insisted on, that no man can be a sound Christian, and more

especially a Christian minister, who does not hold pure and undefiled the doctrine of the grace of God. "To the law and to the testimony: if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is no light in them." Should Satan, or any emissary of his, attempt (as from many intimations in Scripture we have reason to apprehend they may) to introduce false doctrine in the latter times, causing even fire to come down from heaven in attestation of its truth, we have deposited in this place an antidote for the poison, at once a refutation of the heresy and a condemnation of him who propounds it—let him be *anathema*.

‘Παρ’ ὃ, ‘beside that.’ A sharp controversy has arisen amongst commentators as to the meaning of παρ’ ὃ in this context, which has been conducted on both sides with more than usual vivacity, the opposite opinions being maintained (and not without interested motives) by two conflicting parties; the Romanists for the most part affirming that παρ’ ὃ signifies ‘things *contrary to*,’ the Protestants, ‘things *in addition to*,’ the gospel. But παρ’ ὃ, strictly regarded, denotes neither one nor the other, but includes either or both, as the case may require. The sentence, if completed, would run thus: εὐαγγελίζεται ὑμῖν εὐαγγέλιον παρ’ ὃ (εὐαγγέλιον nempe) εὐηγγελισάμεθα—“would preach unto you a gospel *beside the one* (or alongside of the one) which we preached unto you,” in plain terms, ‘not absolutely identical with it.’ Now, this lack of identity may originate in addition, or subtraction, or substitution, and that in whole or in part. In short, any departure whatever from the truth which would make it diverse from what had been already delivered would constitute it παρ’ ὃ εὐηγγελισάμεθα. The example cited by Ellicott in favour of the sense ‘contra’ (Xen. Mem., i. 1, 18), where παρὰ τοὺς νόμους and κατὰ τοὺς νόμους are antithetically opposed, is an inconclusive authority; for it is undenied that in certain cases (and the antithesis would constitute such a case) παρὰ may be equivalent to ‘contra.’—See Rom. i. 26, iv. 18. But that it is susceptible of a wider range, and in the absence of controlling elements ought not to be so confined, is the position laid down and insisted upon here.*

Nor is it any answer to this interpretation to say, that such a construction would implicate St. Paul himself in the meshes of his own anathema, for that doubtless he had written many things to the Galatians and other churches *beside* what he had communicated to them in the first instance; for it is to be borne in mind that ‘the gospel,’ properly so called, and that which is alone the subject in contemplation here, is one specific truth, ‘man’s righteousness through faith in a cru-

* Such is the endless variety of meanings which the prepositions assume, from the multiplicity of subjects to which they are applied, and the aspects in which they are capable of being viewed, that it is always the safest course to adhere strictly to the original and primary meaning, unless there are circumstances in the case to fix the application in some restricted sense. That nothing of the kind occurs here is manifest from the lengthened controversy which has been sustained upon the subject—the ‘contrary to’ of Ellicott, and the ‘beyond’ of Alford, being alike unsupported by proof; whereas the primitive ‘beside’ is not only defensible upon every ground, but educes in this instance the most weighty and suggestive truth.

cified Redeemer;' and as to that truth, much as he may have dilated upon it, and much said by way of explanation, he neither added thereto nor detracted therefrom, since the day he first received it by revelation from Jesus Christ, to the hour in which he penned the Epistle, "lest (in his own impressive language) he should be now running, or had been running, in vain."

^d Ἀνάθεμα ἔστω, 'let him be accursed: ' ἀνάθεμα, the Hebraic reading for ἀναθημα, used by the LXX. to express the Hebrew word, חֵרֶם, *cherem*; ἀνάθεμα denotes a thing consecrated, or devoted to God, either to His *service* or to His *vengeance*.* However this word may, according to ecclesiastical writers, have been employed, in later periods, in the milder sense of 'excommunication from the benefit of church privileges,' it is plain that, in the place before us, it is to be understood, in its widest and severest application, to denote "everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of His power," being used in reference to one who, from his exalted nature, would be incapable of being subjected to human discipline.

VERSE 9.—^a Ὡς προειρήκαμεν, καὶ ἄρτι πάλιν λέγω, 'As we said before, so now I repeat.' The Apostle, having made his approaches from a distance, now comes to close quarters with his opponents. Before he had said, "If (ἐὰν *with a conjunct.*) we, or an angel from heaven, should preach (a purely hypothetical proposition, without any expression of subjective reality) any other gospel, let him be accursed." But now it is differently worded: "If (εἰ *with an ind.*) any man (not purely hypothetical, as before, but a case which is assumed to exist, see Winer, Gr. § xli.) is preaching a different gospel, let him be accursed." The Greek commentators concur in representing προειρήκαμεν as to be understood of the sentence immediately preceding, rather than of any declaration assumed to be made upon a previous visit to Galatia. Grammatical considerations (as Ellicott justly observes) do not help us to a decision. But contextual considerations, "viz., the insertion of ἄρτι, as marking an antithesis to what was *distinctly past*, and the apparent identity of time marked by the two plural verbs, εὐαγγελ. προειρ. (Alford)," induce him, in opposition to the Greek expositors, unhesitatingly to prefer the latter. But ἄρτι, strictly speaking (as to the conventional usage of ἄρτι, it is not likely that the Greek commentators could have been at fault) represents but a moment of time, and being spoken of the time *present* (λέγω) effectually distinguishes it from every preceding moment, as *distinctly past*, how near soever it may be. And as to the argument founded upon "the identity of time, as marked by the two plural verbs, εὐαγγελ. and προειρ. (Alford)," if there be any identity of time marked at all by these verbs, it must be by reason of their both referring to one and the same transaction; but certainly, if

* "Herem autem in Hebræo duplicem habet significationem: uno modo significat sanctificationem: alio modo significat destructionem, non quamcunque, sed destructionem aliquam ad Dei gloriam ordinatam."—De Syra, in cap. 27; Levit., ver. 28, quoted by Bagge.

what is *repeated now* be a specimen of what was *said then*, it was anything but the *preaching of the gospel of Jesus Christ*.

Nor, again, is there any matter introduced in the sentence which follows, which was not virtually included in that which preceded, to render the application inadmissible. When the Apostle declared, "even if we, or an angel from heaven, should preach differently," it is *à fortiori* implied, 'if any other creature be guilty of a similar offence;' and when he said, "other than we preached unto you," it is to be inferred, "other than ye received." But it being, as we may easily conceive, asserted, and pressed upon the Galatian church by the Judaizing teachers, that 'ye Galatians are in error, having misapprehended the purport of the Apostle's teaching, which we now more fully declare unto you,' to meet this and every similar device, the Apostle may have varied his expression, and written unequivocally in the second member, "other than ye received," a repetition of the previous statement, only in terms more personal, more explicit, and consequently less liable to misconstruction. The consideration, however, *e contra*, which chiefly weighs upon my mind, and induces me to concur in the interpretation of the modern commentators, is the abrupt and, upon the other view, unaccountable transition from *προειρήκαμεν*, in the plural, to *λέγω*, in the singular number, which takes place in the second clause, which, if it be not an error of the transcribers (by no means an improbable supposition, Griesbach reading it *προείρηκα μὲν*), must have reference to some declaration of the Apostle and others, made upon a former occasion (not, probably, his first visit to Galatia), and now produced with all the force and freshness of re-assertion. But it is one of those points upon which, from the defectiveness of our information, it is impossible at this time to arrive at any certain conclusion, but which, happily, does not affect materially the general import of the passage. But whether the Apostle refers to the present, or to any past communication, the change from *εὐηγγελισάμεθα* to *παρελάβετε* is remarkable, and most satisfactorily to be accounted for upon the ground above assigned. See also the same distinction insisted upon, 1 Cor. xv. 1.

VERSE 10.—^a Ἄρτι γὰρ, 'Now then.' Considerable difficulty has always been felt in tracing the exact connexion of these words with the context—a difficulty, I am persuaded, originating chiefly in the erroneous meaning usually ascribed to ἄρτι, and, I may also add, to the particle γὰρ. Bloomfield alleges that ἄρτι refers to *the whole time* which elapsed since his (Paul's) conversion to Christianity, and that the full sense is, "What then, am I now all along conciliating men or pleasing God?"—a sense which is pointless and incoherent, having no connexion with the immediate context, and inconsistent also with the ordinary use of ἄρτι, which properly betokens 'a moment of time,' either 'that now present,' or 'the moment immediately elapsed,' and is seldom, if ever, employed in the New Testament to describe a lengthened period of duration, and certainly not necessarily so to be understood here. Again, γὰρ has been assumed in its "*argumentative*" sense (Ellicott), and it is difficult to perceive what it is in the antecedent context to which it argumenta-

tively applies. But let *ἄρτι* be understood in its ordinary signification, 'now,' 'this present moment,' and *γὰρ*, not *argumentatively*, but *interrogatively*, retaining, as it always does, a measure of its *inferential* force, as in *πῶς γὰρ*, 'how then?' *τί γὰρ*, 'what then?' and the difficulty at once disappears. ** Ἀρτι γὰρ*, 'now then' (exclaims the Apostle, with an eye to the unfounded calumnies of his opponents), 'now then, these things being so'—that is, after the bold and uncompromising denunciation which I have just pronounced against any creature, be he high or low, who shall presume to preach a doctrine diverse from that which I preached—can it be with truth affirmed of me that I am one who is endeavouring to conciliate the good-will of men, and not rather, by an honest and fearless discharge of my duty, to commend myself to the favour of God?*

^b ** Ἡ ζητῶ ἀνθρώποις ἀρέσκειν*, 'or am I seeking to please men?' These words are regarded by some (Ellicott and Alford) as *amplification*; by others (Bloomfield, al.) as *explanation* of the preceding clause. But unquestionably they are neither one nor the other, but the introduction of a distinct subject. *To conciliate a person* (*πείθειν ἄνθρωπον*) is to please him with a view to attract his favour and kind offices towards ourselves, and is commonly applied to a superior in position or circumstances, who has it in his power to befriend and serve us, or to a person at variance with us, whose ill-will we desire to avert; but in either case some benefit is expected to accrue to ourselves from the acquisition of his favour. *To please a person* (*ἀρέσκειν ἄνθρωπῳ*) has no such reflective force, but simply refers to the gratification afforded, without any view, it may be, to a return. In these senses the words are distinctly employed here:—The former query introduced by *γὰρ* *inferential*, logically connecting it with *the antecedent context*, refers to 'those in authority in the church, and to God'—'Now then, after the vehement denunciation just pronounced against all, be they apostles or who they may, who would preach a different gospel from what we preached, am I seeking to ingratiate myself with men (my superiors in the apostolic office, as some would persuade you) or—with God?'

That question being triumphantly disposed of by the evidently implied response, 'not certainly with men, but with God,' another of a different character ensues, as strictly connected by *γὰρ* *causal and argumentative*, with *the context which follows*, and applying to a different class of persons—to 'men who are the hearers of his gospel'—'do I seek to please my hearers? *for*, if such were the case, if I were still pleasing men, I should not be the servant of Christ; but I make it known unto you, brethren, that I am not a pleaser of men; for the gospel which I preach is not after the fashion of man, for man had no part in its origination or conception'—a line of argument so natural, and at the same

* *πείθω*, in the sense 'to conciliate,' occurs Acts, xii. 20, and is to be understood here, apparently, of *the effort* (de conatu), rather than of *the result* (de facto), an issue as yet unknown. Ellicott's objection to this interpretation appears to me irrelevant, the interpretation resting, not upon the meaning of the verb itself, but upon the circumstances in which it is used.

time so apparent upon the face of the Scripture, that it seems almost strange that any person could read the passage attentively, and not be struck with its force. Imputations on both these heads had, doubtless, been cast upon the Apostle by his adversaries in the Galatian church, which were the occasion of their introduction here, to give them a flat and conclusive denial.

‘Εἰ γὰρ, ‘for if.’ γὰρ causal and elliptical, the suppressed premiss being the negation of the previous question. The argument is an *argumentum ad absurdum*, or, more properly, *ad improbabilitatem*—‘if such were the case, I should not be the servant of Christ’—an improbability, however, not so great as to constitute in itself a conclusive argument: the Apostle, therefore, in the following verses, proceeds to support it by direct proof.

^d Ἐτι ἀνθρώποις ἡρεσκον, ‘I were still pleasing men.’ In this clause, the Apostle contrasts his present mode of life with that which he previously pursued in Judaism, when he was not only a Jew, but of the strictest sect of the Jews, ‘a Pharisee,’ and placed no small portion of his religion in compassing the favour of man:—‘If that were *still* my object (to wit, the pleasing of men), I should not be what I profess to be, and what by the grace of God I am, the servant of Jesus Christ; for the gospel committed to my hands, and which it is my bounden duty to publish, is so essentially antagonistic to man’s most cherished thoughts, and tastes, and habits, that I could not discharge my duty to the one, and at the same time please the other.’

Alford takes a different view of the reference involved in ἔτι—“Not necessarily,” he says, “referring back to the time before his own conversion, any more than that is contained by implication in the words, but rather, perhaps, to the accumulated enormity of his being, after all he had gone through, ‘a man-pleaser.’”—ALFORD, *in loco*. But this misapprehension is to be accounted for on the ground that, not having observed the connexion (here pointed out) between this and the succeeding context, he is precluded the benefit of any light which it is capable of throwing upon the subject. But when we read the two passages in connexion, there can be little doubt upon our minds that the one is explanatory of the other, indicating the ground upon which he was no longer ‘a pleaser of men’—namely, the incongruity of the gospel which he preached with the tastes and inclinations of men—a reason which must necessarily have applied to the whole period of his ministry, and which brings us back to his conversion, or, more properly, to his appointment to the apostolic office (the same period in effect), as the date from which he ceased to please men, and consequently refers ἔτι to the antecedent period, when he was by profession a Jew.

VERSE 11.—* Γνωρίζω δὲ ὑμῖν, ‘But I apprise you.’ These words have been generally regarded as the commencement of a new subject. According to Ellicott, “the commencement of what may be termed the apologetic portion of the epistle,” δὲ to be taken *transitionally*, and the clause to be translated thus, “Now then I certify you.” But whether this exposition is satisfactory *per se*, and whether it is to be preferred to

that which makes the clause a continuation of the previous subject, containing a direct proof of that which had been only implied before, logically introduced by the *adversative* particle δὲ, I leave to the judicious reader himself to decide. See the argument stated, ver. 10, ^b.

^b Κατὰ ἄνθρωπον, 'after man.' In accordance with the nature of man, after the notions, tastes, desires, inclinations, of human nature, where ἄνθρωπος, as in verse 1, is evidently to be understood in its *abstract* signification, 'man.'

VERSE 12.—^a Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγὼ, 'For neither did I.' The proper force of οὐδὲ is negation, absolutely and objectively (see Winer, Greek Grammar). It is also contrastive, in reference to some previous negation expressed or understood. Standing, as it does here, at the commencement of a sentence, we naturally refer to the preceding context for the antecedent, and, finding nothing to attract its application there, we conclude that it is to be sought for in the train of thought passing at the time through the Apostle's mind. And that train it is not difficult to discover. 'Peter and the rest of the apostles received not their doctrine from man, but from God, neither received I mine from any inferior source;' the ἐγὼ being clearly emphatic, and introduced to mark the comparison between Paul and others, who, though unnamed, are nevertheless not slow to suggest themselves.

^b Γὰρ, 'for.' Causal, introducing the explanatory statement, why the gospel, as preached by Paul, was not in accordance with man; '*for*' it did not originate with man.

^c Παρὰ ἀνθρώπου παρέλαβον αὐτό, 'received I it from man.' In arriving at a conclusion with respect to the structure of this at first sight rather ambiguous sentence, it will be expedient in the outset to ascertain to which member of it the verb ἐδιδάχθην is to be referred. Does the meaning of the passage simply amount to this—'I did not receive my gospel from man, nor was I taught it in any other way, *save only* by the inspiration of God' (the latter alternative being expressed in the negative form, to correspond with the former, which had been of necessity so introduced)? Assuredly not; for that were to assign to ἀλλὰ the force of εἰ μὴ, which is lexically objectionable (see ver. 7, ^a). ἐδιδάχθην, then, is to be disconnected with the latter, and united with the preceding member of the sentence. We have, then, in that portion of the sentence two palpable negations—'I *neither* received it from man,' 'nor was I taught it,' (*by men* of course, the revelation *from God* being, as we have just seen, logically excluded by ἀλλὰ). What, then, is the distinction assignable between these two negations? In what sense is it conceivable that the Apostle could have derived his gospel from *man*, independently of the teaching of *men*, unless we are prepared to accept ἀνθρώπου here (as it has already occurred, verses 1 and 11) in the abstract sense, 'man's nature'? If that be done, the meaning of the passage is evident:—"The gospel which I preach I *neither* received from man's nature, *nor* was I taught it by men, *but* (ἀλλὰ in its legitimate sense) I received it (παρέλαβον repeated from the previous clause) by revelation from Jesus Christ."

A gospel derived from man's nature, independently of the teaching of men, can be none other than a gospel of one's own devising, the creature of one's own imagining, the embodiment of one's thoughts, tastes, feelings, and sense of fitness—in one word, a self-originated gospel. And that this is the idea which the Apostle intended to convey, is farther inferrible from the terms in which he has been pleased to present it:—“*παρὰ ἀνθρώπου* (according to Ellicott) not synonymous with *ἀπὸ ἀνθρώπου*, the distinction between these prepositions after verbs of receiving, &c. (*παρὰ* more *immediate*, *ἀπὸ* more *remote* source), being apparently regularly maintained in St. Paul's Epistles.”—(See Winer, Gr. § xlvii. *ἀπὸ*. n. 1.) *Παρὰ*, then, would appear to be selected, according to the acknowledged usage of St. Paul, to express the *immediateness* of the communication—a derivation from the fountain-head, without the intervention of others.

Again, the same studied selection of terms is apparent in the choice of the verb *παρέλαβον*, with which *παρὰ ἀνθρώπου* is joined “being distinguishable (according to Bengel) from *ἐδιδάχθην*, in that the former denotes acquirement *without the labour*, the latter *with the labour* of learning.” Now, a gospel acquired without the labour of learning, if not the fruit of divine inspiration (which is expressly excluded in the present instance), can be none other than a ‘self-originated gospel.’ It is observable that Ellicott, from whose critical work on Galatians both these extracts have been taken, has not availed of them himself, in the exegesis which he offers of the passage; the distinction, “the *ἐδιδάχθην* pointing more to *subjective* appropriation, while *παρέλαβον* only marks *objective* reception” (Ellicott), is possibly of too subtle and metaphysical a nature to find a place in a plain theological discourse.*

^d *Δι' ἀποκαλύψεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, ‘by revelation from Jesus Christ.’ (*Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, gen. subj.) antithetically opposed to the preceding clause. It is observable that *παρέλαβον* (the verb to be *regularly* supplied in this place) again applies, in its strictly etymological sense, to express ‘a communication *sine labore discendi*’—a revelation from Jesus Christ. There can be no reasonable doubt that the revelation here referred to is the same that is introduced at verse 16 of this context, and there ascribed to the Father. But the reconciliation of this and every such apparent discrepancy is to be found in the plain theological truth, that what the Father does in reference to the church, He does by Jesus Christ. Whom the Father calls, He calls by Jesus; whom He justifies, He justifies, whom He saves, He saves, by Jesus Christ; and when God revealed His Son Jesus Christ in the heart of the Apostle Paul, that he might preach Him among the Gentiles, that revelation also was made through the agency of Christ. So that, being the joint and several act

* It cannot be denied that *παραλαμβάνω* occurs in the New Testament (1 Cor. xvi. 1; Gal. i. 9) in a laxer usage, as denoting ‘reception, the result of instruction;’ but it is submitted that its association with *ΠΑΡΑ ἀνθρώπου*, and the contrast established between it and *διδάσκειν*, determine its usage here, and restrict it to its more precise and etymological meaning, ‘to acquire *sine labore discendi*.’ See a similar distinction observed, Phil. iv. 9.

of the Father and of the Son, it is indifferently ascribed to either, Holy Scripture conducting us to the conclusion, that in this, as in every other sense of the word, "God createth all things through Jesus Christ."

VERSE 13.—^a Ἠκούσατε γὰρ, 'For ye heard.' At this point the Apostle commences his proof (introduced by the argumentative particle γὰρ) of the positions laid down in the preceding verse, that he received not his gospel from man, nor was taught it by men, but received it directly from Jesus Christ, though not precisely in the order in which they are there enumerated. In this and the succeeding verse, he argues that such was his natural indisposition (amounting, indeed, to positive hostility) to the gospel of the grace of God, that it was not possible to conceive that it could have originated in 'his own breast.' In the two following verses (15, 16) he recounts the actual mode of its reception, 'by direct revelation from God;' and the residue of the chapter, and the greater part of the one following, is taken up in demonstrating the truth, that, being communicated to him from above, 'it underwent no modification whatsoever at the hands of men.' This last proposition being material to the establishing of his independence as an Apostle of Jesus Christ, and requiring more lengthened and varied proof than the rest to sustain it, is, for the sake of perspicuity, reserved for the last.

Ἠκούσατε. In this word the Apostle appeals to historical facts which had come to the knowledge of them all:—'Ye heard of my conversation in time past in Judaism: I showed no predilection, you will admit, for the gospel of Christ, when I persecuted and laid waste the church of God; nor did I entertain any prejudice against the Jews' religion, for I yielded to no man living in earnest desires and unwearied efforts to advance its interests: so that, whether you regard my hostility to Christianity on the one hand, or my enthusiasm for the Jews' religion on the other, it is equally patent that the gospel did not originate with myself; nor should I ever have embraced its doctrines, save under the pressure of some powerful and overwhelming conviction.'

^b Ποτε, 'at one time.' I cannot concur with Bloomfield and others who represent ποτε as here used for πρότερον, and as referring to the whole period of the Apostle's conversation in Judaism. Had, indeed, the order of the words been reversed, and the clause been written, τὴν ποτε ἀναστροφὴν, there might have been some ground for the supposition; but the adverbial position of ποτε distinctly shows that attention is directed to a *limited* period of the conversation, to which alone the observation applies. Nor, indeed, does it seem to have fallen within the scope of the Apostle's argument to refer to the entire of his past life in Judaism, which possibly was not even known to the Galatians, but to that portion of it in which (as he himself emphatically describes it) he "persecuted the church of God," and which was unhappily a subject of universal notoriety. It is unnatural to conceive (with Alford) that the information was derived from *himself*; nor would it in all probability have been referred to in this form if it had. It is a more reasonable conjecture that they learned it by general report.

^c Ἐν τῷ Ἰουδαϊσμῷ, 'in Judaism'; not (as it is generally understood)

‘in the Jews’ religion,’ but ‘in the Jewish state and condition’—in plain terms, when he was by profession a Jew, and acting under the influence of Jewish prejudices and feelings; ἐν τῷ Ἰουδαϊσμῷ, denoting the sphere in which his conversation, or, more properly, that portion of it to which attention is directed, took place, which certainly could not be said to be ‘the Jews’ religion,’ but ‘the state of being a Jew.’ It was not the genius of the Jews’ religion to persecute, nor was it in the exercise of religious duties that the persecution actually took place, but in the Jewish state, when under the influence of those complex feelings and modes of thinking which constituted ‘the condition of the Jew.’ Ἰουδαϊσμος is an abstract term, comprehending the whole system of Judaism, not only the laws and institutions of Moses, but the customs and traditions of men, everything, in short, which went to the constitution of the Jewish state; the article serving to particularize the abstract. See Jelf, Gr. Gr., 448.

ἃ Ἐδίωκον, ‘I was persecuting.’ And so continued to do, without intermission (the full force of the imperfect), until I was arrested by the grace of God.

ἃ Τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ, ‘the church of God.’ So called for “*aggravation*” (Bloomfield); “for *solemnity*, to set himself in contrast to the gospel, and show how alien he then was from it” (Alford). But possibly it is no more than bare *designation* after all (see Acts, xx. 28), the ‘alienation,’ and ‘aggravation,’ being marked rather by the action of the verbs ἐδίωκον, ἐπόρθουν, than by the adjunct τοῦ Θεοῦ.*

VERSE 14.—ἃ Προέκοπτον ἐν τῷ Ἰουδαϊσμῷ, ‘I was going ahead in Judaism.’ I am confident that the universally received interpretation, under whatever form expressed—“profited in the Jews’ religion,” “made advance in Judaism,” “proficiency in the rites and forms of the Jews’ religion”—is quite beside the purport of the Apostle’s statement in this place. I can conceive no reasonable ground why the same word (Ἰουδαϊσμος) should be accepted in a different sense in two successive members of the same sentence, where there is not a clearly defined intention that so it should be. And, unquestionably, “my manner of life in Judaism,” in the 13th verse, imports ‘my manner of life in *the Jewish state*,’ or when I was in religion a Jew, and actuated by Jewish prejudices and feelings, “in Judaism” describing ‘the complex element in which he moved,’ rather than ‘the religious system in which he was brought up.’ By parity of interpretation, then, I contend, that when the Apostle states, in the 14th verse, ‘I was going ahead in Judaism,’ “in Judaism” must be referred, as before, not to ‘the Jewish religion,’ which he professed, but ‘to the Jewish state and condition’ in which he laboured.

To instance a parallel expression in our own tongue—if it were asserted of the leading demagogue of our times, that ‘he went ahead (a

* If persecuting and laying waste the church of God proved his proficiency “in Judaism,” it certainly could not be the Jews’ religion, but the Jews’ state that is contemplated.

metaphor taken from a ship at sea beating her way against opposing winds and currents, the literal meaning of *προκόπτω*) in Popery above all his cotemporaries,' would it be apprehended thereby that he was the greatest recluse, or the most devoted student of the Breviary or Missal of all his associates, and not rather that he as a Papist did more to promote the interests of Popery than any other individual of his generation? And why not understand it similarly of St. Paul, that he, when a Jew, laboured more heartily and more determinedly in the cause of Judaism than any other of his nation? The particular object to which his energies were directed being undefined, they are referred by attraction to the system under which they were called forth, upon the same principle that the work of a labourer 'in the field' is referred 'to the field' in which he labours.

Besides, the choice of the word *ζηλωτής* is strongly confirmatory of this opinion. Of course it is to be interpreted in keeping with its immediate context. If we are informed that St. Paul "profited in the Jews' religion above many of his equals," then his being "more exceedingly zealous of (or, as the words more emphatically import, 'more vehemently *a zealot* for') the traditions of the fathers," must imply his more than ordinary ambition to excel in *patristic lore*. But surely *ζηλωτής* is not precisely the word best adapted to depict a student's ardour in literary pursuits, but rather the red-hot zeal of an infuriate bigot, intent by fire and sword to propagate his opinions. If, on the other hand, the purport of the passage be to inform us that St. Paul 'went ahead' or laboured *in the cause of Judaism* more than all others, then no more fitting word could have been selected to describe the fanatic zeal and the persecuting ardour which he brought with him to the task. I would only observe in passing, that whatever was the nature of his pursuit, it is represented (such is the force of the imperfect tense) as continuing without interruption until the day of the revelation of Jesus Christ; and unquestionably the divine light burst upon his benighted soul, not in the retirement of his closet, in the midst of his books and of his studies, but on the road to Damascus, when, an infuriate *zealot*, "breathing out threatenings and slaughter," he was hastening to hale men and women, and bring them bound to Jerusalem, "*for the traditions of the fathers*".*

ὁ Περισσότερως *ζηλωτής* ὑπάρχων, 'Being (all the while) more exceedingly a zealot.' A participial clause defining *more particularly* the sphere in which the exertion was made, namely, the upholding of pharisaical traditions. The comparison established in the word *περισσότερως* does not seem to be, as maintained by Ellicott and Alford, with the *πολλοὶ συνηλικιώται* of the preceding clause, as though he were more zealous than they, that fact having been sufficiently attested in *προέκοπ-*

* *Ζηλωταί*, a sect "the members of which professed great attachment to the Jewish institutions, and undertook to punish without trial those guilty of violating them, under which pretext they committed the greatest excesses and crimes, for several years before the destruction of Jerusalem."—ROB. *Lex.*

τον ὑπὲρ πολλοὺς συνηλικιώτας ('I was labouring above all my cotemporaries'), but, more properly, with 'the precepts and ordinances of the law of Moses,' of which his appreciation was not so high, nor his zeal for them so fervid as for his 'ancestral traditions,'—a circumstance judiciously introduced here to intimate that he had no predisposing taste for Christianity; for of all the parts of the Jewish system, in the corrupt state in which it was then maintained, none certainly were so antagonistic to THE TRUTH, or so little calculated to lead to an appreciation of the gospel of Jesus Christ, as "the traditions of the fathers."

^c Τῶν πατρικῶν μου παραδόσεων, 'For the traditions of my fathers,' gen. objecti, denoting the object about which the zeal was exhibited. Ellicott quotes with approval from Meyer:—"The insertion of μου qualifies the more general term πατρικός, making it equivalent to the more special πατροπαράδοτος, and thus certainly seeming to limit here the παραδόσεις to the special ancestral traditions of the sect to which the Apostle belonged, i. e. to pharisaical traditions." While Calvin, on the other hand, maintains that, "when he speaks of the traditions of the fathers, he means not those additions by which the law of God had been corrupted, but the law of God itself, in which he had been educated from his childhood, and which he had received through the hands of his parents and ancestors." But certainly, if the preceding observation be well founded, that 'the comparison is instituted, not between St. Paul and others, but between the different parts of Judaism amongst themselves,' it is more reasonable to conclude that the Apostle instances here as the object of his peculiar zeal, *a part* rather than *the whole* of that which constituted the chief feature of Judaism, namely, the religious institutions. In the mind of any other people 'the laws or institutions of our fathers' might be a consideration of preponderating interest; but not so with the Jews, to whom their law had a much higher and more noble commendation than any which antiquity could confer, inasmuch as "it was *ordained by angels*."

VERSE 15.—^a Ὅτε δὲ, 'But when.' The first statement being disposed of, namely, that the gospel which he preached did not originate with *himself*, the Apostle now proceeds to take up, not the second, but the third, that 'he received it *by revelation from God*,' the order being reversed, as we before intimated (v. 13, ^a), for the sake of perspicuity. And in the description which follows of the circumstances under which he was put into possession of the gospel, every term applied, and every expression used, is redolent of divine grace, wholly irrespective of any predisposing cause or qualification whatsoever upon the part of the recipient; ὅτε referring to the time subsequent to the revelation of the gospel, when the Apostle might have been thought to confer with man, but did not.

^b Εὐδόκησεν ὁ Θεός, 'it pleased God.' The selection of *the time when*, as well as *the persons to whom* (Eph. i. 5), divine grace is imparted is in the hands of the Omnipotent One, here ascribed to the free, undeserved, unconditional (εὐδοκία) 'good pleasure of God.'

^c Ὁ ἀφόρισας με, 'who set me apart'—not *physically* from his mo-

ther's womb, but *ethically*, in the divine counsels, from all others, to preach the gospel among the Gentiles.—Rom. i. 1.

^d Ἐκ κοιλίας μητρός μου, 'from my mother's womb'—in other words, 'from the moment I was born' (not as Calvin has it, "being yet unborn"), the ἐκ being here used temporally, as in Mat. xix. 12; Luke, i. 5., al.). The setting apart of Paul to the apostolic office, being the purpose of God from the beginning, and in no way dependent upon the circumstances connected with his birth, might with equal propriety, so far as the divine purpose is concerned, have been so stated here. But the Apostle's object being simply to establish the fact that he was indebted for this distinguished mercy, not to any righteousness of his own, or to any peculiar fitness which he had exhibited for the discharge of the duties to which he was called, but to the grace of God alone, it was enough for him to go back to that period of his existence before which it was impossible for him to have done anything "either good or evil," namely, the day of his birth.—See Rom. ix. 11.

* Καὶ καλέσας, 'and called.' From the position which these words occupy (between the notice of 'the separation from his mother's womb to preach the gospel' and 'the actual revelation of the gospel in order to its being preached'), we must understand them, not of his calling to salvation generally, but of his calling to the apostolic office in particular—an event which took place on the road to Damascus, and which, though not here represented so to be (it being irrelevant to the subject in hand), was, in point of fact, his calling to salvation, or the period of his conversion. 'Election and predestination' are represented in Scripture as existing *from eternity*—'calling,' as having its origin *in time*.—See ch. iv. 6, *.

Ἐν χάριτι αὐτοῦ, 'through his grace.' According to Ellicott, "the moving cause of the call was the divine εὐδοκία, the mediating cause, the boundless grace of God, the instrument, the heaven-sent voice." But it is difficult to conceive of a 'causa medians' between the good-will of God (εὐδοκία) and the instrument by which it is carried into effect; nor are we required in the present instance so to do. Διὰ denotes the state or condition of mind through which and out of which, viewed instrumentally (see Winer's Greek Grammar), the call proceeded—a use of the preposition which accords well with the general purpose of the Apostle in this context, which is unquestionably to exhibit the absolute gratuitousness of the call, originating, not in any merit or qualification upon his part, but in the undeserved favour of God. The 'εὐδοκία' (evidently derived from εδόκησε in the same sentence), which Ellicott regards as "*the moving cause*," has no reference, as it so happens, to *the calling* at all, but merely to *the time when it pleased God to make the revelation*—a time which (from the past tense of the verb—καλέσας) was distinguished by an interval (however brief—possibly only a few days at Damascus) from the period of his call.*

* For διὰ similarly employed, see ch. v. 13—"διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης δουλεύετε ἀλλήλοις" (through love serve one another), where ἀγάπη represents not merely the

VERSE 16.—^a 'Εν ἐμοί, 'within me.' It may be laid down as a general rule, that "whenever the primary meaning (of a preposition) gives a sense which cannot be objected to dogmatically or exegetically, we are bound to abide by it" (Ellicott), and in the present instance this meaning is especially pertinent. In this sense God revealed his Son Jesus Christ 'within him;' not indeed *personally*, as though he "had Jesus Christ speaking within him," the extravagant notion of Chrysostom, but *historically*, in his person, offices, work, and every circumstance connected with his history, past, present, and to come; not by open vision, or audible voice, such as dazzled the eye, and clanged upon the ear, of the beloved disciple on the rugged rock of Patmos, but in the interior recesses of his soul, by a secret and mysterious influence, whereby intuitively, without any mental effort, he became indoctrinated with all that needed to be known to qualify him to preach Christ fully and effectively amongst the Gentiles. Nothing can be more distinctly attributed than is the acquisition of the gospel, in this passage, to direct *revelation from God*.

This second point being established, the apostle proceeds in a lengthened dissertation in the third place to show, 'that by no subsequent act of his did he afford the slightest pretext for the allegation of the false teachers, that the gospel which had been derived to him from God underwent any change or modification whatsoever at the hands of man.'

^b Εὐθέως, 'immediately.' It is plain that εὐθέως is to be read in connexion with ἀπῆλθον, the intervening negative sentence partaking of the nature of a parenthesis. From the prominent position which εὐθέως occupies in the sentence, we gather the *instantaneousness* of the transfer; no sooner was the revelation given, than forthwith he betook himself into Arabia.

^c Οὐ προσανεθέμην, οὐδὲ ἀνῆλθον, 'I conferred not, nor did I go up,' negations of the same kind. 'I held no communication with *human nature within*, nor did I go up to consult those (*men*), who were apostles before me, in Jerusalem, but (ἀλλὰ e contrario) I went into Arabia. The immediate withdrawal into Arabia is here noticed, not only to establish the fact that, having received his gospel from above, he removed himself beyond the sphere of human influence; but besides, and perhaps principally, to account for a critical period of his life, which if wholly unnoticed, or not satisfactorily accounted for, would have a prejudicial effect upon his case. Of course, the reason of the apostle's retirement into Arabia is one thing; of its introduction into this context, another.

^d Σαρκὶ καὶ αἵματι, 'flesh and blood,'—a Hebrew periphrasis for 'man;' and did the expression stand alone, we should have no hesitation in pronouncing it a general description of 'humanity,' man's nature in the abstract; and the purport of the passage to be, that upon receiv-

instrument by which, but the element *through and out of* which, the δουλεία was to proceed.—See also 2 Cor. v. 7.

ing the divine revelation, the Apostle took no counsel with *man*, but betook himself into the wilderness to hold communion in solitude with *God*. But, inasmuch as the words, “neither went I up to Jerusalem to (confer, no doubt, with) them which were apostles before me” are immediately subjoined, we are compelled to receive the expression with some degree of qualification,—‘man’ in the abstract being too comprehensive an idea, as including within itself the substance of the second negation, which would thereby become ineffective and needless. “Flesh and blood,” therefore, through the exclusion of all other individuals (for, if not with the apostles, with whom else could he be supposed to confer?) must be accepted (as *ἄνθρωπος* *singular* in this context has invariably been) in the restricted sense of ‘human nature in the proper person of Paul;’ and the information communicated in the sentence will be, that having received a revelation from God, he consulted not his own natural tastes or prejudices upon the subject, so as to be influenced in any measure by them, nor did he go up to Jerusalem to receive instruction from others, but committed himself unreservedly to the inspiration of God—a communication most pertinent to the subject in hand, namely, that the gospel which he preached was in no wise (*κατὰ ἄνθρωπον*) in accordance with the humour of man.

I know not whether we should be justified in recognising in this phrase (“flesh and blood”) an allusion to a well-known historical circumstance, which may possibly account for its selection. We cannot but have observed in this chapter, and the one which follows it, a substratum, occasionally cropping up to the surface, of contrast between St. Peter and St. Paul. Being the apostle of the circumcision, and not a little given at one time to temporizing, the Judaistic teachers may have been in the habit of exalting Peter at the expense of Paul, possibly attributing to the former the commission of the latter to preach the gospel, or some sort of jurisdiction over him. Be this as it may, the Apostle never loses an opportunity of magnifying his office as against Peter especially, and claiming upon all occasions a rigid equality with him, witness the account of his controversy at Antioch, chapter ii. 14, sq., and the comparison instituted at verse 8 of the same chapter—“He that wrought effectually for Peter to the apostleship of the circumcision, the same was mighty for me towards the Gentiles.” Now, it is not inconceivable that in such a spirit, and in reference to that celebrated declaration of our blessed Lord, recorded at Matt. xvi. 16, which never was and never could be forgotten in the early church, the Apostle may have intimated in these terms, ‘if it was said of Peter “flesh and blood hath not revealed it to thee, but my Father which is in heaven,” with equal truth, and no less propriety, may it be affirmed of myself, “flesh and blood hath not revealed it to thee, but my Father which is in heaven;” for from the moment that God was pleased to reveal his Son within me, I held no conference with “flesh and blood.”’ At the same time we must acknowledge, that “flesh and blood” is an expression too descriptive of the carnality of the human heart, which if allowed its own way would override the provisions of the gospel of the grace of

God, to need any additional adaptation to impart to it pungency or force.

VERSE 17.—^a *Εἰς Ἀραβίαν*, ‘into Arabia.’ St. Luke’s narrative, in the ninth chapter of the Acts of the Apostles, of the early history of St. Paul after his conversion, and instalment in the apostolic office, does not tally circumstantially with the Apostle’s account of himself here given. At the same time, there is no discrepancy between them which a careful comparison of the two statements will not satisfactorily reconcile. From St. Paul we learn that, after the revelation of Jesus Christ vouchsafed him, he immediately retired into Arabia; hence after a short delay he returned again to Damascus, Gal. i. 17, and straightway (according to St. Luke) preached Christ in the synagogue, Acts, ix. 20. So brief was his sojourn in Arabia, that upon his return to Damascus the impression was fresh upon the minds of all who heard him, “is not this he who destroyed them who called upon this name in Jerusalem, and came hither with that intent that he might bring them bound unto the chief priests?” so brief, indeed, that it escaped the notice (it would appear) of the people of Damascus that he had been absent from their city at all. An interval such as this cannot possibly, in a general history like St. Luke’s, affect the propriety of *εὐθέως*, the term used, Acts, ix. 20. Here at Damascus he waxed stronger and stronger (*ἐνεδυναμοῦντο*) every day, and “confounded the Jews that dwelt at Damascus, proving that this is very Christ;” until that “after many days were fulfilled (the three years noticed by St. Paul, Gal. i. 18) the Jews took counsel to kill him.”—Acts, ix. 22, 23. Hence he proceeded “to Jerusalem to make (according to his own account, Gal. i. 18) the acquaintance of Peter.” And, having arrived at Jerusalem, “he essayed to join himself to the disciples; but they were all afraid of him, and believed not that he was an apostle.”—Acts, ix. 26. “But Barnabas took him and brought him to the apostles,” v. 27. Peter, and James, the brother of the Lord, being the only members of the apostolic college who were then present at Jerusalem, Gal. i. 19, with them he continued only fifteen days, v. 18, during which period “he spake boldly in the name of the Lord Jesus, and disputed against the Grecians,” until “they went about to slay him; which when the brethren knew, they brought him down to Cæsarea, and sent him forth to Tarsus,” Acts, ix. 29, 30, in “the regions of Syria and Cilicia,” whither, according to his own statement (Gal. i. 21), he retired upon leaving Jerusalem, without so much as visiting “the churches of Judæa which were in Christ,” v. 22. Such is the simple and satisfactory adjustment of the two statements, without resorting to the clumsy and unwarrantable expedient of improvising a second journey to Arabia, or distorting in the slightest degree the language of either author.

VERSE 18.—^a *Μετὰ ἔτη τρία*, ‘after three years,’ from his instalment into the apostolic office, the only justly assignable terminus, except indeed *the date last mentioned* be preferred, his return to Damascus; but that, as we have already seen, so slightly differed from the former, that it may be regarded as substantially the same. The time usually as-

signed, namely, 'his conversion to Christianity,' is in point of fact the same date, a very inconsiderable period intervening between them; but as 'his conversion' has nothing whatever to do with the subject in hand, which is exclusively occupied with 'his apostolic mission, and his discharge of its duties independently of the counsel of man,' I prefer to assign it, in the terms of the context, to 'the revelation of his Son within him, that he might preach Him among the Gentiles.' And that this is the true terminus is confirmed by the consideration that the specific object of the passage before us is to make it plain that three whole years elapsed, from *some date* undefined, before he had so much as seen one of the apostles, to have received instruction from them. Now, this argument would have been deceptive and inconclusive, if *that date* undefined were any other than the *date of his appointment*.

^b Ἰστορήσαι Κηφᾶν, 'to make the acquaintance of Cephas.' So trivial a point as this might seem hardly deserving of notice in an important document like the present. Nevertheless it is most pertinent to the subject in hand, as satisfactorily accounting for a circumstance which otherwise would be open to misconstruction, namely, his visit to Jerusalem at this juncture. Nor would it have answered to have passed it over in silence, such an omission being calculated to affect injuriously the apparent ingenuousness of his narrative.

^c Ἡμέρας δεκαπέντε, 'fifteen days.' The number of days specified, probably upon the principle before-mentioned, to establish the independence of his teaching, irrespective of the counsels of men; the improbability of any important alteration being wrought in his views in so short a period as fifteen days being apparent to all. The abruptness of his departure from Jerusalem is accounted for in the narrative in the Acts (ch. ix. 29)—"They went about to kill him." Perhaps we are not bound to maintain that fifteen days was the whole extent of the Apostle's sojourning at Jerusalem at that time, the manner in which it is mentioned in the Acts would seem to intimate a more protracted visit; that he abode so long in the house with Peter will satisfy all the requirements of the text.

VERSE 19.—^a Εἰ μὴ Ἰάκωβον τὸν ἀδελφὸν τοῦ Κυρίου, 'except James the brother of the Lord.' So called, doubtless, to distinguish him from another of the apostles of the same name (James the son of Zebedee), who was still living at the time to which the notice refers, but subsequently cut off at an early date by the sword of Herod.—Acts, xii. 2. That the James here mentioned was an apostle, there can be no reasonable doubt; "other of the apostles saw I none (says St. Paul), save James the Lord's brother." James, therefore, was both seen by him, and, if there be perspicuity in language, must have been an apostle. Nor can it be urged that he was an apostle of an inferior grade, for he is here named in the same category with Peter; nor indeed would he have been named at all, if not an apostle in the highest acceptance of the term. For the object of St. Paul is evidently to show, that "from those who were apostles before him," and presumed to be apostles above him, he received literally nothing. And in pursuance of that object he

goes on to state, that upon the occasion of his visit to Jerusalem he saw but two, Peter, and James the Lord's brother, and these two for so inconsiderable a period, that he could have learned nothing from them. Now, if James was not an apostle before him, and one of the chief apostles too, the introduction of his name into this context would be not only irrelevant, but faulty: James, then, the subject of this notice, was, we conclude, one of the twelve.* Now, of the twelve apostles there were but two of that name—James the son of Zebedee, and James the son of Alphæus—the former in no way, that we can trace,† connected with the family of our Lord; the latter accounted to be the son of Mary, the sister of our Lord's mother, and consequently cousin-german of the Lord. And such near kinsmen being in Hebrew phraseology commonly designated 'brethren,' we do not perhaps unwarrantably conclude that the son of Alphæus was the James to whom the Apostle refers.

VERSE 20.—^a Ἰδὸν ἐνώπιον τοῦ Θεοῦ, 'Behold, before God.' A strong asseveration, approaching to the solemnity of an oath—a form of speech which would only be resorted to by the Apostle upon some extraordinary occasion. Hence we infer the importance which St. Paul attached to the circumstances above narrated, as establishing the independence of his position as an apostle of Jesus Christ.

^b Ὅτι, 'that.' In strict grammatical propriety, some verb should be supplied before ὅτι in order to establish the sense. Ellicott, with some reason (seeing that in three places out of five where ἐνώπιον τοῦ Θεοῦ occurs in the New Testament it is found joined with it), supposes διαμαρτύρομαι to be the verb. But it is useless to conjecture about it; for doubtless in Greek, as in English, such an expression would be an idiomatic ellipsis, no verb being in point of fact present to the writer's mind when he penned the sentence.

VERSE 21.—^a Εἰς τὰ κλίματα τῆς Συρίας, 'To the regions of Syria.' Syria being an extensive region of Asia, stretching from Mount Taurus to the Tigris, we are to understand here 'the parts adjacent to Cilicia,' whither, upon his flight from Jerusalem (Acts, ix. 30), St. Paul proceeded, Tarsus being the chief city of Cilicia—introduced in this connexion to show that, from the remoteness of his position, all farther intercourse with the apostles was at that time effectually cut off.

* The statement of John (ch. vii. 5)—"For neither did his brethren believe on Him," at a period subsequent to the calling of the twelve, which had been recorded in the previous chapter (ch. vi. 70), cited by Alford in proof that 'none of our Lord's brethren could have been included in the number of His apostles,' is far too general a statement to be relied on in the face of such distinct testimony as the above. Much more reasonable is it to conclude that the verb ἐπίστευον implies such a clear, strong, intelligent faith as not even our Lord's apostles had attained to at the time.

† That the sons of Zebedee were not included in the number of our Lord's brethren may be deduced from the enumeration of his brethren, Matt. xiii. 55—"Is not this the carpenter's son, and his brethren James and Joses, and Simon and Judas?" and also from the specification of the women present at our Lord's crucifixion, amongst whom we find "Mary the mother of James and Joses, and the mother of Zebedee's children," as two distinct heads of families.

VERSE 22.—^a Ἀγνοούμενος τῷ προσώπῳ, ‘unknown in (in respect to) appearance.’ Πρόσωπον, literally, ‘the face,’ or, more accurately speaking, ‘the region about the eye,’ by a common figure of speech put for the whole personal appearance. Προσώπῳ, a dative of reference. “The Apostle’s appearance was not *that by which*, but, as it were, *the place in which*, their ignorance was evinced.”—ELLICOTT.

^b Ταῖς ἐν Χριστῷ, ‘those in Christ’—specification of the churches to which the notice applied, where ἐν is to be understood *locally* ‘baptized or planted into the mystical body of Christ,’ and consequently “in Christ.” This declaration, however, is to be understood with the exception, it would seem, of the church in Jerusalem, which was ‘in Christ,’ “as there the Apostle was εἰσπορευόμενος καὶ ἐκπορευόμενος παρρησιαζόμενος ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι τοῦ Κυρίου, Acts, ix. 28.”—ELLICOTT.

VERSE 23.—^a Μόνον, ‘only,’ an adverb of limitation—‘one of many’—‘so much and no more’—‘so far and no farther.’—See Matt. v. 47; Mark, v. 36. Here connected with the verb ἀκούοντες, ‘personal acquaintance they had not,’ *only they were hearing*, that “he which persecuted us,” &c. &c. To a hearsay knowledge they had attained, but nothing farther.

^b Ἀκούοντες ἦσαν, ‘they were hearing.’ Not the churches before mentioned, which would have required the feminine (ἀκουούσαι) to denote them, but the individuals of whom they were composed. The periphrasis more graphic than the simple ἤκουον, “they were hearing”—fresh reports were reaching them every day to the effect that “he which persecuted us,” &c. &c.

^c Ὅτι, ‘that.’ According to Ellicott, in which view he is supported by Alford, “ὅτι is here not the ‘ὅτι recitativum’ (Schott), a use of the particle not found in St. Paul’s Epistles, except in citations from the Old Testament (Meyer), but preserves its usual relational force, the ‘oratio indirecta’ which it introduces passing afterwards into the ‘oratio directa’ in the pronoun.” But certainly it seems more in keeping with the dramatic phraseology of the previous clause, ‘they were hearing,’ to follow it up with the ‘ὅτι recitativum’ in this. And as there are undoubted instances of its use in the New Testament, and by St. Paul himself in quotations from the Old Testament, it seems more reasonable to conclude that, contrary though it may be to custom, he has adopted it here, than that he has fallen into the lax and inaccurate mode of writing which must otherwise be attributed to him.

^d Ὁ διώκων ἡμᾶς, ‘our persecutor,’ used substantively—“The participle being here, by means of the article, turned into a species of substantive, and losing all temporal force.”—ELLICOTT. But it is not to the force of the article alone that the transmutation is due, but to the circumstance of the present participle being used in reference to an action not presently taking place, nor viewed from a stand-point of present time, which sufficiently attests that the word is not used in its ordinary participial signification, but, being joined with the article, substantively.

^e Ποτὲ, ‘once, formerly.’ At a former period, now past and gone.

^f Τὴν πίστιν, ‘the faith.’ Ἡ πίστις here stands for ‘the object of

faith' (Acts, vii. 7), that which is believed—the Christian doctrine—in the same manner as 'hope' (Col. i. 5), for 'the object of hope,' and 'joy' (1 Thess. ii. 19), 'for the object of joy.' In the latter part of the sentence a transition takes place from the doctrines themselves to those who maintained them—men, not doctrines, being the subjects of persecution (ἐπ'όρθει). The explanation is found in verse 13—"I persecuted the church of God (καὶ ἐπ'όρθουν αὐτήν), and laid it waste."

VERSE 24.—^a Ἐν ἐμοί, 'in me,' ἐν denoting the sphere or element out of which the ascription of praise arose. Not that there was any ground of glorying in Paul himself. The contrary is clearly intimated: whatever good thing was in him was made the occasion of glory, not unto himself, but unto God. They magnified the mercy of God for the mighty change which he had wrought in Saul, "the blasphemer, the persecutor, the injurious."

Let us learn from this passage the light in which God's faithful ministers are to be regarded by their fellowmen. When we behold a man adorned with all the graces of the Christian character, and enriched with all the gifts which qualify for ministerial usefulness, let us not worship the creature as though he were God, but rather let us lift up our hearts in adoring gratitude to Him "from whom all holy desires, all good counsels, and all just works do proceed," and ascribe unto Him the honour due unto His name.

CHAPTER II.

THROUGHOUT the whole of the chapter on which we are now entering the Apostle pursues the same line of argument which he had commenced in the preceding one, namely, to clear himself from the imputation of the false teachers, that he was merely an emissary of the apostles, and that, by his teaching and practice, he had countenanced the circumcision of the Gentiles.

VERSE 1.—^a Διὰ δεκατεσσάρων ἐτῶν, 'after fourteen years.' Διὰ, in its *temporal* (following strictly its *local*) signification, primarily denotes 'the continuance of an action *through and out of* a specified period,' as δι' ἡμερῶν τεσσαράκοντα (*during* forty days), Acts, i. 3; διὰ παντὸς τοῦ ζῆν (*during* their whole life), Heb. ii. 15. Sometimes, however, in a looser way, it is used when the action occurs *occasionally*, or *only once* even within the specified period, as, Ἄγγελος δὲ Κυρίου διὰ τῆς νυκτὸς ἤνοιξεν τὰς θύρας τῆς φυλακῆς (The angel of the Lord *by night* opened the doors of the prison), Acts, v. 19; see also Acts, xvi. 9; and sometimes even when the action occurs entirely outside of it, the given period being supposed to have elapsed, as, δι' ἐτῶν πλειόνων (*after the lapse of* many years), Acts, xxiv. 17; and again, εἰσῆλθεν εἰς Καπερναοὺμ δι' ἡμερῶν (He entered into Capernaum *after* some days), Mark, ii. 1; the sense in which it is used being determinable by the context

in which it stands. In the present instance, the subject under discussion being a visit to Jerusalem—which, upon historical grounds, we know did not continue *throughout the period* of fourteen years, and upon argumentative considerations (namely, the indeterminateness of such a statement in a manifestly circumstantial narration) was not likely to have occurred *within* it,—we are shut up to the conclusion that it took place ‘*after an interval of fourteen years.*’ This point being settled, the next inquiry is, From what date is this period to be reckoned?

^b Ἐπειτα διὰ δεκ., κ. τ. λ., ‘*then after fourteen,*’ &c., would naturally lead to the inquiry, ‘What was the date before mentioned?’ And by turning to the foregoing context we find that the date last specified was ‘the Apostle’s visit to Jerusalem to see Peter,’ referred to in the 18th verse of the preceding chapter, which took place just three years after his apostolic calling. But, as has been well observed by Whitby, the intervention of another ἔπειτα (ch. i. 21) effectually severs the chronological sequence between these two events. No date, therefore, being in point of fact assigned, we are compelled to fall back, as we have before done (ch. i. 18), upon the great event of his life, and that too which is especially the subject of notice here, ‘his appointment to the apostolic office.’ And this we do with the greater confidence, because we find that that terminus corresponds exactly with the manifest scope of the Apostle’s argument, which is unquestionably to prove that, so independent was he of the instruction or sanction of men, he had been preaching and exercising apostolic functions for fourteen years previously to any communication whatsoever with the apostles upon the subject, during his first visit to Peter, the question not having been brought under consideration at all, or, at least, no proceedings having been taken upon it.

That this visit is identical with the one recorded in the 15th chapter of the Acts of the Apostles, will appear upon a comparison of the account there given of the occasion of it with that which is here stated by the Apostle, and, if so, his *third* visit to Jerusalem: *the first* being that mentioned in the previous chapter, which took place in the third year from his calling to the apostolate; *the second*, when he went up with Barnabas in charge of the alms from the church of Antioch, which visit (none of the apostles having been then present, as may be concluded from the alms being transmitted to the elders of the church), being irrelevant to his purpose, is consequently omitted here; and *the third*, that which is the subject of the present notice.

^c Πάλιν, ‘again.’ It has been attempted, from the introduction of πάλιν, to argue that the visit in question was *the second*, and not, as above represented, *the third*; but no argument adverse to the proposition here laid down can be founded upon the introduction of that word; for, admitting that the proper force of πάλιν is ‘again,’ ‘another time,’ ‘once more,’ and that it is seldom if ever used in the lax sense of ‘repetition’ only, as suggested by M’Knight and others, to elude the force of the objection thus raised, yet we contend that there is ample scope for the application of the word here in its proper and ordinary signifi-

cation, without trenching upon the ground of historic truth. A previous visit to Jerusalem had been already noticed by the Apostle in the same narrative (ch. i. 18); upon that *πάλιν* lays hold; and it is intimated that 'again, upon another occasion' (*πάλιν*), *other in respect to that one*, he went up to Jerusalem, any number of intervening visits being totally unaffected and unquestioned by the assertion. So that no difficulty in reconciling this passage with historic testimony arises from the intervention of the word *πάλιν*, it being "the object of the Apostle (as Alford well remarks) to specify, not all his visits to Jerusalem, but all his occasions of intercourse with the other apostles."

Again, it has been attempted to set aside the conclusion that the visit before us was St. Paul's *third* visit to Jerusalem, by impeaching its identity with the one recorded in the 15th chapter of the Acts of the Apostles, upon the ground that, after the decree then passed at the council of Jerusalem 'not to impose the Mosaic yoke upon the neck of the Gentiles,' and passed too with the unanimous consent of all the apostles, St. Peter himself leading the way, it is impossible to conceive that, within so short a period as had then elapsed, he should be so far forgetful of what became him as an apostle of the Lord Jesus Christ as to lend himself to the disgraceful proceedings which took place at Antioch. But this argument, plausible as it may appear, is effectually overthrown by M'Knight, who observes "that Peter's behaviour did not proceed from ignorance, but from fear; for he was equally informed of the freedom of the Gentiles from the law before the council as after it, as is plain from his speech in the council, and therefore his behaviour is termed 'hypocrisy,' which it could not be if it proceeded from ignorance." We have sufficient reason, therefore, to conclude, historical evidence being decidedly in favour of the position, and no textual or other consideration (when duly weighed) against it, that this was the Apostle's *third visit* to Jerusalem since his calling, and that it took place precisely fourteen years after his instalment in the apostolic office.

^a *Καὶ Τίτον*, 'Titus also.' *Καὶ*, in its ordinary 'conjunctive meaning,' according to Ellicott 'ascensive'—"the ascensive *καὶ* perhaps alluding to his being uncircumcised." But there is no need of understanding it emphatically here, the attendance of Titus being apparently noticed as introductory to the subsequent statement concerning him, and *καὶ* having reference to other parties besides him, who accompanied St. Paul to Jerusalem.

VERSE 2.—^a *Ἀνέβην δὲ*, 'But I went up.' *Δὲ* 'continuative and adversative,' the adversativeness of the particle being traceable in the subjective contrast between the motive assigned and that which either was or might have been imputed.

^b *Κατὰ ἀποκάλυψιν*, 'in accordance with revelation.' When St. Paul, in the preceding chapter, would inform his readers of 'the instrumental agency' whereby he was put in possession of the gospel, he describes it in the usual form, by the use of the preposition *διὰ* (*δι' ἀποκαλύψεως*); here, however, he adopts a different construction (*κατὰ ἀποκάλυψιν*), because he had a different object in view. *Κατὰ ἀποκά-*

λῦψιν properly denotes 'according to,' or 'in conformity with,' revelation; δι' ἀποκάλυψεως, 'by means of' revelation. The former presents revelation as 'the occasion' or 'the ground' of the proceeding, the latter as 'the instrument' or 'motive principle' by which it took place. Κατ' ἀποκ. does not affect to inform us that St. Paul went up to Jerusalem, *under the influence of* a divine impulse or inspiration so to do, but that he went up *in accordance with* a revelation; but to whom made, or to what purport, is not intimated.* And when we turn to the 15th chapter of the Acts of the Apostles, where the whole circumstance is narrated *in extenso*, we find that in point of fact such was the case; the suggestion that he should proceed to Jerusalem having originated by no means with the Apostle himself, under the influence of divine illumination, but with the church at large, who (being directed by revelation, we may easily infer, to send a mission upon the subject to Jerusalem) "determined that Paul and Barnabas, and certain others of them, should go up to Jerusalem to the apostles and elders about this question."—Acts, xv. 1, 2.

We cannot but observe the practical bearing of this circumstance upon the validity of the Apostle's testimony. We are not to suppose that the fact of the journey to Jerusalem "in accordance with revelation" is only introduced (as has been suggested by some) to mark the importance of the occasion on which he visited that city, which would be an inconsiderable object, and irrelevant to his present purpose; but in pursuance of a line of argument which he has adopted throughout, to establish his independence of all human authority as an apostle of Jesus Christ. 'From the moment that he was called to the office, he avoided all appearance of taking counsel with man; he did not go up for three years to Jerusalem, and then he went up, not for instruction, but only to make the acquaintance of Peter. Fourteen years elapsed before he met the apostles in conclave; and when he did so, it was not of his own seeking, but "in accordance with a revelation" from God.' How much more forcible is the argument when it appears, as now it does, that this revelation was made, not unto himself personally, whose veracity might possibly be impeached (not so extravagant a supposition, when we bear in mind the asseveration in chapter i. 20), but to independent parties in the church, in compliance with whose injunctions he acted!

* Ἀνεθέμην, 'I communicated.' Ellicott discovers two distinct communications of the gospel in this passage—one, to the Christians in Jerusalem, openly and unreservedly; the other, to those who were in reputation amongst them, privately and specially. But no evidence of anything of the sort can be adduced: κατ' ἰδίαν δὲ is evidently parenthetical, and explanatory of the previous statement. "How improbable (says Alford) that St. Paul should have thus given an exoteric and eso-

* In the absence of any direct information upon this head, it is quite as reasonable to suppose that the revelation was made to the church at large, as that it was made to the Apostle individually.

teric exposition of his teaching!" Nor is ἀνεθέμην, the word employed, ever used in Scripture to denote 'the setting forth of gospel truth in the way of public delivery or instruction,' nor is it properly applicable to such a purpose. It signifies 'a setting forth or propounding in order to consideration or consultation,' and sometimes even with a view to elicit an opinion. Certainly, in the only other place where it occurs in the New Testament, where Festus states Paul's case to King Agrippa (τῷ βασιλεῖ ἀνέθετο τὰ κατὰ τὸν Παῦλον), Acts, xxv. 14, it is used in that sense.

When Paul, therefore, informs us that he submitted his gospel to those at Jerusalem, he qualifies his statement by the subsequent declaration, 'not openly or generally, but privately, to those who were in reputation amongst them.' The communication was but one,—to the apostles in conclave, and that not with a view to his own confirmation or support, but to their information and instruction. Having received his gospel by direct revelation from God, and having preached it with acceptance for fourteen years, God doubtless bearing him witness, as He did the rest of the apostles, "with signs and wonders and divers miracles and gifts of the Holy Ghost," he would be infinitely indifferent to man's estimation concerning him; but he communicated it to them, *possibly*, as Whitby supposes, "to obviate the cavils of those who laboured to hinder the effect of his gospel by suggesting that it was contrary to, or disowned by, those apostles who were called before him;" but *more probably*, as it occurs to me, for the edification of the apostles themselves.

That some of the leading men amongst them were lamentably unsound upon the subject of circumcision, and the essentiality of Jewish rites to salvation, is placed beyond a doubt by the ὅποιοί ποτε ᾤσαν of verse 6, and other passages to be met with in this Epistle (especially verses 12 and 14 of this chapter). That St. Paul should set before them the doctrine which he had by immediate inspiration from God was the most natural procedure in the world; and that he should do it in private, not openly, to their disparagement in the sight of the people, was no more than was to have been expected from the acknowledged courtesy of Paul. Such, at least, appears to me to be the history of the communication in question—an opinion which is in some measure confirmed by an expression which incidentally occurs: "I communicated to them (he says) the gospel which I preach *among the Gentiles*"—an intimation to the effect that, in some peculiar aspect as connected with the Gentile portion of the church, his gospel was submitted to the apostles: what more likely than in reference to the very subject which was the occasion of his journey to Jerusalem, and upon which, on his arrival in that city, he found that the minds of the apostles were not so correctly informed or so steadfast as they ought to be, namely, the inexpediency of imposing Jewish rites upon the reluctant necks of the Gentiles? With this object, and with this alone, as I conceive, was the communication to the apostles made.

^d Αὐτοῖς, 'to them.' Grammatical construction would suggest, 'to

the inhabitants of Jerusalem'—exegetical considerations would incline to 'the professors of Christianity in that city'; but the qualification of the Apostle (*κατ' ἰδίαν δὲ, κ. τ. λ.*) distinctly limits it 'to those who were in authority amongst them.'

* *Κατ' ἰδίαν δὲ*, 'privately, however.' Δὲ in its ordinary oppositive signification, as distinguishing the clause to which it is annexed from something which preceded it, either expressed or implied. Here the Apostle had just said that 'he communicated his gospel to those who were at Jerusalem,' publicly and indiscriminately it might be apprehended, 'but no, privately, and to those only who were in authority amongst them.' In St. Luke's narrative (Acts, xv.) no trace is to be found of this interview with the apostles; so secretly had it been conducted, that it seems to have escaped the notice of the Evangelist himself, being a communication, not to the church at large, but to those "who were in reputation amongst them."

† *Τοῖς δοκοῦσιν*, 'to those in reputation.' An abbreviation for *δοκοῦσιν εἶναι τι*, or *στύλοις εἶναι* (see verses 6 and 9). Ellicott adduces an apposite example from Euripides—"Hec., 292, where *οἱ δοκοῦντες* is opposed to *οἱ ἀδοξοῦντες*." "Hesychius says: *δοκοῦντες, οἱ ἐνδοξοί*. Theodoret explains by *τοῖς ἐπισήμοις*."—BAGGE.

‡ *Μήπως εἰς κενὸν τρέχω ἢ ἔδραμον*, 'so that I run not now, nor was (then) running in vain.' There are few passages in the New Testament which have given occasion to more discussion, or upon which a greater amount of critical acumen has been expended, and possibly with less effect, than the one now under consideration. With all that has been written upon the subject, the real meaning of the Apostle seems altogether to have escaped detection. The grand mistake invariably has been, to connect the clause in question with *ἀνεθέμην*, remote in position, and unsatisfactory in result, overlooking *εὐαγγέλιον ὃ κηρύσσω ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσι* with which (the intervening clause, in the nature of a parenthesis, being shut out) *it is immediately connected*. Such being the construction, it is no wonder that to every exposition which has been hitherto offered, objections logical, grammatical, and exegetical, have been taken.

When so much has been written, I may be permitted to state the result in the perspicuous terms of one of the most recent, the most painstaking, and not the least acute of modern expositors:—"We have, then (says Ellicott), two possible translations—(1) Purpose, *ἀνεθέμην . . . μήπως ἔδραμον*, I communicated . . . that I might not perchance have run in vain (as I should have done, if I had not, &c.) (2) Apprehension, *ἀνεθέμην . . . (φοβούμενος) μήπως ἔδραμον*, I communicated . . . being apprehensive lest perchance I might really have, &c., the verb 'timendi' being idiomatically omitted. To both these translations, however, there are very grave objections: to (1) on logical, to (2) on exegetical grounds—to (1) because it was not on the communication or the non-communication of his gospel that St. Paul's running in vain hinged, but on the assent or dissent of the apostles; to (2), because it is incredible that he who went up *κατὰ ἀποκάλυψιν* could have felt any

doubt about his own course. To escape these difficulties, we must adopt one of two explanations (neither wholly free from objections): either we must refer the words *objectively* to the danger St. Paul's converts might have run of being rejected by the church, if he had not communicated, or (which is most probable) *subjectively*, with the Greek commentators, to the opinion of others. If others deemed St. Paul's past and present course fruitless, it really must in that case have amounted to a loss of past and present labour."—ELLICOTT, *in loco*.

No one can read this extract without being impressed with the feeling, how sadly unsatisfactory has been the result of all previous efforts towards the elucidation of this passage. But all these difficulties and ineffective explanations vanish at once, if we connect the words μήπως εἰς κενὸν τρέχω ἢ ἔδραμον with ἀνεθέμην τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ὃ κηρύσσω ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσι (from which they are only separated by a parenthesis), and lay the emphasis, not, as is wont to be done, upon ἀνεθέμην, but on the words which follow, when the meaning will be, 'I submitted *the gospel which I preach among the Gentiles*, (emphatically "*the gospel which I preach*," and none other), so that I run not now, nor was then running, in vain.'

The referring of μήπως, κ. τ. λ., to ἀνεθέμην, and thereby restricting the sentence "to two possible (as Ellicott pronounces, but as they appear to me, *impossible*) translations," is the occasion of all the difficulty; the idea that St. Paul submitted his gospel to the apostles with the *design* that he might not lose his past or present labour, seems utterly incomprehensible; that it was not on the communication or the non-communication of his gospel that St. Paul's running in vain really hinged, Ellicott himself admits, but on the assent or dissent of the apostles. But how "the assent or dissent of the apostles," eminent as they might be in the church, could affect the truth of God's revealed word, or render it more or less efficacious to the work whereunto he had sent it, requires some further explanation.

Again, that it was not in the *apprehension* of such a result he submitted his gospel to the apostles, is equally capable of demonstration; for what possible apprehension could he have entertained of the success of his gospel, knowing from whom he had received it? or how could it be allayed by such a course if he had? But it is suggested that the apprehension might have been *objective*, "of the danger his converts might have run of being rejected by the church if he had not communicated." Some inconvenience, unquestionably, they might have suffered, if his ministry had not been acknowledged by the church at large; but how their soul's salvation could have been imperilled, or his hope of ultimate reward affected thereby, is a mystery not easily explained. Or his apprehension may have been *subjective* of the opinion of others with respect to himself: "if others deemed St. Paul's past and present course fruitless, it really must in that respect have amounted to a loss of past and present labour." But I have been used to believe that the value of a Christian ministry is irrespective of the judgment of man; that we must all stand by the judgment seat of Christ, and that "the day"

will declare every man's work what sort it is, for "it shall be revealed by fire."

A construction of the sentence which leads to such incomprehensible explanations as these (and they are about the best which the collective wisdom of former commentators has devised) presents but little claim upon our attention. But if we connect the clause, as now suggested, not with ἀνεθέμην, but with τὸ εὐαγγέλιον, κ. τ. λ., laying the stress, not upon *the fact of the communication* of the gospel to the apostles, but upon *the sameness of the doctrine throughout*, we open the door to a new interpretation: discarding 'apprehension' and 'purpose,' as impracticable and worthless, we admit 'eventuality'—'adeo non,' a simple and grammatical usage, and producing a comprehensible and relevant sense.*

That St. Paul could have been actuated by any consideration whatever in making the communication which he did, but that it was positively and literally true, and that he was desirous to acquaint the apostles with the real nature of that doctrine which he had received by revelation from God, is not only highly improbable, but, judging from the result which followed, highly illogical to conclude. So satisfied were the apostles with the statements which he made, and so convinced were they of the authenticity of his mission, that, perceiving the grace that was given unto him, they gave unto him and Barnabas right hands of fellowship that they should go unto the heathen, and themselves unto the circumcision (v. 9). But the communication having been once made, upon the grounds above suggested, it was competent to him at any time to refer to it in attestation of the fact that no variance whatever subsisted between the doctrine which he *now* preached and that which he *formerly* propounded; for had he preached 'circumcision' at one time, and 'no circumcision' at another, the result would necessarily have followed, that at one period or the other he should have been labouring in vain; the doctrines, being conflicting, could not both be true; and at whatever time he upheld and inculcated error, his labour should have been to no purpose—'he should be running now, or have been then running in vain.'

^h Τρέχω, 'I run.' It will have been seen that in the explication above offered, τρέχω has been assumed as the *indicative present*, and not, as it has been usually understood, *the subjunctive*. But there is no reason why it should not be so taken; it is coupled with ἔγραμον, which is plainly indicative; and though instances have been adduced where μήπω occurs in the same sentence with an indicative and a subjunctive, yet the construction is rare, and not to be assumed when another explication will suffice. Besides, τρέχω in the indicative (interpreted as above proposed) affords a meaning not only intelligible but apposite; whereas in the subjunctive, in which it is the fashion to take it, there is (as Ellicott candidly acknowledges) "a difficulty both in mood and

* Μήπως in this place is equivalent to ἵνα μή (see Bloomfield on Matt. xiii. 15), which, taken embatically, yields the sense above attributed to it—'adeo non.'

tense," which, however he may attempt to explain it, continues a difficulty still. Moreover, it is unsusceptible, as we have just seen, of any meaning compatible with a due appreciation of St. Paul's position as an apostle.

VERSE 3.—* 'Αλλ' οὐδὲ Τίτος, 'But not even Titus'—ἀλλὰ, in its true 'separative' force, denoting a transition *to additional though not contrary* matter; joined with οὐδὲ, it here indicates transition from the *less weighty* to the *more important*.—See Luke, xxiii. 15; Acts, xix. 2. It had been maliciously asserted of Paul that at one period of his ministry he countenanced the circumcision of the Gentiles. To remove an impression so injurious to the consistency of his character, and to the integrity of the truth which he professed, the Apostle had just declared that the views which he entertained now upon the subject of circumcision were the very same which he held so far back as the council of Jerusalem, 'lest (in his own impressive language) he should be now running, or then have run in vain.' In corroboration of that *statement*, he now adduces *a fact*, namely, 'that not even was Titus, who accompanied him to Jerusalem, that stronghold of Jewish prejudice, where, if anywhere, he should have counselled him to submit, in order to please the Jews, "compelled to be circumcised."'

^b 'Ο σὺν ἐμοί, 'he that was with me'—'my companion' and *protege*, and presumably 'of the same mind with himself' upon all important religious topics, or perhaps more decidedly, 'under his direction and guidance.'

^c Ἑλλήν ὦν, 'being (or because he was) a Greek.' According to Ellicott, "*a concessive* participial clause, 'inasmuch as, or, though he was, a Greek,' suggestive of the reason why the demand was made." But the Apostle is evidently more intent to inform us in this place upon what principle the demand was resisted, than why it was made. More plausible is the explication of Alford, who regards Ἑλλήν ὦν as a *predicative* clause, "and was a Greek, and therefore liable to the demand that he should be circumcised," a translation unexceptionable in itself, and not incongruous with the general scope of the Apostle's argument, 'not even was Titus, my companion *and a Greek*, compelled to be circumcised, which would have been otherwise had I been the advocate (which they represent me to have been) of the circumcision of the Gentiles.' But not even yet, as it appears to me, is the Apostle's idea exactly developed. Ἑλλήν ὦν I take to be an *explicative* participial clause, 'being (or because he was) a Greek,' denoting, not "the reason why the demand was made" (Ellicott), nor yet "the reason why he was liable to the demand" (Alford), but 'the reason why the demand was resisted' "*because he was a Greek*," and it would be inconsistent with the doctrine which St. Paul maintained to circumcise him. Had he 'not been a Greek,' no principle would have been involved in his circumcision, no more than in the case of Timothy (the son of a Jewess), who was circumcised; nor should there have been any occasion to refer to the matter here, the question being, 'did St. Paul preach or countenance the circumcision of *the Gentiles*?' He avers that he did not, and points

to the opinions which he advocated in his interview with the apostles at Jerusalem; and *in proof of the averment* he further adduces *the fact*, 'that Titus, under his influence, and doubtless by his direction, "being (that is, *because he was*) a Greek," and not entitled to circumcision as a political or national badge, resisted, and successfully resisted, every influence that was brought to bear upon him to induce him to circumcise.' His being a Greek had no tendency—as the translation, "inasmuch as, or although he was a Greek," might lead one to suppose—to *attract* circumcision; on the contrary, it had the strongest possible tendency, without the abandonment of gospel principle, *to repel* it.

^a ἤναγκάσθη, 'was compelled.' It is generally considered that ἤναγκάσθη is too strong a term to be applied to any influence or moral suasion which St. Paul could be supposed to exercise over Titus to induce him to circumcise, and therefore it is explained in preference of the pertinacity and intimidation with which it may have been pressed upon him by the church at Jerusalem. Upon which I shall only remark, that it is the same word which is elsewhere (v. 14) applied by the Apostle to designate the influence which Peter exercised over the Gentile converts to induce them to judaize, which consisted, if not solely, at least principally, of the force of example. At the same time, I have no desire to controvert or call in question the opinion of recent expositors, who have agreed that the meaning of the expression in this place is, that while the circumcision of Titus was urgently demanded by the church at Jerusalem, it was for the reason above assigned successfully resisted by Paul and Barnabas.

VERSE 4.—^a Παρεισάκτους, primarily, 'brought in side by side,' hence figuratively 'under cover of another'—'furtively,' 'craftily introduced.' The object is subsequently explained, "they came in privily to spy out our liberty which we have in Christ Jesus"—a strategic figure, taken from the case of spies who introduce themselves craftily into a besieged place, to possess themselves of the stronghold, and thence to subdue the inhabitants. In like manner these 'false brethren' cunningly introduced themselves into the fellowship of the church, not out of regard to the truth it upheld, nor solicitude for the welfare of souls, but with a view from within more effectually to assail its doctrines, and more especially that citadel of Christian liberty, the doctrine of 'justification by faith irrespective of legal works,' and to bring its members into subjection to themselves. The church is never in so great peril from the violence of open enemies, as from the machinations of false and pretended friends.

^b Ψευδαδέλφους, 'false (or pretended) brethren'—brethren only by profession, having never participated in the true source of brotherhood, 'regeneration,' whereby we are made the children of God, and brethren one of the other. "He that sanctifieth (Jesus Christ), and those who are sanctified, are all of one (God), for which cause He is not ashamed to call them brethren."—Heb. ii. 11. That these men (teachers, it would seem) did not maintain the truth of the gospel in all its simplicity, mixing up ceremonial observances with the work of

Christ, as constituting a ground of hope, is true; and that they did so, not from honest and sincere conviction, but from base and temporizing motives (see ch. vi. 12), is equally true; but, nevertheless, these were but the evidences, not the ground of their corruption; the true ground is disclosed in the designation applied, they were “false (or pretended) brethren.”

^c Οἷτινες, ‘who’—‘men who, or a set of men who’—“not simply equivalent to οἱ (Ust.), but specifying the class to which they belong.”—ELLICOTT.

^d Κατασκοπῆσαι, ‘to spy out’—to be understood here in a hostile sense, of persons who introduced themselves insidiously into the fellowship of the church, to make themselves acquainted with the system and character of Christian liberty, that they might be in a better position to assail it.

^e Καταδουλώσωνται, ‘that they may bring us into subjection to themselves.’ The mention in the same context of “the liberty (to wit, from the law) which we have in Christ” might naturally lead us to expect καταδουλώσωνται should have reference to the same subject, and indicate ‘subjection to the law,’ which would in itself present a good and suitable meaning. But the verb is in the middle voice, and must properly be translated, ‘bring into subjection to themselves.’ It must be recollected that the great boast of the Jewish people was their severance from all the nations of the earth, as the chosen people of Jehovah; favoured above all others, as being the depositories of the divine law; theirs were the adoption, and the glory, and the worship, which pre-eminence they were naturally unwilling to forego; and consequently, upon the introduction of Christianity into the world, their first efforts were directed by every available means—by persuasion, by intimidation, and even by open violence—to oppose its progress, and hinder its proclamation to the Gentiles. But when they found that opposition was useless, that the gospel was destined to succeed, their next endeavour was to secure the pre-eminence of their own nation, by insisting that, if the Gentiles were to be saved, they should at least be indebted to Jewish ordinances for their salvation. Hence the zeal and pertinacity with which, for years, indeed throughout the whole course of their national existence, they struggled to impose the yoke of the Mosaic law upon the reluctant neck of the Gentiles.

We may well suppose that pecuniary considerations (as St. Paul plainly intimates in more places than one of his writings) were not without their influence in producing and fostering that zeal. The Jewish teachers might well anticipate a preference, if not an absolute monopoly, of teaching, if the ceremonial law were to constitute the principal subject of instruction. Besides, the many expensive offerings at the temple, and the confluence of all nations which would consequently ensue to Jerusalem, could not fail of producing a beneficial effect upon the material interests of that sordid yet ambitious people. Hence every subversion of gospel liberty was hailed as a direct gain to Judaism, and every fresh batch of converts to circumcision was an accession *of subjects and tribu-*

taries to mother church. A close parallel may be traced in the efforts of Romanism, in all ages and in all countries, to prevent the circulation of the Scriptures, and oppose the preaching of the gospel, that by the substitution of unmeaning and antichristian ceremonies, in the place of simple trust in the Redeemer, they may enslave the souls and bodies of men, and “bring them into subjection to themselves”—a parallelism well calculated to reflect light upon the word *καταδουλώσονται* in the passage before us.

‘*Διὰ δὲ τοὺς, κ. τ. λ.*’ The terms being thus expounded, we now turn to the material consideration, the construction of the sentence. What is the government of *διὰ δὲ τοὺς παρεισάκτους*? and here a vast diversity of opinion meets us. *Οὐκ ἠναγκάσθη περιτμηθῆναι* says one—“and that, or now it was, because of the false brethren insidiously brought in, explanatory statement why Titus was not compelled to be circumcised, viz., because the *ψευδαδελφοί* were making it a party matter,” Ellicott (with whom also Alford); but this construction, he candidly admits, “is not very perspicuous.” *Ἀνεθέμην αὐτοῖς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον*, answers a second—“I laid before them an account of my preaching among the Gentiles, but privately to those of reputation, lest haply I might be running, or had been running, in vain; and this was done on account of false brethren, who had been unwarily introduced among us, who had stolen in to become spies on the liberty which we have in Christ,” Bloomfield; to which also might have been appended the annotation, “not very perspicuous.” *Συνπαρέλαβον δὲ Τίτον*, replies a third—“And I took with me Titus because of the false brethren,” Whitby; but he cautiously abstains from explanation. But to all and every of these constructions the same objection applies—they take no notice whatever of *δὲ* (*διὰ δὲ τοὺς παρεισ.*); and I might also add, the difficulty of tracing any ostensible *vis consequentiæ* between the respective members of the sentence.

The correct answer I apprehend to be, *ἀνέβην*, supplied from the second verse, ‘and I went up in consequence of certain privily introduced false brethren.’ The Apostle, exhibiting a brief sketch of his history from his accession to the apostolate to the period of his rencounter with Peter at Antioch, in order to show that from the moment he was put in trust of the gospel by the immediate revelation of God it underwent no change or modification whatsoever at the hands of men, gives an account, amongst other things, of his visit to Jerusalem, recorded in the fifteenth chapter of the Acts of the Apostles; and in order to make a full statement of every circumstance, and cut off every pretext for misrepresentation or error, introduces by the way that he went up in accordance with a revelation; that he submitted his gospel to the authorities in private, as free from every tinge of Judaism then as it was on the day in which he was now addressing them, in confirmation of which declaration ‘not even Titus, who was with him, was compelled to be circumcised;’ and then continues his narrative—“and I went up (*ἀνέβην*, resumed from the second verse) on the occasion of certain false brethren privily introduced”—*ἀνέβην δὲ* in the first instance (v. 2) declaring *the*

origin of his mission, the revelation to the church at Antioch, ἀνέβην resumed *the occasion* of it, and both together exhibiting a detailed account of ἀνέβην εἰς Ἱεροσόλυμα in the first verse; a translation devoid of every grammatical or contextual difficulty (δὲ being duly acknowledged and accounted for), and in singular accordance with historic truth; for, turning to the fifteenth chapter of the Acts of the Apostles, where the whole circumstance is narrated at large, the first sentence which meets the eye is, “And certain men which came down from Judea taught the brethren, and said, *except ye be circumcised* after the manner of Moses, ye cannot be saved: when therefore *Paul and Barnabas* had no small discussion and disputation with them, they determined that *Paul and Barnabas*, and certain others with them, *should go up* (ἀναβαίνειν) to *Jerusalem*, unto the apostles and elders about this question”—a coincidence so striking, that even if the grammatical inducement was less strong than it is, we should be almost constrained, upon exegetical considerations alone, to admit the propriety of the explanation.

VERSE 5.—^a Οἷς, ‘to whom,’ the false brethren, to wit: of the alacrity and courage with which the Apostle met their pretensions we have ample testimony.—Acts, xv. 1.

^b Τῇ ὑποταγῇ, ‘by subjection.’ A modal dative, the article being prefixed for the purpose of specification; ‘*the subjection*,’ namely, that which they would have imposed upon us. “To whom I did not yield by subjection,” equivalent to, ‘to whom I did not submit, either to their arguments or to their intimidation.’

^c Ἡ ἀλήθεια, ‘the truth’—*the characteristic truth* of the gospel, which was assailed and imperilled by the Judaizing teachers, who would impose the yoke of the ceremonial law upon the Gentile converts. Bloomfield is doubly in error, paraphrasing ἡ ἀλήθεια τοῦ εὐαγγελίου by “the true gospel,” a translation which not only ignores the fact that there is one great transcendental truth, which is emphatically “the truth of the gospel,” namely, ‘justification by faith only without legal works;’ the truth which was embodied (as the Apostle shows in the following chapter) in the original promise to Abraham, and was assailed by the ritualism of the false teachers, but also violates a sound grammatical principle, that ‘whenever the governing noun is *a distinct element* in the noun governed, it should invariably be translated as such;’ here, therefore, “the truth of the gospel.”—See Winer, Gr. § xxxiv. 3, a.

^d Διαμείνη πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ‘may continue to abide with you’—abide with you *all through*, the force of διὰ in composition. It was not for the Galatians only that the Apostle fought the battle at Antioch, but for the whole Gentile world, inasmuch as he was “the Apostle of the Gentiles,” Rom. xi. 13. Πρὸς ὑμᾶς, then, is applied to them only as being included in the general denomination τὰ ἔθνη.

VERSE 6.—^a Ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν δοκούντων, κ. τ. λ. ‘but of those (who are) in reputation,’ &c. Before entering upon the investigation of this much-controverted passage, I must protest *in limine* against the intervention of anacoluthon, that redoubtable champion, who so opportunely appears to cut the knot of every grammatical difficulty. “Here again is an

anacoluthon," exclaims Dr. Bloomfield, when he proceeds to inform us what St. Paul intended to have written, but did not. It would greatly facilitate our progress in scriptural investigation, if we took it for granted that the inspired writer not only indited sound theology, but that he did it in ordinarily grammatical language. And should the meaning at any time be inapparent, it becomes our duty, in all humility, and with heart-felt distrust of our own powers,—with patient and prayerful application to dig beneath the surface in order to attain it, rather than at the first blush of difficulty to give the reins to an inventive imagination, and suffer it to dictate to us what might, or what ought, to have been said upon the occasion. In such a spirit of inquiry I doubt not but that the present passage will be divested of all its perplexity, and turn out to be nothing more than a very intelligible and straightforward continuation of the account of St. Paul's visit to Jerusalem, wherein, having immediately before stated 'the occasion upon which' he went up, he now proceeds to inform us of 'the events which befel him' in that city, the very circumstance, indeed, in order to which he adverted to the subject at all.

In schoolboy fashion then, ὅποιοί δ' ἔ ποτε ἦσαν, but what manner of persons at one time were ἀπὸ τῶν δοκούντων εἶναι τι, some of those (τίνας inferred from ἀπὸ) who are in repute (in the church) οὐδέν μοι διαφέρει, maketh no difference to me, or affects not my case (πρόσωπον Θεοῦ ἀνθρώπου οὐ λαμβάνει, being a parenthesis, pretermitted for the present) ἐμοὶ γὰρ οἱ δοκοῦντες, for to me they who are in repute, οὐδὲν προσανέθεντο, enjoined or communicated nothing; but on the contrary, &c. &c.—a translation unassailable on the score of grammar, presenting no formidable hiatus, to be filled up at the discretion of the translator—no unaccountable mutation of syntax which at one stroke converts a genitive into a nominative (Bloomfield); or, commencing the sentence passively, concludes it actively (Ellicott); or, "going off into a parenthesis, entirely loses sight of the original construction, forgetting even to close his parenthesis," the plausible conjecture of Alford. But, on the contrary, every word occupies its proper place, is understood in its ordinary signification, and every word tells; while the connexion with the context is not problematical, but pointed, establishing beyond all controversy the position with which the Apostle sets out, that whatever intercourse he may have had with his brother apostles in Jerusalem, he derived neither instruction nor commission from them. And if any error or inconsistency did at one time attach to the character or the teaching of any of them, it could by no means affect his case, for that in conference they communicated to him—nothing.

^b Ὅποιοί, 'what sort or kind'—*qualis*, but in what respect *qualis*, must depend upon the nature of the context. Here *qualis* as to the views, opinions, statements, errors, which at one time they might have entertained or promulgated—the ignorance, or weakness, or inconsistency, or whatever else it might be termed, which attached to their conduct upon the subject (it may be supposed) of circumcision, which was principally in contemplation at the time.

^c Ποτε, also indefinite, 'once,' some past period; certainly not, as has been surmised, 'when they were unconverted,' or 'when they were in attendance upon the Lord,' a period their shortcomings in which were not likely to be called in question now; but 'when, as apostles of Jesus Christ, they held, or by the inconsistency of their conduct led others to believe that they held, opinions subversive of the truth of the gospel.' Ellicott, indeed, thinks that ποτε here "is not *temporal*, but connected with ὅποιοί, which it seems to render more general and inclusive;" but it is more natural to understand it in the sense attributed to it above, as indicating the period to which the reflection conveyed in ὅποιοί refers.

^d Οὐδὲν μοι διαφέρει, 'maketh no difference to me.' There is not a shadow of depreciation traceable in this phrase. The Apostle was absolutely incapable of the sentiments attributed to him by some writers, as though he were indifferent to the character, real or imputed, of his brother apostles. I cannot even go the length of Dr. Bloomfield when defending the Apostle's language, to admit "that he merely used words which may have the appearance of arrogance, but have not the reality; and that, not to gratify vanity, but, as Chrysostom says, 'to benefit the weak in Christ.'" There is not, I maintain, when fairly interpreted, even "the appearance of arrogance" in these words; but, as I before showed, a plain matter-of-fact statement, that whatever opinions the apostles, or some of them, may have entertained upon the subject of circumcision as pertaining to the Gentile converts, or however they may have comported themselves in the matter, it could in nowise affect his case either as to doctrine or to practice, for from them he had received no communication or injunction whatever.

In the commencement of the sentence there is indeed an allusion (ὅποιοί ποτε ἦσαν) to some measure of inconsistency attaching in some way to some of the apostles; but so far from its being paraded ostentatiously, or descanted upon with arrogance or severity, it is introduced in a spirit of diffidence and mildness, spoken of as a thing of the past (ἦσαν), and adverted to of necessity, in self-vindication, and in defence of the fundamental truth of the gospel committed to his charge, and under the shield too of a *quasi* apology—"God is no respecter of persons."

^e Πρόσωπον Θεὸς ἀνθρώπου οὐ λαμβάνει, 'God accepteth not the person of man'—an expression "used by the LXX. to translate a Hebrew phrase, meaning to show partiality or favour, and this either in a good sense, as Mal. i. 8, or in a bad one, as Mal. ii. 9. It is used in the latter sense in the New Testament. Hence the words προσωπολήπτης, Acts, x. 34, and προσωποληψία, Rom. xi. 11; Eph. vi. 9."—BAGGE. What the precise manner may be in which it is intended to apply, affords, however, room for conjecture, there being no sure grounds in the sentence for arriving at an exact conclusion. However, upon a consideration of the circumstances under which it is used, the following suggestion, it is presumed, cannot be far from the mark:—"God does not, cannot shut his eyes to the faults of his creatures, be they high or low.

And the servant of the living God, in whom is the spirit of his Master, in the discharge of his sacred duties, must lay aside all false delicacy in his dealing with men and with things, when the interests of religion are at stake.' To apply the maxim in the present instance—the defence of his gospel, and of his own consistency as a minister of Jesus Christ, called for an allusion to the shortcomings of some, and there was no reason why he should affect a concealment. Eminent as they might be in the estimation of the church, 'God accepteth no man's person,' that he should pass over their faults in silence, when the cause of truth required outspokenness upon his part.

As to any supposable contrast between what the apostles really were and what they professed to be ("whether they were or were not the very *ὑπερλίαν ἀπόστολοι*"), it is totally out of the question, being founded upon a sheer misconception of the object of the passage, and the import of the terms used, *οἱ ποτε ἦσαν*, as I before observed, referring not to general character, but to their behaviour upon some particular time and occasion which is the subject of allusion here, *ποτε*, 'once,' *scil.*, in the affair of the circumcision of the Gentiles; and the phrase *ἀπὸ τῶν δοκούντων εἶναί τι*, being expressive, not of any doubt or suspicion as to the sincerity of the profession of those to whom it applied, but of the acknowledged esteem and reverence in which they were held by all parties in the church, and by none, we may be assured, more unfeignedly or more heartily than by St. Paul himself.

'Οὐδὲν προσανέθεντο, 'they upon their part laid (upon me) no injunction beyond what I was subjected to before.' *Ἀνατίθημι*, literally, 'to set up upon'; in the middle voice, in which form alone it occurs in the New Testament, 'to lay up (or set up on) in one's own behalf;' in later usage (the original idea, however, not being lost sight of), 'to communicate,' as we find it in Gal. ii. 6, or 'to communicate for the purpose of consultation;' 'to confer,' as in Gal. i. 16. Here the compound *ΠΡΟΣανέθεντο*, 'they on their part laid (upon me) no fresh or additional injunction.'

VERSE 7.—* *Ἀλλὰ τὸναντίον*, 'but on the contrary.' So far from communicating anything to me by way of injunction, or conferring any authority upon me, as though I had need of either, they, on the contrary, seeing from the evidence that was laid before them that I was entrusted with the gospel of the uncircumcision, as fully and unreservedly as Peter with the gospel of the circumcision, gave to me and Barnabas right hands of fellowship. Alford's idea of 'the contrariety' expressed in these terms, namely, "that instead of strengthening the hands of Paul, they left him to fight his own battle," is extravagant and visionary, and at variance with the fact stated, 'that they extended to Paul and Barnabas right hands of fellowship, and divided the field of labour between them.*

* "The order is, *ἀλλὰ τὸναντίον Ἰάκωβος καὶ Κηφᾶς καὶ Ἰωάννης, οἱ δοκῶντες στῦλοι εἶναι, ἰδόντες . . . καὶ γνόντες . . . δεξιὰς ἔδωκαν, κ. τ. λ.* Scholefield justly observes that, by interposing the nominative between the two participles, our translators have confused the sense."—BAGGE.

^b Τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς ἀκροβυστίας, gen. subjecti, 'the gospel of or belonging to the uncircumcision' (ἀκροβυστίας, abstract for concrete),—of which he was the depository or trustee for the Gentiles. This trust the Apostle recognises elsewhere—"I am a debtor both to the Greeks and to the Barbarians, to the wise and to the unwise," Rom. i. 14, having received the gospel in trust for the whole world. We are not, however, to conclude from this expression that the ministry of St. Paul was exclusively confined to the Gentiles (on the contrary, see Acts, xvii. 2, 10, xviii. 5, xix. 3), any more than the ministry of Peter was exclusively applied to the Jews (*e contra*, see Acts, x.), but that the principal engagement of Paul lay with the uncircumcision, as that of Peter with the circumcision.

VERSE 8.—^a Ὁ γὰρ ἐνεργήσας Πέτρῳ, 'For he that wrought effectually for Peter.' Πέτρῳ, dat. commodi, "not governed by the ἐν in ἐνεργήσας (as Alford well remarks), the meaning of this preposition being already expressed in the word ἐνεργεῖν, and having therefore no force to pass on."* This sentence is evidently parenthetical, and explanatory of the preceding statement. He had just observed that the apostles, "having seen," that is, being satisfied in their own minds, that he was entrusted with the gospel of the uncircumcision (καθὼς, 'just as,' in manner and extent, for there is nothing to limit the application), as distinctly and fully as Peter was with the gospel of the circumcision, and going on to notice what happened consequentially thereon, namely, that they gave right hands of fellowship to Barnabas and himself, introduces *parenthetically* the grounds upon which that conclusion was founded, *scil.*, that in both instances alike the divine appointment was signified by the effectual working of God, the nature of the working to be deduced from the object to which it is applied, and that object is distinctly defined—εἰς ἀποστολήν, that is, to the due and effective discharge of the apostolic office.

Whatever, therefore, qualified the apostles for such a discharge, must of necessity have been included in the ἐνέργημα τοῦ Θεοῦ (the effectual working of God). We must understand, therefore, in the first place, those miraculous gifts and powers by which their divine authority was attested, which we find expressly ascribed to the energizing of God (1 Cor. xii. 6, 11); and, secondly, that divine aid and assistance by which they were supported and carried forward triumphantly in the exercise of their sacred office, which likewise we find attributed to the same divine source (Col. i. 28, 29). These evidences then having been duly laid before them, as by reference to Acts, xv. 4, we find that they were, and the apostles James, Cephas, and John, apprehending with their minds and knowing in their hearts (the climax probably presented, ἰδόντες referring to mental vision, γνόντες to spiritual apprehension,—the conviction of the mind and the conviction of the heart) the grace

* That the force of the preposition is expended within the word itself is apparent, from the constant use of the preposition ἐν, when the sphere within which the operation is supposed to take place is intended to be expressed. For examples, see Mark, vi. 14; Rom. vii. 5; Eph. i. 20, *et al.*

that was given to him, “gave to Paul and to Barnabas right hands of fellowship.”

VERSE 9.—^a Τὴν χάριν τὴν δοθεῖσάν μοι, ‘the grace that was given unto me’—the grace of apostleship, that which was the immediate subject of discussion, the apostleship of the uncircumcision—to which also he refers in another place: “To me, who am less than the least of all saints, is *this* grace given, that I should preach among the Gentiles the *unsearchable riches of Christ*,” Eph. iii. 8.

^b Δεξιὰς κοινωνίας, ‘right hands of fellowship,’ a qualitative genitive, specifying the kind of right hands intended, *scil.*, “right hands of fellowship.” Right hands clasped have been universally regarded as an emblem of fellowship. The giving, therefore, of a right hand was an acknowledgment upon the part of the profferer ‘of a fellowship’ then commencing, or subsisting at the time. The same emblem was also used to denote ‘compact or agreement;’ nevertheless, fellowship and compact are two several ideas, and, though both represented by the same emblem, are not by any means to be confounded together, or regarded as necessarily conjoined. The emblem here intended is expressly defined to be the right hand of ‘fellowship,’ being the result of evidence adduced that both parties were called of God to the same sacred office. Bloomfield, therefore, is not justified in supposing that “here it would seem that *both fellowship and compact* are meant—the former principally, the latter secondarily,” in which supposition he thinks that he is borne out by the insertion of the clause introduced by ἵνα at the close of the ninth verse; for the division of labour there referred to by no means appears to be the result of ‘compact’ confirmed between the parties by the joining of hands, but merely an arrangement of convenience, to reach no farther or to last no longer than the service of the good cause in which they were respectively engaged would seem to require; accordingly, we find it dispensed with on sundry and manifold occasions.

^c Κοινωνίας, ‘of fellowship,’ not with the body of Christ generally, i.e. ‘Christian fellowship,’ but with the company of the apostles—‘apostolic fellowship.’ As a Christian brother, it is probable that he had been long known and acknowledged by the apostles, but as an accredited apostle of the Lord Jesus Christ never formally till now. It is observable that Barnabas, who was not, strictly speaking, an apostle (though loosely styled a thirteenth apostle by some), is associated with Paul in the receiving the right hand of fellowship; but it is quite plain that Paul is regarded as the principal personage throughout; it is *his* authority as an apostle which is the subject of investigation; it is *for him* that the signs of an apostle are said to have been wrought similarly as for Peter; and it is *to him*, consequently, upon the recognition of those signs, that the right hand of fellowship is principally extended. Barnabas, however, being his companion in travel, and associated with him generally in the ministry of the word, as well as in this particular mission from the church of Antioch, is included in this act of recognition, but each in his proper sphere and position. “Paul they acknowledged to

be an apostle of equal rank and authority with themselves, and Barnabas they acknowledged to be a minister sent forth by the Holy Ghost to preach the gospel to the Gentiles: this distinction it is necessary to make, because it does not appear that Barnabas was an apostle in the proper sense of the word."—M'KNIGHT *in loco*. On the separation of the genitive (κοινωνίας) from its governing noun (δεξιὰς), Alford observes, that "it is made here because what follows respects rather κοινωνίας than ἔδωκαν"—fellowship, to wit, in the apostolic office, "that we should go unto the Gentiles, and they unto the circumcision."

VERSE 10.—^a Μόνον τῶν πτωχῶν ἵνα μνημονεύωμεν, 'only that we should remember the poor.' There appears to be a general consent amongst commentators that "the poor" in this place means the poor saints at Jerusalem, who in the arrangement above mentioned, that Paul should devote himself to the ministry of the Gentiles, might seem to be overlooked or disregarded. And this appropriation of the term is borne out by the fact, that it was the constant practice of the Apostle, wherever he went, to make collections for the poor, amongst the Gentile converts, and transmit them to Jerusalem. To this practice he refers in the following words:—"Now I go to Jerusalem to minister unto the saints," that is, to carry to them the alms and contributions which he had collected for them through the churches; "for it hath pleased them of Macedonia and Achaia to make a certain contribution for *the poor saints which are at Jerusalem*," meaning thereby of Jewish extraction; for immediately he adds—"for if the Gentiles have been made partakers of their spiritual things, their duty is also to minister unto them in carnal things."—See Rom. xv. 25, *et seq.* In another place he gives directions how these collections were to be made:—"Upon the first day of the week (the Christian Sabbath) let every one of you lay by him in store, as God hath prospered him, that there be no gatherings (collections) when I come; and when I come, whomsoever ye shall approve by your letters, them will I send to bring your liberality to Jerusalem."—1 Cor. xvi. 23.

But it is by no means so generally agreed how this injunction, "only that we should remember the poor" (μόνον τῶν πτωχῶν, κ. τ. λ.) is (constructively) introduced. Some consider it "a limiting clause, dependent on δεξιὰς ἔδωκαν, and expressive of the condition attached to the general compact—"we were to go to the Gentiles, they to the circumcision," with this stipulation only, that we were not to forget the poor in Judea" (Ellicott and Alford). But, independently of the fact above adverted to, that there was positively *no compact at all*, but merely an acknowledgment of apostolic fellowship, and an understanding as to the fields of labour which they were respectively to occupy, it is difficult to apprehend how a commission emanating from God could be limited or affected by any stipulation appended to it by man. Bloomfield indeed regards it as an ellipsis, and supplies αἰτοῦντες, or παρακαλοῦντες, or some such word, "the complete sense being (they did not wish to impede or circumscribe our liberty of action as apostles by any rules or directions of theirs), but they only desired that we

should be mindful of the poor.” But it is uncritical to encumber the sentence with words not found in the text, when we have only to go back to οὐδὲν προσανέθεντο of verse 6 to find the government required.

The construction is natural and easy—οὐδὲν προσανέθεντο, μόνον (προσανέθεντο understood) τῶν πτωχῶν ἵνα, κ. τ. λ. It is to be borne in mind, that throughout the entire of this context the Apostle’s sole object is to evince, that whatever tendency some of his brethren might have exhibited at one period (and that the very period to which reference is now made) to Jewish rites and ceremonies, it was matter of indifference to him, inasmuch as, in the conference which took place at Jerusalem (or indeed at any other time), they enjoined upon him nothing. Having so far proceeded in declaring what they *did not do*, he branches off (verses 7, 8, 9) parenthetically to state what *they did do*—“On the contrary, they fully recognised my independent position as an apostle of Jesus Christ, and divided the field of labour between us;” and then, resuming his direct discourse, he continues—“only that we should remember the poor,” which, when read connectedly with the preceding words (the parenthesis being shut off), is to this effect: “they communicated to (or enjoined upon) me nothing, only that I should remember the poor”—an exception so immaterial in itself, that it could not be regarded as affecting the general question of his independence as an apostle of Jesus Christ—a construction which has the recommendation of an exact correspondence with the subject in hand, without straining the language of the text, or the addition of supplementary words.

^b “Ὁ καὶ ἐσπούδασα, αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ποιῆσαι, ‘which I was also anxious, that same, to do.’ The construction above submitted of the early part of the verse receives further confirmation from the introduction of these words, which upon any other view of the connexion are comparatively unmeaning and pointless, but upon the construction there proposed assume considerable pertinency and force. The clause commencing ὁ καὶ ἐσπούδασα, and concluding with ποιῆσαι, is not to be regarded as a description of the Apostle’s alacrity in the performance of the duty assigned him. If that had been the object, it would have been sufficiently effected by the words ὁ καὶ ἐσπούδασα ποιῆσαι, without the additional words which follow; but the introduction of αὐτὸ τοῦτο gives a new colouring to the whole passage, being a reference to the injunction aforesaid in some particular aspect, only to be deduced from the context. If it had been some great difficulty which had been imposed upon the Apostle, “which also, that same,” would imply ‘which also, great and arduous as it was, I was ready to undertake;’ or, had it been some act of humiliation that was required of him, ‘which also that same, degrading and humiliating to my feelings as it might be, I did not shrink from performing;’ but here all that was prescribed to him was, that he should remember the poor, ‘which also that same, trifling and inconsiderable as it was, I was anxious myself to perform;’ where ἐσπούδασα represents, not the haste with which the Apostle proceeded to carry the

injunction into effect, but the alacrity with which he took it in hand. Observe now how effectively the relation of this incident bears upon the purpose in view. 'I met the apostles, indeed, in conclave at Jerusalem; but so little was my course of action affected by that interview, that I received but one injunction at their hands, namely, that I should remember the poor; and that same, inconsiderable as it was, positively uncalled for and unneeded, inasmuch as I was willing and anxious of mine ownself to attend to it.' *Kaì* may possibly be regarded here, not merely as copulative, but 'ascensive' ('even'); 'which duty I not only undertook, but (*καὶ ἐσπούδασα*) *even* with the utmost alacrity and zeal.'

VERSE 11.—* Ὅτε δὲ ἦλθε, κ. τ. λ. In this paragraph the Apostle passes on to the notice of a further occurrence, illustrative of the same position, namely, his absolute independence of Peter and the rest of the Apostles in the course which he pursued, and the steady and determined resistance which circumcision and Jewish ordinances, when attempted to be imposed upon the Gentile converts, invariably encountered at his hands. "And (*δὲ* continuative and oppositive as in verse 4) when Peter came to Antioch" (which event took place subsequently to the interview just detailed), "I withstood him" (*ἀντέστην αὐτῷ*), not timidly and cautiously, behind his back, but boldly and manfully "to his face" (*κατὰ πρόσωπον*).*

^b *Κατεγνωσμένος ἦν*, 'he was condemned,' or 'stood condemned.' The translation in the Authorized Version presents a plain and appropriate sense, and such as, from our imperfect knowledge of the circumstance referred to, we should have been fully satisfied to accept. Nevertheless, the form of the verb is too strong for us; the participle perfect passive is capable of no other translation than that adopted above, 'he was condemned,' or 'stood condemned.'

It is possible that this circumstance having occurred subsequently to the return of Paul and Barnabas to Antioch, bringing with them the decree of the council relative to the noncircumcision of the Gentiles, the inconsistency of Peter's conduct, glaring and unjustifiable as it would seem, gave occasion to serious displeasure to the better-minded portion of the church (that is, of the Gentiles, for the Jews to a man sided with Peter); and that Paul, being the leader of the anti-judaistic section, feeling that an important crisis had arrived, and that the very existence of gospel liberty was imperilled, gave expression to the general feeling, and, in the exercise of his apostolic authority, rebuked him openly (the

* "Chrysostom and Jerome are here followed by Erasmus and A Lapide in a strange departure from honesty, common sense, and sound criticism; and translating *κατὰ πρόσω.*, 'in appearance,' say that Paul's opposition was feigned and (as Elsner says of Jerome) 'pias fraudes minus pie defendunt.' If any desire to be shown the absurdity and wickedness of such a supposition, they may read Augustine's letters to Jerome, in which he opposes the idea. St. Paul, indeed, sufficiently explains himself by *ἐμπροσθεν πάντων*, in verse 14; but we have the very expression in the LXX., Deut. vii. 24, xi. 25; Jud. ii. 14, showing that it means open opposition."
—BAGGE.

supposition of Ellicott). But I am more disposed to agree with Alford, that "St. Paul would hardly have waited for the prompting of others to pronounce his condemnation of Peter," but that the condemnation here contemplated was not by the Christians at Antioch and Paul at their head, but *by his own act*; in other words, 'he was self-condemned'—convicted by his own conduct of 'inconsistency,' the nature and extent of which inconsistency is fully set forth and established in the argument which follows.

VERSE 12.—^a *Τινες ἀπὸ Ἰακώβου*, 'certain persons from James.' Though it is not expressly asserted in these words, nor are we at liberty certainly to conclude from anything that is here stated, that these persons were sent down upon a mission from James to effect the revolution which they did, or that they even fairly represented the sentiments of that distinguished apostle, yet from the suggestive manner in which his name is introduced in connexion with them (*ἀπὸ Ἰακώβου* rather than *ἀπὸ Ἱεροσολύμων*), which is, to say the least of it, suspicious, I am inclined to think that in some manner and to some extent James was implicated in the temporary defection of Peter,—a supposition which may not improbably account for the *οἱ ποτε ἦσαν* (plural) of a former verse (v. 6).

Upon the first glance it might be considered that the question at issue here was not precisely the same that had been mooted and definitively settled at the council of Jerusalem,—the question there being, 'whether it was incumbent *upon the Gentile converts* to keep the law of Moses in its ritualistic observances in order to salvation;' whereas the question involved in Peter's case would seem to be, whether it was lawful for a man who was *by birth a Jew* to dispense with the ceremonial law, and eat with the Gentiles? If such a distinction could be established, it might go some length to palliate the otherwise inexcusable aberration of Peter, as originating in misconception and ignorance. Peter, it seems, had been in the habit of associating with the Gentiles daily at their meals, until the arrival of certain parties from Jerusalem; but when they came, and objected and remonstrated, and evidently intimidated him with their presence, he pusillanimously gave way, and withdrew from their society, the rest of the Jews following his example.

But, after all, the question is practically the same: Peter's withdrawing himself from the Gentile converts, through the intimidation of those from James, was no mere assertion of his own personal liberty to eat and drink as he pleased, but a virtual condemnation of Gentile fashion, and an indirect attempt to compel them to conform to the usages of the Jews. As such, evidently, it was regarded by St. Paul; for the whole weight of his remonstrance is rested upon this point: "If thou, being a Jew, livest after the manner of the Gentiles, and not as do the Jews, *why compellest thou the Gentiles to live as do the Jews?*"

^b *Μετὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν συνήσθιεν*, 'he ate (or was in the habit of eating) with the Gentiles'—evidently the Gentile converts to Christianity, for with none others would he associate. Under Mosaic discipline it was unlawful for a Jew, under any pretence or circumstance whatsoever, to

associate with Gentiles. To this prohibition Peter adverts upon his first introduction to Cornelius: "Ye know that it is an unlawful thing for a man that is a Jew to keep company with, or to come unto one of another nation; but God hath showed me (by the vision recorded, Acts, x. 11), that I should not call any man common or unclean."—Acts, x. 28. To which vision he afterwards alludes in his speech in the council, and indeed was mainly influenced by it in giving his decision as he did, to put not "a yoke upon the neck of the disciples which neither our fathers nor we were able to bear." In the spirit of this decision, we find him at Antioch eating and drinking with the Gentiles, until he suffered himself to be drawn aside by those of the circumcision, when he withdrew from their society, and so doing imperilled the great truth which he was expressly commissioned to uphold. Upon which defalcation M'Knight judiciously observes:—"Though the gift of inspiration bestowed on the apostles secured them from error in doctrine, it did not preserve them from all imprudence and sin in conduct, as is plain from this instance; therefore the most advanced, whether in knowledge or virtue, warned by Peter's example, ought to take heed lest they fall."

^c Ὑπέστελλεν καὶ ἀφώριζεν ἑαυτόν, 'he pusillanimously drew back, and separated himself.' On these two verbs Ellicott observes, "The first does not mark *the secret*; the second, *the open course* (Matth.), but simply *the initial* and *more completed acts*, respectively." I agree with Bagge that ἑαυτόν, being coupled with ὑπέστελλεν, gives it the sense of the middle voice (see Jelf, Gr. Gr., 363, 4), 'to dread,' 'to shrink back:' "he shrunk back, and separated himself."—BAGGE.

^d Τοὺς ἐκ περιτομῆς, 'those of the circumcision.' We may confidently affirm that this expression does not contemplate the whole body of the Jewish converts inclusively; for a large portion of them, we have reason to apprehend, indeed all that were at Antioch at the time, followed Peter in his hypocrisy, "*fearing them of the circumcision*." They were then but a section of the Jewish converts who are so designated (those who had come down from Jerusalem), who were more than ordinarily zealous for circumcision and the law of Moses, most probably of the sect of the Pharisees, of whom we read that "there arose up certain of the sect of the Pharisees which believed, saying, that it was needful to circumcise them (the Gentiles), and to command them to keep the law of Moses."—Acts, xv. 5. In the same restricted sense, apparently, the expression occurs in the Epistle to Titus—"For there are many unruly and vain talkers and deceivers, specially *they of the circumcision* (οἱ ἐκ περιτομῆς) whose mouths must be stopped."—Tit. i. 10, 11. It is not to be imagined that the Apostle intended to stigmatize the whole body of Jewish converts as "vain and unruly talkers," which should have been the case were the words to be taken in an unlimited sense. It is moreover to be observed that the expression in that place is not μάλιστα ἐκ τῆς περιτομῆς, as though these troublesome and vain babblers were principally of the sect of the Jews, that is, the Jewish portion of the Christian church; but μάλιστα οἱ ἐκ περιτομῆς, as though *an entire class of persons*, whosoever they might be, were collectively designated.

In like manner it is reasonable to conclude that the expression before us embraced only a section of the Jewish believers, who either from their extravagant admiration of the Jewish ritual assumed to themselves the title, or (more probably), from the vehemency with which they advocated its claims, were denominated by others οἱ ἐκ περιτομῆς.

VERSE 13.—^a Συνυπεκρίθησαν αὐτῷ ‘practised dissimulation (literally ‘played a part’) together with him.’ That Peter in this instance erred, not from ignorance or any misconception of the true plan of salvation as respected the Gentiles, is evident, not only from his address to Cornelius (Acts, x. 28), but also from the plain testimony of St. Paul, who informs us that Peter was actuated in this instance by an unworthy timidity, “fearing them of the circumcision,” and not averting, in all probability, to the pernicious effect which his vacillating policy was calculated to have upon the truth of the gospel: hence his conduct is characteristically stigmatized as hypocritical and delusive.

And that the Jews at Antioch who followed his example were equally dissemblers with himself, and acting in the teeth of their own convictions, if even we had not direct testimony (συνυπεκρίθησαν) to that effect, might easily be inferred from the consideration that they were the first to hear the decision of the apostles, ‘to impose no yoke upon the Gentiles which they were not able to bear,’ and “*they rejoiced for the consolation.*”—Acts, xv. 31. Calvin’s comment upon this circumstance is deserving of regard:—“This shows us how cautiously we ought to guard against giving way to the opinions of men, lest an immoderate desire to please, or an undue dread of giving offence, should turn us aside from the right path. If this might happen to Peter, how much more easily may it happen to us, if we are not duly careful!”

^b Ὡστε καὶ Βαρνάβας, ‘insomuch that even Barnabas,’ καὶ, ‘ascensive,’ “even Barnabas,” a man not naturally of a timid or vacillating spirit—a man who had hazarded his life with Paul for the name of the Lord Jesus Christ (Acts, xv. 16)—who, upon this very question of circumcision, had maintained by his side “no small discussion and disputation” with the judaizing brethren—who, by reason of that very steadfastness and tenacity of purpose (we may well suppose), was selected as a fit and proper person to accompany St. Paul to Jerusalem “to the apostles and elders upon this question,” and was made, with him, the honoured instrument of carrying back their righteous decision to the church, “to put no yoke upon the Gentiles which they were not able to bear”—even Barnabas (such is the force of bad example when exhibited by persons in exalted position), upon this very question upon which he was so well informed, and had acted hitherto with so much spirit and resolution, “was carried away with them by their dissimulation.”

^c Συναπήχθη, ‘was carried away together with them’—a compound verb, well suited to express the action contemplated—‘was carried away’ (ἀπὸ)—‘in company with’ (σὺν)—the instrument by which, (τῇ ὑποκρίσει) ‘by their hypocrisy’—a metaphor taken from the case of

persons involuntarily carried along by the pressure of a crowd, or swept away by the resistless force of a torrent.*

VERSE 14.—^a Ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθοποδοῦσιν πρὸς., κ. τ. λ., ‘that they walk not straight towards,’ &c. ‘The not walking according to the truth of the gospel,’ or, as Bloomfield paraphrases it, “the not acting with that straightforwardness which the spirit of the gospel requires,” the sense usually attributed to these words, falls far short of the full development of the gravity of the offence with which Peter and his associates are here charged. Such a dereliction of duty would doubtless have lamentably disturbed their own peace of mind, despoiled them of present comfort, and jeopardized their future happiness; but error of deeper dye is here described—evil of greater magnitude, which, had it been allowed to pass unrebuked, might have extended its baleful influence to the remotest verge of time, and involved in its unhappy consequences ages yet unborn. The tendency of Peter’s dissimulation, by attributing undue efficacy to the law, was to subvert the gospel of the grace of God—to cancel the entire work of the Redeemer—to reduce to a nullity the sacrifice of the death of Christ (see v. 21), and to expose its unhappy authors to the penalties of a certain and ruthless anathema (see ch. i. 8). The translation of these words is incorrect, the literal meaning being, ‘when I perceived that they are not walking right, or taking right steps towards the establishment or the maintenance of the truth of the gospel.’ The primary meaning of ὀρθοποδεῖν is ‘to walk straight forward,’ hence, figuratively, ‘to take a right course’—πρὸς, ‘towards,’ figuratively, ‘for the accomplishment of,’ an object. That object is distinctly defined here, “towards THE TRUTH of the gospel”—an expression of frequent occurrence in St. Paul’s writings, and uniformly in the same sense—the grand leading truth which is the characteristic of the gospel of grace—‘man’s salvation independently of legal works.’ This cardinal truth was jeopardized by the conduct of Peter, who practically taught that the observance of Jewish rites and ceremonies was essential to salvation—that “unless a man was circumcised, and kept the whole law, he could not be saved,” thereby renouncing ‘the liberty whereunto Christ hath made us free,’ ‘entangling us once more in the yoke of bondage,’ and reducing us to that state of hopeless apostacy in which “Christ shall profit us nothing.” Such also seems to have been the impression of Calvin, that Peter, by his dissimulation, and halting between two opinions, compromised THE TRUTH of the gospel; his words are these:—“*The proper road to the truth of the gospel* was to unite the Gentiles with the Jews, in such a manner that the true doctrine should not be injured. But to bind the consciences of godly men by an obli-

* “The infinitive is used with ὥστε ‘when the result or effect follows from, and is, as it were, necessarily implied in the nature of something’ (Jelf, Gr. Gr., 863, 2 a). The indicative is used ‘when the thing spoken of is to be represented primarily in its character of an action or fact; so that this is rather brought forward, while its other character of a *result* is not wholly lost sight of, but only kept in the background: hence it signifies something really following from the principal verb, but not immediately or of necessity’ (Jelf, Gr. Gr., 863, 2, 1).”—BAGGE.

gation to keep the law, and to bury in silence the doctrine of liberty, was to purchase unity at an exorbitant price.”—CALVIN, *in loco*.

The choice of the preposition in this place, *πρὸς* *vice* *κατὰ*, is immeasurably in favour of this translation. For though, admittedly, instances may be adduced from the New Testament where *πρὸς* signifies ‘suitably to, agreeably to,’ yet it is submitted that they are but rare, and not strictly in point; for they are cases where *πρὸς* occurs in non-connexion with ‘a verb of motion,’ which materially alters the case. In connexion with such verbs, Meyer’s assertion appears to be unanswerable—“St. Paul always expresses ‘rule,’ ‘measure,’ &c., *after verbs eundi* by *κατὰ*, not *πρὸς*.” What Ellicott means by saying “that motion is much more obscurely expressed in *ὀρθοποδεῖν* than *περιπατεῖν* (St. Paul’s favourite verb of moral motion), which appears in all the instances that Meyer has adduced,” is incomprehensible to me; for methinks no word in the Greek language more emphatically denotes *motion* than *ὀρθοποδεῖν* in its primary and proper signification, in which sense it is contended that it should be accepted here. Alford’s version, “*to behave uprightly towards* (with a view to) maintaining and propagating the truth of the gospel” is a step in the right direction, but not sufficiently literal or explicit; and his paraphrase of “the truth (“the unadulterated character”) of the gospel” plainly exceptionable. On the force of the expression, “the truth of the gospel,” see ver. 5 ^c, ch. iii. 1 ^c.*

^b Ἐμπροσθεν πάντων, ‘before all men,’ openly, above-board, without any attempt at concealment, adduced here in proof of independence of action, and possibly, too, in contrast with his previous communication upon the same subject (ver. 2), which was made, not (ἔμπροσθεν πάντων) ‘before all men,’ ‘but (κατ’ ἰδίαν) in private.’ St. Peter’s conduct in this instance was an offence against public morals, being done advertently and hypocritically, and therefore publicly to be reprimanded. The reproof administered by Paul was intended not only for Peter, but for all those who participated in his dissimulation, and for those in every age who may be guilty of like unfaithfulness, in order to their correction—a carrying out to the letter of his own injunction to Timothy—“Them that sin rebuke before all, that others also may fear.”—1 Tim. v. 20.

^c Ἐθνικῶς ζῆς, ‘thou livest after the manner of Gentiles’—as Gentiles do who are not subject to the law of Moses, that is, regardless of Jewish ordinances—a course of life which Peter pursued when he conorted and eat with the Gentiles. The use of the present tense (ζῆς) is not without its significance. Hence we infer that Peter, though he had ostensibly withdrawn from the society of the Gentiles, had no intention in so doing to surrender his Christian liberty, or to engage himself to any course of life different from that in which he had been previously living—in Gentile fashion. Had he undergone any change of senti-

* Calvin’s translation, “ubi vidissem quod non recto pede incederent ad veritatem evangelii,” is strictly literal, and, as above explained, exhibits the full meaning of the passage.

ment upon the subject, it would have been competent to him to have replied, 'True, I fell into the error of living after the manner of the Gentiles, but I have retraced my steps, and am now conforming to the strictest fashion of the Jews,' and the apostle's rebuke would have fallen harmless to the ground. But seeing that he had only abandoned it hypocritically, for a purpose, while maintaining as firmly as ever his immunity from legal obligation, the admonition of the apostle came home to him with unabated force—*ἐθνικῶς ζῆς*.

^d *Ἀναγκάζεις*, 'compellest thou'—not by physical compulsion, but by moral suasion. The influence of example in high places is so strong, that it amounts to a species of compulsion.

^e *Ἰουδαῖζειν* and *Ἰουδαϊκῶς ζῆν*, not strictly synonymous: the former more properly denotes the entrance upon the Jewish state; the latter, the living in accordance with its requirements—the one more fitly applied to a Gentile, the other to a professed Jew.

VERSE 15.—^a *Ἡμεῖς φύσει Ἰουδαῖοι, κ. τ. λ.* Having in the preceding verse briefly stated the purport of his argument with Peter—"If thou, being a Jew, livest after the manner of the Gentiles, why compellest thou the Gentiles to become Jews?" the Apostle proceeds in this and the succeeding verses to develop and apply his reasoning, following it up to its legitimate conclusion, the absurdity, not to say profanity, involved in the course which he condemns.

There is no portion, perhaps, of St. Paul's writings involved in deeper obscurity than the section upon which we are now entering. To give an idea of the lack of knowledge which prevails upon this subject, I have only to transcribe the following paragraph from Dr. Bloomfield's exposition *in loco*:—"It is not agreed among editors and commentators whether the Apostle's address to Peter terminates at verse 14, or is carried forward; and, if so, where it terminates. Many think it is continued to the end of the chapter, while some suppose it terminates at verse 17; others, at verse 16; others, again, at *νόμου*, in verse 16; and others, at verse 14. Weighty reasons are alleged in support of the first and last of these opinions. The question is, I apprehend, one that *cannot be brought to any absolute decision*." And he adduces the authority of another learned critic (Schott) in support of his 'apprehension.' That such should be the conviction of so recent a commentator as Dr. B., with the aid, it may be assumed, of almost everything which has been written upon the subject, may well excite our surprise; for methinks a plainer, simpler, more intelligible line of argument is not to be found within the compass of the Bible than that adopted by the Apostle here, if only we rightly apprehend the object to which it is addressed. But if the drift of an argument be unknown, or, worse still, if it be mistaken, it is no wonder that the expositor should be involved in mazes of obscurity, or tossed about upon a sea of difficulty.

According to the apprehension of Dr. Bloomfield, the object of the Apostle in introducing this subject is "to maintain the doctrine that a man is not justified by the works of the law, but by the faith of Christ." But assuredly, though that important topic is incidentally handled in

the passage before us as being the subject of his dispute with Peter, it is by no means to be regarded as the point to be established by it. No; the object of the Apostle is simple and definite, '*by reference to this argument with Peter*' to show that at no period of his ministerial life did he for one moment countenance, much less inculcate, the doctrine of the circumcision of the Gentiles.' His aim is, not to establish the doctrine of justification by faith (which is the distinct subject of a future section of the Epistle), but to vindicate his character from the aspersions of the judaizing teachers, preparatory to his entering upon that subject—an object which has engaged his attention from the commencement of the Epistle until now, and which only terminates with the conclusion of the present chapter. With this conception of the scope of the passage before our minds, we shall experience no difficulty, I apprehend, in tracing step by step the argument as it proceeds, and determining the precise point at which it concludes, and marking the transition to another subject. But, before entering upon the investigation, it will be expedient to make ourselves acquainted with the exact import of the terms in which it is enunciated.

^b Φύσει, literally, 'by nature,' here, 'by birth'—a sense in which φύσις is of frequent occurrence in classical writers.

^c Ἡμεῖς Ἰουδαῖοι, 'we Jews'—not Peter and Paul only, though evidently included in the number, but, as the words import, "we Jews," a common designation of all those Jews by birth who, being dissatisfied with their own system of works, had sought justification through faith in Christ.

Ἰουδαῖοι, 'Jews'—a word capable of a double import, according to the aspect in which it is viewed, indicating (1), 'race or nationality,' in which sense it is limited to the lineal descendants of Jacob; (2), 'religion,' when it applies to the followers of the law of Moses, from whatever stock they may have sprung, which law being promulgated to the Jews alone, the profession of it is called Ἰουδαϊσμός (Judaism). And for a man of another nation to assume its obligation is in Scripture language Ἰουδαΐζειν (to judaize).

^d Ἀμαρτωλοὶ, 'sinners'—another term of varying import, according to the light in which it is regarded. Sometimes it is understood 'generally,' as applicable to every child of Adam, Jew and Gentile alike, "for all have sinned, and fallen short of the glory of God."—Rom. iii. 23. At other times, 'specially,' as applied only to the Gentiles, in which sense it is coextensive with τὰ ἔθνη. Accordingly, Whitby observes, that "'to be delivered into the hands of sinners' (εἰς χεῖρας ἀμαρτωλῶν), Matt. xxvi. 45, is rendered 'to be delivered to the Gentiles' (τοῖς ἔθνεσι), Luke, xviii. 32." But, though co-extensive with, it is by no means equivalent to, τὰ ἔθνη, for it presents τὰ ἔθνη in a special, namely, 'a religious' point of view. The recognition of this distinction is material to the understanding of the argument; for it enables us to determine with exactness in what sense Ἰουδαῖοι (Jews) occurs in this context, which would otherwise, as we have just seen, be equivocal. There is a marked antithesis in this place between Jews and

Gentiles; but from the selection of the term *ἁμαρτωλοὶ* (sinners) as the designation for 'Gentiles,' we distinctly learn that it is Gentiles *in their religious aspect* who are contemplated, and, consequently, it is Jews *in their religious aspect* with whom they are compared,—a conclusion which, as we shall presently see, is essential to the full development of the Apostle's argument.

VERSE 16.—* 'Εξ ἔργων νόμου, 'of legal works,' ἐξ ἔργων denoting 'the source' out of which justification is supposed to proceed, namely, 'works;' νόμου gen. qualitatis, with an adjectival force, denoting the nature and quality of the works contemplated. By ἔργα νόμου we are to understand, not works conformable to God's law, i. e. 'ordained works,' but works capable of satisfying the requirements of God's law, 'meritorious works.' Νόμος with and νόμος without the article, it is submitted, are exponents of very different ideas, and should carefully be distinguished in translation. Νόμος *dnarthrous* represents the idea of 'obligation arising out of a law,' namely, the obligation to discharge the duties imposed thereby with undeviating obedience, under sanction of rewards and punishments, the nature of the duties themselves forming no part of the conception; ὁ νόμος, on the other hand, represents a specific code of enactments, under such sanction to be obeyed. Νόμος (the abstract) is the same under every imaginable circumstance; ὁ νόμος (the concrete) varies with the object and the will of the legislator. Νόμος, though inseparably attendant upon, is essentially distinct from ὁ νόμος, and therefore it is an error to translate them as though they were the same.

In a large proportion of instances in which the words occur in the New Testament, it may be a matter of indifference in which way the subject is presented by the writer, and consequently in which way they are translated, whether as 'the law' out of which the obligation arises, or 'the obligation' which arises out of the law. Nevertheless, there are occasions when it is of the utmost importance to distinguish between them; and indeed, as a general rule in Biblical interpretation, we cannot adhere too closely to the language of the original. Germs of precious truth, of which we have no conception at the present, may be wrapped in the folds of scriptural phraseology, which we have no right by an arbitrary and inaccurate translation to exclude from the contemplation of the general reader, and so retard, if not, possibly, prevent their development altogether. In the case before us, it is most material to the argument to make the distinction prescribed. To translate ἐξ ἔργων νόμου as though it were written ἐξ ἔργων τοῦ νόμου, is not only anomalous as a translation, but absolutely subversive of the force of the reasoning. A man may not be justified by 'the works of the (ceremonial) law' (the subject under discussion at present), but *non constat* that works of another description ('moral works,' for instance) may not prove more efficacious. But the Apostle's statement, when faithfully interpreted, goes the length to say, 'that a man cannot be justified by *meritorious works* of any kind or description whatsoever.'

A fitter example of the inconvenience arising from this defective

mode of translation could not be adduced than that furnished by this passage, as illustrated by Calvin :—"The Papists (he tells us), misled by Origen and Jerome, are of opinion, and lay it down as certain, that the dispute relates to shadows, and accordingly assert that by 'works of the law' are meant ceremonies . . . for they see no absurdity in maintaining that 'no man is justified by the works of *the law*,' and yet that '*by merit of works* we are accounted righteous in the sight of God.'"—CALVIN, *in loco*. So that by simply limiting 'the law' to which the observation applies to 'the ceremonial law,' they are enabled to evade the force of the Apostle's reasoning altogether; and their opponent, to meet them, is obliged to have recourse to such argument as this :—"But the context clearly proves that *the moral law* is also comprehended in these words; for almost everything which St. Paul afterwards advances belongs more properly to the moral than to the ceremonial law, and he is continually employed in contrasting the righteousness of the law with the free acceptance which God is pleased to bestow."—CALVIN, *in loco*.

But without stopping to arraign or to call in question the conclusiveness of this answer, we ask how much more satisfactory would it have been, were we enabled to reply, 'it matters not in what point of view you take it, whether it be the moral or the ceremonial law which is the subject of discussion here, *the terms of the Apostle* apply equally to both, that—by legal performances, be they of what kind they may, no man shall stand accepted in the sight of God.' And this is precisely what the Apostle has said, but it is obscured and lost sight of by the incorrectness of the translation. That the efficacy of *the Jewish ritual* was the subject immediately in dispute, there can be no reasonable doubt; it was that which the hypocrisy of Peter tended to establish, and for which, consequently, he was taken to task by St. Paul. And for all the purposes of the argument, it might have sufficed to have confined the negation expressly to it; but a wider principle, and one of much more general interest, was at stake, and consequently the Apostle has used terms of the most comprehensive import—"legal works," under which are comprised works of every kind, moral or ceremonial, done with a view to self-justification.

^b 'Εὰν μὴ, 'save only.' St. Paul's rapidity of thought has evidently left something to be supplied here. According to Ellicott, two constructions are blended into one—"a man not justified by legal works," and 'a man not justified except by faith.' To take the words precisely as they stand might lead to the conclusion that faith is required to give effect to legal performances, and that both conjointly procure our acceptance with God—a conclusion not only theologically unsound, but directly at variance with the whole scope of the Apostle's reasoning in this place, which is distinctly to prove that faith is not to be supplemented by legal works, nor consequently legal works by faith. If such were the opinion maintained by the Apostle, there was positively no need of the argument at all, nor of the hot discussion which doubtless preceded it; he and his adversaries were agreed. The sentence, therefore, is to be

regarded elliptically—‘a man is not justified by legal works (nor in any other way), save only by faith of Jesus Christ.’

^c Διὰ πίστεως, ‘by faith.’ The sudden and marked transition which takes place here from the use of one preposition (ἐκ) to that of another (διὰ), in the enunciation of what are evidently but the several parts of the same subject, ‘the terms of justification, whether by works or by faith,’ must strike the attentive reader with surprise, and lead to the inquiry, whence is this? The choice of the preposition depends upon the aspect in which the subject is viewed. If we regard ‘faith’ as a *source* out of which justification proceeds, then ἐκ is the preposition to be used; if, on the other hand, we regard it as *the instrument* wherewith justification is effected, then διὰ is to be preferred, each preposition being so used in its primary and proper signification. Nor are we, perhaps, altogether in the dark with regard to the consideration by which ‘aspect’ is governed. When faith is regarded *subjectively*, then it is treated as an existing source (secondary only, to be sure), out of which justification proceeds; but when looked upon *objectively*, it is viewed as an instrument by means of which justification is achieved—a rule which, if I mistake not, will be found of general application in the Epistles of St. Paul.

In the present instance the parties, when first they come into notice, are Jews under the law, who, being sensible of the inadequacy of legal performances, out of which (ἐκ), as an existing source, no man is justified; and apprehending that ‘a man is justified, or, in other words, that justification is attainable (δικαιούται, the ethical present) by means of (διὰ) the faith of Christ, of which as yet they have had no personal experience, and consequently, *objective*, believed “into Christ,” in order that they might be justified out of (ἐκ) the faith that is exercised (and now become an existing source) *in Him*.’ In this way the choice of the prepositions is simply and *regularly* accounted for—inattention to which usage, it is believed, has left many passages involved in needless perplexity and doubt.

^d Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, ‘of Jesus Christ.’ The question is, what is the character of the genitive here, objecti or subjecti? As a general rule, the character of the genitive is to be determined by the context in which it stands, or other external considerations; but in cases like the present, where the noun governed represents a *person*, then the genitive (in the absence of overruling circumstances) is invariably to be taken ‘*subjectively*,’ any other practice opening a wide door to uncertainty and error. And the *rationale* of the rule appears to be this—when a writer would describe a person as the ‘author or owner’ of a thing, the proper and obvious course is to write the name in the genitive case; if he desires to present him as the ‘object of reference,’ a variety of forms suggest themselves (which are freely availed of by New Testament writers, such as εἰς, ἐπὶ, πρὸς, and sometimes ἐν, with their respective cases), by which his purpose can be effected without exposing himself to the charge of ambiguity, or the risk of misapprehension. Should he, however, passing over all these forms, select the genitive which is the

natural expression of source or proprietorship, it is to be presumed that it was his intention so to do, and the genitive is to be understood *subjectively*.

In this place, where there are no countervailing influences, textual or doctrinal, πίστεις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ as plainly denotes 'the faith of Jesus Christ' *subjectively*, or, in a theological sense, I might even say *possessively* (that is, the faith which is not only 'of Christ' as the author and giver, but 'of Christ' as the owner and possessor; that which is exercised 'in union with him' by those who have "the spirit of Christ"—*Christ*, in a word, *believing within them*), as πίστεις Ἀβραὰμ denotes faith, not 'in Abraham' as *the object*, but 'of Abraham' as *the subject*. Nevertheless, Ellicott affirms that "here certainly the context and the preceding antithesis seem decidedly in favour of the more simple gen. objecti;" but, with all due deference to his opinion, I rather think that the context points distinctly the other way, in favour of the opposite construction—"We Jews, knowing that a man is justified in no other way, save by the faith *of* Christ (that is, the faith exercised by those who are *in* Christ,—in union with him), have believed *into* Christ, in order that we may be justified (ἐκ) out of the faith *of* Jesus Christ," *subjectively or possessively*.

* Καὶ ἡμεῖς, καὶ ascensive, 'even we,' Jews though we be, born under the law, having received it as an inheritance from our fathers, every feeling and prejudice of our nature enlisted on its side, 'even we,' seeing its insufficiency to justify, have believed into Christ, in order to be justified in him. "We also, as well as the Gentile sinners," the exposition of Ellicott and Alford, seems weak, and out of keeping with "we Jews by birth, *and not* sinners of the Gentiles," which is the key to the expression before us.

† Εἰς Χριστὸν, 'into Christ.' By no grammatical necessity are we moved in controverting the prevailing impression that these words present Christ as *the object of faith*; εἰς Χριστὸν, beyond all doubt, is so used in a variety of places in the New Testament in perfect harmony with an acknowledged application of the preposition, nor can it be said to offer an unsuitable meaning here; they who were seeking justification, sought it (according to this interpretation), as it must ever be sought, through faith *in Christ objectively*. But admissible as the construction may be, and agreeable to the present context, it must not be allowed to prevail to the exclusion of a better. It is submitted that εἰς here denotes, not the object *towards which* their faith was exercised, but, according to its primary signification, *that into which* they had believed, a sense in which εἰς Χριστὸν incontestibly occurs in the epistle before us (εἰς Χριστὸν ἐβαπτίσθητε, chap. iii. 27, were baptized into Christ). 'Believing into Christ' is tantamount to 'being ingrafted into Christ,' the living vine—'being incorporated into the body of Christ,' which are distinctly attributable to the operation of faith. And what particularly commends this construction to our acceptance here is, that the parties who are at first presented outside of Christ, and desirous of justification instrumentally (διὰ) by the faith of Christ, are, subse-

quently to this process 'of believing *into Christ*,' contemplated as standing in Christ (*ἐν Χριστῷ*), and justified (*ἐκ*) out of the faith which is *in* Him. "In the formula *πιστεύειν εἰς* with acc. (Ellicott admits, though he does not so translate it himself) the prep. retains its proper force, and marks, not the mere direction of the belief (or object towards which), but the more strictly theological ideas of *union and incorporation with*." In a sentence like the present, where such a studied use of the prepositions manifestly prevails, an exposition which accepts every one of them in its primary and literal signification, and presents at the same time a meaning so consistent with theological truth, and so pertinent to the subject-matter in hand, comes before us with more than ordinary claims upon our consideration.

The distinction between faith as exercised *in* Christ, and faith antecedently to incorporation *into* Christ, is illustrated in an interesting manner in a passage in the Acts of the Apostles, which, from the overlooking of this distinction, and mistranslation in consequence, is involved in inextricable perplexity and confusion. The passage to which I refer is the account given by Peter (Acts, iii. 16) of the healing of the lame man at "the beautiful gate" of the temple. Peter and John, it would appear, going up to the temple at the hour of prayer, found the lame man sitting at the gate, asking alms. Peter (seeing in him, doubtless, faith to be saved) looked steadfastly at him and "said, *in the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth*, rise up and walk. And he took him by the right hand, and lifted him up: and immediately his feet and ankle bones received strength; and he leaping up stood, and walked." Upon the bystanders being struck with astonishment and awe at the scene they had witnessed, and attributing the efficacy of the cure to the holiness and power of the agents by whom it was effected, Peter rose up in the midst of them, and explained the principle upon which the lame man was made whole, in terms which in our translation are thus rendered:—"And His name, through faith in His name, hath made this man strong whom ye see and know: yea, the faith which is by Him, hath given him this perfect soundness in the presence of you all"—a passage which, I believe, no intelligent person can read without being struck with the weakness and tautology which it exhibits, and weakness originating in tautology.

Very different, indeed, is the passage as it is presented in the original. The sentence, when literally translated, runs thus:—"And His name hath strengthened this man whom ye see and know to the faith of His name, and the faith, that by it (the name aforesaid), hath given him this perfect soundness in the presence of you all"—a sentence in which there is not one word redundant, nor one sentiment repeated, but a clear and concise account of a circumstance illustrative of a great scriptural verity, namely, that the faith of the Jew required elevation to the faith of Christ to render it efficacious to *the present salvation* of its subject, which was doubtless exemplified in that "perfect soundness" which the lame man acquired in the presence of them all.*

* The translation of the first member of this sentence, as given in our Autho-

He upon whom this miracle was performed, we may be well assured, was a son of faithful Abraham, believing up to the light vouchsafed him in the imperfect, preparatory, system under which he lived, and consequently in a condition to receive and appropriate to himself the sublime truth enunciated *in the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth*. No sooner had that talismanic name sounded in his ear, in the deep and solemn accents of the apostle of the circumcision, than his impotent Jewish faith bounded upward to the level of 'the faith of Christ;' and that faith, so wrought in his heart by the energizing of the Holy Ghost, eventuated in that perfect soundness of body which he instantaneously acquired in the presence of them all. The distinction between the faith of the Jew and the faith of the Christian will engage more of our attention at a future stage of the Epistle.—See ch. iii. 23 ^b.

* Διότι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου, κ. τ. λ. 'because out of legal works,' &c. From the manner in which this clause is introduced, I am disposed to think that "by legal works shall no flesh be justified" (an adaptation of Psalm cxliii. 2*) was a familiar maxim in the early Christian church, and as such referred to here. Certainly we find it in so many words in the Epistle to the Romans (ch. iii. 20), where likewise it seems applied in *quasi*-proverbial form, *in confirmation* of the alleged truth 'that in the matter of justification all men stood upon the same level in the sight of God;' for having quoted sundry condemnatory sentences out of the Old Testament Scriptures, and asserted their application to the Jew, "that every mouth might be stopped, and the whole world brought in guilty before God," the Apostle immediately subjoins (in confirmation, it would seem, of the assertion), "for by legal works shall *no flesh* (Jew no more than Gentile) be justified in his sight." In like manner is it introduced here. Having intimated the general rule that "a man is justified not out of legal works, but through the faith of Christ," and that upon apprehension of that rule, "even we Jews," who might be presumed to have some claim to justification upon the score of legality, had believed into Christ, in order to be justified by faith, he follows it up, *in sanction of*

vised Version, is in accordance with an acknowledged use of the preposition. 'Ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει τοῦ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ may well denote 'on the ground of' or 'through faith in His name,' upon which ground (i. e. of faith) His name was efficacious to the restoration of the impotent man; but it is utterly inconsistent with the second member of the sentence, where "the faith, that by it," that is, 'the faith so acquired, by means of the name of Jesus Christ,' is represented as the instrumental cause of the cure. To be consistent with the latter, the first clause should exhibit the acquisition, by the pronouncement of the name of Jesus Christ, of that faith by which the lame man was made whole, but which, according to the received version, it fails to do. 'Ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει, I doubt not, is a construction similar to ἐπ' ἐλευθερίᾳ (ch. v. 13), 'unto a state of liberty;' ἐπὶ ἀκαθαρσίᾳ (1 Thess. iv. 7), 'unto a state of uncleanness;' the preposition in each instance including the idea of motion towards the object, as well as subsequent continuance therein. "When ἐπὶ with dat. in a *local* sense, is joined to a verb of direction or motion (in which sense ἐστερέωσε may be regarded here—EDIT.), the phrase comprehends also continuing or resting *on, at*, the object in question."—WINER, Gr., § xlviii. f.

* In the LXX. the passage stands thus:—ὅτι οὐ δικαιοθήσεται ἐν ὀπτιόν σου πᾶς ζῶν.

the procedure, as it would seem, with the axiomatic sentence, “for by legal works shall no flesh be justified.”

^h Δικαιωθήσεται, ‘shall be justified’—a future, irrespective of any consideration of time. “It is here ‘ethical,’ i. e. it indicates not so much mere futurity as moral possibility; and with οὐ, something that neither can or will ever happen.”—ELLICOTT.

VERSE 17.—^a Εἰ δὲ ζητοῦντες, ‘but if while seeking,’ δὲ adversative and logical. Having introduced the subject, ‘We Jews, knowing that a man is not justified by legal works, &c. &c., have believed into Christ, in order to be justified in him;’ the Apostle proceeds argumentatively, ‘but if, seeking to be justified in him, we ourselves also are found ‘sinners,’ then is the conclusion inevitable, “Christ is the minister of sin.”’ Some commentators (Bengel, al.), from the presence of ζητοῦντες in the same context with εὐρέθημεν, have inferred an antithesis, which Ellicott expresses thus, “were *found* to be after all our *seeking*”—a fanciful and unwarranted assumption. If indeed the ‘seekers’ were represented subsequently as ‘finders,’ there might be some ground for the conjecture; but as it is, the words are selected for their individual propriety, without any regard to the relationship subsisting between themselves; or, if the one be suggested by the other, it is an antithesis only to the ear, attributable to the idiosyncrasy of the Apostle’s mind, and presenting no contrast whatsoever in the sense.

^b Ἐν Χριστῷ, ‘in Christ;’ denoting position, the *locus standi*, in union with Christ: lately they were represented as “believing *into* Christ;” now they are supposed to be standing ‘*in* Christ,’ and expecting justification through him. Ellicott, while very justly maintaining the translation ‘*in* Christ,’ in opposition to those who contend for the instrumental force of ἐν (‘*by* Christ’), makes an admission which, if true, would go far to impair the force of the Apostle’s reasoning. He says—“In the present passage the meaning is practically the same whichever translation is adopted;” but I am far from concurring in this admission. If, seeking only to be justified ‘*by* Christ,’ they are themselves found to be ‘sinners,’ how, I ask, is Christ necessarily implicated in their sin? who would think of attributing the ignorance or the error in faith or practice, of a mere inquirer, who made no profession of fellowship with Christ, or of being actuated by the Spirit of Christ, to that gracious Being to whose assistance he looked for salvation? But if, seeking to be justified ‘*in* Christ,’ that is, as professed members of Christ, and under the dictation and guidance of the Spirit of Christ, they are nevertheless found ‘sinners,’ then necessarily and reasonably their defects in doctrine and practice are imputable to Him from whom their inspiration is derived, and “Christ is the minister of sin.” By the one translation Christ is constituted ‘particeps criminis,’ by the other He is not.

^c Εὐρέθημεν, ‘we are found.’ Εὐρίσκεισθαι by no means equivalent to the personal verb εἶναι, from which it is distinguished in that “the latter denotes the quality of a thing in itself, the former the same quality as found or recognised in the subject.”—WINER, Gr., § lxxv. 8. It is

just conceivable that *εὐρέθημεν* in this place may retain somewhat of its primitive meaning of 'discovery;' if so, it is a gentle stroke of Pauline humour at the expense of Peter, and the new light which his dissimulation had let in upon the truth. 'If after the disuse of Mosaic customs, and without any scruple of conscience, for so long a period, we are now, by your superior illumination '*found out, or discovered*' to be, in consequence of our departure therefrom, 'sinners,' is not Christ the minister of sin?' But it is as well, perhaps, to take it in its plain and natural signification.

^d *Καὶ αὐτοὶ*, 'even (we) ourselves.' The position of the words in the sentence requires the translation to run thus—"if seeking to be justified in Christ we are found, even ourselves" not merely *as Jews* (the ordinary acceptation), but *as Christians*. The matter in dispute between Paul and Peter had reference, not to Jews, but to Christians. Were 'Christian converts to be subjected to the law of Moses, under penalty of being accounted *ἁμαρτωλοὶ* (sinners) if they were not? The conduct of Peter would seem to indicate the affirmative; but St. Paul shows in these words the absurdity which would follow: 'If we Christians who have believed into Christ, and are in Christ, and are led by the Spirit of Christ, "*even we ourselves*" (notwithstanding our fellowship with Christ, and inspiration by His Spirit) are nevertheless found sinners, there is no evading the conclusion, "Christ is the minister of sin," is it not so?' The expressions, then, *καὶ ἡμεῖς* and *καὶ αὐτοὶ*, though referring to the same parties, refer to them in different aspects—the former, to them as they were before they believed into Jesus Christ (Jews); the latter, as they were subsequently to their belief (Christians).

^e *Ἐπεὶ*, a particle illative and interrogative, 'Christ then is the minister of sin, is he not?' Ellicott justly remarks that "*μὴ γένοιτο* in St. Paul's Epistles is never found except after a question." *Ἐπεὶ* is used by the Attics *ironically*. A vein of irony seems to pervade the entire of this passage, not only in the terms employed, but also in the conclusion to which they lead.

^f *Ἀμαρτίας διάκονος*, 'a minister of sin' (sin personified); gen. subjecti, a promoter of the cause of sin; in other words 'a constitutor of sinners' (*ἁμαρτωλοὶ*), which Christ would inevitably be, not only negatively, but positively, if the observance of the Jewish ritual were essential to salvation; for it was at his suggestion, and by his authority, while seeking to be justified through Him, that they, Jews by descent, had abjured them, and given them up.

^g *Ἀμαρτωλοὶ*, 'sinners.' We now approach the real difficulty of the passage, which has given occasion to such diversity of opinion, and such multiplicity of explanation. In what sense, and in reference to what circumstance, *ἁμαρτωλοὶ* (sinners)?—a question upon the reply to which the whole point of the argument turns. And have we no clue to the inquiry? Are we abandoned upon the wide field of conjecture, without a compass to direct our course? I apprehend not. One observation presents itself at the outset, that the same word *ἁμαρτωλοὶ* (sinners) occurs in the same context (v. 15), and in a plain, precise, determinable

sense, as contrasted with *Ἰουδαῖοι* (Jews). Now *Ἰουδαῖοι*, in *the religious acceptation* of the term (see v. 15, °), in which alone it is contrasted with *ἁμαρτωλοὶ*, denotes those who, 'through circumcision and the observance of Mosaic rites, had acquired for themselves, as they fondly believed, a claim upon the acceptance of God;' while the rest of the world, being outside the pale of the Jewish church, and uninterested in 'the promises,' were, by the same process of reasoning, in Jewish theology, accounted 'sinners.'

That such was the distinction in the Jewish mind is easily established from their writings. And as a clear understanding upon this point is essential to the exposition of the passage, it may not be amiss to insert the following extract from Whitby:—"The Jewish religion was very much corrupted at our Saviour's coming, so that they thought it sufficient to obtain God's favour, and to secure them from His judgment,—(1.) That they were the seed of Abraham; and hence the Baptist speaks thus to them—'Bring forth fruits meet for repentance; and (think it not sufficient to) say within yourselves, We have Abraham for our Father,' Matt. iii. 8, 9. The Chaldee paraphrasts do often mention their expectation of being preserved for the merits or good works of their forefathers, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; and their writers add that 'Hell-fire hath no power over the sinners of Israel, because Abraham and Isaac descend thither to fetch them thence.' (2.) They held that circumcision was of sufficient virtue to render them accepted of God, and preserve them from eternal ruin; for they teach that 'no circumcised person goes to hell, God having promised to deliver them from it for the merit of circumcision;' and having told Abraham that 'when his children fell into transgression, and did wicked works, He would remember the odour of their foreskins, and would be satisfied with their piety.' And (3.) They taught that 'all Israelites had a portion in the world to come,' and that 'notwithstanding their sins, yea, though they were condemned here for their wickedness.' This is the first sentence in the *Capitula Patrum*; whereas of all the Gentiles without exception they pronounced, that 'they are fuel for hell-fire.' (4.) They teach that 'to be employed in hearing and studying the law was a thing sufficient to make them acceptable with God.'"—WHITBY ON Rom. ii. 13.

According to this account, the summary of Jewish theology amounted briefly to this—'Every Jew was *righteous*, and every Gentile '*a sinner*:' the Jew righteous *by virtue of ritual observances*, the Gentiles '*sinners through lack of them*.' Now, with such an explication of *ἁμαρτωλοὶ*, in the sense in which it would evidently be used by a Jew, and *in contrast with Jews* (*ἁμαρτωλοὶ ἐξ ἐθνῶν*), are we at liberty to pass it by, and assign to the word another signification here, until at least we shall have satisfied ourselves that it is incompatible with the context in this? But upon examination we shall find, that so far from being incompatible with the context in this, it is the meaning above all others the most natural, the most pertinent, nay, the only one in which the force of the argument is at all adequately brought out. As to the scope of the Apostle's reasoning, there need be little hesitation upon that head. He

himself has sketched it in general terms in the preceding verse—‘If thou, being a Jew, livest as do the Gentiles, why, in the name of common sense, do you insist upon the Gentiles becoming Jews?’ He now descends into particulars, and points out the absurdity which would ensue. ‘We, by birth Jews, nurtured and fostered in the ordinances of the ceremonial law, and not through ignorance or contempt thereof ἀμαρτωλοὶ ἐξ ἐθνῶν (sinners of the Gentiles), knowing that a man is not justified out of legal works, but only by the faith of Christ, *even we* (Jews though we be) have believed into Jesus Christ, in order to be justified by faith. And if, seeking justification in Christ, *we ourselves* (now believers in Him) are found, through the disuse of ceremonial observances (ἀμαρτωλοὶ) sinners (Peter’s doctrine, that circumcision is indispensable to salvation, being true), what is the inference? Why, Christ, in whose name and at whose instigation we have acted, while dispensing with these ordinances, is the minister of sin, is it not so? God forbid that we should so think or speak, or by the inconsistency of our conduct lead others so to think or speak, of our adorable Redeemer, the Lord Jesus Christ.’

What, I ask, could be more intelligible or more to the point than such a line of argument adopted towards Peter and his co-sympathizing Jews? And it is just the overlooking of this important circumstance, that the latter portion of the context is explanatory of the former—that it is no more than amplification, and a pursuing to its legitimate result of what is more concisely stated in general terms before—that has given occasion to all the perplexity and confusion which has surrounded the passage. Without this key to the interpretation, there is no determining with any approach to certainty where the argument with Peter concludes, and the address to the Galatians is resumed; and, moreover, whether ἀμαρτωλοὶ is to be understood in a ceremonial and special, or in a general and moral sense. And if the latter, what is the precise phase of immorality or moral delinquency to which it points? Upon all these matters, commentators have been absolutely at sea, and there have been as many shades of opinion amongst them as there have been pencils to delineate them; whereas, with this simple clue to the interpretation obscurity vanishes away—the point of the Apostle’s argument stands forth in unmistakable relief, and the conclusion at which it arrives has all the definiteness and perspicuity of mathematical demonstration.

VERSE 18.—The argument with Peter being thus concluded, the Apostle now addresses himself, as before, to the Galatian church, and resumes in the *singular number*. In order to a distinct apprehension of what follows, we must bear in mind (as we before observed) that the argument with Peter has been by no means introduced to establish the doctrine of justification by faith, though that subject has been largely mixed up with it, but simply and solely in defence of his own character as against the aspersions of the judaizing teachers, who affirmed that he had been himself an advocate for the circumcision of the Gentiles; to which the Apostle opposes sundry facts and considerations,

and among the rest this controversy with Peter, by which he proves, that at the period when this dispute took place he was an uncompromising opposer of ritualism; and then proceeds to argue that, had any change of sentiment been subsequently induced, he should not only be guilty of the grossest inconsistency of conduct, but absolutely brand himself as a 'transgressor of law.'

^a Εἰ γὰρ, 'if then;' γὰρ inferential, 'these things being so.' "Γὰρ (according to Winer) commonly expresses a corroboration or *admission* of what precedes."—(See Winer, Gr., § liii. 8.) 'If then (admitting the argument with Peter to be correctly stated, and that I did indeed assail ritualism in manner and form aforesaid) I should again build up what I then pulled down, I establish myself thereby 'a transgressor of law.''

^b Ἄ κατέλυσα, 'the things which I pulled down'—an architectural figure, suggested by the conduct of unwise builders, who, pulling down with one hand, and building up with the other, leave behind them a monument of inconsistency and folly. By the things which he pulled down we are to understand the whole fabric of ceremonial religion as practised by the judaizing Christians with a view to their own perfection, which in his argument with Peter he so unscrupulously assailed, cast to the ground, and trampled upon. These things were he again to reconstruct, by proclaiming the circumcision of the Gentiles, he should establish himself thereby 'a transgressor of law;' for in so doing he should assert the continued validity of that law which he then so wantonly violated and assailed.

^c Παραβάτην ἐμαυτὸν συνίστημι, 'I establish (convict myself of being) a transgressor.*' Παραβάτης, a word invariably associated in the New Testament with the violation of a *legal compact*; in which respect it differs from ἁμαρτωλός, which represents a sinner irrespectively of any such consideration: "*Before law*, sin (ἁμαρτία) was in the world" and consequently ἁμαρτωλός; but "*where no law is*, there is no transgression" (παραβάσις), and consequently *no παραβάτης*. The former term, in its moral and comprehensive signification, is applicable to every child of Adam, whether he be Jew or whether he be Gentile; the latter is limited principally to the Jew, who by the letter of his covenant, and circumcision his engagement to fulfil the same, rendered himself, upon violation of it, παραβάτης νόμου, Rom. ii. 27; and such should the Apostle constitute himself by reasserting the obligation of the law. Throughout the entire of the argument with Peter, and the subsequent application of it, the conjectures of commentators fall so wide of the mark, that it would be a waste of time to follow them in their aberrations; I have contented myself, therefore, with simply expounding the reasoning of the Apostle, without reference to the opinions of others.

VERSE 19.—^a Ἐγὼ γὰρ, 'for I,' ἐγὼ emphatic; 'I for my part,' in

* Συνέστησεν αὐτοὺς Δανιήλ ἐκ τοῦ στόματος αὐτῶν ψευδομαρτυρήσαντας.—Susan. 61, lxx.

contradistinction to others who may be actuated by different principles and motives, *scil.*, the judaizing teachers and their disciples, who affect to live under the law, and regard the observance of its ritual as a ground of justification, ‘I am dead to law;’ γὰρ explanatory and elliptical, assigning the ground or proof of a premiss which is suppressed (for many instances of this use of γὰρ, in reference to a suppressed premiss, see Rob., *Lex.*). The suppressed premiss it is not difficult in the present instance to supply; ‘but I do not build them up again, *for* I repudiate the obligation of law altogether’—“I am dead to law.”

^b Νόμῳ ἀπέθανον, ‘I died to law.’ Νόμος anarthrous, as we have had occasion to remark before (ver. 16, ^a), denotes not ‘the law,’ but ‘the obligation arising out of a law.’ In Rom. vii. 1, we read that “The law (ὁ νόμος) hath dominion over a man so long as he liveth,” where ‘the law’ is evidently personified and represented as a slaveholder, who has absolute dominion over the person of his slave, so long as the slave existeth; but when the slave is no more, he is delivered from the dominion of his master. Now, that obligation which the law imposed upon its subjects is here represented by the term νόμος, from which obligation St. Paul has been by his death set free, that he should be no more holden in its bonds. But what death did he die? or by what instrumentality was he set free?

^c Διὰ νόμου νόμῳ ἀπέθανον, ‘by law I died to law.’ It is a faulty translation of these words to render them, as is invariably done, ‘I by the law am dead to the law,’ νόμος with and νόμος without the article representing (as we have before explained, ver. 16 ^a) essentially different ideas. Wherever ὁ νόμος is found in the New Testament, it points to some particular law, or code of laws, which is at the time being the subject of consideration; or, in the absence of any such subject, to ‘the law of Moses,’ ὁ νόμος κατ’ ἐξοχὴν; and it regards it in reference, not to the abstract theory of ‘obligation,’ but to ‘the precepts and prohibitions of which it consists;’ whereas νόμος without the article means ‘law’ in the abstract, the obligation arising out of some such code, without any regard whatsoever to the specific provisions which it contains; ὁ νόμος, consequently, is susceptible of a diversity of application, ‘the law’ of one country differing from ‘the law’ of another, and ‘the law’ of the same country varying with the periods in which it exists; but νόμος without the article is incapable of change, the same in all countries and at all periods. Where νόμος occurs with a preposition, without any qualifying adjunct, it should invariably be translated into English without the article, the usage of both languages being in this particular the same.*

To translate, then, the words before us as though they were equivalent to διὰ τοῦ νόμου τῷ νόμῳ ἀπέθανον, is not a translation, but a para-

* In cases where νόμος (anarthrous) is accompanied by an explanatory noun, such as νόμος Κυρίου, νόμος ἐλευθερίας, νόμος δικαιοσύνης, νόμος πίστεως, or the like, it is to be translated with the article, the abstract notion of νόμος being modified by the specializing power of the adjunct.

phrase, and highly injurious to the sense of the passage. 'I by law am dead (or died) to law,' is the proper translation, an expression of much wider import than that to which exception is taken; for when the Apostle says, 'I am dead to law,' he affirms not only his death to the ceremonial law (the subject immediately under consideration), but death to every species of legal obligation which can possibly be devised or proposed to man as a medium of justification.

Ellicott and Alford regard *διὰ νόμον νόμῳ ἀπέθανον* as a compendium of St. Paul's expanded experience in Rom. vii., but evidently under misapprehension of one or of both of these passages. In Rom. vii. 7, *et seq.*, we have exhibited the damnatory process of the law, whereby it wrought sin and death in those who were subject to its power; whereas the death here contemplated is the mystical death of the old man, by reason of his crucifixion with Christ. The satisfaction even unto death made by the Lord Jesus Christ upon the cross was the complete enfranchisement of every believer in Him from every obligation of law (*—νόμῳ ἀπέθανον*); and the legal obligation imposed upon him to make that satisfaction, as the representative of the human family, was the *νόμος* by which (*διὰ νόμον*) Christ died, and by which, consequently, every believer in Him, by participation, died also.

^d *ἵνα Θεῷ ζήσω*, 'that I may live for God;' *ζήσω* not the future indicative, but the aorist subjunctive, 'that I may live;' *Θεῷ* and *νόμῳ*, datives commodi, and antithetically opposed—'dead to the claims of law; alive to the service of God.*' The necessity of thus dying to law, as preparatory to a life for God, is an essential article of the Christian faith, and distinctly set forth and expounded by St. Paul in his Epistle to the Romans:—"Wherefore, my brethren, ye also *are become dead to the law* by the body of Christ, that ye should be married to another, even to Him who is raised from the dead, *that we should bring forth fruit unto God.*"—Rom. vii. 4. And the ground of that necessity is immediately subjoined—"for when we were in the flesh (that is, during the continuance of the old man which was subject to the law), the motions of sins which were *by the law* did work in our members *to bring forth fruit unto death*; but now ye are *delivered from the law*, that being dead (the old man before mentioned), wherein we were held, *that we should serve in newness of spirit*, and not in the oldness of the letter."

The testimony of Scripture is irresistible upon this point, that to be under law is to be the servant of sin, for—"the strength of sin is the law." 1 Cor. xv. 56. "Sin, taking occasion by the commandment, worketh in us all manner of concupiscence; for without law sin is dead" (that is, comparatively inactive and harmless), Rom. vii. 8;—"Sin working death in us by that which is good (namely the law), becometh exceeding sinful by the commandment," Rom. vii. 13:—"Sin shall not have domi-

* "Wetstein adduces several instances of a similar usage, and among others a very remarkable one from Dion. Hal., iii. 17:—'Ἀλλ' εὐσεβὲς μὲν, ἔφη, πρᾶγμα ποιεῖτε, ὦ παῖδες, τῷ πατρὶ ζῶντες, καὶ οὐδὲν ἄνευ τῆς ἐμῆς γνώμης διαπραττόμενος.'—BAGGE.

nion over you; for ye are not under law, but under grace," Rom. vi. 8. All these Scriptures with trumpet tongue proclaim, that in order to live to the service of God, we must be dead unto law. But still the question awaits an answer (for we have somewhat anticipated the Apostle), 'by what death did he die?'

VERSE 20.—^a Χριστῷ συνεσταύρωμαι, 'I am crucified with Christ.' A more direct or a more comprehensible answer could not be returned to the question above proposed—"I am crucified with Christ." And no doubt it is subjoined in explanation of the previous statement. There is a manifest advertence in these words to the mystical union which subsists between the believer and Christ, wherein by baptism ("not the putting away of the filth of the flesh," but "the washing of regeneration and the renewing of the Holy Ghost"), the believer becomes a partaker with his blessed Lord in his suffering of death (and not in his death only, but in his resurrection, his risen life, and his ascension glory). "Know ye not (says St. Paul, explaining this great mystery to the Romans) that so many of us as were baptized into Jesus Christ, *were baptized into his death?*" and that this death was *a death unto law*, the Apostle further acquaints us: "Wherefore, my brethren, ye also are become *dead to the law* by the body of Christ."—Rom. vii. 4. The suspension of Christ's body upon the tree, seeing that "he bare our sins," and suffered in our stead, "the just for the unjust," was in effect *the death unto law* of every particular member of his body who should in the course of time be engrafted into him, through the exercise of a living faith, so that every individual Christian may affirm with equal truth and propriety as St. Paul, "I by law am dead unto law."

^b Ζῶ δέ, 'nevertheless I live.' A new and unexpected announcement, "I was crucified with Christ, nevertheless I live," introduced by the adversative particle δέ in its strictest and most legitimate usage: "Δέ is employed where something new is subjoined, distinct and different from what precedes, though not strictly its very opposite."—WINER, Gr., § liii. 7. At first sight, indeed, it may seem to be a purely contradictory statement, 'I am crucified with Christ, nevertheless I live;' but it will be found easily reconcilable with itself, when in the following clause we are taught that the 'I' who am crucified with Christ, and the 'I' who now live are, theologically regarded, two distinct persons, and consequently there is no direct antagonism between the several parts of the sentence.

^c Οὐκ ἔτι ἐγώ, 'no longer I;' explanatory statement, introduced by way of correction.—See 1 Cor. xv. 10. The man who now lives is not identically the same who was crucified with Christ—"no longer *I*," the emphatic ἐγώ designating, not Paul absolutely, nor Paul relatively in contradistinction to others, but Paul naturally. 'I,' the merely natural man, descendant of sinful Adam, born after the flesh, the inheritor of a depraved nature, obnoxious to the curse of a broken law, but now dead to the law by the body of Christ, being crucified together with him, that 'I' no longer exists, but "Christ liveth in me."

^d Ζῇ δὲ ἐν ἐμοὶ Χριστός, 'but Christ liveth in me'—a further com-

munication, introduced as before by the adversative particle *δὲ*. 'The *I* that liveth is not the *I* that previously existed (the old man), *but* Christ, the new man, who is formed within me.' The use of *δὲ* in this clause, in preference to *ἀλλὰ*, is not without its significance. "*Ἀλλὰ* expresses proper and strict opposition, either explaining away or reducing to insignificance the previous statement."—WINER, Gr., § liii. 7. Had *ἀλλὰ* been inserted here, we should have been prepared (in accordance with this definition) to expect a total annihilation of the old man, and a substitution in its stead of the new. But both Scripture and experience alike testify that the old man, though subdued and kept under in the exercise of a living faith, is not totally extinct; a remnant remains to be mortified throughout the whole course of our earthly existence—a mortification which only terminates with the grave, "where the wicked cease from troubling, and the weary are at rest."

The punctuation of this passage insisted upon by most modern commentators, *Χριστῷ συνεσταύρωμαι, ζῶ δὲ οὐκ ἔτι ἐγὼ, ζῇ δὲ ἐν ἐμοὶ Χριστός*, if not absolutely inadmissible, has but little apparently to recommend it. In sense varying immaterially from the received construction, it presents a pleasing parallelism to the ear, but dearly purchased at the expense of the old familiar paradox, 'I am crucified with Christ, nevertheless I live,' which bears so unmistakably the impress of Pauline antithesis. See 2 Cor. vi. 8–10. Alford dogmatically pronounces that "the punctuation as in the English version is altogether wrong, and would require *ἀλλὰ* before *οὐκέτι*;" but it requires something more than mere assertion to sustain the allegation.

According to the old construction, there is no such antagonism between *ζῶ* and *οὐκ ἔτι ἐγὼ* as to need the intervention of *ἀλλὰ*, the latter being evidently explanatory or qualifying of the former, but not subversive. The Apostle had just said, 'I am crucified with Christ, nevertheless I live;' and to clear up the apparent contradiction, showing in what sense it was to be understood, developing at the same time the truth which he was desirous to inculcate, he adds, "no longer I (the old man) live, but Christ liveth in me," a sentiment clearly enough enunciated by the simple negation *οὐκ ἔτι ἐγὼ*, without the assistance of the adversative *ἀλλὰ*.

Nor is it indeed an easy matter, consistently with this punctuation, to give a satisfactory translation to the sentence. Certainly the one adopted by Alford, "I have been crucified with Christ, but it is no longer I that live, but (it is) Christ that liveth in me," exhibits an imperfect conception; for having said, 'I have been crucified with Christ,' the appended 'but it is no longer I that live,' is superfluous and repugnant, until life has been reasserted in the following clause, "nevertheless I live," and then indeed it were wanting neither in point nor pertinency. Ellicott evades this difficulty by referring *δὲ*, in its proper adversative force, not to its immediate antecedent *συνεσταύρωμαι*, but to *ἵνα Θεῷ ζήσω* of the preceding verse, "*συνεστ.* being not so much a link in the chain of thought, as a rapid and almost parenthetical epexegetis of *ἀπέθανον*," a very ingenious and not absolutely untenable construction.

But it is uncritical to have recourse to extreme or extraordinary measures, when a plain and natural solution lieth at the door.

Again, the second $\delta\epsilon$ (according to Ellicott) introduces not “any opposition to the preceding negative clause, but simply marks the emphatic repetition of the same verb.” But it is impossible to read the sentence without being satisfied that in whatever sense the former $\delta\epsilon$ is to be understood, in that same sense must the latter be also. Alford, indeed, is more consistent in this particular; for he gives the same interpretation to $\delta\epsilon$ in both clauses, the difficulty with him being to account for the introduction of the first $\delta\epsilon$, if it be not antithetical. It seems to me, however, that the criticism with respect to the punctuation is wholly uncalled for, $\delta\epsilon$ being *adversative* in both instances, but not *subversive* like $\alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha$, and for the mildness of its oppositiveness most probably selected in this place. The Apostle does not affect to say that ‘because I am crucified with Christ,’ or ‘because Christ liveth in me, I cease to live myself’ (the peculiar province of $\alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha$ by the remotion of the one to establish the position of the other), but ‘I live a different person from what I was before’—the old man is done away, and the new man is raised up in me.

The indwelling of Christ by His Spirit animating the believer’s soul, attracting his sympathies, strengthening his faculties, stimulating his energies, guiding his counsels, controlling his actions—in a word, ordering the whole course and current of his life, is a point of doctrine so well known and so generally admitted, that any further comment upon it might be deemed unnecessary and obtrusive. It may be permitted to me, however, to add, that the sway of Christ in the renewed soul is not so overpowering in its nature as to be incapable of check, or even of positive suspension for a while. The old man (scotched, as we have just seen), but not killed, through the temptation of Satan and our own sinful complicity, breaks out at times into spasmodic effort to reassert his lost dominion; and were it not for the restraining grace of God, we should be at such seasons hurried away into divers lusts and passions; but God is faithful, who has promised that “He will not suffer us to be tempted above what we are able, but will, with the temptation, make also a way of escape.” Nevertheless, with all its inconsistencies, shortcomings, and defects, the tenor of the renewed life harmonizes in the main with the dictation of the Spirit of Christ; that which in the eye of God constitutes the believer’s *walk*, is “not after the flesh, but after the Spirit.”

• $\text{O } \delta\epsilon \nu\upsilon\nu \zeta\omega$, ‘but the life which I now live.’ Here, as in many other instances before noted, the adversativeness of $\delta\epsilon$ is to be sought in a suppressed contrast in the Apostle’s mind between the manner of life which he indeed lives, and that which might by possibility be imputed to him—a life of faith, as opposed to a life of ritual observance. O , grammatically regarded, may be understood either in the sense of ‘as to’—‘quod attinet ad id quod,’ or as an objective case after the verb (Winer, Gr., § xxiv. 4, note 3). Bloomfield and others adopt the former view, “as regards the life which I now live;” Ellicott and Alford

the latter, "the life which I now live," which is clearly the preferable construction, as harmonizing better with the second ζῶ, to which the entire clause ὁ δὲ νῦν ζῶ ἐν σαρκὶ must be regarded as the objective case; νῦν referring, not to *the whole period* of the Apostle's 'life in the flesh,' as contrasted with 'that which is to come,' but only to *that portion of it which had elapsed since the great change* which he describes in the 16th verse as a 'death unto law' and 'a crucifixion with Christ.' Ellicott objects to this limited application of νῦν, that in that case "the qualitative and tacitly contrasting ἐν σαρκὶ ('earthly existence,' 'life in the phenomenal world,' αἰσθητῇ ζωῇ, Chrys.) would seem wholly superfluous." But, independently of its being the only construction consistent with the facts of the case, the logical objection will be overruled if we accept ἐν σαρκὶ in the sense immediately to be proposed.

Ἐν σαρκὶ, 'in the flesh,' to wit, 'in the phenomenal world' (see ch. vi. 12 °),—'the outer life.' Ὁ δὲ νῦν ζῶ, to which ἐν σαρκὶ is joined, 'the life which I now live,' or 'my present life,' is a phrase susceptible of a double meaning. It may either denote that *course of life* which the Apostle pursued subsequently to his conversion, which is not unusually styled 'the life' or manner of living of a person, or it may be understood (theologically) of the *inner life* or *mode of existence* which he since enjoyed—that spiritual being which is the result of regeneration or the new birth, in which sense the believer is said to be "raised from death unto *life*"—to "be quickened"—to "be *alive* unto God," and such like. Now, this latter signification being wholly irrelevant to the Apostle's purpose, which is to show that he no longer walked as once he did, under the influence of a self-justifying spirit, in the attendance upon carnal rites and ceremonies, but by the principle of faith in the Son of God, ἐν σαρκὶ is introduced to preclude the possibility of confounding ὁ δὲ νῦν ζῶ (the life which I now live) with 'that divine life which Christ liveth in us,' which was the proximate subject of discourse, being an epithet plainly inapplicable, save to 'the course and tenor of one's life.' We have only to read the sentence, with the omission of ἐν σαρκὶ, to be sensible of the ambiguity which in its absence would prevail.

Ἐν πίστει, 'in faith'—an expression of frequent occurrence in the New Testament, and invariably in the same sense, 'in (and not *by*) faith.' Nor is there any instance in our version where it is translated '*instrumentally*' but here; whereas, on the other hand, faith as *the instrumental cause* is referred to repeatedly in the dative case (πίστει, or τῇ πίστει), but always without the preposition: on which grounds alone we should translate it here 'in faith,' a sense at the same time singularly in accordance with the context. Previously to his conversion the Apostle had lived ἐν νόμῳ (in law); all his designs and motives originated in legal considerations; what he did he did by constraint, and he did with a view to a reward; but now he is 'dead to law,' and lives ἐν πίστει; the element in which he moves is 'faith.' By faith he draws continually out of the fulness which is in Christ; by faith he imbibes fresh draughts of heavenly love, receives fresh inspirations of thought, of feeling, of motive, eventuating in a happy life of obedience, and un-

constrained conformity to the will of his Father which is in heaven. That such a contrast was present to the Apostle's mind when he wrote ἐν πίστει, will be farther apparent when we proceed to the consideration of the following clause.

^h Τῇ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ, 'that of the Son of God,' gen. subjecti. There can be no sufficient reason assigned for departure in this place (Ellicott and Alford make it gen. objecti) from the general rule, that where the genitive denotes a person, it should, if possible, be translated *subjectively*. The Apostle, speaking of that faith which actuated the whole course of his life since the period of his conversion, describes it as 'the faith of the Son of God;' faith, as we have before seen (ver. 16, ^d), exercised *in* Him and *by* Him; but though expressive of *the source* from whence all Christian faith proceeds (which in the 'objective' mode of construction is left entirely out of view), it is not thereby to the exclusion of *the object*. 'The faith of Christ,' which is essentially Gospel faith, is exercised upon all the revealed truths of the gospel, and not the least intensely upon that which is pre-eminently the theme of gospel story, 'Christ Jesus the Son of God;' so that by adopting the one, we by no means discard or disparage the other; to the well-instructed mind *the divine object of faith* is ever present upon the recurrence of that truly scriptural phrase, "the faith of (or from) Jesus Christ." Τῇ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ, here used for the purpose of particularization, to specify the faith to which allusion is made (unexpressed in the anarthrous πίστει); not that exercised under the law (see ver. 16, ^s), but that more efficacious faith which came into the world with the Son of God (see ch. iii. 23–25), and is the attribute of those only who are in communion with Him, in whose heart Christ dwells and believes, and so characteristically 'the faith of Christ,' or 'the faith of the Son of God.'

The transition from the 'faith of Christ'—the expression which has hitherto prevailed throughout the entire of this context—to 'the faith of the Son of God,' in this place, is remarkable, but by no means, it is submitted, unaccountable. Redemption is everywhere described in Scripture as the work of God's own Son: "God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son"—"He spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all"—"When the fulness of time was come, God sent forth his Son . . . to redeem them that were under the law," and so in many other places. It is this wondrous love of God, in sparing not 'his own Son,' that imparts to redemption half its value; it is this that renders it mighty as it is in recovering the alienated affections of man to God, not only that he found a ransom, but that that ransom was none other than "His well-beloved Son." Having it, then, in contemplation to introduce the subject of redemption in the following clause, preparatory to it the transition was not unnatural from 'the faith of Christ' to the kindred expression 'the faith of the Son of God,' who loved me and gave himself for me.

ⁱ Τοῦ ἀγαπήσαντός με καὶ, κ. τ. λ., 'who loved me and,' &c.—καὶ not merely 'copulative,' but 'epexegetical'—"He loved me and (illustrative of that love) He gave himself for me," the latter (παράδόντος)

being the effective word in the sentence; the former, in the nature of inducement. Παράδόντος, 'gave himself up,' *scil.*, to death; ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ, 'for me,' in my stead and in my behalf, where the substitutional character and the expiatory nature of Christ's death are plainly asserted. But an inquiry suggests itself—What is the pertinency of Christ's death to the subject in hand—for what purpose is it introduced here?

Τοῦ ἀγαπήσαντός με καὶ παραδόντος ἑαυτὸν is 'an explicative participial clause,' explanatory of the previous statement. In that statement St. Paul had represented himself as living no longer ἐν νόμῳ, but ἐν πίστει, in an element not of legality, but of faith—a position only attainable by virtue of the death of Christ, who gave himself for him, by satisfying the demands of the law, to transfer him from the bondage of a servant into the liberty of a child of God. To account, then, for this transition from law to grace, inexplicable upon any other ground, the Apostle subjoins the explanatory note, "who loved me, and gave himself for me." In an early stage of the Epistle, while pronouncing the apostolic salutation, "grace to you and peace from God the Father, and our Lord Jesus Christ," the Apostle, actuated by the same motive, had recourse to the same expedient. To point out the incompatibility of the enjoyment of the invoked blessings, 'grace and peace,' with the continuance of a legal condition, and at the same time to indicate the means whereby that legal condition was to be evaded, and grace and peace attained, the Apostle subjoined to the name of Jesus Christ a similar appendix, "who gave himself for us, that he might deliver us from the present evil age," by which expression we saw reason to understand 'the existing evil state of bondage and subjection under law:' such, too, is the reason of its introduction here.

VER. 21.—^a Τὴν χάριν τοῦ Θεοῦ, 'the grace of God.' But what are we to understand by 'the grace of God' in this connexion? Unquestionably that 'grace of God' which should be invalidated and set at nought by any man who would propose to justify himself by his own works, ceremonial or moral, namely, 'the grace of God which satisfied the claims of the divine law in our behalf,' and left us nothing to *do*, but only to *believe*. And seeing that that grace of God has been the subject of the preceding clause, we can have no hesitation in arriving at the conclusion that such is 'the grace of God' here intended. But this conclusion derives farther confirmation from the course which the argument subsequently pursues:—"I do not set at nought the grace of God by ceremonial justification; for if righteousness come by law, then"—what follows?—the grace of God is set aside?—nay, but "Christ has died in vain," where the substitution of the death of Christ for 'the grace of God' distinctly shows that in the estimation of the Apostle they were convertible ideas. Upon these grounds, then, we are satisfied that "the grace of God" in this passage means that 'act of grace,' with all its preliminaries and concomitants, the result of divine love, wherein Jesus Christ gave himself up voluntarily to death, to deliver us from the claims of the law. Nor is it any objection to this conclusion to say

that that was more properly 'the grace of Christ;' it only furnishes additional evidence, if such were wanted, that Jesus Christ is God.

^b Εἰ γὰρ, 'for if'—γὰρ explanatory and elliptical, as in verse 19. The suppressed premiss will easily suggest itself—'I do not set at nought the grace of God, *which I should do did I think to justify myself by works*; "for (γὰρ, explanatory of the assertion that self-justification would be a virtual nullification of grace), if righteousness come by law, then Christ hath died in vain."

^c Δωρεάν, 'needlessly,' 'without a cause,' as in John, xv. 25—ἐμίσσησάν με δωρεάν. The common rendering of this word ("in vain") falls short of its actual meaning:—'In vain' would lead us to apprehend that Christ had died 'ineffectually'—that he had not obtained the object proposed to himself in dying, whereas the intention of the writer obviously is to convey to us the impression that Christ had died 'unnecessarily.' If man could be justified by his own works, then was the sacrifice of the death of Christ uncalled for (δωρεάν, according to the primary signification of the word, 'gratuitously'); he died when there was no demand upon him, that he should die—'needlessly'—an absurd and impossible conclusion.

Calvin's commentary on this place is full of divine truth and instruction:—"If we could produce a righteousness of our own, then Christ hath suffered in vain; for the intention of his sufferings was to procure it for us; and what need was there that a work which we could accomplish for ourselves should be obtained from another? If the death of Christ be our redemption, then were we captives—if it be satisfaction, we were debtors—if it be atonement, we were guilty—if it be cleansing, we were unclean. On the other hand, he who ascribes to works his sanctification, pardon, atonement, righteousness or deliverance, makes void the death of Christ."—CALVIN, *in loco*.

CHAPTER III.

IN the chapter upon which we are now entering, the Apostle addresses himself to the main subject of his Epistle. Hitherto he has not taken one *direct* step towards the establishment of the doctrine in dispute: all his efforts have been aimed at the vindication of his character from the aspersions and insinuations of designing men; and though in the course of his defence many expressions have been used, and many circumstances adverted to, which *indirectly* bear upon the subject, yet he must have conceived a very imperfect notion indeed of the plan of the Epistle who is not prepared to admit that, so far, the *direct* argument has been absolutely and literally untouched. But now, his authority as an independent apostle being established, the judaical tendencies which had been imputed to him disproved, and his triumphant defence concluded with a distinct and spirited avowal of his personal repudia-

tion of the law for ever as a medium of justification, and his exclusive and unqualified reliance upon the gospel principle of faith, he enters upon a course of reasoning as close, as logical, and as conclusive as is to be met with in the works of the most metaphysical of modern writers.

VERSE 1.—* Ὁ ἀνόητος, 'O thoughtless.' There may be some diversity of opinion as to the exact force of this expression; but one thing is evident, that, whatever its meaning may be, it is conceived in no spirit of angry recrimination, or with the slightest disposition to hurt the feelings or to wound the sensibilities of his Galatian readers, an intention as irreconcilable with the acknowledged policy of Paul, as it would be at variance with the strain of affectionate consideration which is discernible throughout the entire Epistle. Ἀνόητος, then, is not to be understood in the general sense, 'stupid, or insensible,'* but rather as an expression of opinion upon their conduct on a particular occasion: in their departure from the simplicity of Gospel truth, they had acted with unaccountable inconsiderateness and haste—a sentiment not very remote from that conveyed in the word ταχέως, which meets us in the commencement of the Epistle (ch. i. 6^b). Ellicott and Alford represent the fervidness of this exordium as attributable to the excitement occasioned by the foregoing rebuke of Peter; but this is clearly under misapprehension as to where that argument concludes (so far back as ver. 17 of the preceding chapter). Whatever warmth is exhibited herein is due rather to the solicitude which the Apostle felt at the critical position in which the Galatians had placed themselves through their defection from the truth of the gospel.

^b Ἐβάσκαθεν, 'did bewitch you.' In the application of this language the Apostle evinces a very gentle and indulgent spirit towards the Galatian perverts, shifting the blame of their secession almost entirely from their own shoulders to those of others, by whose arts he supposes them to have been seduced—a complete refutation of any contemplated harshness in the preceding expression. Βασκαίνω, 'to fascinate,' to 'bewitch.'† Ellicott derives the word from βάζω, βάσκω, and thinks that it signified originally 'mala lingua nocere.' At the same time he admits that the reference is in this place to "the bewitching influence of the evil eye." So, likewise, Bagge:—"St. Paul evidently uses the word in the sense of *bewitching*, not that he necessarily believed in such a power; but he avails himself of a strong word, or, as Jerome says—'verbum quotidianæ sermocinationis,' to express his wonder at the sud-

* "Themistius (Orat. xxiii.) ascribes to the Galatians the same characteristics as those of their ancestors, the *Galli* (and transmitted to their posterity, the modern French), namely, a *quickness of apprehension*, but united with levity and inconstancy."—BLOOMFIELD.

† "A. Morus, quoted by Wolf, says: 'Βασκαίνω dicitur tanquam φασκαίνω, fiebat enim harum literarum transpositio; ut Φίλιππος Βίλιππος dictus est apud Macedonas.' It is derived by the Greek grammarians from φαός and καίειν. This derivation is favoured by the Latin form of 'fascino':—

"Nescio quis teneros oculus mihi fascinat agnos."

Virg. Eclog., iii. 103."

—BAGGE.

denness of the Galatians' fall, preceded as it had been by prominent tokens of enlightenment."—BAGGE, *in loco*. By this mode of address the blame is much more distinctly thrown upon the active agents in the seduction, than upon those who were the passive and unreflecting dupes of the delusion.

‘Τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μὴ πείθεσθαι, ‘not to obey,’ or ‘that ye do not obey the truth.’ These words, though wanting in some of the best copies, and now generally discarded by modern expositors, do nevertheless contain the very pith and marrow of the Apostle’s rebuke; and, if not admitted formally into the text, must at least be mentally supplied by every intelligent reader of the passage. For what purpose is this fascination adverted to? or wherein does it appear, if not in this, that they do not submit themselves to the truth, when the strongest evidence in its support has been laid before them? ‘THE TRUTH’ in question is the great truth which is traceable upon every page of the New Testament, but which is especially the subject of the present discourse—‘Man’s justification by faith in a crucified Redeemer, and not by legal works, moral or ceremonial.’ This was the truth imperilled, and almost subverted, in the Galatian church, and this truth a due appreciation of Christ crucified would have indelibly engraven upon their hearts; but this truth they did not obey.

The declaration of gospel truth, though it leaves man nothing whatever to *do* in order to justification, but only to *believe*, is capable, nevertheless, of being disobeyed, as the words *μὴ πείθεσθαι* distinctly intimate. But it is to be remembered that there is an obedience of the heart (see Rom. vi. 17)—a soul-submissiveness to heavenly teaching, which is as plainly and as properly ‘obedience’ as the submission of the bodily members to the influence of the will, or the submission of a servant to the control of his master. It was this consideration, probably, which induced Erasmus to construe the words before us, “that ye should *not believe* the truth,” a meaning which is certainly implied in the words; but something more than belief may be intended, namely, *a deportment suitable and conformable thereto*—a practical abnegation of all human appliances as a means of justification—a fruit in which the Galatian church were sadly deficient. It is to be observed that it is not here attributed to the Galatians that they *had not obeyed* the truth—that they had apparently done; it was from that position of sound doctrine that they had now, at the instigation of the false teachers, so thoughtlessly seceded.

ἡ Προεγράφη, ‘was set forth,’ or ‘represented.’ Etymologically regarded, the verb *προγράφω* is capable of a two-fold acceptation, accordingly as it is applied *to time* or *to place*. When applied to time, it presents a thing as written before (*antea*) some certain period past, present, or to come, in which case attention is drawn to *the contents* of the writing, rather than to the characters in which they are expressed. When applied to place, it presents a thing as written before (*pro*) the eyes, when *the characters* of the writing are at least as much the object of contemplation as the communication which they convey. This second

use of the word lets in the idea of pictorial representation, which finds no place in the first. The question then arises, in which sense is the word to be taken here? In the New Testament, with the exception of this single instance, it is to be found only in the former. Usage, then, would incline to the former, the sense which should, doubtless, prevail here, were it not for the accompanying words, *κατ' ὀφθαλμοῦς*, which turn the scale decisively in favour of the latter. The latter sense then being, as we have just seen, that of a visible representation, we may imagine the force of the figure (for figure assuredly it is) to be this:—‘The cross of Christ was so clearly, distinctly, circumstantially, set forth by the Apostle Paul, in his ministry in the Galatian church, that it almost amounted to a pictorial representation of the scene’—the vividness of the delineation, no doubt, contributing to the aggravation of their folly in disregarding it.*

* *Κατ' ὀφθαλμοῦς*, ‘visibly.’ The meaning of *προγράφω* being, as we have just said, determinable by the context in which it stands, these words ascertain and fix it here. Jesus Christ, and him crucified, had been set forth, not merely to the hearing of the ear, but *κατ' ὀφθαλμοῦς*, ‘before the eyes’ (Winer, Gr., § xlix. *κατὰ, ὅ*), ‘visibly,’ by which we are to understand, not literally, but metaphorically, by a description so minute, accurate, and circumstantial, as would seem almost addressed to the eye. Calvin’s comment upon this expression is too characteristic and too instructive to be denied a place here:—“Let those who would discharge aright the ministry of the gospel learn, not merely to speak and declaim, but to penetrate into the consciences of men, to make them see Christ crucified, and feel the shedding of his blood. When the church has such painters as these, she no longer needs the dead images of wood and stone—she no longer requires pictures, both of which unquestionably were first admitted to Christian temples when the pastors had become dumb, and been converted into mere idols, or when they uttered a few words from the pulpit in such a cold and careless manner, that the power and efficacy of the ministry were utterly extinguished.” Were all ministers of the gospel to acquit themselves in the spirit of this injunction, the souls of the faithful would not be disquieted within them, or their indignation roused so frequently as it now is, by the miserable theatrical exhibitions, or the paltry pictorial devices, which are the disfigurement of our churches, and a disgrace to the Christianity of the nineteenth century.

‘*Ἐν ὑμῖν*, ‘in the midst of you.’ In many copies these words are omitted, as tending, no doubt, to the supposed simplicity of the sentence that they should be expunged. But retaining them, as from the weight of authority in their favour we are bound to do, we must see

* This sense of *προγράφω*, though supported by a long catalogue of authorities (see Ellicott and Alford, *in loco*), has been impugned by modern expositors as unexampled in the New Testament. However, it is strongly supported by etymology; and of all the senses which have been attributed to it here, not one of them accords nearly so well with the context.

that they be not improperly explained. The ordinary interpretation is faulty. If intended to be joined with *ἐσταυρωμένος*, perspicuity and emphasis (as Ellicott observes) would require that the order should be reversed, and that they should be placed not *before* the participle, but *after*. Besides, there is no instance in the New Testament where *ἐν* is employed as equivalent to *περὶ* or *ὑπὲρ*, as by such construction unquestionably it would be. We must therefore connect them with *προεγράφη*, placing the comma, not before, but after *ἐν ὑμῖν*, when we shall find that their insertion is neither unaccountable nor ineffective. These words being omitted, there is nothing in the sentence to declare in what way the exhibition referred to was presented. That it was not openly, to the eye, might indeed be conceded; but whether by word of mouth or by letter would not appear; but *ἐν ὑμῖν* supplies the information wanted—not *to them* only, but *among them*—not by letter from a distance, but by the *vivâ voce* testimony of the Apostle in their midst.

Luther, in his commentary upon this place, conceits that *ἐν ὑμῖν* is a specimen of very rough and sharp language:—"Before, he said that they sought righteousness by the law, rejected the grace of God, and that to them Christ died in vain: now he addeth, moreover, that they crucify Christ, who before lived and reigned in them; as if he should say, ye have not only rejected the grace of God, not only to you Christ died in vain, but also he is most shamefully crucified *amongst you*." But however, in point of fact, this censure may have applied to the Galatian church, it evidently was not the idea prominent in the Apostle's mind when he wrote the passage; for it proceeds upon the mistaken notion that *ἐν ὑμῖν* is governed by *ἐσταυρωμένος*, whereas it is properly assignable, and with much greater emphasis, to *προεγράφη*.

But an important inquiry remains behind. What was there in the vivid representation of the cross of Christ so palpably connected with the truth in question, as to place it beyond conception that a man should witness the one and not accept the other, save only on the assumed ground of some extraordinary mental hallucination?

The doctrine of the cross of Christ is the distinct teaching that 'the sacrifice of the death of Christ is a complete satisfaction for the sins of the whole world; and that whosoever is interested in that sacrifice by faith is delivered from condemnation of every kind, and needeth not the blood of bulls or of goats, or other ceremonial observances, to insure his acceptance with God'—a doctrine plainly at variance with that futile, ritualistic system, which the members of the Galatian church had embraced, and embracing which they had not submitted to THE TRUTH of the gospel.

VERSE 2.—*Μαθεῖν*, 'to learn.' *Μαυθάνω* usually implies 'to come to the knowledge of a thing, as the result of instruction, study, observation;' in which sense Luther understands it here, and takes it ironically:—"Go to, now, answer me, I pray you, which am your scholar; for ye are so suddenly become doctors, that ye are now my masters and teachers." But this is a fanciful exposition; the question being put *bonâ fide* with a view to an admission, to obtain thereby a basis for further

operations; for the word signifies also 'to learn without mental effort, as the result of inquiry, or even of casual information.' See Acts, xxiii. 27.

^b Ἐξ ἔργων νόμου, 'of works of law'—'legal works.'—See chapter ii. 16^a.

^c Τὸ Πνεῦμα ἐλάβετε, 'received ye the Spirit?' At this point the Apostle enters upon the main subject of the Epistle, all that has hitherto preceded being rather of a prefatory nature. 'Ye Galatians desire to place yourselves under the institutions of Moses, in order to perfect yourselves by your own works. This only I wish to inquire of you, in what way did ye commence the divine life? for in whatever way ye commenced it, in that same way, it is reasonable to conclude, ye must go on to perfection. Received ye then, I ask you, the Spirit, &c. &c.?' But in what sense are we to understand the term? Is it 'the Spirit' in His ordinary or His extraordinary manifestations?

If the question before us were to be regarded as an appeal to *the experience* of the Galatian people, then probably 'the Spirit' would have reference to the miraculous gifts of the Holy Ghost. The presence of the divine Comforter in the soul in his sanctifying influences being incognizable to the outward senses, or even to the inward perceptions of a man, consistently with our Lord's own declaration (John, iii. 8), "The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, or whither it goeth; so is every one that is born of the Spirit;" the precise time or mode of its reception would hardly be made the subject of special inquiry in the church. But it is evidently not a simple appeal to experience, but *the introduction of a problem*, in order to its logical solution. The same inquiry is repeated at verse 5, and immediately followed up by an appeal to the testimony of Scripture, which is brought to a conclusion no earlier than in the eighteenth verse, where the Apostle concludes:—"If the inheritance (to wit, the Holy Ghost) be of law, then is it no more *of promise*," and the law has superseded the promise.

Now, as it is reasonable to conclude that the answer would be brought out in terms corresponding with the purport of the inquiry, from this conclusion we infer that the question under consideration had respect to 'the Spirit,' not in His extraordinary but in His ordinary operations—in the same comprehensiveness of meaning in which *the promise* was made to Abraham, "in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed," words which are explained to signify 'shall receive the Spirit in his *justifying* power.' See verse 8 of this chapter. It is a great misapprehension of the purport of this passage to regard it, as some have done (see Bloomfield, *in loco*), as an independent argument, which being presented in a skeleton form, they proceed to clothe and complete every one after the fashion which seemeth best to himself, whereas it is in truth but inducement to an admission implied in the succeeding verse, which admission is made the ground of the remonstrance which follows.

^d Ἐξ ἀκοῆς πίστεως, 'of the hearing of faith'—'faithful hearing.' To the attentive reader it will be evident that the expressions before us, ἐξ

ἔργων νόμου and ἐξ ἀκοῆς πίστεως, are contrasted one with the other, and manifestly in the same form of construction. In the former, as we have already seen (ch. ii. 16 *), νόμου is to be regarded as a *qualitative* genitive, descriptive of the character of the works contemplated, 'works of law'—'meritorious works.' In the same manner we conceive that πίστews denotes the *quality* of the hearing, 'hearing of faith,' i. e. 'faithful hearing,' the ordinary construction involving the necessity of accepting πίστις in a sense in which it does not elsewhere occur. "Faith is here put by a figure of speech for *the gospel*, which is elsewhere called 'the law of faith' (Rom. iii. 17), because it exhibits to us the free grace of God in Christ without any merit of works."—CALVIN, in which he is followed by Bloomfield, Chandler, Brown, and others. But surely there is upon the face of it an objection to this construction which ought to be allowed some weight, that no instance can be adduced in the New Testament where πίστις without the article, can be shown to denote "the gospel," or "the abstract of Christian faith," or any other thing but the abstract quality, 'faith.' Nor is there any occasion for a departure from established usage here; there is no exegetical consideration which will not be fully answered by a strict adherence to lexical propriety—'the hearing of faith,' or 'faithful hearing' of the word preached—to which the Apostle refers as a supposed medium of derivation of the Holy Ghost, not the hearing of the ear, the natural exercise of the outward organ (to which no such benefit is attached), but the hearing 'of faith'—ἀκοῆς to be understood of *the process of hearing*, not of the report heard.

Ellicott and Alford represent ἀκοῆς πίστεως as denoting 'the report or message of faith,' gen. objecti, where faith is the subject of the preaching, a form of expression unprecedented in the New Testament. It seems more natural, and more consistent with the circumstances of the case, to understand it as represented above, gen. qualitatis, 'the hearing of faith,' or 'faithful hearing,' which was in fact the medium of communication of the Holy Ghost. If we turn to the Acts of the Apostles, tenth chapter and verse 44, we will there learn how the Holy Ghost fell upon Cornelius and those who were with him: "*While Peter yet spake these words* (setting forth the death and resurrection of Christ, and remission of sins through faith in him, ver. 40–42), the Holy Ghost fell on all them which heard the word." Did they then receive the Spirit 'through legal works, or through faithful hearing?' Through the faithful hearing of the gospel of Jesus Christ; unlike the case of those of whom we read in the Epistle to the Hebrews, whom "the word preached did not profit, *not being mixed with faith in them that heard it*" (Heb. iv. 2), they heard the word in faith, and it profited them, even to the receiving of the Holy Ghost. The question proposed for consideration is, upon what grounds was the Holy Ghost originally conferred upon the church? Was it the result of a previous attendance upon the Mosaic ritual? or was it by grace through the faithful hearing of the word preached? Not through the observance of the law, which they never did observe (being Gentiles, and aliens from the commonwealth of Is-

rael); but whilst they stood and listened to the living preacher's voice, the Holy Ghost fell upon them, as many as heard with faith, and his miraculous powers forthwith, in many instances, exhibited themselves amongst them.

The translation advocated by M'Knight is ἀκοῆς πίστεως, "the obedience of faith," assuming ἀκοή for ὑπακοή, which, although a solitary instance in the Old Testament (1 Sam. xv. 22, LXX.) may be adduced where ἀκοή does seem to bear that signification; yet, to say the least of it, it is a forced interpretation, and not to be resorted to except in a case of necessity. According to this exposition, πίστεως must be regarded either as gen. of origin or gen. in apposition: the former construction, 'the obedience which springs from faith,' is in this place theologically untenable, for such obedience could not precede the gift of the Holy Ghost; the latter, 'the obedience which consists in faith,' is needless and unserviceable; for after having unduly strained ἀκοῆς to obtain it, the result differs but little from the ordinary interpretation, 'the hearing of faith,' and that little only as being less explicit, and consequently less satisfactory, leaving undetermined the mode in which that 'obedience which is faith' was in exercise when the Holy Ghost was communicated, namely, in the hearing of the gospel of Jesus Christ. I would press the remark, that nothing is implied in this verse beyond what is actually expressed: a plain question is asked, and the answer to that question is assumed in the way in which (consistently with the truth) the Apostle's argument required, namely, 'by faithful hearing;' and upon that assumption his appeal to the common sense of the Galatians is founded.

VERSE 3.—* Οὕτως ἀνόητοί, 'so very thoughtless;' ἀνόητος, as we have already seen (ver. 1, *), 'inconsiderate,' 'unreflective;' denoting, not so much mental incapacity as non-application of mental power; hence inaccurately in our version rendered "foolish." In the present instance the want of reflection exhibited itself in their unconsciousness of the absurdity involved in the course they were pursuing, 'having begun with the Spirit, to seek now to perfect themselves with the flesh.'

ἃ Πνεύματι—σαρκί, 'with the spirit'—'with the flesh;' datives of the instrument (see ch. v. 16, ἃ, note); here used with a *modal* signification (Winer, Gr., § xxxi. 7). Great diversity of opinion exists amongst commentators as to the sense in which the terms are to be understood here. Some have supposed that by 'the spirit' is designated *the gospel*, and by 'the flesh,' *the law* (M'KNIGHT). Others would explain the passage, "having begun with a *spiritual religion* (one whose truth was attested by the Holy Ghost), are ye finishing with a *carnal and ceremonial one*?" (BLOOMFIELD). Ellicott and Alford consider that 'spirit' is to be "understood of the *Holy Spirit, regarded as the governing and directing principle in man*; 'flesh' on the contrary, as *the worldly tendency of human life*—the life and movement of man in things of the phenomenal world"—an approximation, it may be, to the sense, but nevertheless far removed from the exact meaning of the Apostle; πνεῦμα and σὰρξ occur

here in their ordinary and familiar usage, as denoting respectively *the Holy Ghost*, and *the corrupt nature of man*. In the preceding verse the question had been proposed, “received ye *the Spirit* (τὸ Πνεῦμα) out of legal works, or out of faithful hearing?” and the answer had been assumed, ‘not out of legal works, but out of faithful hearing;’ upon which assumption the Apostle proceeds, ‘having begun the divine life (admittedly) with *the Spirit* through (or out of) faith, without any preparatory observance of the law, are ye so irrational as to seek now to perfect yourselves with ‘the flesh?’ where ‘the Spirit’ is of course to be understood in the same sense as before, of ‘the Holy Spirit of God’ Had the reception of the Spirit by the church been the result of a protracted course of legal obedience, then the case would have been different; the divine life would have commenced with ‘*the flesh*,’ from which that obedience sprung, and not as now with ‘*the Spirit*;’ but seeing that the communication of the Holy Ghost was *an act of grace*, and not *the recompense of obedience*, the commencement of the divine life is to be dated from the entrance of the Spirit into the soul, in other words, they ‘began with the Spirit.’

‘To be perfected with the flesh’ means—to be perfected through the instrumentality of the flesh, by the observance of those outward rites and ceremonies which constitute the service of the flesh, the performances of corrupt nature, undertaken with a view to self-justification in the sight of God; and the force of the argument amounts to this—‘If the flesh be incapable of taking the first step in the heavenward journey, how should it suffice for the second or the third? If it has no part in the inception, why should it be deemed instrumental to the consummation? If it cannot introduce to the lists as candidates, by what virtue can it confer the crown? If it be impotent to bring the children to the birth, how shall it advance them to the stature of perfect men?’ Such is the nature of the weapon which the Apostle wields—an ‘argumentum ad absurdum’ of no ordinary propriety and force.

‘Ἐπιτελεῖσθε, ‘are ye bringing yourselves to perfection?’ or rather, *de conatu*, ‘are ye seeking to perfect yourselves?’ The compound ἐπιτελέω, as Ellicott justly observes, presents the idea not merely of ‘finishing,’ as contrasted with ‘beginning,’ but of bringing “to a complete and perfect end:” why modern commentators should concur in pronouncing ἐπιτελεῖσθε in this place “not middle but passive,” I cannot conjecture. Surely the meaning, ‘are ye bringing yourselves to perfection?’ or ‘are ye seeking to perfect yourselves?’ is as agreeable to the context, being addressed to persons who were endeavouring to commend themselves by the works of the law, as ‘are ye brought to completion?’ or ‘are ye being completed?’ the rendering preferred. As to the observation of Alford, that “the middle voice does not appear to occur in the New Testament,” it does not seem to carry with it much weight; for a word occurring but three times in the New Testament out of the active voice, a better example (one might suppose) of the middle need hardly be desired than the one presented before our eyes.

VERSE 4.—‘Ἐπάθετε, ‘Did ye suffer?’ The verb πάσχω being met

with in some ancient writings in a favourable sense, has given occasion, in the absence of every unfavourable allusion in the context, to its being accepted in that sense by some commentators here. But surely nothing can be more in accordance with epistolary usage than to refer to trials and difficulties well known to the parties themselves, without any recitation of them in form? But the word never being found in the Old Testament, or the New, in *a good*, or even in *a neutral* sense ('experienced'), and the old and generally received interpretation suiting the context quite as well, if not indeed a great deal better, than the new, is sufficient authority for its retention here.*

^b *Εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἐῖς κῆν, 'if it be only to no purpose.' This expression is susceptible of different, and in a measure contrary, interpretations, accordingly as we ascribe to καὶ its ascensive or descensive force. According to the former, the meaning would be, 'if indeed it amount to this, that it be in vain,' implying, perhaps, a hope and a belief that it had not yet reached that point, in which sense it seems to have been taken in our Authorized Version; according to the latter, 'if indeed it be only in vain,' expressive of apprehension that it may have descended lower, or, in other words, be a great deal worse. Of these two meanings, Ellicott admits that the latter is "the most emphatic and pungent," but the former "most characteristic of the large heart of the Apostle, and the spirit of love and tenderness to his converts which is blended even with the rebukes of his Epistle." But we have yet to learn that "the large heart of the Apostle," or his unquestionable love to his disciples, ever influenced him to withhold from them any part of the divine counsels concerning them, or to forbear to warn them of the tremendous yet probable consequences of their defaults. I hold, therefore, to the latter, as being more suggestive and more instructive.

Having previously observed upon the *irrationality* of their conduct, the Apostle, in the words before us, adverts to the *danger* which they incurred—'Have ye suffered so many things in vain? if indeed it be *only* in vain.' Doubtless the transition from heathenism to Christianity could not but be accompanied with many and sore trials: many an ancient prejudice, many a loved association, many a time-honoured custom, and many a cherished vice, should needs be relinquished and given up for ever; many a tie of love, and brotherhood, and friendship, and domestic peace, and social intercourse, severed; much obloquy, contempt, reproach, vituperation, incurred; high and honourable positions aban-

* Bagge understands the words of the spiritual experiences of which the Galatians had been the subjects, πάσχω being used, he says, "in its radical signification 'to suffer,' that is, to experience anything either good or bad." To this effect he quotes Schomerus—"Verbum ἐπάθετε eo sensu accipiendum est, quo occurrit apud Plutarchum et alios scriptores Græcos, ut explicetur de quovis affectu aut re, quæ alicui accidit, et sic sententia est hæc: Tantane signa gratiæ divinæ sensistis frustra?" But this opinion is chiefly founded upon the supposition that ῥοσαῦτα refers primarily to the influences of the Spirit before mentioned, which being, doubtless, blessings, ἐπάθετε should be taken in a favourable sense. But there is no need to suppose that ῥοσαῦτα has any reference to the influence of the Spirit, and the meaning of ἐπάθετε is consequently unaffected thereby.

done, hopes frustrated, prospects blighted, persecutions of a sterner kind, perhaps, endured—bonds, imprisonment, and death, in the eventful struggle from darkness to light, and from the power of heathendom into the kingdom of God's dear Son. And were all these sufferings to turn to no account? Were they to become vain and unprofitable by the abandonment of the Gospel liberty whereunto they had attained?

But would they be *only* in vain? Were they confident that they could even return to their original position if they would? Was it to be permitted to them, at the sacrifice of all that they had suffered, to resume precisely their former estate? Oh, no; it could not be *only* in vain: a sterner measure of retributive justice, and deeper depths of woe, await those who turn their backs upon the grace of God—"The servant which knew his lord's will, and prepared not himself, neither did according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes," Luke, xii. 47; "It had been better for them not to have known the way of righteousness, than after they have known it to turn from the holy commandment delivered unto them," 2 Pet. ii. 21; "He that despised Moses' law died without mercy under two or three witnesses: of how much sorer punishment, suppose ye, shall he be thought worthy, who hath trodden under foot the Son of God, and hath counted the blood of the covenant, wherewith he was sanctified, an unholy thing, and hath done despite to the Spirit of grace?" Heb. x. 29. All Scripture testifies with open mouth, that evangelical privileges cannot be surrendered with impunity—that the man who voluntarily returns to the error of his ways incurs a heavier responsibility, and a deadlier load of guilt, than if he had never known the way of righteousness. If these things be so, what must be the condition of those unhappy perverts who, being born and nurtured in the bosom of the reformed church, have deliberately turned their backs upon the light and liberty of Gospel truth, and retreated into the holes and corners of mediæval darkness—what, if God's Word be true, but "a fearful looking for of judgment and fiery indignation which shall devour the adversaries?" Heb. x. 27. May "God give them repentance to the acknowledging of the truth, and that they may recover themselves out of the snare of the devil, who are taken captive by him at his will!" 2 Tim. ii. 26. Such were the weapons with which St. Paul assailed the errors of the Galatian church—'argumentum ad absurdum,' followed up by a no less potent arm, 'argumentum ad damnum.'

VERSE 5.—No one can attentively regard this verse, and not feel assured that the question which meets the eye here is the same which presented itself at verse 2, though propounded in a somewhat different form. If so, it may be asked, 'For what purpose is the repetition?' To which I reply:—Hitherto the Apostle had presented but a summary of his argument, the substance of what was to follow being clearly epitomized in the second verse. As he himself declares, the whole weight of his reasoning is to be rested upon one point—"Have ye received the Spirit out of legal works, or out of faithful hearing?" This is all he required to learn of them in order to convince them of their

folly; and to this he had assumed an answer, and upon the answer so assumed had pressed the Galatians with the bitter consequences of their defection. But Paul was not the man to found a solemn remonstrance upon a baseless *petitio principii*, as he should have done had he left the answer to that question unproven. Having, then, in a few words sketched the plan of his address, he now reproduces his former query, to give it a searching, scriptural, and truly logical investigation.

In consulting commentators upon this portion of Holy Writ, we cannot but be struck with the fragmentary nature of the expositions which are commonly offered. Every sentence almost is made to represent a distinct argument, and a change of topic meets us at every turn. Whereas, when we examine the original for ourselves, we find that one continuous chain of reasoning pervades this and the following chapter from first to last, divided indeed into sections, but still the same unbroken chain throughout, each sentence a distinct link in the chain, naturally and logically connected with its precedent and its consequent, nothing superfluous, nothing wanting, no disorder or confusion in the arrangement, but each part conspiring with marvellous simplicity to effect the object for which the whole was designed. Such, I think, will be found, upon a careful investigation of the subject, to be a faithful delineation of the Apostle's reasoning in this place.

The object of the section on which we are now entering is *single* and definite. In reference to the question already proposed, it is the Apostle's purpose to prove that the Spirit has been and is received in the church, not as the result of legal obedience, but of a faithful hearing of the gospel of Christ. To establish this point he has recourse to two successive arguments—the first purely *scriptural*, terminating with verse 14, inclusive; the second *analogical*, concluding with verse 18; and both combined furnishing a full and incontrovertible answer to the question proposed. The first of these arguments is the subject of the present section.

* Οὖν, 'therefore.' I have just stated that the question introduced by this particle is the same which has before met us at verse 2; and that, having assumed the answer *pro tem.*, the Apostle had branched off into an hortatory representation, founded upon that assumption, of the *absurdity* and *danger* of their present course, and that he here resumes the subject in order to a scriptural and searching investigation. And at the outset I am sustained in my allegation by the insertion of the conjunction οὖν, one of whose uses is thus defined:—"Οὖν is used when a sentence has been interrupted by a parenthesis or *intervening clause*, and is again taken up, in which sense it is equivalent to 'I say,' Lat. 'inquam,' or the like."—Rob., *Lex.*

Οὖν, then, occurs here in its *resumptive force*, taking up the question which had been laid aside at verse 2, in order to its being prosecuted to its legitimate conclusion.

^b Ὁ ἐπιχορηγῶν—καὶ ἐνεργῶν, κ. τ. λ. 'He that ministereth—and worketh,' &c. The subject of this query is not St. Paul, or any casual member (one for many) of the Galatian church, but, as the entire con-

text, and as the peculiar force of every word, testifies—God. *Χορηγός* was a name given by the Greeks to a person who, upon great public festivals, was used to *lead out a band of singers or players* for the entertainment of the populace, furnishing out of his own pocket dresses, scenery, and all other requisites for the occasion. Hence the word *χορηγέω* (equivalent to *ἐπιχορηγέω*) came to signify ‘to furnish liberally,’ ‘to supply fully’—in which sense it is here used to depict God’s gracious and bountiful supply of the Spirit to the church, meeting all the wants and necessities of His faithful people, and enabling them effectually and cheerfully to discharge the various duties to which in His providence they are called—an end which, no doubt, was set forth and illustrated by the manifold dispensations of the Spirit in the miraculous gifts and powers of the early day. That the subject of *ἐνεργῶν* is the same as that of *ἐπιχορηγῶν* is manifest, inasmuch as they are linked together under the regimen of the same pronoun, and consequently—God, a conclusion which derives farther support from the specific force of *ἐνεργῶν*, appropriated as it is in Scripture to God as the author of all our (good) works, ordinary and extraordinary: “there is a diversity of operations, but it is the same God which worketh (*ὁ ἐνεργῶν*) all in all,” 1 Cor. xii. 6. See also ch. ii. 8; Phil. ii. 13.

But another consideration presents itself. In what tense are these participles found? Chrys., Thdrt., Bengl., al., maintain, that they are participles of the imperfect—Ellicott and Alford, on the contrary, of the present tense. That this question can be decided (as Alford suggests) by determining the agent to whom the acts are attributed, whether Paul or God; and if God, then, consequently, of the present tense, can by no means be conceded. Affirming in the strongest manner that they are the attributes of Deity, and of none else, it remains to be ascertained to what period are they to be referred. Is it to their exercise when the gospel was first introduced into Galatia, or to the work being carried on at the time when the Apostle wrote? And if we are right in regarding the sentence before us as a repetition, in another form, of the question previously proposed (and it is generally admitted that it is), there would be much reason to apprehend that the former construction should prevail. The question at verse 2 is, “*Did ye receive* the Spirit (originally of course) out of legal works or out of faithful hearing?” and the answer being assumed, it is immediately followed up with the remonstrance, “Are ye so foolish? *having begun* with the Spirit, are ye now being made perfect with the flesh?” Whence it appears that, as *originally* proposed, the question had respect to the mode in which the spirit was *first* communicated to the church; and (if our supposition be correct) when it occurs a second time, it must have reference to the same period, and might naturally be expected to be found in a past tense.

But, on the other hand, it may be replied that the present participle, is capable of being understood, not *literally*, of the time now being, but *ethically*, of a habit, in which sense it is referrible to any period of time, past, present, or to come. In such case the meaning of the question before us would be, What is God’s habit of dealing in this matter? does

He minister the Spirit, and work powers in the church, out of legal works, or out of faithful hearing? the point of the inquiry all the while (conformably with the requirement of the context) bearing upon the period when they first received the Holy Ghost. And this mode of construction is to be preferred, not only as being familiar in the writings of St. Paul, but also as being more conformable with the use of the participle, which is but seldom found in the imperfect tense. The "substantive sense" suggested by Alford, after the alleged example of ch. i. 23, is uncalled for, and objectionable upon the score of indeterminateness, leaving the date of the transaction dependent upon a verb to be supplied by the expositor; whereas, in the precedent adduced (*ὁ διώκων ἡμᾶς ποτε*), the substantive construction is unavoidable (for the reasons there advanced), and the time provided for by the tense of the verb.

* *Δυνάμεις*, literally, 'powers,'—commonly translated in this place 'miracles,' for which use see Matt. xi. 20; Luke, x. 13; Acts, ii. 22. It is not easy at this period to enumerate all the extraordinary operations which may be classed under the denomination *δυνάμεις*. Suffice it to say, that they were superhuman effects exhibited by our Lord himself, and the early teachers of Christianity under the immediate impulse of the Holy Ghost, in attestation of the truth of their doctrine and the authenticity of their mission. It is by no means clear, however, that the word *δυνάμεις* is to be here taken in the restricted sense commonly assigned to it, but rather in its ordinary and primary signification, comprehending therein not only those 'powers' which are commonly called miraculous, but also those ordinary operations of the Holy Spirit which are designated (Heb. vi. 5) "the powers of the world to come," that is, of the Christian dispensation, and which are so often referred to by the sacred writers—see 1 Cor. xii. 6; Phil. ii. 13, al. The application of *πνεῦμα*, verse 2, to the *ordinary* communication of the Holy Ghost, seems considerably in favour of this supposition.

When it is asked, "He that ministereth to you the Spirit, and worketh powers within you, doeth He it out of legal works, or out of faithful hearing?" the operative party being God, the meaning of the question must necessarily be, works or faith upon the part of the beneficiary: is it the result of legal obedience, or of faithful hearing of the word of God? It is, I believe, an acknowledged fact, that neither were the gifts of the Spirit dispensed, nor the miraculous powers exercised, in any instance where there was not faith on the part of the recipient. The impotent man at Lystra (Acts, xiv. 9) had first "heard Paul speak," and the Apostle "saw that he had *faith to be healed*" before he said unto him, "stand upright on thy feet." Our Lord himself seems to have attested this truth in many instances, when he said to those who were healed, "thy faith hath saved thee," or, "thy faith hath made thee whole." On one occasion it is expressly affirmed of him, that "He did not many mighty works (*πολλοὺς δυνάμεις*) there, because of their unbelief," Matt. xii. 58. And the same is predicable, no doubt, of the ordinary communication and operations of the Holy Ghost. The connecting particle (*καὶ*) between the two clauses Ellicott understands

“*exegetically* ;” but, as it seems to me, without sufficient reason. The gift of the Spirit *to* the church, and the powers wrought *within* them, though sufficiently cognate to admit of being included under one general head, “received ye the Spirit?” (ver. 2), are nevertheless so far distinguishable as not only to *admit*, but positively to *court*, the application of *καὶ* in its ordinary *conjunctive* signification.

^d Ἐν ὑμῖν, ‘within you.’ If *δυνάμεις* be referred, not to the ‘powers’ themselves, but, metonymically, to ‘the miracles,’ the result of the powers, it is plain that *ἐν ὑμῖν* must be translated ‘amongst you’—‘in the midst of you ;’—but if, as is more probable, it be used of ‘the powers’ themselves, whether miraculous or ordinary, wrought in us by the grace of the Holy Spirit, then is it to be translated ‘within you ;’ the Spirit itself being supplied *to* them (*ὑμῖν*)—the operations of the Spirit being wrought *within* them (*ἐν ὑμῖν*).

^e Ἐξ ἔργων νόμου, ‘out of legal works’—the ritual observances, to wit, to which the Galatians looked for perfection—see chap. ii. 16 ^a. Ellicott regards *ἐργων νόμου* “in strict accordance with the primary force of the prep. ‘from,’ ‘out of’ (ex Vulg.) as *the originating or moving power* of the *ἐπιχορηγήσεις*.” But though this construction might pass unquestioned in the case of *ἐξ ἔργων νόμου*, where causation is expressly denied, what are we to say of its admission in the alternative clause *ἐξ ἀκοῆς πίστεως*, where faith is as distinctly affirmed to be the source of the blessing? Of course, the construction would be similar in both instances; and will it be argued that the faithful hearing of the word preached is *the originating or moving cause* of the bestowal of the Holy Ghost? The mere enunciation of the heresy should be sufficient to effect its overthrow. No; *ἐκ* here, as throughout the entire Epistle, where it is found in connexion with *ἐργων* or *πίστεως* (except, indeed, in the phrases *οἱ ἐκ πίστεως*, or *οἱ ἐξ ἔργων νόμου*, where it expresses ‘dependence,’ or ‘reliance upon’), represents *the occasional or incidental source* out of which the blessing is supposed to proceed. God has been pleased to connect faith with the bestowal of the Holy Ghost; and *out of* (*ἐκ πίστεως*) or *through faith*, as the appointed channel, the Spirit consequently proceeds—see ver. 10 ^c. Alford’s version—“*ἐκ*, ‘in consequence of’ (or following upon) the works of law, or the hearing of faith,” is neither so literal nor so satisfactory, the important idea ‘faith or works, as *the channel* of the communication of the Holy Ghost,’ being wholly lost sight of and unexpressed.

VERSE 6.—^a Καθὼς, ‘inasmuch as,’ ‘since.’ The question being now fairly propounded, “received ye the Spirit?” (as in verse 2), or “ministereth He to you the Spirit, and worketh He powers within you (as in verse 5), out of legal works, or out of faithful hearing?” the Apostle now proceeds with the inquiry, which he conducts throughout on purely scriptural grounds. The first step in the argument, “they of faith are the children of Abraham,” is thus wrought out: “Know ye, therefore, that they of faith are the children of Abraham.” But wherefore know we it? By what process of reasoning do we attain to the knowledge? “*Forasmuch* as Abraham believed God, and it was ac-

counted to him for righteousness." The ordinary—indeed, I might say the universally received—translation of *καθὼς* is clearly inadmissible. *Καθὼς*, if understood in the 'comparative' sense, "even as," requires *οὕτως*, expressed or understood in the corresponding clause, to sustain it. But no such word is expressed or understood here. If indeed the passage were written (as Ellicott, to suit the view which he takes of it, has paraphrased it), "*As Abraham was justified by faith, so shall his spiritual children be justified*," then indeed the 'comparative' sense of *καθὼς* would be not only proper, but indispensable. But such is not the conclusion to which the Apostle leads us; but, "know ye, therefore, that they of faith *are the children of Abraham*"—a conclusion to which *καθὼς* is much more conducive in its *causal* (see 1 Cor. v. 7; Phil. i. 7) than in its *comparative* sense. "Forasmuch as Abraham believed God, and it was accounted to him for righteousness;" or, in other words, 'since faith was the characteristic virtue of Abraham, that by which he was favourably distinguished from his fellows—know ye, therefore, that they in whom the same characteristic is discernible are the children of Abraham.'

But Paul says nothing about the characteristic virtue of Abraham, but only that he "believed God, and it was accounted to him for righteousness." Granted that he does not. But is it to be expected that, in an argument exclusively framed upon the terms of Scripture, the Apostle should be at liberty, at every step he takes, to vary those terms to suit his own convenience? All that was open to him was to quote the words as he found them, and leave it to his readers to draw the natural inference; and what inference could be more natural or more imperative than this—that faith was the virtue which was pre-eminently characteristic of Abraham, as being pre-eminently acknowledged by God?—an inference which, in point of fact, has been drawn by mankind in every age of the church, who universally acknowledge Abraham as 'faithful Abraham,' and 'the father of the faithful.' 'Since, then, faith was the characteristic virtue of Abraham, know ye, therefore, that *the faithful are his children*.'

We must carefully keep out of view every other consideration for the present. What is the nature of justifying faith? What is imputed righteousness? why faith is selected as the medium of justification? All these questions, which have been handled at large by theologians, may be and are most interesting topics of inquiry, and volumes might be written to edification upon each of them. But they are clearly out of court at present. All that we are required now to know—and this we must distinctly bear in mind—is 'that Abraham was justified by faith, and that all they who are partakers of like precious faith are *the children of faithful Abraham*.' Alford, from not tracing the steps of the argument *seriatim*, cuts the matter short by saying, "the reply to the foregoing question *is understood*; it is ἐξ ἀκοῆς πίστεως." The right conclusion, truly, but improperly deduced. So far from *being understood*, it is the result, as we shall presently see, of a most elaborate and systematic process of reasoning.

^b Ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ, 'it was counted to him.' The quotation is taken from Gen. xv. 6, as it appears in the LXX. Λογίζομαι, in this connexion, means simply either actively, 'to count, or set down to the account of;' or passively, 'to be reckoned, or set down to the account of.' In two places in our Authorized Version it has been rendered by the word 'impute;' but not perhaps so well; for though the Latin *imputare* aliquid alicui means no more than "to reckon and account it in the number of those things which are his own and belong to him" (Davenant "De justitia," chap. xxvii.); yet the English derivative has come to signify, in later usage, 'to attribute to a person that which is not his own'—a meaning not conveyed in the original word, which only expresses 'that a thing is counted to a man, or set down to his account, without intimating whether it is the property of himself or of another.' That no idea of 'imputation *by grace*' enters into the Apostle's estimate of the force of λογίζομαι may be inferred from the use which he makes of it, Rom. iv. 4, where he says, Τῷ δὲ ἐργαζομένῳ ὁ μισθὸς οὐ λογίζεται κατὰ χάριν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ ὀφείλημα, where, upon such supposition, κατὰ χάριν should be regarded as superfluous, and κατὰ ὀφείλημα as incongruous. For fuller information on this point, see Bishop O'Brien's elaborate note N, and addition II. to note N, in the late edition of his Sermons.

^c Εἰς δικαιοσύνην, 'for, or instead of, righteousness'—a use in which the preposition is frequently found in the LXX., and in New Testament writers in conformity with them.—See Gen. xi. 3; Exod. ii. 10; Hosea, viii. 12; Acts, vii. 21; Rom. ii. 26, ix. 8. Δικαιοσύνη, 'the quality by which a man is made δίκαιος;'—"the condition of one who has done all that is required of him by the law," ТЮЛУКЪ;—"not equivalent to δικαίωσις, nor yet, strictly considered, the result of it, but apparently in the most inclusive meaning of the term—*righteousness*, whether imputed, by which we are accounted δίκαιοι; or infused and inherited, by which we could be found so."—ELLICOTT on Gal. ii. 21. According to this latter authority, it would appear that the difference between 'imputed righteousness' and 'inherent righteousness' lies not in the character of the righteousness itself, but only in the method by which it is attained. Of such opinion also seems to be Archbishop Whately, who questions (see his "Dangers to Christian Faith," Essay i.) whether δικαιοσύνη is ever found (as advocated by Bishop O'Brien) in a mere *forensic* sense as denoting an extrinsic change of condition, the result of imputation of good actions not really performed; but that it invariably implies "a moral habit possessed and exercised by the persons to whom it is attributed." And certainly in the place under consideration, where faith is said to be "accounted for righteousness," it would seem that by the term 'righteousness' a complete conformity to the holy law of God in principle, disposition, affection, and conduct, is contemplated, which, had it been found in Abraham, would have entitled him of itself to the approbation of God, but in the absence of which, faith is graciously accounted in its stead. When it is intimated that δικαιοσύνη denotes 'a moral habit possessed or exercised by the persons

to whom it is attributed,' it is to be regarded merely as a definition of *δικαιοσύνη*, and by no means as an implication that they to whom 'faith is imputed for righteousness' do themselves personally possess or exercise such a habit—nay, the contrary is clearly implied—that, having no righteousness of their own, faith is accounted or reckoned to them as such. There is no occasion, then, in order to meet the case of those who are justified by faith, to lower the standard of *δικαιοσύνη*, or to make it to represent anything short of its most inclusive etymological signification.

VERSE 7.—^a Γινώσκετε ἄρα, 'Know ye therefore'—not indicative, as Ellicott well observes in opposition to Alford and others: "*the imperative* is not only more animated, but more logically correct; for the declaration in the verse is really one of the points which the Apostle is labouring to prove," indeed, the very point at present under discussion." Comp. 2 Tim. iii. 1.

^b Οἱ ἐκ πίστεως, 'they of faith;' a form of expression similar to οἱ ἐκ περιτομῆς, which we have already noticed (ch. ii. 12, ^d), indicating not merely 'those who believe,' but 'those who make a profession of faith'—who cling to and hang out of faith, as the means of justification; as οἱ ἐκ περιτομῆς denotes not 'those who are circumcised' only, but 'those who make their boast of and depend upon circumcision.' Here οἱ ἐκ πίστεως are manifestly contrasted with ὅσοι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου of verse 10 (read verses 9 and 10 in connexion)—'those who put their trust in law' as a means of justification, whereas these rest their righteousness and hope of salvation 'upon the grace of God through faith.' Ellicott arrives at a different conclusion—"not 'they who rest in faith,' but, in accordance with the primary meaning of origin, 'they who are spiritually descended from, whose source of spiritual life is πίστις;'" but how this interpretation accords with the requirement of the contrasted expression, ὅσοι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου, to which the same rule of construction ought, properly, to apply, I leave it to himself to explain. Indeed, the expression, "they who are spiritually descended from faith," is to my mind hardly intelligible, and, when explained upon the principle of "the primary meaning of origin," highly objectionable and fallacious. See observations upon this point, verse 5, ^e.

^c Οὗτοι εἰσιν υἱοὶ Ἀβραὰμ, 'these (emphatically, and none others, see Winer, Gr., § xxiii. 4) are the sons of Abraham.' When we read that "they of faith are the sons of Abraham," a distinction naturally suggests itself between the children of Abraham according to the flesh, and those who are his children by promise, who are alone contemplated in this place. When Abraham was now ninety years old and nine, the Lord appeared to him (Gen. xvii. 5), and said, "Behold, my covenant is with thee, and thou shalt be a father of many nations;" by which covenant he was at that moment instituted in the sight of the Omniscient One 'the father of believers' throughout all ages and in all nations.' St. Paul, in reference to that covenant, and to that construction of it, says (Rom. iv. 16)—"Therefore it is of faith, that it might be of grace, to the end that the promise (the covenant and the promise of God, as we

shall presently see, verse 15, *, are one) might be sure to all the seed, not to that only which is of the law (believers amongst the Jewish people), but to that also which is of *the faith of Abraham*, who is *the father of us all* (Jew and Gentile believers alike), as it is written, I have made thee the father of many nations" (Jews inclusive, see ver. 8 of this chap.). And not only is the covenant *secured to believers*, Gentiles as well as Jews, but it is *limited to them*, to the exclusion of even the natural seed, not being believers. Wherefore it was said in vindication of God's dealings with the Jewish people in respect to the gospel of salvation, "they are not all Israel who are of Israel; neither *because they are the seed of Abraham are they all children*, but *in Isaac* shall thy seed be called," Rom. ix. 6, 7, the meaning of which, according to the mystic import of the terms is, '*the children of promise* shall be accounted for the seed;' for "we brethren, *as Isaac was*, are *the children of promise*," ch. iv. 28; so that οἱ ἐκ πίστεως (they of faith) are the sons of Abraham, not by natural descent, nor by circumcision, but by virtue of the covenant which God made with Abraham in the land of Canaan, whereby he was constituted "the father of many nations before Him who quickeneth the dead, and calleth the things that are not as though they were," Rom. iv. 17.

VERSE 8.—We are now prepared to advance another step in the argument, namely, 'that the aforementioned children *are blessed*,' which the Apostle educes thus—"But the Scripture, foreseeing that God justifies the nations out of faith, communicated beforehand the glad tidings of that justification to Abraham in these terms, "*in thee* (as their paternal head, and they consequently as being thy children) shall all nations be blessed." ' This one object, namely, 'that the children of Abraham are *blessed*,' must be now kept steadily in view as the 'probandum' of the proposition before us, to the exclusion of every other, or we shall miss the point of the Apostle's reasoning. But, before we proceed with the argument, we must advert to *the terms* in which this proposition is stated.

* Προϊδοῦσα ἡ γραφή, 'the Scripture foreseeing'—probably a Jewish form of expression, ἡ γραφή 'the inspired record of God's designs' being put for 'the author' of it. By προϊδοῦσα we are to understand "not a bare foreknowledge; for the promise of God to Abraham, as well as the record of that promise, was the consequence of a predetermination on the part of God that he would justify the heathen through faith."—BAGGE.

ἃ Δὲ, 'but.' According to Ellicott and Alford, the force of δὲ is 'transitional,' not merely connecting this verse with the preceding, but introducing "a further consideration of the subject under another aspect;" hence they translate it 'moreover.' But δὲ is not simply '*transitional*,' but *logically and technically* used to introduce the minor proposition of a formal syllogism, and as such properly to be translated 'but.'

ᶜ Ἐκ πίστεως, 'through' or 'out of faith;' ἐκ denoting the source, not original, but incidental; in point of fact, the channel through which the promised blessing is conferred, as in ver. 22; ch. v. 5.

ᶜ Δικαιοῖ, 'justifieth.' Upon this word Ellicott aptly observes, "jus-

tifieth, not 'would justify,' Auth., 'præsens pro futuro' (Grot.), nor present with reference to what is now taking place (De W.), but what is termed *the ethical present*, with significant reference to the eternal and immutable counsels of God"—God's unvarying plan of justifying the nations by faith, and not by works; the word 'nations' to be understood in the comprehensive sense, in which it occurs in the Abrahamic promise.

As to the meaning of the verb *δικαιῶ*,—whether it signifies 'to make righteous,' or 'to declare righteous,' has been long a matter of dispute. Protestant writers, however, generally agree in advocating the latter sense, affirming that in all doctrinal passages in the New Testament it unequivocally bears that meaning. This is not the place to enter upon so wide and so important a field of discussion. I may be allowed, however, to suggest that a justification which is effected by 'the gift of the Holy Ghost' (see the whole tenor of the Apostle's argument, comprised between verses 8 and 18 of this chapter, inclusive), which gift is the virtual engrafting of the recipient into Christ, whereby he is made *partaker of the righteousness of Christ*, may be something more than a mere *declaration of righteousness*. At the same time, it must be admitted that it is far from including such a change in the moral habit of the justified as has been erroneously ascribed to it by some, and which has called forth, and justly, the reprehension of eminent divines; such a change, so far as it does take place, being an attendant upon justification, not justification itself.

* Προεγγελίσατο, 'announced beforehand the glad tidings.' The translation of this word in our Authorized Version, "preached before *the gospel*," though not absolutely indefensible, is at least an inconvenient translation. The word 'gospel' is so intimately associated in our minds with the doctrine and history of Jesus Christ, his incarnation, life, death, atonement, resurrection, ascension, intercession, and glorious reign—in short, what is called in Scripture "the gospel of God concerning his Son Jesus Christ," and which appears from St. Mark's account of it (ch. i. 1), to date its commencement, more properly, from the preaching of John the Baptist; that the use of it in this place is calculated not only to divert attention from that which is the especial object of the Apostle's reference, the promise to Abraham, "in thee shall all nations be blessed," but also to mislead the mind as to the amount of information actually possessed by Abraham and the Old Testament saints upon the subject of the good things to come, which, though of a highly evangelical character, and directly pointing to Christ, fell infinitely short, both in extent and influence, of that complete and ultimate revelation which is generally known as 'the gospel.' Upon this ground it seems preferable to translate the word in its ordinary, secular, acceptation, 'announced beforehand the glad tidings,' limiting it to the subject immediately in contemplation, the announcement of the gift of the Holy Spirit, or, as it is here described, 'of God's intention to justify the nations through (or out of) faith.'

'Εν σοί, 'in thee,' as their ancestral head, and consequently 'in

theo,' as being *thy children* by faith. There is nothing in these words, nor indeed in Scripture generally, to warrant the notion of *spiritual headship* on the part of Abraham—that he was “the spiritual father of all the faithful,” as it has been expressed by some, a notion which savours too much of source and influence to be attributable to any finite creature. Nor of *federal headship*, as it has been designated by others, an implication that Abraham has represented us in some transaction with God, wherein the benefit of his faithfulness has accrued to those who should afterwards become his children through faith. It cannot be admitted that the bare circumstance of Abraham being made the recipient of the great evangelical promise, or even his being set forth as the example of the imputation of faith for righteousness, could have invested him with so solemn and responsible an office. No; the headship of Abraham amounted to no more than this, that he was the individual, in the providence of God, selected out of all nations as the depository of the gracious promise that ‘faith should be imputed unto righteousness’—the exemplar and forerunner of those who should afterwards believe. In which sense Abraham was ‘the father of the faithful;’ in the same manner, and to the same extent precisely, as Jabel was “the father of all such as dwell in tents, and such as have cattle;” and Jubal “the father of all such as handle the harp and organ.” Any more influential headship than this cannot scripturally be conceded to Abraham.

He was the chosen individual of the human race to whom, and in whom, God set forth his gracious and eternal purpose to justify the nations by faith; and consequently “he received the sign of circumcision, a seal of the righteousness of faith which he had yet being uncircumcised, that he might be the father of all them that believe, though they be not circumcised, that righteousness might be imputed to them also,” Rom. iv. 11. There is no ascription of *influence* in these words, but only of *precedency*. As each successive sinner believes in the Lord, he is *ipso facto* engrafted into this stock, and becomes a partaker of justification by faith, and all the rich provision for his future happiness secured to him therein. He is a branch of the root Abraham, but deriving as much benefit from the root as the root does from him. There is but one head of influence in the universe, and that head is Christ. The blessing and faith of Abraham is the same as ours, and no more. Our Christ is Abraham’s Christ; our Lord, Abraham’s Lord; and “the blood which cleanseth from all sin” is the same fountain in which Abraham washed, and was clean. “Your father Abraham rejoiced to see my day, and he saw it and was glad,” is the testimony of Jesus Christ, the alone federal head and head of influence. It is baptism *into Christ* which constitutes any one of us ‘the seed of Abraham, and heir according to promise’ (ver. 29); and having Him we are complete, and can well dispense with Abraham, and Mary and Joseph, and the whole company of saints and angels, as sources of spiritual influence.

* Τὰ ἔθνη, ‘the nations.’ We have in the rendering of this word “the heathen” in our Authorized Version another instance of the misapplication of conventional terms. When these words were spoken, the

division of mankind into Jews and Gentiles had not yet taken place, nor did it for centuries after, till the promulgation of the Jewish law had definitely severed the descendants of Abraham from the rest of mankind as the peculiar people of God; nor can it be argued that they are here so designated by prophetic anticipation, for in that sense the term 'Gentile' would not reach the scope of the promise. The promise should have been restricted to Gentiles to the exclusion of Jews, whereas from Scripture it is evident that they were joint-inheritors of the promise; and had either party been excluded, the promise should have failed of its accomplishment, not being made "sure to all the seed." Consequently we contend that both here and at verse 14 it is most important that the phrase τὰ ἔθνη should be taken in its primary and most comprehensive signification, "the nations."

^b Εὐλογηθήσονται, 'shall be blessed.' From what has been already observed, we are prepared to admit that the first part of this sentence, "the Scripture, foreseeing that God justifies (habit) the nations through faith," is but preparatory to what follows, namely, "announced beforehand the glad tidings to Abraham, 'in thee shall all nations be blessed;'" so that in truth the whole weight of the declaration rests upon these two points, '*in thee*' and '*blessed*.' 'In thee' we have before explained to signify, 'in thee as *thy children*.' The burden of the passage then is this, 'the children of Abraham *are blessed*.' What the blessing here intended may be, it is needless now to inquire; it will turn up for consideration in its proper place. But this the Apostle has established as a proven fact, that "*the children of Abraham are blessed*." One proposition more is wanted to constitute a perfect syllogism, and that proposition is supplied in the following verse, "so that *they which be of faith are blessed* with faithful Abraham." The syllogism is now complete—"They of faith are the children of Abraham" (ver. 7); 'The children of Abraham are blessed' (ver. 8): 'So then they of faith are blessed with faithful Abraham' (ver. 9); a syllogism which will stand the test of the strictest application of the rules of logic. Thus has the Apostle achieved the *first position* towards the perfecting of his scriptural argument, which, being stated at verse 5, arrives at a conclusion no earlier than at verse 14. But, before leaving this part of the subject, we must inquire into the force of the terms in which this last proposition is stated.

VERSE 9.—^a Ὅστε, 'so that,' 'consequently;' a fitting term to introduce a conclusion or *consequens* from foregoing premises. Of the force of ὥστε with an indicative, see ch. ii. 14, ^a, note.

^b Εὐλογοῦνται, 'are blessed;' the ethical present. See ver. 8, ^c.

^c Σὺν τῷ πιστῷ Ἀβραὰμ, 'with faithful Abraham;' 'together with,' 'in association with' him. In these words we learn St. Paul's estimate of the headship of Abraham. From the terms in which the promise has been announced (ἐν σοὶ) we might be disposed to attach too much of importance to the headship of Abraham, and our connexion with him; but here we are instructed that we are saved, not *in him* as our federal head, nor *by him* as our head of influence, but *with him* as a brother in distress, embarked in the same boat, delivered from the breakers by the

same all-succouring hand—a sinner saved from wrath “by grace through faith”—*we are blessed with faithful Abraham*. Calvin, in his commentary on this place, dwelling upon the word ‘faithful,’ observes—“This expression is very emphatic; they *are blessed*, not with Abraham as circumcised, nor as entitled to boast of the works of the law, nor as a Hebrew, nor as relying on his own excellence, but with Abraham who by faith obtained the blessing; for no personal quality is here taken into account but faith alone.” A distinct recognition of the truth intimated in these terms is essentially requisite to salvation.

VERSE 10.—We now take up the thread of the argument again. Leaving the *οἱ ἐκ πίστεως* (they of faith) in possession of *the blessing*, our attention is now directed, for a time, to another class, equally the subject of consideration, the *οἱ ἐξ ἔργων νόμου* (they of legal works), and we read that “as many as are of legal works are under a *curse*,” so far from inheriting *the blessing*, they are subject to *a curse*; “for it is written, *cursed* is every one that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law, to do them;” and certainly, if incapable of justification under the law (which yet remains to be proved), the conclusion is inevitable, according to the most sure word of God ‘they are accursed.’

^a Γὰρ, ‘for.’ In what sense is γὰρ to be received here? M’Knight, in his ‘Preliminary Essays,’ alleges that γὰρ frequently has the adversative force of δὲ (but), in which sense he interprets it here, and brings forward a variety of examples from the New Testament in support of his allegation; but with every disposition to regard them favourably, as conducing to a simple and suitable solution of the passage, I feel bound to reject them, as being all of them capable of a less forced interpretation. Ellicott, who is a more recent and a much higher grammatical authority, seems to adopt pretty nearly the same view—“γὰρ (according to him) introducing, *e contrario*, a confirmatory notice of the acknowledged state of the other class, *οἱ ἐξ ἔργων νόμου*; not only are they not blessed with Abraham, but they are actually under a curse.” However, contrary to his way, he cites no examples in support of the usage, nor have I been able to verify it in any single instance in the New Testament; γὰρ (the second), Rom. v. 7, which approaches it most nearly, is, to say the least of it, an equivocal example. The translation which I prefer, as unquestionably legitimate, and no less agreeable to the context, is γὰρ in its ‘causal and elliptical’ sense, referring to a clause omitted in terms, but supplied in thought, undoubted instances of which abound in Scripture, and more especially in the writings of St. Paul—“So then they of faith are blessed (and they alone), *for* they of legal works (the contrasted denomination) are under a curse.” This is a competent rendering (the limitation assumed being strictly implied in the foregoing affirmation), and expresses with sufficient accuracy the point of the Apostle’s reasoning.

^b Ὅσοι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου, ‘as many as are of legal works’—an expression of the same character with *οἱ ἐκ πίστεως*, and evidently contrasting with it, denoting those who rest in the law, and trust for salvation to

their own works, moral or ritual; expecting justification ἐξ ἑργων—the unbelieving Jews, and all those who voluntarily submitted to the rite of circumcision. What distinction Ellicott discovers between the force of ἐκ here and in the corresponding passage, verse 5, I am at a loss to conjecture; but while there, “in strict accordance with the primary force of the preposition,” he regards it as denoting “the originating or moving cause,” he here admits that, “owing to the nature of the expression, the primary force of ἐκ is slightly less obvious than in verse 8, suggesting more the secondary and derivative idea of *dependence on*, than that of direct origination from.” One might suppose that in all the passages where the expression occurs, it might, from the nature of the subject, indicate the same thing, which unquestionably it does; and, according to my judgment, neither ‘origination from,’ nor ‘dependence on,’ but simply ‘issuing out of;’—the *occasional* or *incidental* source.

The statement now under consideration, regarded by itself, is manifestly inconclusive. It assumes that all who are under law are necessarily under a curse, because it is written that the smallest deviation from complete and uniform obedience involves a curse; but it does not proceed to show that all who are under law do necessarily fall short, and so far it is inconclusive. But what is wanting in this verse is amply supplied in the next; so that the Apostle’s argument is neither lame nor inconclusive, but binds the curse of the broken law with unrelenting hand upon the neck of every individual human being who is subject to its yoke.

It is the habit to which I before alluded, of forcing a distinct argument from almost every particular sentence, which renders the writings of St. Paul in the eyes of many readers so inconsequential as they seem to be; and not only inconsequential, but, I might almost say, absolutely confused and incomprehensible. Every writer supplies the lacking premiss or premises according to his own notion of what is wanting, and there are as many ideas upon that subject often as there are pens to delineate them. So that the reader who has neither capacity nor assiduity to investigate the subject for himself hastily concludes that St. Paul’s epistles are bordering upon the unintelligible, and consequently sits down satisfied with a very meagre and superficial acquaintance with their contents. Whereas, St. Paul is at all times lucid and logical (though elliptical occasionally in his expression), if only we are at the pains to understand him; and had we the same knowledge of the language in which he wrote, and the circumstances to which he refers, as they had to whom the epistles were addressed, there can be little doubt but we should read their contents with the same facility and certitude as to their meaning, as that with which the eye now traverses the page. But, as this amount of information is unattainable in the present day, we must be content to make up by prayer and application for what is wanting in familiarity and acquaintance, and at least suffer the Apostle to express his own ideas fully before we presume to supplement his deficiency out of our imaginings.

These observations have been not unnaturally called forth by the

expositions which have been offered of the passage under consideration. To give an instance of that style of commenting to which I allude, I transcribe the following passage from the writings of the learned and laborious Calvin, a man who has drunk as deeply into *the spirit* of St. Paul's writings as perhaps any human being ever did, though he has given himself the license to deal thus lightly occasionally with *the letter*:—"All who wish to be justified by the works of the law are declared to be liable to the curse; but how does he prove this? The sentence of the law is, that all who have transgressed any part of the law are cursed. Let us now see if there be any living man who fulfils the law. But no such person, it is evident has been or ever can be found. All to a man are condemned." (Nothing can be better or more scriptural than this; but hear what follows.) "*The minor and the conclusion are wanting*, for the entire syllogism would run thus:—'Whoever has come short in any part of the law is cursed; all are held chargeable with this guilt; therefore, all are cursed.'"—CALVIN.

A very sound syllogism he makes of it, and one quite to the purpose; but we shall soon see that we are not indebted to Calvin or to any other uninspired writer for its production, but to St. Paul himself, who has exhibited it, not in the skeleton form attributed to him above, leaving it to the sagacious critic to supply "*the minor and the conclusion*" at his own discretion, but in the most approved form of logical precision, major, minor, and conclusion complete. The truth is, that with St. Paul it is an inverted syllogism. The conclusion (a fact which has escaped the observation of Calvin) is first stated: 'all who are under law are accursed.' Why accursed? Here follows the major: 'because under law cursed is every one who continueth not in all things written in the book of the law to do them'—in other words, 'who is not justified by his works;' but (the minor, from the following verse), 'under law, no man is justified;' *ergo*, 'all under law are cursed.' But, before we take leave of this portion of the argument, we must investigate the terms in which it is enunciated.

VERSE 11.—^a Δὲ, 'but,' *atque*, in its ordinary logical sense (not 'moreover,' Ellicott and Alford); here employed in its legitimate vocation to introduce the negative minor—"but that in law no man is justified," &c. &c. The observation of Alford, that the syllogism introduced by δὲ "is inserted to strengthen the inference of the former verse, by showing that not even could a man keep the law would he be justified, *the condition* of justification, as revealed in Scripture, being that it is *by faith*," is founded upon a total misconception of the part which it sustains in the general structure of the argument (for which, see ver. 13 ^a), and is also inconsistent with fact; for, assuredly, had any man fulfilled the requisition of the law, he should have lived therein—see verse 12. But inasmuch as, from the infirmity of nature, no man could fulfil the law, God provided beforehand a more effectual way, *by faith*, not to controvert his covenant, but to supply its deficiency.

^b Ἐν νόμῳ, 'in, or, under law,' ἐν in the sphere or domain (as in Rom. ii. 12, iii. 19), not "of *the* law" (Ellicott), but 'of law' (νόμῳ

anarthrous). “The *instrumental* meaning is grammatically tenable . . . and even contextually plausible As, however, owing to the inversion of the syllogism, the opposition between the clauses is much obscured, the simpler and more usual meaning is here to be preferred. . . . The more inclusive *ἐν* is thus, perhaps, chosen designedly, as the Apostle’s object is apparently to show that the idea of justification falls wholly *out of the domain of the law*, and is incompatible with its very nature and character.”—ELLICOTT.

‘Ο δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται, ‘The just shall live by (or, out of) faith.’ It is a matter of no small difficulty to pronounce positively upon the way in which this clause is to be understood—whether it be ‘the just of faith shall live,’ or ‘the just shall live of faith.’ We have high authority for saying that, *grammatically* considered, the words are susceptible of either interpretation; and certainly, *exegetically* viewed, there can be no objection to either. Nevertheless, notwithstanding this apparent equilibrium of claims, there are preponderating considerations in favour of the latter—“the just shall live of faith.” In the first place, in the original Hebrew from which the words are translated by the LXX., the most competent Hebræists have agreed that they are incapable of any other construction than “the just shall live of faith;” secondly, though, as we have just seen, in the Greek both readings are sustainable, yet, from the order in which the words are arranged (ὁ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως, and not ὁ ἐκ πίστεως δίκαιος), there can be little doubt but that the latter is the *more natural*; and thirdly, and principally, because the latter construction places ζήσεται more *d’accord* with the same verb as it occurs in the ensuing sentence—a reason which will be better understood when we proceed, as we now do, to the investigation of verse 12, which requires to be studied in connexion with the one before us.

VERSE 12.—* But, before entering upon the investigation, I would premise that we should bear in mind that this sentence is not to be looked upon in the light of a purely original composition, but is in part an extract from the LXX., in which the Apostle had no option left but to transcribe the words as he found them, and to tack them to his own as best he could—in which, again, no great latitude of construction was allowed him, owing to the syllogistic form of writing which he had adopted—a consideration which sufficiently accounts for any angularity of expression which may possibly appear in the passage.

In closely investigating the sentence, the first point that arrests our attention is, that there are no correlatives to be found for αὐτὰ and αὐτοῖς. These, then, are to be sought in the omitted portion of Lev. xviii. 5, from which the extract is taken; and upon turning to that place, we find that τὰ προστάγματα and τὰ κρίματα are the terms referred to. Secondly, there is reason to apprehend that ἐκ πίστεως may not be governed (as with the unanimous consent of all commentators it is) by the verb ἐστίν, with which it is in immediate connexion; for I observe, from the intervention of the adversative ἀλλὰ, that ἐκ πίστεως and ὁ ποιήσας αὐτὰ ζήσεται are alternative opposites, the one, there-

fore, capable of reflecting light upon the other. 'Ο ποιήσας αὐτὰ ζήσεται is manifestly an enunciation of what the legal mode of justification *is*—'He that hath done them (namely, the precepts and enactments before mentioned) shall live in them.' The other, then, which is contrasted with it, is, from the nature of opposites, an enunciation of what the legal mode of justification *is not*, namely, ἐκ πίστεως (of faith). But ἐκ πίστεως is a defective enunciation: where is the verb? Unquestionably (in this view), ζήσεται, repeated from the former clause, or forestalled, if we prefer it, from that which is to follow. This construction would be apparent upon the most cursory observation, had the sentence been expressed thus: 'The law *is not* (that is, such is not the condition of the law) ἐκ πίστεως, but ἐξ ἔργων, ζήσεται' (the verb ζήσεται to be referred to both members), which I doubt not it would have been, had the Apostle been at liberty to select his own language; but (as before observed) he was fettered by the necessity of introducing scriptural authority in scriptural terms, and hence ὁ ποιήσας αὐτὰ substituted for ἐξ ἔργων.

A further argument in favour of this construction may possibly be derived from the difficulty in which the ablest critics and grammarians have found themselves placed to account for ἐκ πίστεως in government with ἔστιν. Ellicott endeavours to explain it thus:—"But the law is not of faith, *scil.*, does not spring from it—has no connexion with it in point of principle or origin"—the only feasible translation, it may be, of ἐκ in such a connexion, but at the same time sadly irreconcilable with the alternative clause, which, according to all the rules of propriety, should (consistently with this construction) proceed to point out what the true source and origin of the law is—not of faith, but of—something else; whereas it follows—"he that hath done these things shall live in them"—a lame and incoherent conclusion. But perhaps the view submitted may appear more distinctly tenable, if we read the two sentences in connexion thus: 'that under law no man is justified before God' is manifest; for the Scripture says that 'the just ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται, but the law is not ἐκ πίστεως (ζήσεται), but ὁ ποιήσας αὐτὰ ζήσεται,' the verb ζήσεται being understood after πίστεως, as before explained. However, if any one objects to the novelty of the construction, I am content to waive it, and to fall back upon the commonly received version, seeing that my exposition as respects the Apostle's argument is totally unaffected thereby. At the same time I confidently press it as the true grammatical construction, open to no objection, theological or otherwise, and more characteristic of the brachylogical style of St. Paul than the one universally adopted. But to return to the argument.

We have already seen that the sentence commencing, 'But that under law no man is justified in the sight of God,' is the minor proposition of a perfect syllogism. We now discover that it is itself *the conclusion* of another syllogism equally complete, and no less evident on the face of the Scripture, which may be paraphrased in these terms:—'It is written that justification is only of faith' (ver. 11); 'but the law admits not of justification by faith' (ver. 12); 'consequently, no man

under law is justified' (ver. 10). Here again the conclusion is stated first, for the sake of perspicuity, being logically (as minor) connected with the preceding syllogism, as in the former instance it was stated first in order to bring 'those who were *concluded to be under curse*' into immediate contact with 'those who had *been concluded to be heirs of the blessing*,' the two conclusions being, by this arrangement, placed in contrastive juxtaposition.

In taking leave of this portion of the Epistle, we would only repeat, that if any obscurity rests upon it, it is mainly attributable to the peculiar circumstances under which it was written—the necessity imposed upon the writer, in accordance with his original intention, to prove his case in purely scriptural language, and the difficulty of so doing without leaving something, and possibly not a little, to be supplied by the intelligent reader, to mould it into syllogistic form—a result which could not have been effected by the Apostle himself, except at the expense of a prolixity hardly consistent with the perfection of epistolary writing. In anything which has been advanced in the way of exposition, it is hoped that the language of Scripture has not been unduly taxed, or anything extorted from it which it was not specially framed to convey.

VERSE 13.—'Ἡμεῖς, 'us.' Before proceeding to the next stage, we must for a moment stop to recall the recollection that the question proposed for consideration is—"Have ye received the Spirit out of legal works, or out of faithful hearing?" That question is debated throughout on scriptural ground. The *first position* taken in the argument, which is the result of three successive steps, the several propositions of the first syllogism, is the established fact that '*they who look to faith for justification, according to the terms of the promise are inheritors of the blessing*' (ver. 9). The *next position*, the result of two completed syllogisms, consisting respectively of three distinct propositions, is, that '*as many as are of legal works* (the Jews primarily, and all others who placed themselves under the law, and looked to works for justification) are, from the very necessity of the case, *subjects*, not of a blessing, but *of a curse*' (verses 10-12). And the *third* and last *position* now about to be established is, that '*they who were thus exposed to the curse aforesaid have been, by the execrable death of Christ in their stead, redeemed from the curse of the law, that they, in common with the rest of mankind, might participate in the promised blessing, in Christ*,' to wit, 'that we might receive the promised Spirit, through faith.' Such is a brief outline of the Apostle's argument, and such is the conclusion at which it ultimately arrives at verse 14.

'Ἡμεῖς, 'us (Jews).' It has been sharply debated amongst commentators as to the parties represented by ἡμεῖς, and much has been written upon both sides which it has not fallen to my lot to see. But to my apprehension there is ample evidence upon the face of the paragraph itself to satisfy any impartial inquirer, that, whatever may be said or written to the contrary, the Jewish church, and they only, are the subjects of ἡμεῖς. The whole question, in fact, hinges upon one point—

What law is the subject of contemplation? If it be *the law of Moses*, the Gentiles are clearly exempt from its curse, and consequently uninterested in a redemption which was specifically from the curse of the law. On the other hand, if it be (as Dr. M'Knight and others contend) *the Adamic law, or the law of nature*, which is contemplated, then it is equally patent that the redemption which is the subject of this passage extended also to them. But it is confidently affirmed, that not only in the passage before us, but throughout the entire argument, *one law* only will be found to be the subject of discussion, and that *the Mosaic law*: at the same time it will not be denied that the terms used are sufficiently comprehensive to include legal obligation, from whatsoever source derived.

It was the yoke of *the Mosaic law*, which the Galatians, instigated by Jewish teachers, were desirous, by the rite of circumcision, to assume. It was by *the Mosaic ritual* that they expected to perfect themselves in the sight of God. And upon the occasion of that infatuation it was, and in order to put an extinguisher upon it, the question was proposed, 'received ye the Spirit out of legal works, or out of faithful hearing?' to give it a complete and unanswerable reply—"if the law did not help you to the commencement of the divine life, why should it assist you to the consummation?" Whenever, then, in the prosecution of such an argument, mention is made of 'the law', of what law have we reason to conceive, but of that law in the misapprehension of which the inquiry originated?

But further. We arrive at the same conclusion upon totally distinct grounds—*the consideration of the terms in which the subject is pursued*, which are invariably and unequivocally *Mosaic*. If they who are of legal works are accursed, it is the curse of *the law of Moses* which has fallen upon them: "Cursed is he who continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law to do them." If they who are under law are precluded from the benefit of justification by faith, what is it that stands in their way but the obstacle of *the Jewish law*, which takes no cognizance of faith, but declares that "he that doeth these things shall live in them"? Again, if the Redeemer hath delivered from the curse of the law, being made a curse in their stead, those who by the requirement of the law were doomed to malediction, what law could be in view but *the Mosaic law*, of whose ordinance alone it was 'that he that is accursed of God should "hang upon a tree"'?

M'Knight, who advocates the opposite opinion, is more than usually ineffective in its support. "That the persons here said to be bought off from the curse of the law are the Gentiles, as well as the Jews, is evident (he says) from verse 10, where the Apostle tells us, 'as many as are of the works of the law . . . are under the curse;' for, the proposition being general, it implies that the Gentiles, as well as the Jews, are under the curse, and need to be bought off." But (*ὅσοι, κ. τ. λ.*) 'as many as,' &c., are not the terms of a general (or as he means, a universal) proposition. Nor can the proposition be said to be general,

if the curse from which they are bought off be (as we affirm that it is) special—the curse of the Mosaic law. But the Doctor denies that it is the curse of the Mosaic law. “The curse from which all are bought off by Christ is not a curse peculiar to the law of Moses; for, as the Gentiles were never under the law, they could have no concern with its curse.” But this is a mere begging of the question. We affirm, from the nature of the curse itself, denounced in the very terms of the Mosaic covenant, that it is a curse peculiar to the law of Moses of which the Apostle is here treating, and consequently that it does not affect the Gentiles. The Doctor avers, “that seeing that the Gentiles were bought off, it could not be the curse of the Jewish law.” But an assertion of this kind can have no weight in deciding the matter at issue.

Nor is Whitby, who is usually a tower of strength in all such disquisitions, one whit more satisfactory. Agreeing with M’Knight upon this point, he argues—“Since it was by virtue of Christ’s dying that ‘the blessing of Abraham came upon *the Gentiles*,’ He must have been thus made a curse for them also.” But this argument it easily disposed of. In the first place, *ἐθνῶν*, as we before remarked, conformably with the terms of the Abrahamic promise, should have been translated, not ‘Gentiles,’ but ‘nations,’ comprehending within its scope all the tribes of the earth; and the passage is capable of explanation thus:—Jesus Christ redeemed the Jews from the curse of their law, being made a curse in their stead, in order that the promise might take effect on the whole family of nations, which it could not do so long as so important a branch of it—the Jewish people—were by the malediction of their law excluded.

But his main argument is of a more general character. “To restrain the words ‘he redeemed us from the curse of the law’ to the Jews only, is in effect to say, Christ only suffered for the Jews, seeing he only suffered by hanging on the cross, the tree on which he did expire.” But is it to be conceded that an affirmation that Christ died for the Jewish people amounts to a negation that he died for others besides? Or, that because he suffered *a peculiar form of death* adapted to the exigency of the Jewish case, therefore the efficacy of *his death* did not extend to other parties beyond, where *no peculiarity of form* was prescribed? It was incumbent upon him, whosoever he might be, who would undertake to bear the burden of the Jewish curse, to hang upon a tree; for had not that requisition been complied with, beneficial as his death might be to others, it would be fraught with no advantage to the Jew. But surely its profiting of the Jew should not be regarded as a hindrance to its efficacy for the Gentile! When two such able controversialists as M’Knight and Whitby have recourse to no better or more conclusive arguments *e contra*, we may safely conclude, that when it is written, “Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us, as it is written, cursed is every one who hangeth upon a tree,” that predication is made of *the Jews*, and of none but the Jews.

^b Ἐκ τῆς κατάρας, ‘from the curse,’ τῆς emphatic, the curse which has been already the subject of notice, verse 10.

° Γενόμενος, 'having become'—a modal participle, indicating the method by which Christ delivered them from the curse of the law, namely, by being made a curse for them, and in their stead.

ᵃ Ὑπὲρ, in the New Testament only found in a figurative sense, may denote (1) in commodum (alicujus); (2) in loco (alicujus). In a doctrinal passage like the present, Ellicott conceives that ὑπὲρ may admit the second meaning united with the first, when the context and nature of the argument seem to require it, though probably never the second exclusively—see, however, Jelf, Gr. Gr., 630, 2 b.

° Κατάρα, 'a curse,' the abstract for the concrete—a much more forcible term than if the Apostle had written ἐπικατάρατος (accursed). By this form of expression he would intimate, not only that Jesus Christ became an accursed person—one, it might be, of many similarly circumstanced—but as though the curse of the broken law, abstracted from all other human beings, had in one concentrated mass been laid upon Him. In the same way, and doubtless with the same intent, it is said "He was made sin (abstract) for us," God "having laid upon him the iniquities of us all." And when the Apostle would describe the immeasurable and immitigable hostility of the human heart to God, he expresses it in the same abstract form—"the carnal mind is *enmity* against God."

A very dangerous and unwarrantable deduction has been drawn by M'Knight from the use of the word κατάρα in this place. "It merits (he tells us) the reader's attention, that in this passage Christ is not said to have suffered the curse of the law, but *to have become a curse for us*. The curse of the law of nature which was published in the law of Moses, being eternal death, is a curse which no man can suppose Christ to have suffered. But he *became a curse*, that is, an accursed person—a person most ignominiously punished for us." It is a dangerous and perverse apprehension of Scripture that leads to such a conclusion as this. If this be all that is implied in the word "curse," then, contrary to general apprehension, the Apostle has not used so forcible a term as if he had written 'accursed;' for, unquestionably, any person accursed of God was doomed to suffer, and should inevitably have suffered, the extreme penalty of the law which he had violated; whereas Jesus Christ did only suffer (according to this doctrine) in an *ignominious*, that is, in a mitigated form.

But, if this be all which is implied in the word "curse," then the death of Christ was not, strictly speaking, *vicarious* (in the place of the sinner's death), for he did not suffer the very same penalty which they should have suffered for whom he died. And if he did not suffer the same penalty, no more can it be accounted *propitiatory*, unless indeed we are prepared to say that the majesty of heaven could be appeased with something short of that which his broken law demanded. Much sounder and much more comfortable theology is that of Calvin, who in his commentary upon this place observes:—"He does not say that Christ was cursed, but, which is still more, that *he was a curse*, intimating that the curse of all men was laid upon him Again, how could he have freed us from the wrath of God if he had not trans-

ferred it from us to himself? Thus 'he was wounded for our transgressions,' and had to deal with God as an angry judge. This is the foolishness of the cross, and the admiration of angels, which not only exceeds, but swallows up, all the wisdom of the world." If only he had restricted the application of 'redemption' in this place to the Jew, his commentary would have been faultless. For further observations upon this subject, see Appendix I.

Γέγραπται γάρ, 'for it is written'—confirmation of the assertion in the participial clause, "having become a curse for us," His position on the cross indicating so much, "because it is written, cursed is every one who is hanged upon a tree." And here an interesting inquiry suggests itself—by what process of reasoning was an enlightened Israelite to conclude, or even to understand the allegation when made, that because it was written in the law "accursed is every one who is hanged upon a tree," therefore Jesus Christ hanging upon the cross was a peculiar victim for the Jewish people? We are not to conclude that every person who was hanged upon a tree was *ipso facto* accursed. Many an innocent victim was doubtless from time to time subjected to that ignominious treatment, to whom it cannot be supposed that by reason of the adventitious nature of his suffering the curse of God attached. The Hebrew text is instructive upon this point:—"The Hebrew sayth, 'chilelah heloim,' *accursed by the judges*, is he that is hanged upon a tree. Now, those judges being the ordinance of God, he that receives an execrable sentence from them may be said to be under the curse of God, as receiving that execrable punishment which his vicegerents do inflict upon him by the determinate counsel of God."—WHITBY, *in loco*. So that the sentence is to be understood with this qualification, he who is *formally and judicially hanged* upon a tree.

How, then, to proceed with the inquiry, did this quotation from the book of the law apply? The Apostle had just declared that "Christ redeemed us (Jews) from the curse of the law, *having been made a curse for us*;" and, confirmatory of that statement, he cites the judicial sentence of the Mosaic law that 'cursed is every one who is hanged upon a tree.' When therefore an enlightened Israelite would hear that "Jesus, *delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, was crucified and slain*," would he not be prepared to recognise in the execution of that sentence that he was a person *accursed of God*? And when he was further informed that that same Jesus thus suspended upon the cross was none other than God's immaculate son, who had fulfilled all righteousness in his own person, *and done nothing worthy of death*, would he not have further concluded that he was a victim devoted to destruction, *not for his own sins, but for the sins of others*? And for whose sins could he possibly have suffered, if not for theirs, who, being amenable to the same law, had become obnoxious to its curse? The suspension, therefore, of Jesus Christ upon the cross, was an evident token to the believing Jew that his sins were atoned for—that the curse of the broken law had been transferred from himself to his substitute, and that 'by His stripes he was healed.' So far as we are in-

formed, a death by any other process would have sufficed to have made atonement for the sins of others; but, owing to the peculiarity of the Mosaic institute, a death upon the cross was essential for the Jew.

VERSE 14.—^a *ἵνα*, ‘in order that’—indicative of the divine purpose in delivering the Jews from the curse of the law, ‘in order that the blessing of Abraham might come to ‘the nations’ (Jews included) in Christ,’ the curse being an insuperable barrier, while it continued in the way. I observe, in passing, that Ellicott has fallen into the same error with Alford and others (see Alford, on verse 13), of supposing a succession of purposes intimated in this passage. “*The first* purpose (he tells us) was the ransom of the Jews from the curse; *the second*, which was involved in the first (*ὅτι ἡ σωτηρία ἐκ τῶν Ἰουδαίων ἐστὶ*, John, iv. 22), was the extension of Abraham’s blessing to the Gentiles,” whereas the removal of the Jewish curse is not treated here or elsewhere in this Epistle as a definitive purpose at all, much less as equivalent to the bestowal of the blessing of Abraham upon the Jews, but only as a preliminary step, removing out of the way existing impediments to the accomplishment of the divine purpose, which, as regards the promise before us, was one and entire, namely, ‘that the blessing of Abraham should be conferred upon ‘*the nations*’ in Christ.’

^b *Εἰς τὰ ἔθνη*, ‘unto the nations;’ *ἔθνη* here, as in verse 8, to be translated ‘nations,’ for the reason before assigned. All the nations of the earth being interested in the promised blessing, the Jewish family were redeemed from the curse under which they lay, in order that ‘the blessing of Abraham might come unto ‘the nations’ indiscriminately, in Christ.’

^c *Ἡ εὐλογία τοῦ Ἀβραὰμ*, ‘the blessing of Abraham,’ generally regarded (Ellicott and Alford) as a gen. objecti, ‘the blessing announced and promised to Abraham;’ but when the genitive is of *a person*, it is always preferable, when doctrinal considerations will admit of it, to understand it as a gen. subjecti; here the blessing of the Holy Spirit, by the most sure word of God promised to Abraham, and ever after regarded and made mention of, as the inheritance *of* (or belonging to) Abraham.

^d *Ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*, ‘in (or being in) Christ Jesus’—not “in the knowledge of him and in his death,” the very inadequate explanation of Ellicott; but ‘in him’ locally—‘in him by position, as the branch is *in* the vine’ (*κλήμα ἐν τῇ ἀμπέλῳ*, John, xv. 4). When we take into account that the blessing promised to Abraham was ‘the Spirit of God,’ there will be little difficulty in comprehending in what manner that blessing should come unto the nations “*in (or being in) Christ Jesus*,” in whose mystical body alone it is that the Spirit is communicated or received. When the promise was first spoken to Abraham, “*in thee* shall all nations be blessed,” the purpose intimated thereby would seem to be (what indeed is assumed by the Apostle himself in the course of this argument, verses 6, 7), that ‘in thee, as thy children (figuratively, that is, walking in the footsteps of his faith), shall all nations be blessed.’ But the promise was subsequently renewed in a more ex-

panded form, "*in thy seed* shall all nations be blessed," whereby it became more explicit; for it now appeared, when fully explained and understood, that *in Christ*, the seed of Abraham, the promise should take effect; and that they who might previously be accounted the children of Abraham only as successors in his faith, should have a stronger and more incontestible ground of relationship as being adopted into his family *in Christ*; and so adopted that they cease not still to be indebted to *faith* for the promised blessing, faith being the instrumental cause of their adoption.

But further, had the promised blessing been attainable in the lifetime of Abraham, from the terms in which it was announced we should have been prepared to find that in some manner, at the time unknown, he should be himself instrumental in its communication; less than that would hardly seem to satisfy the terms of the promise, "*in thee* shall all nations be blessed." And it is probably an impression derived from this source that, dwelling upon the minds of some, disposes them even yet to attribute somewhat of influential or federal headship to Abraham—an idea which should at once be discarded, when we reflect that "*in thee*" has been subsequently explained to mean "*in thy seed*," and that seed "*Christ*," by whom, in a way no longer inscrutable to us, the promised blessing is indeed communicated; for He, as the veritable head of influence, distributes the Holy Ghost to each of his members severally as he wills; so that the phrase, "*in Christ Jesus*," though primarily and principally denoting locality, 'the position or *locus standi*' in which the Spirit is to be attained, yet is it not so exclusively tied to 'locality' as to shut out altogether the idea of 'instrumentality,' a consideration equally important, and no less the subject of promise. It is to this latter feature, as clearly involved in the promise, that St. Peter directs attention in his address to the Jews, where he says, "Ye are the children of the prophets, and of the covenant which God made with your fathers, saying, '*and in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed*;' to you first, God having raised up his Son Jesus, sent him to bless you," Acts, iii. 25, 26.

* *ἵνα*, 'in order that.' But it is to be ascertained to which member of the sentence the clause introduced by the second *ἵνα* belongs? Not certainly to the immediate, but to the remote; that is, we are not to conceive that the blessing of Abraham came unto the nations 'in order that they might receive the promised Spirit through faith,' for that were to make the Spirit some other and more remote attainment than the blessing of Abraham, whereas they are manifestly the same; but that the Jews were redeemed from the curse of the law, in order that they with us, Jew and Gentile together, should receive (λάβωμεν) the promised Spirit through faith. Ellicott describes it as a "second statement of purpose, not subordinated to but co-ordinate with the preceding." But he might have gone farther, and said, explanatory of, and in terms more conducive to the conclusion towards which the argument tends than the preceding.

† *Τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν τοῦ Πνεύματος*, literally 'the promise of the Spirit,'

equivalent to 'the promised Spirit.' That the gift of the Holy Ghost is the blessing promised to Abraham, there can be no reasonable doubt; indeed, on no other supposition could the promise to Abraham have been introduced into this connexion at all. The question to be decided was, "received ye *the Spirit* out of legal works, or out of faithful hearing?" In giving a scriptural reply to that question, the Apostle has introduced the subject of the promise to Abraham, and argued that, according to that promise, '*they of faith*' are heirs of *the promised blessing*, whereas '*they of legal works*' had need to be redeemed from the curse of the law, in order to participate in *the promised blessing*. Now what, I ask, had the promise to Abraham to do with the question at all? or what the force of the reasoning, unless that in the eye of the Apostle the promised blessing and the gift of the Holy Ghost were identical? So that, independently of any grammatical consideration whatsoever, we have reason to conclude from the course of the argument itself, that 'the blessing' and 'the Spirit' are one.

The construction attributed to these words by recent commentators (Ellicott and Alford), ἐπαγγελίαν τοῦ πνεύματος, gen. objecti, 'the promise in reference to the Spirit,' or 'of which the Spirit is the object,' does not fully meet the requirement of the context. The proposed construction, gen. appositionis, 'the promise (*res promissa*), the Spirit,' equivalent to 'the promised Spirit,' an ordinary grammatical usage, many instances of which might be adduced from the New Testament (see Rom. iv. 11; 2 Cor. v. 5), seems more in accordance with the general scope of the Apostle's reasoning. Alford, indeed, designates the interpretation offered (ἐπαγγελίαν τοῦ πνεύματος *pro* τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἐπηγγελμένον), "the old absurdity, which would destroy the logical form of the sentence." But without infringing at all "the logical form of the sentence" (see ch. v. 5, *), it effectually establishes the logical force of the passage. The clause introduced by the second ἵνα, being parallel with the preceding clause (which, from the scope of the Apostle's argument, we have reason to apprehend that it is, no ulterior object being, evidently, in contemplation) must be regarded as explanatory of it. The phrase ἐπαγγελία τοῦ πνεύματος consequently corresponds with ἡ εὐλογία τοῦ Ἀβραάμ, which expresses a great deal more than the mere abstract idea, 'the fulfilment of a promise,' even 'the *res promissa*' itself. Besides, this clause being the formal conclusion of the argument commencing with verse 5, or more properly with verse 2, "received ye *the Spirit* out of legal works, or out of faithful hearing?" logical precision would seem to require that the conclusion should be deduced in terms co-ordinate with the subject proposed, which subject had respect to *the actual reception of the Spirit*, and not merely the abstract fulfilment of a promise. Upon these grounds I confidently impugn the construction assigned, and maintain that gen. appositionis is upon every consideration the more suitable.

Alford, while desirous "to guard tyros against the old absurdity" (the interpretation contended for here), has himself fallen into a mistake far more prejudicial to the sense of the passage than that against

which he so providently guards; and as he proceeds with his exposition, "He drags at each remove a lengthened chain." The erroneous assumption with which he sets out, namely, that the Jews were justified; that is, *received the blessing of Abraham* as the immediate (*antepentecostal*) result of the sacrifice of the death of Christ, and that it (the blessing of Abraham) was thereupon set at liberty to flow out from them to the Gentiles (see his note on verse 13), has given occasion, in the first place, to the unwarrantable exclusion of the Jews from the general denomination τὰ ἔθνη (ver. 14), which he advertently translates 'Gentiles' ("not all nations, but strictly 'the Gentiles'"); and, secondly, has necessitated (the Abrahamic promise having been already, according to his notion, fulfilled to Jew and Gentile successively, and he not observing that the latter clause is explanatory of the former—"the promise of the Spirit" equivalent to 'the blessing of Abraham'), has necessitated, I say, the application of the clause introduced by the second ἵνα to a distinct denomination from the τὰ ἔθνη of the preceding clause, namely, "to all Christians," and the promise of the Spirit referred to therein, not to the Abrahamic promise at all (that being already fulfilled), but to the prophecy of Joel (ch. ii. 28), which having no possible connexion with the previous argument, left him at liberty (see the conclusion of the last paragraph) to construe τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν τοῦ Πνεύματος, not according to "the old absurdity" ("the promised Spirit"), but according to the modern presumption ("the promise in reference to the Spirit").

But it is plain that every step in this exposition is a distinct error. (1). In the promise to Abraham, *which is the subject of exposition here*, there is no priority of attainment assigned to the Jew above the Gentile, nor any succession intimated in the fulfilment. (2). The removal of the legal disability did not of itself confer upon believing Jews 'the blessing of Abraham,' and consequently did not set it at liberty to flow forth from them to the Gentiles. (3). The Jews ought not to be excluded from the denomination τὰ ἔθνη, which, according to the intent of the promise, embraced all the families of the earth. (4). The prophecy of Joel ought not to have been intruded irrelevantly upon a context which was professedly occupied in expounding *the Abrahamic promise* in connexion with the question proposed, "*received ye the Spirit out of legal works, or out of faithful hearing?*" All this concatenation of errors originated in, and is the logical result of, the misapprehension regarding the justification of the Jew, and must be studiously avoided by every tyro who desires to have a just and intelligent apprehension of the scope of the Apostle's reasoning in this place.

As bearing upon the doctrine of justification, it is worthy of note, the Apostle has stated that 'the Scripture foreseeing that God *justifies* the nations through faith, communicated the glad tidings to Abraham in these terms:—"In thee shall all nations *be blessed*"'—a substitution which clearly betokens that, in the vocabulary of St. Paul, 'to justify' and 'to confer the promised blessing' were equivalent expressions. Coupling this with what we have already noticed—that 'the Holy Spirit' and 'the promised blessing' are identi-

cal, the conclusion is inevitable, that '*to confer the Holy Spirit*' is, in some sense of the term, *a justifying act*. Which conclusion is further demonstrable upon the grounds that a man obnoxious to the *curse* of the law cannot be a participator of the promised *blessing* (a truth clearly deducible from the antecedent passages, *scil.*, "Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us, *in order that the blessing of Abraham might come* unto the nations in Jesus Christ," verse 14. And again—"So then they which be of faith are blessed with faithful Abraham (and they only); for as many as are of legal works are under a curse," verses 8, 10). When, I say, we take into account this truth, then the gift of the Holy Ghost (the promised blessing) must be looked upon as an act declaratory upon God's part of the extinction of the curse: but not only is it an act *declaratory* of the extinction of the curse, but *effective* of it; the gift of the Holy Ghost, which baptizes into the body of Christ, "who is made unto us wisdom, and *righteousness*, and sanctification, and redemption," is in itself a justifying gift, and that not only in the sense *to declare* righteous, but *to make* righteous (see verse 8^d). It is easy to estimate the effect of such a conclusion upon the forensic theory of justification.

Above, when it is said that Christ redeemed the Jews from the curse of the law, taking out of the way that grand obstacle to the reception of the Holy Ghost, we are not to assume, with Alford (see his note on verse 13 of this chapter), that the curse was *immediately* removed upon the death of Christ; but that the satisfaction for sin having been made, it was competent to the sinner under the law, to avail himself, (*upon the outpouring of the Holy Ghost*), of that atonement through faith, and, *believing, to be absolved from the curse*. The blood of Christ is represented in Scripture as a fountain opened for sin and for uncleanness, into which it behoves every man who would have recourse to its cleansing property to wash and be clean. As with its mysterious prototype of old by the sheep-gate at Jerusalem, there was efficacy in those waters, when stirred by the angelic messenger, to heal all manner of diseases; but it was he only who was happy enough to step into it opportunely who was cured. The brazen serpent in the wilderness was an institution of God—of virtue to reach to the utmost limits of the camp, and deliver from the poisonous wounds of the fiery serpents every individual amongst the thousands of Israel; but it was he only who looked who was saved. So is it with the redemption which is in Christ Jesus: there is merit in his death to atone for the sins of the whole world, and he died to be a propitiation for the sins of the whole world; but it is he only who, through faith (as exercised in communion with Christ), turns to the all-sufficient remedy, who is absolved from the condemnation of the law—"a propitiation *through faith in his blood*," Rom. iii. 25.

⁸ Δία τῆς πίστεως, 'through the faith;' τῆς, emphatic, 'the faith of Jesus Christ.' The truth established in these words, though possibly the most material in the whole paragraph, is, with the general consent of commentators, passed over *sub silentio*, Alford alone hazarding the opinion that "no stress" is to be laid upon it. But if this single expression had been omitted, in vain was it to have proved

that the curse which weighed upon the Jewish nation had been borne in their stead, in order that the promised blessing might come unto the nations in Christ, and that the promised blessing was the gift of the Holy Ghost: all this would have been to little purpose, were we not conducted forward to the conclusion that that Spirit is to be received *through faith*. The subject of inquiry was, not whether the Spirit had been received in the church; for that would have been universally conceded; but whether they had received the Spirit through works or through faith. That point the Apostle had undertaken to settle; and his reasoning would have been defective—positively lame and inconclusive—had he rested in any position short of the one presented to us, that ‘the Spirit is to be received *through faith*.’

Nor is it a point to be extracted, only, by a curious investigation of the text, but one to be clearly and prominently set forth as forming the *res materia* of the question at issue. Where, then, it may be asked, do we find it thus authoritatively established? for evidently, in the place before us, it is but slightly and cursorily introduced. I answer, at the ninth verse, where, after a series of argumentation, the Apostle arrives at the conclusion, that “*they of faith (and they only) are blessed* with faithful Abraham;” and there the argument might have terminated with a brief statement to the effect that the blessing contemplated was the gift of the Holy Ghost, had there not been other parties besides ‘those of faith’ to be taken into account, namely, ‘they who sought justification through legal works,’ who required to be informed that the law, so far from helping them to the wished-for end, needed itself to be swept out of the way, in order to the attainment of the blessing. But that done, there was no occasion to repeat the process anew; it was already matter upon scriptural record, that ‘*through faith alone* was the blessing to be derived;’ and when the Apostle had shown that the impediment affecting the Jewish people had been removed, that they might participate with the rest of mankind in the promised blessing, he had only to resume his former conclusion, to establish that which he had undertaken to prove—‘that the Spirit is communicated *through faith*,’ and that not faith ordinary, but, according to the emphasizing power of the article (τῆς), ‘the faith of Jesus Christ.’ And thus, after a lengthened process of reasoning, the conclusion is finally attained, that, ‘*consistently with the terms of the promise*, the Spirit is received in the church, not *through legal works*, but *through faithful hearing*.’

VERSE 15.—This branch of the subject being concluded, our attention is now invited to another and a distinct process of reasoning, in the course of which the Apostle proves, from the analogy of human transactions, that the law could not invalidate or alter the terms of the promise, which virtually it should do, were the Spirit to be conferred in any other way than the way prescribed—*through faith*. This is the sole and definite object of the ensuing section; and nothing can be more direct, simple, and intelligible, than the steps by which it is pursued. In the verse before us, the analogy is stated upon which the argument is founded, and nothing more.

* Κατὰ ἄνθρωπον λέγω, 'I speak after the manner of men'—as men are wont to argue, deducing their reasons from human customs and human institutions. Objections have been raised in diverse quarters, and in various shades of animadversion, to the line of argument adopted by the Apostle in this section—some of them too irreverent to be repeated. It is no wonder that scriptural exposition should have failed, as to a considerable extent it has done, in the hands of men who have presumed to pronounce thus disparagingly upon the sacred oracles of God. Even the great Luther himself is not wholly free from imputation on this score. In his commentary on the passage before us he thus commits himself:—"After this principal and invincible argument (alluding to the one immediately preceding), Paul addeth another, grounded upon the similitude of a man's testament, which seemeth to be very weak, and such as the Apostle ought not to use for the confirmation of a matter of so great importance. For in high and weighty matters we ought to confirm earthly things by divine things." Had he at all times approached Holy Scripture in this frame, little should the world have heard of Luther and the Reformation; but he was a great and a good man, though not without his failings—who is? 'Quandoque dormitat Homerus.' But we have yet to learn that human things may not be resorted to—not indeed in confirmation of, but in illustration of, divine things, as a man argues from things better known, to things less known.

But regarding him even as an ordinary, uninspired, writer, before we could impute feebleness to the Apostle upon this ground, it remains to be shown that any stronger or more effective line of argument was open to him under the circumstances. It exhibits a vast amount of precipitancy to assume that this is merely an additional or supplementary argument to the "principal and invincible" one which preceded it. Such is far from being the case; it is a totally distinct process of reasoning, addressed to a different branch of the subject, without which the former, "invincible" as it may appear, would be altogether worthless and incomplete. By the former argument, the Apostle had established upon incontestable grounds, and it needed no farther evidence to confirm it, that, *according to the terms of the promise*, justification should be only through faith. But then there was the great fact to be accounted for—the subsequent introduction of the law—which undoubtedly appeared to sanction, so far at least as the Jewish people were concerned, a different mode of justification—"he that *doeth* these things shall live by them." How, then, was this difficulty to be overcome? Scriptural authority there was none. What remained to be done, but to take the course which the Apostle has taken, and argue, from the analogy of like things, that a subsequent instrument cannot prevail to cancel or alter the terms of a previously ratified covenant! And if such rule hold good in human transactions, how much more forcibly does it apply when the covenanting party is God! This is the course of argument upon which the Apostle here enters, and which he pursues with logical precision throughout the four succeeding verses.

^b ὅμως ἀνθρώπου, 'even of a man,' or 'a human (covenant)'. Ellicott and Alford, following Winer (see Gr., § lxi. 4), suppose a transposition of ὅμως in this place, "which, as the sense shows, really belongs to οὐδεὶς."—ELLICOTT. But there is no occasion to deviate from the natural order. "The word is rightly rendered *quamvis*, 'though' = 'even though,' a signification often found in the classical writers."—BLOOMFIELD. In which sense it is peculiarly appropriate here, helping out the *argumentum à fortiori* ('if even a man's covenant, &c., how much more the covenant of God!') much more effectively than that proposed. However "contrary to usage" (as Alford pronounces it), generally, it may be, it certainly does not seem contrary to Pauline usage; for in the only other place where it occurs in the New Testament it is used precisely as here, *to impart emphasis to the contrast* (ὅμως τὰ ἄψυχα, κ.τ.λ., 1 Cor. xiv. 7), a much more reasonable conjecture than that the Apostle, through inadvertence or any other cause, had fallen into the lax and inelegant mode of writing which is thus attributed to him. Besides, in cases where transposition has really taken place, it has been found necessary, for the sake of perspicuity, to correct it in the translation—witness that passage (Rom. v. 6), ἔτι γὰρ Χριστὸς, ὄντων ἡμῶν ἀσθενῶν . . . ἀπέθανε, which is translated, "While we were *yet without strength*, Christ died." But here, and in 1 Cor. xiv. 7, so agreeable is it to the sense, that in translation the order of the words has been preserved even by those who find fault with their arrangement; I conclude, then, that ὅμως is not only the right word, but *in the right place*.

^c Διαθήκην, 'a covenant.' A difference of opinion has at all times existed, the disputants being ranged pretty equally on both sides, as to whether διαθήκη in this connexion is to be understood of a covenant or of a testament. It will be admitted, of course, that whatever meaning the word bears in verse 17, the same must be ascribed to it here, for the reasoning proceeds upon the supposition that they are parallel cases; otherwise the same rule would not necessarily apply to both. In verse 17, from the nature of the case, the sense 'testament' is absolutely excluded; for what are we to think of God's last will and testament? A testament is confirmed by the death of the testator, being revocable during his lifetime—when, then, is God's testament confirmed? If revocable so long as He lives, it is not likely to be confirmed at all. Any argument, therefore, founded upon confirmation in such case is clearly invalid. Notwithstanding this, we are gravely informed by Luther that "this is the last will and testament of God, the great testator, confirmed by the death of Christ. When Christ died, then was it confirmed in him; and after his death the writing of his last testament was opened, that is to say, the promised blessing to Abraham was preached among all nations dispersed throughout the whole world."—LUTHER *in loco*. So that, according to this sensible interpretation, the promise to Abraham was revocable (for such is the nature of a testament) until the death of Christ, when it was actually to come into effect; and that good man Abraham had by no means the sure ground of confidence in the promise which he credulously believed him-

self to have, when his 'faith was counted to him for righteousness.' Were the argument in favour of 'testament' to rest upon no stronger foundation than this, it needeth only to be stated to be overthrown.

But it is argued that 'covenant' supposes 'a contract or agreement between the parties;' and as nothing of that sort is discoverable in the case before us, that view of *διαθήκη* cannot be sustained here. But query—may not the promise of God on the one part, and the faithful acceptance of the same, and religious dependence thereon, accompanied with a life of holiness conformable thereto, on the other, amount to evidence of at least an *implied contract* sufficient to attract the application of the term? But, not to dwell upon suppositions, it is a direct answer to say, that in scriptural language 'covenant' is employed in many places, where any idea of bargain or agreement is simply impossible.

God, for instance, established a 'covenant' with Noah (Gen. ix. 8-17):—"God spake to Noah and to his sons with him, saying, behold I establish my *covenant* with you and with your seed after you, and with every living creature that is with you, of the fowls and the cattle, and of every beast of the earth with you, I establish my *covenant* with you; neither shall all flesh be cut off any more by the waters of a flood; neither shall there be any more a flood to destroy the earth." Here we have an account of the parties between whom this 'covenant,' as it is called, is established—God on the one part, and Noah and his posterity, and all the animals that were preserved alive in the ark and all their posterity, on the other. But is it not evident that no engagement was or could have been entered into by these parties with God? What else then is the *covenant*, but an especial *appointment* or *settlement* made known by Almighty God to his creatures, which, emanating from so high and unfailing a source, has all the weight and sanctity of a contract?

Again: God made a *covenant* with Phineas (Numb. xxv. 10-13). The Lord said to Moses, "Behold, I give unto him my *covenant* of peace, and he shall have it, and his seed after him, even the covenant of an everlasting priesthood, because he was zealous for his God, and made an atonement for the sins of his people." What more can be discovered in this account than a divine *promise* that Phineas and his posterity should enjoy the distinguished honour of ministering for ever in the priest's office on behalf of the Jewish people? No compact, no agreement of any kind whatsoever is hinted—nothing but a *gracious institution* of God, which, proceeding out of his mouth, should not be revoked.

In like manner God made a *covenant* with David. When the pious king of Israel desired to build a house for God, and was making preparations accordingly, the prophet Nathan was sent to restrain him, and to inform him that the honour of building a habitation for Jehovah was reserved for his son and successor. But in lieu of it a *promise* was vouchsafed to himself, which was announced in these terms:—"And when thy days be fulfilled, and thou shalt sleep with thy fathers, I will set up thy seed after thee which shall proceed out of thy bowels, and I

will establish his kingdom; he shall build a house for my name, and I will establish the throne of his kingdom for ever: I will be his father, and he shall be my son. If he commit iniquity, I will chasten him with the rod of men, and with the stripes of the children of men; but my mercy shall not depart away from him, as I took it from Saul, whom I put away before thee; and thy house and thy kingdom shall be established for ever before thee: thy crown shall be established for ever. According to all these words, and according to all this vision, so did Nathan speak to David," 2 Sam. vii. 12. Now surely this communication was no more than a solemn *promise* of Jehovah that he should raise up unto David a son who should build Him a house, and that his throne should be established throughout all generations. And yet this *promise* we find afterwards referred to under the designation of a *covenant*:—"I have made my *covenant* with my chosen; I have sworn unto David my servant, thy seed will I establish for ever, and build up thy throne to all generations," Ps. lxxxix. 3, 4.

Here then is abundant evidence to satisfy us (and more could be easily accumulated), that in the language of Scripture the *covenant* of God oftentimes means no more than a *promise*, which, proceeding from the mouth of Him who cannot lie, with whom there "is no variable-ness nor shadow of turning"—"the gifts and calling of whom are without repentance"—has all the force and indefeasibility of the most sacred contract. At the same time it cannot but be admitted that 'disposition,' or 'appointment,' or 'settlement,' or some such term, would be a more close and suitable rendering than 'covenant,' lying nearer to the root of the word, and embracing both branches of arrangement—testamentary and conventional. Upon the whole we conclude that, of the two terms under consideration, 'covenant' is preferable, as being the more suitable exponent of *διαθήκη*, when applied to the transaction between God and Christ, which is the subject of verse 17, in which sense (the one ruling the other) it must be accepted here.

VERSE 16.—The analogy, 'the inviolability of a man's compact when duly ratified,' being thus propounded, the Apostle now proceeds with his application; and the first step which he takes is to define the parties between whom, and the subject-matter concerning which, the covenant in question is established. This is the special and sole purport of the 16th verse—this it effectually does, and it does no more.

* *Τῷ δὲ Ἀβραάμ*, 'but to Abraham;' *δὲ* in its ordinary 'logical' force, introducing a new proposition. The argument may briefly be stated thus: 'even a man's covenant, when once duly perfected, is ever after held inviolate; *but* the covenant before us is not merely a man's covenant, but one where the covenanting party is God, and the beneficiary Christ, the promise being to Abraham and his seed, which seed is Christ, *ergo*—the conclusion following in verse 17. Ellicott and Alford deny that the verse before us is the continuation of the direct reasoning applying to the Abrahamic promise the analogy in verse 15, but rather (they account it) a parenthetical or subsidiary argument, "to make the application of this particular example to the general case per-

fectly distinct." But agreeing, as they do, as to the parenthetical nature of the passage, they differ very widely as to its design, no slight presumption in itself of the incorrectness of their general view.

According to Ellicott, "the Apostle seems to say, 'this, however, is not the case merely of a *διαθήκη*, but of an *ἐπαγγελία*, yea, rather of *ἐπαγγελίαι*; nor was it made merely to a man, Abraham, but to Christ.'" But how the negation (whether direct or implied) in verse 16, that the Abrahamic case is the case of a *διαθήκη* at all, but rather of an *ἐπαγγελία*, can render the application of an analogy derived from a *διαθήκη* more distinct or apprehensible, is what I am at a loss to conceive; nor is it needful indeed that I should, for manifestly the Apostle had no such distinction in view when he penned the sentence; but regarding *διαθήκη* and *ἐπαγγελία*, what in truth they are, as one, his object is, to point out *the parties to whom* the covenant or promise, the subject of comparison here, is made—'Abraham and his seed,' which seed, from the use of *σπέρματι* in the singular number, he concludes to be 'Christ,' and *the subject matter* of the covenant—'the contents of the Abrahamic promise,' preparatory to the application of the analogy in the ensuing verse.

The purport of the parenthetical argument, as exhibited by Alford, is of a different character:—"The covenant was not merely nor principally made with Abraham, but with *Abraham and his seed*, and that seed referred not to the Jewish people, but to *Christ*. The covenant then was not fulfilled, but awaiting its fulfilment, and he to whom it was made was yet to appear when the law was given." The averment, though not parenthetically introduced, is correct; but the inference drawn from it is pointless and irrelevant, and consequently inconvenient and embarrassing, diverting attention to extraneous matter, at the very moment when all the powers of the mind should be concentrated upon the issue before it, namely, that the covenant for which the analogy was instituted was the covenant involved in the Abrahamic promise or promises, "in thy seed (Christ) shall all the nations of the earth be blessed," that is, '*receive the gift of the Spirit through faith*,' a covenant which, consequently, according to the analogy of such transactions, could not be cancelled or remodelled by the subsequent delivery of the law.

^b Αἱ ἐπαγγελίαι, 'the promises.' The promises the subject of notice here are doubtless the same which are recorded in the book of Genesis as being delivered to Abraham. The first (Gen. xii. 3)—"*In thee shall all nations be blessed*;" the second (Gen. xxii. 18)—"*In thy seed shall all nations be blessed*;" "*promises*"—several, not only as being made at different periods, but several also as to their respective measure of completeness. Even with apostolic interpretation, the first promise amounted to no more than this, that '*in Abraham* as their head of precedence, and they consequently as his successors walking in the footsteps of that faith which he had presently displayed, should all the nations of the earth be blessed,' no intimation being given of the *agency by* which, or the *manner in* which, the promise should be carried into effect; whereas in the second promise—"In thy seed shall all nations be blessed," it was dis-

tinctly foreshown that to some individual of the posterity of Abraham, and, as the Apostle here intimates, and as Abraham doubtless was well informed (John, viii. 56), that individual, Christ, were the nations to be indebted for the blessing, and through spiritual communion with him. Many temporal blessings were at the same time vouchsafed to Abraham, which being unconnected with the subject of the epistle, are consequently pretermitted here; that alone whereby the blessing was announced concerning which the misapprehension in the Galatian church arose, being the express subject of the preceding argument, and as the exigency of the case demands, and as the conclusion at which it arrives enables us to pronounce, exclusively also of this. It is to be noticed that 'the promises' are introduced in this place simply with a view to identification with 'the covenant' to which the analogy is intended to apply, the contents having been fully discussed in the preceding section.

^c Καὶ τῷ σπέρματι αὐτοῦ, 'and to his seed.' I am strongly of opinion that τῷ Ἀβραὰμ and τῷ σπέρματι are not to be regarded as strictly co-ordinate datives, that is, we are not to understand (as is generally, I believe, done) that the promises were spoken to Abraham and to his seed respectively, but that they were both alike addressed to Abraham *personally*, and to his seed *prospectively* and *beneficially*. Such a supposition were—(1) inconsistent with the statement of facts as given in Genesis, where mention is made of Abraham, and of him only, as the recipient of the promises; and indeed with the terms of the promise itself, where ἐν τῷ σπέρματι σου is evidently introduced as respecting a third party. (2). It is inconsistent with the proper force of ἐρρήθησαν, which denotes a communication made *vivā voce* to a party who is present, whereas the seed to whom it was promised had not yet appeared (v. 19). (3). In the passage before us the whole case is treated as a question of *terms*—the terms in which the promise was propounded, with the obvious intent to determine the party in whose favour the promise was made, and not him to whom it was delivered. (4). It is inconsistent with the use of εἰς Χριστὸν (in favour of Christ), a form of expression not likely to have been employed if Christ had been himself the party to whom the promise was spoken. Upon these grounds distinctly I am of opinion that the datives are not co-ordinate, but that the sentence is an example of the brachylogical style of writing so familiar in the Epistles of St. Paul.

^d Οὐ λέγει καὶ τοῖς σπέρμασιν, 'it (scil. ἡ γραφή, ver. 8; see also ch. iv. 30; Rom. iv. 3) saith not, 'and to seeds.' The Apostle's argument in this place has been very roughly handled by some commentators, and in a strain of animadversion highly indecorous and unjustifiable. The stress laid upon σπέρματι *vice* σπέρμασιν in the terms of the promise, which constitutes the Apostle's proof of the *individuality* of the seed in whose behalf the promise was made, has been unscrupulously assailed as a simple delusion, because that σπέρμα, like its equivalent in Hebrew, is, as they affirm, a noun of multitude, and incapable of being used otherwise than in the singular number. But even admitting that the Hebrew word which is the equivalent of σπέρμα has not been found in

the plural number except as denoting the seeds of plants and vegetables, and that the Greek word *σπέρμα* itself is usually a collective noun, and only found out of the singular in the same usage, are we prepared to affirm that our knowledge of language is so profound and infallible as to admit of our pronouncing thus dogmatically as to the capabilities of either tongue?

Instances have been adduced from the Hebrew to show “that, though commonly used collectively to denote a multitude of children, the word occasionally is found as denoting a single person, and especially a son (Gen. iii. 15)—‘I will put enmity between thy seed and *her seed*; it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel.’ And Eve, speaking of Seth, says (Gen. iv. 25)—‘God hath appointed me another seed instead of Abel, whom Cain slew.’ In this sense Eve had *two seeds* in her, two sons, as is evident from her calling Seth *another seed*; so likewise Abraham had two seeds (Gen. xxi. 12)—‘In Isaac shall *thy seed* be called (13); and also of the son of the handmaid will I make a nation, because he is *thy seed*.’”—M’KNIGHT, *in loco*. These examples are worthy of consideration so far as they go, showing that the word in Hebrew, though usually collective, is capable of individual application; it is quite plain that when God promised that “the seed of the woman should bruise the serpent’s head,” He had, and was understood to have had, but *one* Deliverer in view. The impression upon Eve’s mind unquestionably was that of an individual son who should avenge her fall upon the insidious serpent, as appears from the name given to her first born, “I have gotten a man from the Lord,” which Bishop Patrick interprets “the promised Messiah, which she imagined would have been her first born; for the words of the promise might as well be expounded of *the first seed* the woman had as of any of her posterity;” where it is to be noted that the Bishop himself gives his sanction to the word ‘seed’ in the controverted sense, for he writes “the first seed,” which he could not have done had ‘seed’ in his estimation been incapable of application to one of many.

The example given above, “in Isaac shall thy seed be called,” may be open to dispute, for it is uncertain whether the word is to be understood individually or nationally; but there can be no reason why the other instance, that of Ishmael, should be rejected, for unquestionably the word is applied, not to the posterity of Ishmael, but to Ishmael himself; and in respect to *σπέρμα*, by which the Hebrew word is rendered, it is undoubtedly a word of great latitude; and if, though ordinarily a collective noun, it is susceptible when applied to the seeds of the field of individualization to particular grains, why should it be deemed incapable of like pliancy of meaning when used in reference to the children of men?

But the question is not as to the suitability or the non-suitability of the word as it occurs in the original promise, whether it is capable or not of indicating an individual seed, not being the entire progeny, which, from the examples produced, we have reason to apprehend that it is; but as to the conclusiveness of the Apostle’s induction, whether *σπέρμα*

is so essentially singular as necessarily to exclude plurality, which his comment would seem to imply. This is the real difficulty of the case; and notwithstanding all the examples which have been adduced, a difficulty it still continues to be; but however it be accounted for, one thing is clear, that we have the Apostle's testimony that in the case before us (the Abrahamic promise), *σπέρμα* has been used to denote an individual seed. "We have here (as Ellicott justly observes) an interpretation which the Apostle, writing under illumination of the Holy Ghost, has deliberately propounded, and which, therefore (whatever difficulties may at first sight appear in it), is profoundly and indisputably true." I am satisfied with the solution; and whatever may be thought of the Apostle's mode of induction (and it is the height of presumption in any human being to dare to arraign it), the conclusion is inevitable and certain, that when God said to Abraham, "In thy seed shall all nations be blessed," he contemplated not the posterity of Abraham, nor the posterity of Isaac, nor the posterity of Jacob, but simply and exclusively—Christ.*

But we have not yet completed the investigation; another and a very important matter remains to be settled. In what sense are we to understand—Christ? Is it Christ in his individual, personal capacity, or Christ mystical (that is, Christ in union with his church), to whom the promise was made? In scrutinizing the terms of the promise in connexion with the result, we find that it is to be accepted with a twofold aspect. There is a promise to 'the nations' that they shall receive the Holy Spirit, in Christ, that is, so far forth as they shall be found incorporated in Christ; and there is a promise to 'Christ' that he shall be the medium of communication of the Holy Spirit to 'the nations,' that is, so far as they shall be united to Him. These two elements appear inseparably mixed up with the promise; hence we infer that *the whole promise* has respect to a *whole Christ*, not to the head only, to the exclusion of the members, any more than to the members exclusively of the head, but to both conjointly, as constituting—one Christ.

In regarding the subject in the light which is now vouchsafed us, we find that 'the nations' become interested in the blessing by baptism into Christ, whereby they are made "Abraham's seed, and heirs according to the promise" (v. 29)—that being united to Christ, their risen and exalted head, *He*, according to the part assigned to Him by the promise, mediates the covenant in behalf of his body the church; for them He has entered into the holy of holies, and *having received the promised Spirit from the Father, dispenses it at his pleasure unto them.*

* But the difficulty will be considerably less if we take it that the Apostle refers not to the distinction existing between *σπέρμασιν* and *σπέρματι* as a ground of induction at all; but that, being divinely inspired as to the party in whose favour the promise was made, he points to the distinction to show that in the language employed a foundation was laid for the interpretation which he now authoritatively pronounces, which would not have been the case had *σπέρμασιν* been the word used in the place of *σπέρματι*. In the one case *σπέρμα* should be regarded as absolutely and essentially singular, in the other as only conditionally so.

According to the testimony of St. Peter, "being by the right hand of God exalted, and having received the promise of the Holy Ghost, he hath shed forth this which ye have seen and heard," Acts, iii. 26. Like the precious ointment upon the head of Aaron, which went down to the skirts of his clothing, the Holy Ghost, poured out without measure upon our Anointed Head, descends through the entire church to the humblest member of His body, and to every one according to the measure of the gift of Christ. Such we have reason to apprehend is *the nature of the fulfilment*, and such consequently, we conclude, is *the purport of the promise*. Ellicott's argument to the contrary is inconclusive:—"Not Christ (he says) and his church, as Hammond, *in loco*. This appears evident from the emphasis which St. Paul lays on the use of the singular," for 'Christ and his church' are essentially 'singular.' He and his people are *one*, the contrast being established between the *one seed* (Christ personal or mystical, as the case may be) and the *many seeds*, the various branches of Abraham's family, or possibly the multitudinous offspring descended from him by the flesh.

* *Kaì τῷ σπέρματί σου*, 'and to thy seed.' The attentive reader will easily perceive that these words form no part of the apostolic comment, but are an extract from the original text, and to be read in connexion with the foregoing clause, *ὡς ἐφ' ενός*, "he saith not *καὶ τοῖς σπέρμασιν*, as of many, but (repeating the language of the promise), *καὶ τῷ σπέρματί σου*, as of one," any other construction involving an undue and, indeed, unaccountable emphasis being laid upon the possessive pronoun *σου*. The order of the words in the text is evidently attributable to the desire of the writer to bring *σπέρματί* into immediate contact with its predicate *ὅς ἐστιν Χριστός*, to the avoidance of *ἐφ' ενός*, which, being in contrast with *ἐπὶ πολλῶν*, is used *indefinitely*. Recent commentators (as we before observed) regard this verse as "parenthetical" or "digressive," whereas it is plainly a portion of the direct argument, and a most material portion of it too; for where else are we to discover, with any approximation to certainty, the *covenant* which is the subject of comparison here, or the provisions of which it consists, if not set forth in this place? But here we have *the covenant* definitively stated, and limited to *the promise of spiritual blessing to come upon the nations in Jesus Christ*, preparatory to the application of the analogy in the ensuing verse.

VERSE 17.—*Τοῦτο δὲ λέγω*, 'now this I say.' The argument commencing at ver. 15, not broken off by "a digression," nor even, properly speaking, interrupted by "a parenthesis," but 'suspended for a moment' to define the covenant which is the subject of comparison, is now continued. 'Now this I say, that (according to the principle of analogy before laid down) the law which was 430 years after could not annul, so as to make the promise (covenant) of none effect;' *τοῦτο δὲ λέγω* being no mere "explanatory formula," as represented by Ellicott and Alford—"this, however, I say," or 'this is my meaning, the drift of the previous statement'—but an *emphatic form of assertion*, in prosecution of his argument (in opposition probably (*δὲ*) to the pre-existing notion which he combats), 'this I affirm,' approaching nearly to the

force which it exhibits in chapter v. 2. Dr. Bloomfield, by passing over what he is pleased to account "some parenthetical matter" of the 16th verse, and connecting these words directly with verse 15, and paraphrasing them, "I mean by that example to let you know," obscures altogether the sense of the passage, and renders the entire reasoning in this place feeble and incoherent.

^b Διαθήκην, 'covenant.' But what covenant? If not explained by the preceding verse, the subject is certainly very abruptly and very unaccountably introduced. But unquestionably it is identified with 'the promise' of the preceding verse; for in the first place, if not so, the introduction of that promise was irrelevant and useless, and out of character with the logical precision which distinguishes the entire Epistle. But, secondly, it is used convertibly with the promise in the very sentence in which it stands—"A covenant confirmed before of God, the law cannot invalidate, that it should make (*it?* no, but 'that it should make) *the promise* of none effect." This, coupled with the established fact that in the vocabulary of Scripture the term 'covenant' not unfrequently represents 'a promise' (see ver. 15 ^c), leaves no reasonable doubt upon the mind that in this passage 'the covenant' and 'the promise' are identical.

But when or how, it may be inquired, was 'the promise' previously established? I answer, by the simple announcement of it. The promise of God needed not to wait for five-and-twenty years (as some suggest) to *be confirmed* by an oath (Gen. xxii. 16). God's promise is inviolable as an oath—"He is not a man that he should lie, nor the son of man that he should repent." Man's word may fail, and his most sacred promises be unfulfilled, and fall, disappointingly, to the ground; "all flesh is grass, and all the glory of man as the flower of grass; the grass withereth, and the flower thereof falleth away, but *the word of the Lord endureth for ever.*" In no other way can the establishment of the covenant be reconciled with the 430 years which are said to have elapsed between it and the giving of the law. Nor is it any objection to this statement that the 430 years carry us back to the first promise to Abraham, and not to that in which mention is made of 'the seed'; for, though delivered at different periods, the promises are substantially the same, and so treated throughout the entire of this Epistle, the latter being but a development or expansion of the former.

^c Εἰς Χριστὸν, 'in favour of Christ.' These words are omitted in many copies; but it is generally allowed that there is no sufficient ground for their omission, being probably, as it has been suggested, left out in consequence of their supposed difficulty. But no difficulty or ambiguity whatsoever attaches to them, if only they be treated with ordinary discrimination. Εἰς Χριστὸν may signify 'in respect of,' or 'in regard to,' Christ (as in chap. iv. 11, v. 10; Eph. v. 32); but more probably here, as I have translated it, 'in favour of,' or 'for the interests of,' Christ—many examples of which usage present themselves in the New Testament (see Rob., *Lex.*). It is true that the reading proposed does not appear to harmonize exactly with the use of the word

‘confirmed,’ the received rendering of *προκεκυρωμένην*, which seems to point to some *specific act of confirmation* of a previously existing covenant or promise, at which period no new appointment usually takes place; but *προκεκυρωμένην* merely presents the covenant as ‘previously *established or perfected*,’ with all the solemnity necessary to give it effect, and which (as we have just seen), in the case of God, is no more than simple announcement. It may perhaps facilitate the adoption of this view to observe, that ‘a covenant established *in favour of Christ*’ is no new or unexpected introduction in this context, but the result of proof in the preceding verse, that Christ was the beneficiary of the covenant—the seed to whom the promise referred, and formally repeated here in order to the application of the analogy.

It is a much more rational mode of dealing with the subject to accept the words as we find them, and assign to them a familiar and intelligible meaning, than to have recourse to the extreme measure of expunging them altogether from the text, as has been done by some; or “the more legitimate manner (Bloomfield), of supposing *εἰς Χριστὸν* to be an error of the scribes for *ἐν Χριστῷ*, a reading which involves less difficulty than that involved in *εἰς Χριστὸν*, which is capable of no sense without violence.” But with all due deference to the learned Doctor this seems a perfectly gratuitous assumption in both its members; for assuredly *ἐν Χριστῷ* is a much more difficult expression to deal with, in this connexion, than *εἰς Χριστὸν*, which, so far from being “incapable of any sense without violence,” furnishes a most natural and pertinent meaning in itself, and doubly so when read in connexion with the preceding verse. I am not quite certain that I can claim Ellicott as an authority on my side—his exposition being “*εἰς Χριστὸν*, ‘for Christ,’ i. e. to be fulfilled in Christ”—unaccompanied, however, with any farther explanation. But it is presumed that ‘for Christ,’ or ‘to be fulfilled in Christ,’ is susceptible of no other interpretation than that assigned above—‘in favour of,’ or ‘for the interests of,’ Christ; the beneficiary of the covenant being, as we have before seen, Christ, not personal, but mystical.

^d Μετὰ τετρακόσια καὶ τριάκοντα ἔτη, ‘four hundred and thirty years after.’ Whitby’s account of the period appears so plain and satisfactory, that I cannot do better than transcribe it here:—“Hence it is evident that the Apostle here refers primarily to the promise made, Gen. xii. 3, since from that only are the 430 years to be computed. For then Abraham was seventy-five years old (Gen. xii. 4): from thence to the birth of Isaac, which happened when Abraham was a hundred years old (Gen. xxi. 5), is five-and-twenty years; from his birth to the birth of Jacob was sixty years, for ‘Isaac was sixty years old when Rebecca bare him’ (Gen. xxv. 26); from Jacob’s birth to his descent into Egypt was one hundred and thirty years, as he saith to Pharaoh (Gen. xlvii. 9). The abode of him and his posterity in Egypt was two hundred and fifteen years; so that with their sojourning in Canaan was four hundred and thirty years (Exod. xii. 40), according to the Septuagint.”—WHITBY, *in loco*. This computation, which carries upon the face of it the stamp

of verisimilitude, establishes, as we before observed, that *the perfecting of the covenant* was neither more nor less than *the announcement of the promise*.

I would remark in passing, that the LXX. in their translation of Exod. xii. 40, have introduced the words “and in the land of Canaan” thus:—“Now the sojourning of the children of Israel in the land of Egypt, *and in the land of Canaan*, was four hundred and thirty years,” an interpolation which, while it reflects considerable light upon the period in question, occasions no discrepancy whatever between the Septuagint and our received version; for it is not affirmed in our version that the children of Israel *sojourned in the land of Egypt* four hundred and thirty years; but that “*the sojourning* of the children of Israel *who dwelt in Egypt* was four hundred and thirty years,”—where indeed the parties are described, and their period *of sojourn* before they arrived at any settled habitation, is described; but in what land they sojourned it saith not—a piece of information which the more detailed account of the LXX. accurately supplies.

* Οὐκ ἀκυροῖ, ‘doth not invalidate,’ in opposition to προκεκυρωμένην. The contrast conveyed in the word is—‘a covenant previously *established* by God in favour of Christ, the law does not *dis-establish*’—a conclusion drawn from the analogy of human institutions.

† Εἰς τὸ καταργῆσαι, ‘so as to render inefficacious,’ ‘fruitless’—εἰς expressive of result, not of design, see Rom. i. 20; 1 Thess. ii. 16; καταργεῖν, a word of unusual occurrence, except in the Epistles of St. Paul, derived from ἀργός, contracted from ἀεργός, ‘inactive,’ ‘idle;’ hence ‘inefficacious,’ ‘fruitless.’—See Luke, xiii. 7; Rom. iv. 14.

VERSE 18.—* Εἰ γὰρ, κ. τ. λ., ‘for if,’ &c. The idea is here continued from the preceding verse—‘to render the promise of none effect; I say advisedly of none effect; *for* if the inheritance come of law, then it is no more of promise, and the promise is made of none effect.’ Γὰρ is in this instance epexegetical, explanatory of the strong assertion (εἰς τὸ καταργῆσαι) contained in the previous clause.

† Ἐκ νόμου. Ἐξ ἐπαγγελίας. It is obvious, from the structure of the sentence, that these terms are antithetically opposed, as descriptive of the two presumptive modes whereby the Spirit might be imparted to the church—modes so essentially antagonistic, that the one must always prevail to the exclusion of the other. If the reception of the Spirit be the result ‘of obedience to the law,’ from the very nature of things it cannot be ‘of promise.’ In the one case it should be *the reward of merit*, in the other *the fruit of grace*. And so argues the Apostle:—“If by grace, then it is no more of works: otherwise grace is no more grace. But if it be of works, then it is no more grace: otherwise work is no more work,” Rom. xi. 6.

In the phrase ‘by promise’ the Apostle does not contemplate any specific declaration, such as God made to Abraham when he said, “In thee shall all nations be blessed,” which should properly be introduced with the article; but, abstractly, *that peculiar mode of communication* whereby a thing is conferred, not as a matter of *right*, but of *favour*—

not as *deserved*, but *granted*—in which sense it is clear, that if “the inheritance be of law, then it is no more of promise.”

‘*Ἡ κληρονομία*, ‘the inheritance.’ But what are we to understand by ‘the inheritance’? If there be precision in the Apostle’s language, there is but one subject to which it can by possibility refer. The argument is to this effect:—‘Even a man’s covenant, when duly ratified, is henceforth inviolable. God promised ‘the Spirit’ to the seed of Abraham through faith: that promise or covenant, then, cannot by the law be *annulled*—I say advisedly, cannot *be annulled*; for if the inheritance (what can it be but the subject of the promise?)—if the inheritance be of law, then is the promise, to all intents and purposes, *annulled*; for God gave the inheritance to Abraham, not by law, as the fruit of his own obedience, but freely, unconditionally—by promise.’ Consistently with this line of argument, there can be no question but ‘the inheritance’ represents the subject of the promise—‘the Holy Spirit.’

In making this assertion, it is not intended to be conveyed that other blessings besides the Holy Ghost are not included in the scriptural notion of ‘the inheritance.’ That many and incalculable benefits, spiritual, physical, and incidental, do follow in the train of the Holy Ghost is a most blessed and undeniable truth. But what is maintained is this—that throughout the entire context *the subject of promise* is represented to be *the Holy Ghost*, and such, consequently, in this connexion, must be ‘the inheritance.’ “According to Him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will, we have *received an inheritance*—in God;” and we are now “sealed with that *Holy Spirit of promise* which is *the earnest of our inheritance*, until the redemption of the purchased possession,” Eph. i. 13, 14. And who does not know that ‘an earnest’ is in kind the same as that of which it is the pledge? and that the measure of the Holy Ghost which we have now received is but the pledge or assurance of a far more abundant measure, hereafter to be bestowed upon us—the first-fruits of a coming harvest—the first drops of a copious shower, to be poured out from on high at the redemption of the body? Surely no difficulty should be felt in admitting that in Scripture language ‘the promised blessing’ (see verse 14^c) is designated ‘an inheritance,’ when we call to mind the expression of St. Peter, ‘know ye not that we are hereunto called, that we should *inherit a blessing*?’ According to recent expositors, ‘the inheritance’ is ‘the kingdom of Christ’—“the inheritance of the heavenly Canaan, which was typified by the lower and primary meaning, the inheritance of the earthly Canaan.”—ELLICOTT. But there is no relevancy in this exposition, “the heavenly Canaan” not being the subject of discussion here, but ‘the Holy Ghost,’ through what means to be attained?—a blessing to which, as we have just seen, the term ‘inheritance’ is not unfrequently nor (from the promise to “*the seed*”) inexplicably applied in Scripture.

^d Οὐκ ἔτι, ‘no more’—“In its simple logical sense, without any temporal reference.”—ELLICOTT.

‘*Κεχάρισται*, ‘gave it freely,’—‘it,’ that is, the subject of the previous clause, to wit, ‘the inheritance.’ The chief emphasis in this

place is to be laid upon the verb *κεχάρισται*, gave it freely, gratuitously, unconditionally, undeservedly, "by promise," where, as we have just seen *δι' ἐπαγγελίας* represents, not 'the formula' wherein the glad tidings were announced, but 'the mode' whereby the blessing, the subject of the glad tidings, is conferred, which mode is accurately described in the meaning of the verb *κεχάρισται*. (For the usage of *χαρίζομαι*, see 1 Cor. ii. 12; Phil. i. 29, ii. 9.)

The Apostle's argument is now at length brought to a conclusion, and the subject introduced at verse 5, or more properly, at verse 2, has received an elaborate and exhaustive discussion. *The Holy Spirit is to be received in the church, not through legal works, but through faithful hearing.* In the preceding section he had proved by plain *scriptural induction* that, according to the terms of the promise, through faith it was ordained to be. In the section now concluded he has established, from *analogy*, that the law cannot invalidate the promise (or covenant), and consequently 'by faith' it still continues to be. The chief question being thus disposed of, the Apostle next proceeds to exhibit what the true character and intent of the law was; and there is no portion of the epistolary writings which demands our undivided attention more imperatively than that on which we are now entering.

VERSE 19.—*Τί οὖν ὁ νόμος*, 'What, then, the law?'—either *τί* elliptically, for *εἰς τί*, 'for what purpose, then, the law?' or more probably "the idiomatic neuter, expressive of the abstract nature of the subject."—ELLICOTT.

From the course which the argument has pursued in the preceding paragraphs, it might not unreasonably have been inferred that the law was wholly inoperative—neither able to justify of itself, nor exercising any influence over the method 'by promise:' for what purpose, then, was it ordained? But, before we proceed to the examination of this subject, it will be expedient to arrive at an understanding with respect to the meaning of the terms employed. What are we to understand, in the first place, by 'the law'? The law of Moses we know consisted of three departments—the moral law, the law of ceremonies, and the political or civil law—departments distinct in themselves, but all of them comprised under the general denomination, 'the law'—the portion the subject of notice, whether the whole law, or some particular branch of it, always to be determined by the context in which it stands. In what point of view, then, is it here presented?

From an attentive consideration of the contents of this Epistle, it will appear that the error of the Galatian church was a desire to engraft upon the gratuitous salvation of the Gospel *the ritual* of the Mosaic institute—an impotent and fruitless effort to accomplish the perfection of the Christian state by the observance of a mere outward and ceremonial religion. It is with this (and a more dangerous or delusive error cannot well be conceived) that the Apostle grapples throughout the entire of this Epistle:—'Are ye so foolish? having begun with the Spirit, are ye now seeking to perfect yourselves with the flesh?'—by which is to be understood (see ver. 3^b) 'the carnal observances of *the ceremonial law*.'

Again: when the Apostle would dissuade his disciples from the perilous step which they were taking, he expostulates with them in the following terms:—"After ye have known God, or rather are known of God, how turn ye again to *the weak and beggarly elements*, whereunto ye desire again to be in bondage: ye observe days and months and times and years"—ch. iv. 9, 10. Whereupon Whitby remarks—"The Galatians are said to return to those elements, not because they before observed *the Jewish ceremonies*, but because *the ceremonies of the law* being for the matter mostly the same with those the Gentiles used to their heathen deities, by returning to *them*, they returned to those elements."—WHITBY, *in loco*. The error, then, of the Galatian church was, as we have just said, a disposition to relapse from the pure faith of the Gospel, and the spirituality of Christian service, into dependence upon an outward ceremonial religion. And consequently we conclude that 'the law,' the subject of inquiry here, the nature and office of which, in contravention to such error, the Apostle has undertaken to expound, can be no other than '*the Jewish ceremonial law*.'

And this conclusion derives immeasurable support from the circumstance that 'the law,' which is the subject of inquiry here, is represented by the Apostle as only to continue "until the seed should come to whom the promise was made." In connexion with this circumstance, it is to be borne in mind, that of the three departments of which 'the law' consisted, 'the moral,' from the nature of things, being founded on the immutable character of God, was ordained to be of eternal and universal obligation; 'the political,' to continue as long as the Jews remained a distinct people; but 'the ceremonial' only to last until the advent of Messiah, who should inaugurate a new and a more efficient system. Consequently we find that 'the ceremonial law' was abolished upon the cross of Christ, when "He blotted out *the handwriting of ordinances* that was against us, which was contrary to us, and took it out of the way, nailing it to his cross."—Col. ii. 14. On which verse Whitby observes:—"The handwriting of ordinances in the parallel epistle (Eph. ii. 15) is the law of commandments (*ἐν δόγμασι*) in ritual ordinances, or *the ceremonial law*. And it is here said to be against us, and contrary to the Gentiles, as being a middle wall of partition, hindering them from coming to God, and putting an enmity between them and God's people, *which Christ hath taken away, by abolishing and dissolving the obligation of it*, and admitting the Gentiles fellow-heirs of the same promises and blessings as the Jews." 'The law,' then, which was to terminate at the coming of the promised seed, could be no other than '*the Jewish ceremonial law*.'

^b *Τῶν παραβάσεων χάριν*, 'for the sake of (that is, 'in behalf of') transgressions.' A great diversity of opinion has existed from the earliest ages as to the precise meaning and application of these words. In presenting a summary of what has been offered, I shall avail myself gratefully of the labours of Dean Ellicott, who to extreme candour and industry unites the rare and commendable qualities of succinctness and perspicuity. Of the many interpretations which have been proposed, he

tells us, three principally deserve consideration: 1st, "Ad coercendas transgressionēs," to restrain transgressions, as Chrys. and most of the older expositors; 2nd, "transgressionum gratia," that is, to call forth transgressions, to multiply them, and as it were to bring them to a head, and so apparently Clarm. and some of the modern expositors; 3rd, "transgressionum causa," in order to make known transgressions, and in this way compel men to acknowledge their guilt—Calvin. To *the first* of these Ellicott objects as untenable, "because no satisfactory examples have yet been adduced of such a practically *reversed* meaning of χάρις;" and in this ground of objection I fully concur. *The second*, though more plausible, he rejects as being "open to the grave objection, that in a comparatively undogmatical passage it ascribes a purpose directly to God which would have certainly needed a fuller explanation;" and here also I feel bound to agree. *The third* he retains, "with some confidence, which is lexically defensible, and yields a good pertinent sense. The office of the law was to make transgressions palpable, to awake a conviction of sin in the heart, and make man feel his need of a Saviour."—ELLICOTT, *in loco*.

All this is indubitably true as regards the office of the law; it was one of the many, many ways in which the law of Moses operated for the extreme benefit of its subjects; but still the lexical objection of Meyer to this interpretation seems absolutely insuperable, 'that the force of χάρις is "in gratiam," and there is no approximation to its original import in this view.' Besides, it is to be observed that all those explanations have proceeded upon the principle that it is *the moral law* which is the subject of inquiry here, and not *the ceremonial*; whereas, if there be any force in the arguments above advanced, they go the length to establish that the phrase under consideration is exclusively applied to *the latter*. But before stating the translation which commends itself to my judgment, or entering upon the general discussion of the subject, it will be convenient to ascertain in the first instance the force of the remaining members of the sentence.

^a Προσέτεθι, 'was superadded'—a new and an important element in the discussion. The law which is the subject of inquiry here was, it seems, a *superaddition*; but the question presents itself—superadded to what? To the Abrahamic covenant, is the universal response. But it is difficult to comprehend in what way superadded to it. "No ἐπιδιαθήκη (as Meyer observes), but a totally fresh institution."—ELLICOTT. But how a law introduced 430 years after—"a totally fresh institution"—having no sensible relation to the promise—all whose provisions seemed diametrically opposed to the promise—can with any propriety of language be said to be "superadded" to it, is a mystery which I am unable to solve. Some ancient scribe, feeling the difficulty, had recourse to the usual expedient of altering the text, and wrote ἐτέθη, which, though admitted by Griesbach and others, has been rejected by the best modern editors for lack of authority. "Likely it is (says Bloomfield) that ἐτέθη was introduced by those critics who, as did Theod. (misled by his usual guide, Chrys., who has handled the text

with anything but his usual care), thinking that the sense is simply *lata est*, 'was promulgated,' regarded the preposition as worse than useless, and (according to their wont) expunged it. What farther induced them to do this was, that νόμον τιθέναι is a phrase often occurring in the sense 'to promulgate a law,' but never νόμον προστιθέναι—at least in that sense—but only 'to superadd a law to a previous law,' for in that sense it does occur, however rarely." Hence it appears that προσετέθη has always been felt to be a difficulty in the exposition of this passage; and so must it continue to be until some interpretation be discovered which will admit of the verb being taken in its literal and proper signification, 'to superadd one law to another,' in which case it would be not only correct, but appropriate.

The law, the subject of inquiry here, as we have already submitted, is *the Jewish ceremonial law*. Now, that this law was not promulgated in the first instance to the Jewish people, but was *a superaddition* to the antecedent moral law, is matter of universal notoriety. "It is well known (says Whitby) that all the ancient fathers were of this opinion, that God gave the Jews *only the Decalogue*, till they had made the golden calf, and that *afterwards He laid the yoke of ceremonies upon them*, to restrain them from idolatry. Thus, when God first brought them out of Egypt, and commanded them not "to defile themselves with the idols of Egypt" (Ezek. xx. 7), He is said "to have given them His statutes, and showed them His judgments, which, if a man do, he shall live in them" (verse 11). But, saith He, still their hearts went after their fathers' idols, the Egyptian Apis, &c.; "Wherefore I gave them statutes which were not good, and judgments whereby they should not live" (verses 24, 25)—that is, *that law of carnal commandments* which (saith the Apostle) was abolished "for the weakness and unprofitableness thereof," Heb. viii. 16, 18.—WHITBY, *in loco*.

Nothing can be more apparent, according to the tenor of the above quotation, than that the ceremonial law was in the properest sense of the word 'a law superadded to a previous law,' and thus answering most signally the condition required by προσετέθη. And a farther question presents itself—for what purpose superadded? And though we would not be understood for one moment to controvert, or to call in question the correctness of the ancient opinion, that one especial design of the ceremonial law was to raise a barrier between the Jewish people and the idolatrous nations around them; yet we doubt not that, as we proceed with our inquiry, another and no less cogent reason, and equally plain to our apprehension, will be found to have had its full share in the appointment.

Διαταγείς, 'ordained'—"not promulgated."—ELLICOTT. A word which points distinctly to the internal arrangement and constitution of the law—not to its external delivery or publication: in which sense it indicates the act of God, carried into effect through the ministration of angels.

Δι' ἀγγέλων, 'through angels,' that is, 'through the intervention of angels.' That the ministry of angels was employed in the publica-

tion of the law, though incapable, I believe, of demonstration from the Old Testament Scriptures, is the subject of frequent allusion in the New, and is so universally accredited by Jewish writers, that we cannot withhold from it our assent. It is, however, a fair subject for inquiry—for what purpose is that fact introduced into the present context? And upon this point I shall again revert to the commentary of Dean Ellicott. “Great difference of opinion (he tells us) exists as to St. Paul’s object in recounting these details (included in the clause under consideration). If it was to prove the *lowliness* of the law, such a recital would, in several parts, rather seem to convey the contrary. If it was to show the *glorious nature* (Mey.), such an object would appear seriously at variance with the context. The more natural view is, that it was to mark the fundamental *differences* between the law and the Gospel, and thence, as a natural result of the contrast, the transitory and provisional nature of the former. The law was an institution: (1), restricted and conditional; (2), temporary and provisional; (3), mediately (not immediately) given by God; (4), mediately (but not immediately) received from God.”—ELLICOTT, *in loco*.

But all this accumulation of circumstances has been arbitrarily heaped up, to establish a contrast between the law and the Gospel, which has no existence whatever, save in the fertile imagination of commentators, who have taxed their ingenuity to discover wherein the contrast consists, and, if we may judge from the number of points enumerated, with no inconsiderable success. But the Apostle’s argument, simple and straightforward as it is, scatters to the winds all such hypercritical distinctions. ‘What then is the law? The law was superadded *with a specified object* and *for a limited period*’—an announcement which, in both its members, is the subject of explanation in the adjacent context, by reference to a well-known institution of the law—a line of argument which effectually employs every word in the sentence, and leaves no room for the imaginary contrast above suggested. We must therefore seek some other ground of allusion to “angels” more in conformity with the declared object of the Apostle’s statement.

That the Jews entertained very exalted notions of the dignity of their law, from the pomp and ceremony with which it was introduced, more especially its promulgation by angels, is a fact easily deducible from their writings. They concluded that a judicial system, emanating from so high a source, and established under such sublime auspices, could be no less than perpetual. Hence their decided aversion and unmitigated hostility to any attempt in any quarter to rescind its obligation, or to disparage its ordinances.

Now, the Apostle having it in contemplation to declare the temporary and provisional character of the law, takes advantage (it would seem) of this deep-rooted sentiment in the Jewish breast to insinuate that whatever authority attached to the law, by reason of the interposition of angels, attached by consequence to that provision of it, whereby its continuance was limited to the coming of Him to whom the promise was made, for that it “was ordained *through angels* (with all the sanc-

tity and solemnity which such a promulgation involved) *in the hand of a mediator*," a provision which, as he was immediately to show, establishes *the temporary condition* of the law—a treatment of the subject which, while it had no tendency to undervalue the institution itself, or to denude it of one of those circumstances which invested it with such surpassing dignity in the eye of the Jews (which could only have excited their prejudice, and provoked their hostility to no purpose), at the same time established most conclusively the position of the Apostle that '*the law was of a temporary nature*, and only to continue until 'the promise' could take effect in Him to whom it was made.'

'Εν χειρὶ μεσίτου, 'in the hand of a mediator.' "The ἐν is not instrumental 'by the hand.'"—ELLICOTT. Such double intervention would seem hardly admissible, being in fact not two several acts of intervention between God and man, but (if I may be allowed the expression) one on the back of the other, 'the intervention of angels—by the hand of a mediator.' Besides, if Moses be (as is generally assumed) the mediator in question, he certainly received not his commission at the hands of angels, but directly and immediately from God. "In the hand of a mediator," which is a correct and literal translation, is a figure of speech not difficult of interpretation. An object in the hand of a person is a common symbol of executive power. Thus a sceptre in the hand of a figure represents the exercise of kingly authority; the scales in the hand of Justitia, the impartial administration of justice. In the same way, 'the law in the hand of a mediator' is a figure of speech denoting that a mediator is the administrator of the law. When, therefore, we read that "the law was ordained (by God) through angels, in the hand of a mediator," we instinctively apprehend that by divine appointment a mediator is an essential ordinance of the law—that by such hands, and none other, could its provisions be carried into effect. A decisive argument, by the way, against the mediatorship of Moses; for if it be true that ἐν χειρὶ denotes "not instrumentality," but 'locality,' and that the law in the hand of a mediator is an appropriate symbol of *administration* by the hands of a mediator, there is an end at once to the mediatorship of Moses; for, admitting the law to have been *promulgated* by him, he can certainly lay no claim to its *perpetual administration*, nor to any administration at all, except it be as the first of the Aaronic family (a supposition not altogether improbable, remembering the Psalmist's words, "Moses and Aaron among his priests," Psalm, xcix. 6). But if this be the mediatorship ascribed to Moses, he is mediator in no other or more peculiar fashion than Aaron or Phineas, or any other descendant of his who subsequently enjoyed the priestly office—a notion very far removed from that usually entertained of the mediatorship of Moses.

But if not Moses, it is time to inquire, who was the mediator contemplated in these words? And the answer is at hand: 'the Aaronic or Levitical priesthood,' or, more accurately speaking, 'the high priest' for the time being. That the ceremonial law was administered by the high priest, and that his whole ministry was founded upon the supposition of mediatorship, ought to be so clearly established in the mind of

the reader as to need no further proof here. To him as mediator it appertained *to make atonement for the sins of the people*. His duty it was *to intercede for them* every year in the holy of holies, and, after intercession made, to come forth *and bless them*, in token of their acceptance with God. In one passage, indeed, in the Epistle to the Hebrews (Heb. viii. 6), the very term ‘mediator’ is by implication applied to him. The Apostle, contrasting the priesthood of Christ with the Levitical priesthood, informs us that “He (Christ) is the mediator of *a better covenant*,” that is, by the analogy of contrast, better or more efficacious than that of which *the high priest was the mediator*; so that, independently of any consideration arising out of the passage before us, we have ample testimony of Scripture, leaving not a shadow of doubt that the Levitical high priest was the appointed mediator of the Jewish covenant.

Having thus taken a brief view of the contents of this clause, we now revert with the information so acquired to the explanation of *παπαβάσεων χάριν*, and the illustration of the argument as connected with it. The clause which has just engaged our attention being introduced by the participle *διαταγείς*, is what is known by grammarians as ‘a causal participial clause,’ and is commonly employed to disclose the ground or reason of a foregoing assertion or statement, which statement in the present instance may be resolved into two heads:—(1). The law was superadded *τῶν παπαβάσεων χάριν*. (2). It was only to continue until the seed should come to whom the promise was made. Now, according to the rules of syntax, both these statements should be specifically accounted for in the participial clause; and it is strange to observe that this, which is the true grammatical key to the sentence, should never have been resorted to, to the present hour, in place of those vague and unfounded surmises which have exhibited rather the ingenuity than the critical acumen of the expositors. Let us now turn for instruction to this magisterial clause.

“The law was superadded (assuming the translation which is most suitable to *χάριν*) *in behalf of transgressions*, being ordained (here follows, grammatically, the ground of the statement—‘in behalf of transgressions’) being ordained in the hand of a mediator,” or, in other words, ‘a mediator (the Levitical high priest as we have just seen) being an indispensable officer of the law.’ Now, then, can we discover any instructive connexion between these two clauses? Does the circumstance that the law was constituted in the hand, or in the administration of a mediating priest, reflect any appreciable light upon the antecedent statement that ‘the law was superadded for the benefit of, or in behalf of, transgressions’? What more distinctly? The duty of the high priest was to make intercession for sin, and restore the transgressor to that position in the church which by transgression he had forfeited. “Every high priest taken from among men is ordained for man, in things pertaining unto God, *that he may offer both gifts and sacrifices for sin*,” Heb. v. 1. Surely, then, a law which provided gifts and sacrifices for sin, and a high priest to offer them up acceptably to God, could not be more properly regarded or more appropriately designated than “*a law added in behalf of trans-*

gressions”! The first head then, that “the law was added in behalf of transgressions,” being thus satisfactorily accounted for (as we had reason to anticipate) *in the participial clause*, we again revert to the same source, in the confident expectation that the second head, namely, that “the law was only to continue until the seed should come to whom the promise was made,” shall be as felicitously cleared up.

Admitting it to be a fact that ‘the law was administered by the high priest with the office and authority of mediator,’ how, it may be asked, does that fact sustain the conclusion assumed to be based upon it, namely, that “it was only to continue until the seed should come to whom the promise was made”? St. Paul shall supply the answer with more than his usual conciseness. The Levitical high priest, though invested with the dignity, and discharging the functions, of a mediator, was not *a mediator indeed*, for the reason immediately subjoined, that ‘a mediator is not a mediator of one party, but of two;’ whereas in the case of the high priest there was but one party distinct from the mediator, “for God is one,” or ‘but one,’ as the words imply,—the high priest, the officiating mediator, being himself a member of what should properly have constituted the second party, namely, the people, and consequently “was not such a high priest as became us—holy, harmless, undefiled, and *separate from sinners*” (Heb. vii. 26); where *κεχωρισμένος ἀπὸ τῶν ἁμαρτωλῶν* is not to be regarded in the commonly received notion of *exemption from sin*, that quality having been sufficiently attested in the preceding epithets, but (as the word properly implies) *separate in point of position*—not from sin, but “from sinners;” occupying an intermediate status between God and man, personally distinct from both parties; neither wholly God nor wholly man, and thereby qualified to interpose as days-man between them. And *if not a mediator indeed, then only a type* or representative of one who was to come, and accordingly to disappear at the advent of Him who is “*the one mediator between God and men*, the man Christ Jesus,” the promised “seed,” and with him the law, to the administration of which he was an indispensable ordinance; for, “the priesthood being changed, there is of necessity a change also of the law,” Heb. viii. 10; *res probanda*, that ‘the law was from its very constitution only to last until the seed should come to whom the promise was made, “being ordained through angels *in the hand of a mediator*.”’

Nothing can be more simple in itself, or more in accordance with the requisitions of the argument, than the solution thus presented. To the question, ‘What then the law?’ the Apostle replies, ‘the law was provisional in its character, and temporary in its duration;’ its provisional character appearing in this, that it was added ‘in behalf of transgressions,’ until a better and more efficacious system should take its place; and its temporary duration in that it was ‘only to last until He should come by whom that better system was to be inaugurated,’ the structure of the sentence at the same time pointing to a clause where information upon both these heads might be obtained. To that clause (“ordained through angels in the hand of a mediator”) we accordingly

turned; and upon the first branch we ascertained that *the remedial character of the ceremonial law*, administered as it was by the Jewish high priest, in the capacity, and with the authority, of a mediator, offering up daily gifts and sacrifices for sins, and once a year, upon the great day of atonement, making reconciliation for the sins and transgressions of all Israel, sufficiently attested it what the Apostle had described it to be, "a law added in behalf of transgressions."

Being so far successful in the first essay, we again turned with increased confidence to the same source for information on the second branch, and there too we have not been disappointed; for we have been further instructed that from the symbolic character of the mediatorship under the law, affecting to negotiate between *two* parties, where in point of fact there was but *one*, the legal mediator was not a *bond fide* mediator, but the shadow of one who was to come; and the continuance of the type being limited by the appearing of the antitype, the law, to the administration of which the Levitical priesthood was indispensable, should in the nature of things come to an end at one and the same moment with it. So that in both branches our information is complete, and found, as we had reason to apprehend it should be, *in the participial clause*.

One obstacle in the way of the ordinary reader to the understanding of this difficult passage, may be traced to the interpolation in our version of the conjunctive particle 'and,' and the change in the participial form of the verb, which has found favour so unaccountably in it, in common, I believe, with most other translations, to the manifest injury, if not indeed to the total obscuration, of the sense. The introduction as apparently *a new subject*, by the means adverted to, of that which is in truth but the explanation of *the old*, and the preoccupation of the mind at the same time with the idea of the mediatorship of Moses, has set inquiry on the wrong scent; and, the continuity of the argument being broken, it is not surprising that a growth of unwarranted conjectures should have sprung up to the overshadowing of the true sense, whereas by reverting to the grammatical construction of the sentence (*διαταγείς*, 'being,' or because it was 'ordained'), the lost thread is found, and we are at once placed upon the road which leads with unerring certainty to the long sought for but heretofore undiscovered truth.

The solution thus attained is not, it will be admitted, the result of any unwarrantable liberty taken with the text, or indeed of the smallest departure from its literal and strictly grammatical signification. On the contrary, it has the merit of restoring some words (witness *διαταγείς*, *προστέθη*, *παραβάσεων χάριν*) from a false position in which they were placed, to their true and customary meaning. It is in strict accordance with the question proposed as to the nature and office of the law; it has resuscitated a long neglected theological truth, that the mediator of the ceremonial law was the Levitical high priest; in short, to what exception it is open, I am at a loss to conjecture, except it be that it supplies links of the chain which are not discernible upon the surface of Scripture. But that exception must lie with equal force against every possi-

ble exposition which has been, or ever can be, offered of this much litigated passage. The difficulty exists in the passage itself, which is so highly elliptical, that it never can be explained until its many chasms be spanned across with matter originating (it should be) in the ground of the text, but stretching far beyond the limits to which the simple phraseology extends. This much, it is admitted, has been done, but nothing more.

The prevalent opinion, that Moses is the mediator contemplated in this passage, is naturally enough suggested by the fact, that to his hands was committed the delivery of the law at Mount Sinai; and if indeed *διαταγὴς* had respect, not to the internal arrangement, but to the formal publication of the law to the people, it would be no easy task to divest the mind of the notion, and the difficulty would for ever continue, of reconciling such matter with the stated design of the Apostle, to prove that the law was of a provisional nature, and only to continue until the seed should come to whom the promise was made. Such is the discrepancy between these two subjects, that the advocates of the 'Mosaic theory' (and they are neither few nor undistinguished) have been compelled to abandon all pretence of exposition in conformity with the question proposed, and have exerted all their ingenuity to discover points of agreement, with what success I leave it to their own writings to disclose; whereas taking *διαταγὴς* (as we are bound to do) to apply, not to the publication, but to the internal constitution of the law, and understanding thereby that the law was appointed by God in the hand of a mediator, as a perpetual officer of the same, to minister its provisions for the remission of transgression and sin, until the true mediator should appear, and the better covenant with him, then is our attention diverted from *Moses the promulgator* to *Aaron the administrator of the law*, and the whole subject opens up to our view, the mists disperse, and the law is revealed, from its very constitution, a provisional and temporary expedient, to be abolished and done away with when the seed should come in whom 'the promise' should take effect. In short, we must make our election between Moses the mediator of the covenant, and any feasible or intelligible solution of the passage; for long as the notion has prevailed, and able as the hands have been by which it has been treated, it has led to no other result but disappointment, perplexity, and doubt.

The kindred notion, that Christ is the mediator intended, which also boasts of not a few supporters, chiefly amongst the most ancient expositors, with a fair sprinkling also of the modern, would seem, were it not for the high authority to which it lays claim, almost too preposterous to be entertained. That Christ should be the mediator of the law of Moses, "seeing that there are priests who offer gifts according to the law," Heb. viii. 4—the mediator of a law expressly abolished at His coming, and abolished for the insufficiency and unprofitableness thereof!—at the same time that He is distinctly stated to be "the mediator of a better covenant, which was established upon better promises," Heb. vii. 6!! is so extravagant a supposition, that one might almost have

thought that it needed but to be broached to be condemned. Notwithstanding, it also has its supporters, which only shows to what extravagance the most gifted human intellect may be seduced, if once it lets go the clue which inspired testimony alone supplies, which clue in the present instance is *διαταγείς*; simply and literally explained, which points with grammatic certainty to the clause where the true solution is to be sought, and where it is indeed found without difficulty and without doubt.

VERSE 21.—^a Ὁ οὖν νόμος κατὰ τῶν ἐπαγ. κ. τ. λ., ‘the law then was against the promises of God?’ (For this adversative sense of *κατὰ*, see Psalm ii. 2, LXX.; Gal. v. 17.) The interrogative to be put in the *past* tense (not “*is* the law?”—ELLICOTT) to agree with that in which the answer is brought out (*γέγονεν*, verse 24). The first observation which presents itself upon the contemplation of this sentence is, that it originates in some manner in the statement of the preceding paragraph, being introduced by the inferential particle *οὖν*, “the *οὖν*, with its full *collective force*, gathering up the previous reasoning, and immediately applying its obvious though omitted result.”—ELLICOTT. It having been asserted by the Apostle that “the law was only to continue *until* the seed should come to whom the promise was made,” and then, by implication, to cease, in order to make way for the fulfilment of the promise, the natural inference would be, ‘the law then was against the promise; is that what we are given to understand?’—no ‘simple interrogatory,’ for the purpose of eliciting information, the subject being too palpable to admit of a doubt, that no such antagonism could subsist between systems emanating confessedly from the same infallible source; but rather an ‘argumentative interrogatory,’ reflecting discredit upon the previous statement. ‘What, then, are we to be told?—is this the substance of your teaching, that the law is antagonistic to the promise?’—an argument only to be met, as the Apostle does meet it, by showing that the conclusion does not follow legitimately from the premises; that, though the law and the promise could not concur in the same mode of procedure, yet their object was identically the same, namely, that the gift of the Holy Spirit should be conferred upon *them that believe*. Though this certainly appears to be the natural construction of the passage, there is no obligation to insist dogmatically upon its reception; the question being only a vehicle for the instruction which follows, it matters comparatively but little in which way it be understood. In either way the disparaging idea presents itself, that the law should be antagonistic to the promise, which the Apostle meets with an indignant negation—‘God forbid that it should be so,’ or ‘God forbid that any such absurdity should be involved in my teaching’—one or other to prevail, accordingly as the question is understood inquisitively or argumentatively.

^b Τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν, ‘the promises.’ For the plurality of the promises see verse 16 ^b, introduced here possibly to enhance the absurdity of the supposition, ‘the law against the repeated promise of God!’

^c Τοῦ Θεοῦ, ‘of God’—possibly but ‘simple designation,’ but more

probably 'emphatic;' but if so, emphatic most certainly in a different sense from that attributed to it by Ellicott and Alford:—"Promises (say they) which rested immediately on God, and were attested by no mediator"—a point incapable of being emphasized. The promises of God are the same by whomsoever communicated—whether directly by God himself, or by the mouth of his internunciary, equally obligatory in themselves, and equally sure to be fulfilled. But the implied contrast lies here between the promises of God and the promises of any other being—the latter the law of God might indeed contravene—the former it could not.

^a *Ei γὰρ ἐδόθη νόμος*, 'for if a law were given'—explanatory of the denial involved in *μὴ γένοιτο*. *Γὰρ* epexegetical; 'for if a law were given capable to impart life, and so in more apparent conformity with the promise, such a law would be *indeed* (*ὅντως* emphatic) open to the imputation conveyed, "against the promises of God;" for righteousness would have been *of law* (*ἐκ νόμου*, anarthrous); whereas, consistently with the terms of the promise, it should have been *of grace*. But the law as at present constituted (that is, incapable to impart life), so far from being antagonistic to the promise, is (as the Apostle shows in the following verse) the staunchest friend and upholder of the promise. The contrariety exhibited by Alford, which would ensue between the law and the promise, had a law been given able to impart life—"a rivalry," indeed, both affecting to perform the same office—falls infinitely short of the representation made by the Apostle—an *absolute nullification of the promise*—see verse 17.

^b *Ζωοποιῆσαι*, 'to make alive'—'to quicken'—'to impart spiritual life.' During the whole of this context the Apostle is contending with the judaizing Christians, who expected 'to perfect themselves' through the observance of ceremonial rites. 'In order to convince you of your folly (he says), this only would I inquire of you—how did ye commence the divine life? for in whatsoever manner ye commenced it, in that same way, it is reasonable to conclude, must ye go on to perfection: did ye, then, receive the Spirit, in the first instance, as the result of legal obedience, or through a faithful hearing of the word preached?' This question he argues *in extenso*; and in the course of his argument he shows that, according to the terms of the promise, the Spirit was to be the fruit, not of works, but *of faith*—that the law, which was 430 years after, did not annul or qualify the terms of the promise, so that *of faith* it still continued to be; that the law was of a provisional nature, and only to continue until the seed should come to whom the promise was made, and then to disappear, in order to make way for the promise. What! exclaim his opponents, upon the hearing of this declaration; was the law antagonistic to the promise of God, that it needed to be done away, in order that the promise might take effect? God forbid, answers the Apostle; but if the law had been differently constituted from what it was—'had a law been given capable to impart spiritual life,' then indeed would it be antagonistic to the promise, for then righteousness should have been *by law*, and the promise made of

none effect. From this line of argument it is easy to deduce, that 'to impart life' is here used synonymously with 'to communicate the Holy Spirit.'

It cannot have escaped notice that here again, as in verse 8, 'righteousness' and the 'possession of the Holy Ghost' are treated as interchangeable ideas. 'If a law had been given capable to impart life, then *life*—no, but then *righteousness*, would have been by law.' In the other instance, 'the Scripture, foreseeing that God would *justify* the nations through faith, announced the glad tidings to Abraham in these terms—"In thy seed shall all nations be *blessed*"'—a blessing which is subsequently (verse 14) explained to mean '*shall receive the Holy Spirit*' through faith. Not that 'righteousness' and 'life,' or 'the possession of the Holy Ghost,' are absolutely and intrinsically the same, but that they are so indissolubly linked together as cause and effect, that by a common figure of speech the one is used for the other. 'Righteousness' is a complete and undeviating obedience, capable of satisfying the requirements of God's holy law, which by 'the gift of the Holy Spirit,' and baptism into Christ consequent thereon, is ours, through union with him. 'To justify,' then—'to impart life'—'to communicate the Holy Ghost'—'to confer the inheritance' (and other similar expressions might be added), are, in the phraseology of Scripture, but different expressions for conferring of 'the blessing' secured to the church by the promises to Abraham and to his seed.

VERSE 22.—^a 'Αλλὰ, 'But'—"not δὲ, as there is a marked adversative relation between the clauses, and as a statement in reference to the law is about to be made exactly contrary to the result of the foregoing assumption."—ELLICOTT.

^b Ἡ γραφή, 'the Scripture.' But in what sense is 'the Scripture' here used? From the nature of the question proposed (—"was the law then against the promises of God?") one might be induced to think that 'the Scripture' should in this place denote *the letter of the law*; but inasmuch as no instance can be cited from the New Testament, where ἡ γραφή occurs in that limited signification, we should upon that ground alone have been constrained to reject it. Ἡ γραφή, put for ἡ θεία γραφή, as we use 'the Scripture' for 'the holy Scripture,' denotes in this place the Old Testament writings (the only 'Scripture' then extant), which shut up all under sin, by declaring the universal prevalence of corruption. Nor was it without an assignable cause that the Apostle expressed himself in so comprehensive a form; for although, so far as those under the law were concerned, it might have sufficed to say that '*the letter of the law* shut them all up under sin,' yet as the latter part of the sentence ("that the promise might be given to *them that believe*") had a much wider scope than to those only under the law—even to believers of all nations, who, not being amenable to Jewish law, were not involved in its curse—it was essential upon that ground to rest their condemnation upon a more extended base—not merely 'the letter of the law,' but 'the testimony of Scripture.' The question, however, proposed at verse 21, is not *ultimately* lost sight of. The office attributed to 'the Scrip-

ture' in this place is preparatory to the introduction of the peculiar province of *the law* (the subject of inquiry) in the following verse, which was not 'to condemn,' but to keep in ward those previously, by the testimony of Scripture, condemned, in order that the promise might take effect in them that believe.

° *Συνέκλεισεν*, 'shut up.' The sense in which ἡ γραφή is employed determines the force of the verb *συνέκλεισεν*. Had 'the law,' or any equivalent thereto, been the subject of the verb, then the operation referred to might have been to conclude all under sin, not only *declaratorily*, but *instrumentally*. But seeing that ἡ γραφή represents, not 'the law,' but 'the Scripture,' the only power assignable to which being not *condemnatory*, but *declaratory*, in that sense the verb must consequently be taken here.* "The preposition *συν* (in *συνέκλεισεν*) does not imply the similarity of situation of all (Beng.), but simply the idea of *contraction* (Meyer) 'ab omni parte clausit' (Schott)." —ELLICOTT. That it has no reference to the shutting up of Jew and Gentile under a *common bond* of condemnation, may be concluded from the use of the same verb in the following sentence, where it applies exclusively to the Jew, he being the alone subject of the law.

ἃ *Τὰ πάντα*, 'all.' Various conjectures have been offered by different writers, why these words should have been put in the neuter in preference to the masculine gender. "The exact difference between *τοὺς πάντας* and *τὰ πάντα* is perhaps no greater than between 'all men' and 'all mankind;' the neuter is idiomatically and instinctively chosen as best suiting the generality of the declaration." —ELLICOTT. But this exposition is too vague and too problematical to be satisfactory. According to Bloomfield, "*τὰ πάντα* alludes to the *ἔθνη*, which will serve to account for the neuter gender being used." But it remains to be shown that *τὰ πάντα* is ever idiomatically used for *τὰ πάντα ἔθνη*; otherwise the absence of any reference to *ἔθνη* in the immediate context discountenances the supposition. Calvin alleges that "the word translated 'all' (*τὰ πάντα*) signifies 'all things,' and conveys more than if he had said 'all men;' for it embraces not only men, but everything which they possess or can accomplish." Not very different from this is Alford's exposition—"Neuter, as indicating the entirety of *mankind and man's world*—'humana omnia.'" Ellicott, however, objects "that the neuter cannot safely be pressed, as if it were especially chosen to include not only men, but all their actions, this being neither required by the context, nor justified by St. Paul's *usus loquendi*—see Rom.

* It will be observed, that in the exposition here offered it has been assumed that the only power attributable to "the Scripture" in this connexion is, not 'condemnatory,' but 'declaratory.' And it has proceeded upon the ground, that *συνέκλεισεν* is not subjective (as Chrys., *ἡλεγξεν*), but objective; for, as Alford remarks, "it is their objective state of incapacity to attain righteousness which is here brought out." And none other could it be, inasmuch as a large proportion of the *τὰ πάντα* have never heard 'the Scripture,' which pronounces their condemnation, and consequently have not been brought into a state of *conviction* thereby. The *declaratory* sense, then, must be allowed to prevail.

xi. 32, where in a passage exactly similar the masculine is used." Whatever may be thought of the requirement of the context (and there can be little difference upon that point), certainly the Dean's reference to Rom. xi. 32, as "exhibiting St. Paul's *usus loquendi in a passage exactly similar*," is not very conclusive; for there the Apostle had no alternative but to express himself as he has done, in the masculine gender, the neuter being absolutely inapplicable; for, however 'sin' or 'imperfection' may be said to cleave to things inanimate, it cannot be contended that they are open to the imputation of 'unbelief,' or that they are fit subjects for the display of 'the mercy of God.'

That Calvin's interpretation—"Τὰ πάντα, all things," is not "required by the context," may be freely conceded; for though every consideration of right reason demands that τὰ πάντα should be commensurate in its application with τοῖς πιστεύουσιν, yet no *contextual* reason can be assigned why it should extend beyond it. At the same time, nothing can be more usual than to express a proposition universally when a particular affirmation would suffice. Τὰ πάντα I take (with Alford) to represent 'man and his system—all that by the disobedience of Adam has fallen under the dominion of sin.' Possibly a narrower statement might be deemed to favour the belief that the curse of sin was not universal.

* ἵνα, 'in order that,' denoting the intent or purpose of the σύγκλεισις, "in order that the promise which is through (or out of) the faith of Jesus Christ might be given to them that believe." But the question may occur—"In what way did the shutting up of all, declaratorily, under sin, facilitate the reception of the promise?" The Scripture, concluding all under sin, cut off at one stroke every hope of self-justification—the door of works was for ever closed, and no way of escape remains, save through the outlet of divine grace. Consequently, seeing the impracticability of salvation by works, they would be the more disposed to accept of it when offered to them freely and unconditionally through faith in Jesus Christ. The first work of the Spirit is to "convince the world of sin." No man ever yet truly and earnestly sought to Jesus Christ for salvation, who was not at the same time persuaded in his heart that there was help in none other quarter—"no other name under heaven given amongst men whereby we can be saved."

† Ἡ ἐπαγγελία 'the promise'—a common figure of speech, whereby the thing containing is put for the thing contained—"the cup" for its contents—"the promise" for that which is the subject of promise. In this place 'the promise' denotes 'justification, or the gift of the Holy Ghost, through, or out of, faith' (as explained in verse 8)—the subject of the promise to Abraham—"the Scripture, foreseeing that God would *justify* the nations through faith, announced the glad tidings to Abraham, saying, "In thee shall all nations be *blessed*"—a promise which, as we have so frequently observed, was subsequently explained to mean 'shall receive the Holy Spirit through faith.' In all God's dealings with mankind He had respect to the establishment of His promise.

^s Ἐκ πίστεως, 'out of faith,' ἐκ denoting the immediate source—in point of fact, the channel through and out of which the promised blessing flows.

^h Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, 'of Jesus Christ'—here, as elsewhere, in the Epistle (see ch. ii. 16, ^d), gen. subjecti. Ellicott has no objection to concede the construction here, though rejecting it in other places. "The genitive Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ is, *perhaps*, here to be taken in its most comprehensive sense, not only 'faith in Christ' (gen. objecti), but 'faith as given by him' (gen. subjecti):" but it is difficult to conceive a reason for its admission here which does not apply with equal force elsewhere. It has been before remarked that 'faith *of* Christ' (gen. subjecti) does by no means exclude the idea of 'faith *in* Christ' (gen. objecti); Christ is the alone object of the Christian's faith. It is only so far as faith is exercised upon Christ crucified and risen again, that it is, in the New Testament sense of the word, 'justifying faith.' See Rom. iv. 24, 25. Why, then, it may be asked, do we insist so strenuously upon the subjective, in preference to the objective construction of the genitive? The reason has been assigned elsewhere (chap. ii. 16, ^d). Had it been the intention of the Apostle to present Christ only as the *object* of faith, he had ample means at his disposal to carry it into effect without difficulty and without ambiguity. Having therefore declined to resort to those means, he has practically intimated his intention that the genitive should be taken in its primary and ordinary, that is, in its *subjective* signification.

Nor are we without an inkling of the principle by which he was guided in his choice. Throughout the entire Epistle justification is represented as *the blessing promised to Abraham*, which blessing, we are plainly informed, was to come upon the nations "in Jesus Christ" (see ver. 14, ^d), being, as the lawyers say, 'in nubibus,' until He, by his death upon *the accursed tree*, redeemed the favoured people from *the curse of the law*, and thereby laid open the way for their reception, in common with the rest of mankind, of the promised blessing "*in Christ.*" But antecedently to the advent of *Christ* ("the seed to whom the promise was made"), it is not to be supposed that the Jewish church was altogether devoid of faith in Christ *objectively*. There were doubtless amongst them many who were no strangers to Holy Writ; and "to Him (saith St. Peter) gave all the prophets witness, that through His name all that believe in him should receive remission of sins," Acts, x. 43. And consequently there were some who believed in a promised Messiah, and expected justification at his hands, being prophetically styled "the Lord our Righteousness," and by the Jews themselves commonly designated 'Messiah our justification.'

But, notwithstanding this faith in Christ *objectively*, they never did, nor ever could they, attain to the privilege of *the promised blessing*, which, as we have already seen, was *subsequently to redemption* to come upon the nations *in Christ*. Faith in Christ, then, *objectively*, did not necessarily communicate the promised blessing; but that faith on Christ which is *the gift of Christ*, and exercised in union with him, and

which is consequently '*the faith of Christ*' (gen. subjecti), this is justifying faith according to the intent of the promise. The promise not having received its accomplishment until the coming of Christ, it follows that the Jews who lived anteriorly to the Saviour's advent were not justified in the high and gospel sense (ver. 8) of the term; they did not receive the blessing of the Holy Spirit (John, vii. 39), by which alone they are engrafted into Christ; they were not, consequently, purified in their own consciences (Heb. x. 23); they did not attain to that "peace of God which passeth all understanding," nor did they "rejoice in the hope of the glory of God" (read Rom. v. 1, 2, in connexion with the concluding verses of the previous chapter); but, on the contrary, "through fear of death were all their lifetime subject to bondage," though stainless all the while in the sight of Him who seeth the end from the beginning, by virtue of the atoning blood of Christ, "the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world."*

There is no truth more clearly deducible from Scripture, when fairly and impartially examined, than this, that the privilege of conscious remission of sin, one of the most precious characteristics of the new-covenant state, was communicated to the church with the gift of the Holy Ghost after the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, antecedently to which period, since ever the law was given from Mount Sinai ("which covenant gendered *unto bondage*"), the condition of the Jew was that of a *servant*, not of a *son*, and so did it continue to be until "the spirit of bondage" was exchanged for "the spirit of adoption"—a consummation which did not take place until "God sent forth his Son, made of a woman, made under the law, that he might redeem them that were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons."

Against such distinct testimony of the written word, no argument, founded upon the supposed experience of David, or the Old Testament prophets, can be allowed any weight. Theirs might have been, and doubtless it was, an exceptional case. While the Spirit of the Lord was upon them, which was comparatively, I believe, but seldom in their lives, they were rapt in vision into future times, and, moved by the Holy Ghost, gave utterance (sometimes themselves unconscious of the precious truths they were revealing) to those privileges and experiences which constitute the birthright and the rejoicing of the adopted family in Christ. Nor need it be denied that, under the gracious influences of the Spirit, they enjoyed themselves, betimes, a foretaste of the spirit of adoption, and in the glowing language of the Psalms gave faithful expres-

* Indeed, the phraseology of verse 8 of this chapter seems decisive upon this point. 'The Scripture, *foreseeing* that God *justifies* the nations through faith, proclaimed *beforehand* the glad tidings unto Abraham, in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed,' intimating distinctly that the justification announced to Abraham was a blessing, in the fullest acceptation of the term not previously enjoyed, but reserved for future and more privileged times, when the seed should have come to whom the promise was made; though in the sight of God (and possibly with some indistinct apprehension of it themselves), holy men from the beginning of the world were "heirs of the righteousness which is by faith," Heb. xi. 7.

sion to the feelings and experiences of their own breasts; but their's was, as we said before, an exceptional case—as to the great body of the nation, they were blindfolded by their law; “their table was made a snare, and a trap, and stumbling block, and a recompense unto them.” Their sins, indeed, were acknowledged, and a remedy shadowed forth, by those gifts and sacrifices which day by day were offered up; but “*the comers thereto were not made perfect*,” nor were they enabled with steadfast gaze and unwavering grasp to lay hold on Christ, “who was the end of the law for righteousness.” “They could not look *to the end of that which was abolished* (the ceremonial law), but their minds were blinded: for until this day (says St. Paul, writing to the Corinthian church) remaineth the same veil untaken away, in the reading of the Old Testament, *which veil is done away in Christ*. But even unto this day, when Moses is read, the veil is upon their heart; nevertheless, when it shall turn unto the Lord, the veil shall be taken away: now the Lord is that Spirit,” 2 Cor. iii. 10, *et seq.* What can be more explicit than this statement, that even to the time when the Apostle wrote, a veil, a dense cloud of unbelief, obscuring the righteousness of Christ, brooded upon the Jewish mind, and shall continue so to do, until they turn unto the Lord through the impartation of the Holy Spirit? But to those “who fear his name shall the Sun of Righteousness arise *with healing* on his wings;” the mists of unbelief shall be scattered, and the blessed truth of their acceptance with God shall burst upon their benighted souls with more than noonday splendour, in the light of “the Holy Spirit of promise.”

Admitting, then, the above distinction to be a sound one, and I do not see how it can possibly be controverted, there will be no difficulty in apprehending why, in speaking of the faith of Christ in connexion with the subject of justification, the Apostle should have selected the *subjective* in preference to the *objective* form of construction. Because, in truth, the justification *which is the subject of promise*, whereby we have a present sense of pardon, through the blood of a crucified and now risen Saviour, and consequently peace with God through Him, does not necessarily accompany faith *in* Christ (objectively), which the case of the Jew distinctly proves, but the faith *of* Christ (subjectively) it does. Unless, then, the Apostle were content to express himself loosely and incorrectly upon this momentous and most interesting subject, and in terms most fitted to mislead his unbelieving countrymen, he could not have expressed himself otherwise than he has done in *the subjective form*.

‘Δοθῆναι, ‘might be given,’ that is, ‘conferred.’ Alford understands the word emphatically—“a *free* gift,” without any sufficient authority for so doing; St. Paul’s verb of ‘giving freely,’ being invariably χαρίζομαι. Nor indeed is the emphasis wanted in the present instance, the freeness of the ἐπαγγελία being sufficiently attested in the words annexed—πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. In this verse the Apostle’s object is simply to inform us that all were shut up declaratorily under sin; that hope from every other quarter being excluded, they to whom the offer was made might be the more willing to embrace a free justification through

faith, and consequently, being in an attitude to receive, the *res promissa* might be conferred.

¹ Τοῖς πιστεύουσιν, 'to them that believe'—slightly antithetical to 'them that work;' no more so, however, than is necessarily involved in ἐπαγγελία ἐκ πίστεως, of which it is the counterpart,—the way ἐκ πίστεως involuntarily contrasting with the way ἐξ ἔργων νόμου. Calvin's improvement of this passage is worthy to be laid to heart:—"This sentence is full of the highest consolation; it tells us, that whenever we hear ourselves condemned in Scripture, there is help provided for us in Christ, if we betake ourselves unto Him. We are lost though God were silent; why, then, does He so often pronounce that we are lost? It is that we may not perish by everlasting destruction, but, struck and confounded by such a dreadful sentence, may by faith seek Christ, through whom we pass from death to life."—CALVIN, *in loco*.

VERSE 23.—^a Δὲ, 'but;' δὲ in its ordinary adversative signification introducing an antithesis, the previous state of condemnation under law contrasted with the subsequent justification through the promise. In this place the peculiar province of *the law* is for the first time introduced. In the preceding verse, the whole world, Jew and Gentile alike, *independently of the operation of the law*, are represented as guilty before God, *through the testimony of Holy Scripture*, with a view to a more ready acquiescence in justification through faith, when presented in Jesus Christ. But antecedently to the coming of justifying faith, *the law guarded* the Jews (the peculiar objects of its care) from any possibility of escape from the condemnation previously incurred, until the door of hope was opened to them through the sacrifice of the death of Christ, and faith in His blood. Such was the peculiar and *subsidiary office of the law*, in answer to the inquiry started at ver. 21, "was the law then *against* the promises of God?"

^b Τὴν πίστιν, 'the faith.' Many are the explanations which have been offered of the meaning of πίστιν in this place. Bloomfield understands by it "*the dispensation* which required faith in Christ as indispensable, meaning the gospel covenant," or "*the dispensation* whereby we walk by faith, as distinguished from that of works—the law;" Locke, "*the doctrine* of justification by faith in Christ;" and Calvin, slightly varying, "*the full revelation* of those things which, during the darkness of the shadows of the law, were dimly seen; for he does not intend to say that the fathers who lived under the law did not possess faith." But a common objection lies to each of these explanations, namely, that they assign a purely objective meaning to πίστιν, which the context neither requires nor sustains. The article (τὴν) is plainly emphatic, and refers back to *the faith* which had been immediately before the subject of notice, as Ellicott well paraphrases it, "before faith (above mentioned) came." Now, it is manifest that none of these interpretations accord with "the faith above-mentioned," and consequently they are upon that ground open to objection.

Πίστις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (the above-mentioned faith) has been already expounded to mean, 'that faith on Christ (see ver. 22, ^b) which is the

gift of Christ, and not His *gift* only, but exercised in union with Him, by those who are partakers of the Spirit of Christ,' which alone is justifying faith according to the full intent of the promise. That faith was a stranger to this nether world until the coming of the promised seed; antecedently to that era, or viewing it, as the Apostle here does, from a stand-point of antecedent time, it was to be viewed and designated as 'the faith to come,' or 'the about-to-be revealed faith.' The language of the Apostle in this verse is strongly confirmatory of the view so earnestly advocated in these pages, namely, the non-justification (in the New Testament signification of the term) of the Jew antecedently to the coming of Christ, and the pouring forth on the day of pentecost of the Holy Spirit, when, in common with the rest of mankind (the brief priority of time accorded to him being left out of account), he was put into possession of 'the promised blessing—in Christ.'

^c 'Υπὸ νόμον, 'under law.' Νόμος without the article (as before explained, ch. ii. 16 ^a) fixes attention on *the obligation arising out of a law*, rather than on *the provisions* of which it consists. 'Υπὸ νόμον is a general expression, significant of the state of subjection in which the Jews were held antecedently to the coming of 'the about-to-be revealed faith,' no intimation being given of the nature of 'the law' under which they were subjected, information upon that head being to be derived from external sources. A careful examination, however, of the context will satisfy the reader that 'the law' prominently, though not perhaps exclusively, before the Apostle's mind at the time was 'the Jewish ceremonial law' (see verse 24 ^b). From the choice of the abstract form of expression, we are left, perhaps, to infer that the subservience of 'the law' to 'the promise' is to be sought rather in '*the bondage*' which it perpetuated (see ch. iv. 3, *et seq.*) than in the statutes and ordinances which it prescribed.

^d Ἐφρουρούμεθα, 'we were guarded.' In the preceding verse, while describing mankind generally as concluded by the testimony of Scripture under sin, the Apostle speaks in the third person—here, however, the Jews, the subjects of the law, being alone under contemplation, he varies his style, and writes with self-association in the first person Ἐφρουρούμεθα, "we were guarded," where the system under which they were placed is represented as 'a guard,' to whose custody they were committed for a specified object, and for a determinate period. I must emphatically protest against the prevailing opinion, as it is fairly enunciated by Bloomfield, that "two similitudes are here made use of—one to a *prison*, the other to a *pædagogus*." Such a notion is clearly unwarranted. The noun φρουρὸς, from which the verb is derived, though usually applied to a military guard, in its primary signification means no more than a person placed in charge, whose duty it is to keep a watchful eye upon (the etymology of the Greek word) some party or property committed to his care—a word not very dissimilar in import from ἐπιτρόπος, the term used in a corresponding passage (ch. iv. 2) to designate the same office.

In the present instance, the nature of the guardship is determined

by the words which follow:—"So that the law was our *pædagogus* unto Christ." Ἐφρουρούμεθα, therefore, it is submitted, is not to be understood in any sense incompatible with the idea of a *pædagogus*, which 'prison' or 'gaoler' assuredly is. The general expression, 'we were guarded,' being strictly literal, and in keeping with the context, is clearly to be preferred. The same idea meets us again in the following chapter, where it is treated more elaborately and in detail. It is to be noted that 'the law' in this context is represented, not as *the judge* who condemns, but only as *the guard* to whose keeping the Jews were committed for safety, their condemnation having been effected in common with the rest of the world (τὰ πάντα) by the testimony of Holy Scripture.

• Συγκεκλεισμένοι, 'having been shut up,' *scil.*, under sin, a recital of συνέκλεισεν ὑπὸ ἁμαρτίαν of the preceding verse. Ellicott (and with him Alford) is of opinion that συγκεκλεισμένοι "is to be joined, not with εἰς πίστιν, but in a construction similar to that of the preceding verse, with ὑπὸ νόμον, the law, in fact, being here (as ἁμαρτία in verse 22) represented as a kind of gaoler into whose custody we were delivered." But not to insist upon the confusion which it begets, the ascribing the gaolership at the one time to sin, at the other time to the law, from the position which the words occupy in the sentence (not ὑπὸ νόμον συγκεκλεισμένοι, ἐφρουρούμεθα εἰς τὴν, but ὑπὸ νόμον ἐφρουρούμεθα, συγκεκλεισμένοι εἰς τὴν), it would seem that it was studiously disconnected with ὑπὸ νόμον by the intervention of ἐφρουρούμεθα, and shut up with the concluding portion of the sentence. Besides, Ellicott's view is founded upon the assumption that the law is represented as 'a gaoler,' or more accurately indeed as 'a prison' in which the Jews were confined—an assumption which appears to be wholly unsupported by the context. A much more natural construction it is to connect συγκεκλεισμένοι with the words which follow, making the sentence to run thus: 'We were guarded under law, having been shut up (as aforesaid, verse 22), in common with the rest of mankind, under sin, in order to the about-to-be revealed faith.'

Ἐἰς τὴν, κ. τ. λ., 'unto the,' or 'in order to the,' &c. The force of the preposition εἰς in this place offers a fair field for discussion. It may be understood *temporally*, as defining the *terminus ad quem* the σύγκλεισις should continue—an exposition which comports well with theological truth, there being no conscious remission of sin for the Jewish church, or for an individual sinner of any denomination, *until* the development of the faith of Christ—is an unquestionable grammatical construction, and by no means incongruous with the general scope of the Apostle's argument. Nor indeed is it open to the objection raised by Ellicott, namely, "that it is certainly superfluous, after the predication of time in πρὸ τοῦ ἐλθεῖν;" for, though it is undeniably predicated in that note of time that the Jews were in custody of the law *antecedently* to the coming faith, it is by no means stated therein, nor is it necessarily inferrible therefrom, that the custody should continue until, and terminate with (the substance, in that view of it, of the present clause), the arrival of that faith.

But it must be admitted that, though not unprecedented (see John, xiii. 1; Eph. i. 14), it is a use of εἰς comparatively rare in the New Testament, and that its ethical meaning of 'destination for,' adopted by modern commentators, is much to be preferred. Συγκλεισμένοι, as we before observed, is the recital of the same verb as it occurs in the previous sentence; and there the object of the σύγκλεισις is distinctly stated to be, 'that the promise which is through the faith of Christ should take effect'—in other words, 'that they should be justified *through faith*.' Consistently with that purpose, we are now informed that 'the Jews were preserved in safe keeping under law, being shut up (under sin as aforesaid) *in order to the faith* which was about to be revealed'—that is, 'to prepare the way for their justification through faith,' the concluding of all under sin being unquestionably designed and eminently calculated to effect that end, leaving no loophole of escape save only by the grace of God. The accordance of the object of the σύγκλεισις as thus set forth, with that which had been previously assigned to it in verse 22, is no small inducement to the reception of εἰς in the sense proposed. The new matter introduced in this sentence is the retention of the Jews in a state of condemnation, through the agency of the law—a circumstance which was not brought under contemplation in the preceding verse.

ἡ τὴν μέλλουσαν πίστιν ἀποκαλυφθῆναι, 'the about-to-be revealed faith.' The inverted order of these words cannot fail to attract the notice of the attentive reader, and demand explanation. One thing would be generally conceded, that the inversion has been designed to give prominence to μέλλουσαν; but upon what principle, or with what intent, would still remain to be ascertained. Ellicott suggests that it is "to present more forcibly the contrast between former captivity and subsequent freedom." But in what way it conduces to that end I acknowledge myself at a loss to discover. The Dean refers to Rom. viii. 18, as a case in point—"Πρὸς τὴν μέλλουσαν δόξαν ἀποκαλυφθῆναι, where the future glories are set in strong contrast to present calamities." That they are so is undeniable; but how far their position in the sentence has contributed to that end remains to be shown. For my part, I am satisfied that the same object prevails, as might reasonably be expected, in both instances; but, if I am not mistaken, an object of a very different character from that suggested by the learned critic.

Had the Apostle written the words in the usual order, it would have left it problematical whether faith was recognised by him as at all existing antecedently to that which is designated as 'the faith to be revealed'—a question which was far from being the Apostle's intention to raise; for assuredly faith, little or much, did prevail at all periods throughout the Jewish dispensation, and did not await the fulfilment of the promise to give it birth. But though faith at all times prevailed, yet the faith contemplated by the Apostle—"the faith of Jesus Christ"—was essentially connected with the promise, and is consequently introduced here as "the about-to-be revealed faith"—faith of a different stamp from any that had previously existed, without at the same time im-

pugning or casting a shadow of doubt upon the existence of ordinary Jewish faith.

And precisely so it is with respect to the passage cited from the Romans (and a more apposite illustration of my theory of construction could not be adduced). Had the Apostle written, as our translators indeed have rendered it, "the sufferings of the present time are not worthy to be compared with *the glory which shall be revealed in us*," though a blessed and most comfortable truth in itself, yet would it seem to ignore (and in point of fact it has cast into the shade, for who ever thinks, on the reading of our version, of anything but *future glory*?)—it might seem, I say, to ignore the existence of *present glory*; whereas it is an undeniable fact, and an acknowledged scriptural verity, that the church has attained to, even in its present state, an amount of glory neither small nor inconsiderable, though incomparably inferior to that which is hereafter to be revealed. To avoid such a consequence, the Apostle has had recourse to the same expedient of inverting the order of the words (*πρὸς τὴν μελλουσαν δόξαν ἀποκαλυφθῆναι*), whereby the *future glory* is placed distinctly in the foreground as the subject of comparison, without questioning in the smallest degree, but rather with the effect of establishing by contrast, the existence of that which is *present*.

And the rationale of the inversion appears to be this:—The intervention of *τὴν μελλουσαν* (and by consequence of *ἀποκαλυφθῆναι* attracted by it) between *εἰς* and *πίστιν* invests the words with somewhat of a qualifying power, intimating that the idea presented in them coalesces with, and forms a constituent part of, the object of *εἰς*, that is, that *εἰς* points, not to faith generally, but to that peculiar phase of faith which is described as "yet to be revealed;" whereas, had they followed *πίστιν* in the order of arrangement, after the force of *εἰς* had been expended, they would have amounted to nothing more than ordinary designation.

^h *Ἀποκαλυφθῆναι*, 'to be revealed.' The faith, the subject of this passage, was in antecedent times "a faith about-to-be revealed." Hence we infer that "the faith of Christ," which is represented in Scripture as subjectively justifying faith (Rom. v. 1), is not only faith the gift of Christ, and faith exercised in union with Christ, by the aid of the Spirit of Christ, but faith of which Christ himself in some peculiar aspect is the object, which aspect, prior to His advent, was yet "about-to-be revealed." What that new relation or aspect is we are distinctly informed by the Apostle Paul in his Epistle to the Romans (ch. iv. 24, 25)—'a Saviour delivered on account of our sins, and *raised again on account of our justification*.' The atonement of Christ, though foretold in prophecy and foreshadowed in type, was nevertheless so dimly seen, and so imperfectly apprehended in the Jewish church, that though it was to them an object of faith, and faith the same in kind (though by no means the same in degree) as that now exercised upon an historic truth, through the inworking of the Holy Ghost, yet did it not justify them in their consciences, nor produce in them that sense of present pardon whereby they would attain peace with God, and "joy unspeakable and full of

glory." That privilege awaited the more distinct apprehension of the same truth, through the operation of the Holy Ghost sent down from heaven, when it was no longer a vision of prophecy, but a record of history. By 'the faith,' then, which is here described as "about-to-be-revealed," we are to understand not only that 'act of the mind' which is ordinarily denominated 'faith,' and which may be exercised upon all or any revealed truth indiscriminately, but also, in conjunction with it, that '*special revelation of God*' concerning his Son Jesus Christ, upon which the faith of the Christian lays hold and fastens, and from which, under divine grace, its soul-reviving influence is derived.

In this respect it is that Calvin's definition of 'the faith of Jesus Christ,' before cited (ver. 23^b), falls short. He defines it to be "the full *revelation* of those things which during the darkness of the shadows of the law were dimly seen;" whereas in truth it represents a complex notion—not only *the revelation* of those things, but likewise *the faith exercised upon that revelation*, which alone constitutes subjectively justifying faith.

VERSE 24.—^a ὥστε, 'so that,' indicative of *result*—ὥστε a consecutive particle, used indifferently with a finite and an infinitive verb. Between ὥστε with the indicative, and ὥστε with the infinitive, "the distinction observed by the more classical writers may on the whole be stated to be, that ὥστε with the Ind. exhibits the matter of fact as objectively and effectively *precedens* and *consequens* to each other; while with the Inf. it brings them into closer connexion as arising from each other."—WINER, Gr. § xli. 5, note 1. Consistently with this definition, we infer that the relation which the law maintained towards the believing Jew, though it did not constitute it, necessarily, 'a pædagogues unto Christ,' yet that, in point of fact, looking to the result, such was the office which it sustained towards him. In other words, that the pædagogic character of the law, though not *a necessary or logical result of*, was, nevertheless, to those who benefited by it, *a consequens of*, the guardianship or supervision which it exercised over them.

^b Ὁ νόμος, 'the law.' But the question again arises—'Of what law does the Apostle speak?' And again we answer—'the Jewish ceremonial law.' From the nature of the Galatian error, and other circumstances combined, we saw reason to conclude that the law, whose office in contravention to that error the Apostle undertakes in verse 19 to expound, was the Jewish ceremonial law, and we have had no reason to alter our opinion since. Whatever 'the law' means in verse 19, the same of necessity must it signify here, for the subjects of the two verses are inseparably linked together. '*The law*' was to continue until the seed should come to whom the promise was made, and then to cease, in order to make way for the promise (verses 19, 20). Was '*the law*' then against the promises of God, that it should be so unceremoniously laid aside? God forbid: on the contrary, '*the law*' was in favour of the promise; for if a law had been given other than what it was (that is, one capable to confer life), then *indeed* it would be against the promises of God (verse 21). But as it is, '*the law*' was our guardian,

preserving us in unevadable conviction of sin until justifying faith should be revealed (verses 22, 23). So that, in point of fact, so far from being against the promises of God, '*the law*' acted as our pædagogues into Christ, '*that the promise should take effect by our justification through faith—in Him.*' Such is the line of argument here pursued; and being so, '*the law*' which is the subject of inquiry, being identified with '*the law*' in verse 19, can be no other (if our observations upon that verse be correct) than the Jewish ceremonial law. The same conclusion will also be arrived at from the consideration of the context which follows—see verse 25^b.

^a Παιδαγωγός, 'a pædagogues.' The matter introduced in this clause being consequential upon (as appears from its introduction by ὥστε) the preceding statement, we are not at liberty to construe παιδαγωγός in any sense incompatible with ἐφρουρούμεθα, to which it is to be referred; but rather is it to be regarded as descriptive of the peculiar form of guardianship contemplated therein. Παιδαγωγός, therefore, does not represent in this place 'a preceptor' or 'instructor of youth' in the ordinary acceptation of the term, but rather, in accordance with its primitive meaning, 'one who takes a boy by the hand to conduct him to his master' (Schoeltz.). "The word, however, was adopted by Rabbinical writers, but with some additional notions of care and *guardianship*. Even among the Greek and Latin writers the idea of *guardianship*, and also of *strictness and severity*, are distinctly prominent."—ELLICOTT. In this extended sense παιδαγωγός accords well with ἐπιτρόπος and οἰκονόμος the corresponding words in the following chapter (verse 2), and is strictly consistent with the idea more generally expressed in ἐφρουρούμεθα.

Though, as we have just observed, the idea of *instruction* does not enter into the conception of παιδαγωγός in the sense in which it is here employed, but rather that of *guardianship* and *restraint*; yet, inasmuch as it is applied metaphorically to '*the law*,' it must be taken to include that process of mental discipline whereby those placed under the tutelage of the law were conducted to the desired goal—'incorporation into the body of Christ,' in order to justification through faith—in Him. Though the subserviency of the law to the promise consisted mainly, as we have reason to believe (see verse 23^c), in 'the bondage' and consequent restraint upon self-justification which it imposed, yet it cannot be denied that the character of the institutions themselves was also instrumental in producing that result, a species of instrumentality which has been well described by Calvin:—"What end (he asks) did sacrifices and washings serve, but to keep the mind continually fixed on pollution and condemnation? When a man's uncleanness is placed before his eyes—when the unoffending animal is held forth as the image of his own death—how can he indulge in sleep?—how can he but be roused to the earnest cry for deliverance? Beyond all doubt ceremonies accomplished their object, not merely by *alarming and humbling the conscience*, but by *exciting them to the faith of the coming Redeemer.*"—CALVIN, *in loco*.

Such is the nature of the guardianship ascribed to the law—very

different, it must be admitted, from that of a gaoler or a prison, and yet that it is no "new similitude" is sufficiently attested by its introduction with the consecutive particle ὥστε.

^d Εἰς Χριστὸν, 'into Christ.' The same question arises here as in verse 23, with respect to the force of the preposition εἰς. If εἰς τὴν μέλλουσαν πίστιν be understood *temporally*, εἰς Χριστὸν would not improbably denote the *terminus ad quem* of the pædagogic function—a sense by no means incompatible with a possible scope of the Apostle's argument. The clause before us, being introduced by the consecutive ὥστε, may be regarded as explanatory of the statement in the preceding verse; and *the nature* of the guardianship (ἐφρουρούμεθα) being characterized by παιδαγωγός, *the period of its continuance* (εἰς τὴν μέλλουσαν πίστιν) might be well defined by εἰς Χριστὸν, the state or condition in which alone "the faith of Jesus Christ" (ἡ μέλλουσα πίστις) is realized, the law relaxing not its hold until the subject of it is introduced into the mystical body of Christ.

But since, for reasons already assigned, it has been deemed advisable to give a different interpretation to εἰς in the foregoing clause, that inducement for taking it in its *temporal* signification here is removed. Some commentators have, not unnaturally, regarded εἰς Χριστὸν as the following up of the metaphor—'a pædagogus to conduct us to Christ,' in which sense εἰς would occur *locally*. But it has been well objected by Ellicott—"Εἰς with persons is not simply equivalent to πρὸς, but involves the idea of mingling with and association"—a meaning which, however accordant with *Christ mystical*, would be utterly repugnant to the figure in which it is supposed to originate, viz., a conducting to *Christ personal*. For my part, I understand εἰς Χριστὸν in its proper and primary signification—'into Christ,' meaning thereby, according to acknowledged usage in such cases, 'intermingling with,' or 'incorporation with' Christ, and the purport of the passage to be, 'that the law was our pædagogus or conductor into union with Christ,' 'Christ' to be understood mystically, the sense which has uniformly prevailed throughout this context—see verses 26, 27, 28, 29. I observe that, while combating the notion that 'the law as a pædagogus conducted to Christ as a schoolmaster,' Alford appears to favour the interpretation thus offered of Χριστός: "the whole schoolmaster's work (he tells us) is included in the παιδαγωγός, and Χριστός represents the ἐλευθερία of the full-grown son," where unquestionably "the ἐλευθερία of the full-grown son" can mean nothing else, strictly speaking, than 'the state or condition of the believer in Christ'—the result of incorporation into His mystical body through faith, or, as it is subsequently expressed (verse 27), of 'baptism into Christ.'

^e ἵνα ἐκ πίστεως δικαιωθῶμεν, 'in order that we might be justified through, or out of, **faith**.' Ultimate object of the law (the immediate object being, as we have before seen, 'incorporation into Christ'), namely, that we (Jews), according to the terms of the promise, might be justified freely, *through faith*—a privilege only to be realized *in Christ*. And thus the question proposed at verse 21—"Is the law

against the promises of God?" has at length received a full and decisive reply—"By no means: so far from being against, the law is in favour of, the promise." In the concluding verses of this chapter, the Apostle proceeds to show that the law having discharged its office by leading us into incorporation with Christ, in order to justification in Him according to the promise, *through faith*, its obligation *de facto* ceased, and Jew and Gentile henceforth stand upon the same platform of immunity from legal observances—in Christ.

VERSE 25.—^a Ἐλθούσης δὲ τῆς πίστεως, 'But the faith having come'—δὲ antithetical, contrasting the liberty of the emancipated heir with his former pupillary condition under the law. The article (τῆς), clearly emphatic, referring the reader to "the faith of Jesus Christ" introduced at verse 22, and never lost sight of since. 'Antecedently to the coming of that faith, we Jews were placed under the tutelage of the law, in order to its reception when come; but that faith having come, we are no longer under tutelage, but delivered from the restraint of the law.'

Though that which is *the object* of justifying faith was manifested upon the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, yet '*the faith*' itself could not be strictly said to have 'come,' or to be present in the world, until the descent of the Holy Ghost, under whose gracious influence it is exercised. And to each individual sinner it comes upon his incorporation into Christ, in whom alone the Spirit, according to promise, is conferred—a statement of fact which accords well with St. Paul's argument to Peter:—"Even we have believed *into Christ Jesus*, in order that we might be justified through (or out of) *the faith of Christ*" (ch. ii. 16)—the faith exercised in him (*locally*).

It is strange that commentators, while advancing so many far-fetched explanations of ἡ πίστις, in verse 23, did not perceive that whatever meaning they ascribed to it there must necessarily attach to it here, and that here nothing will suit the context but the ordinary signification, 'gospel faith.' '*Before that faith came* (verse 23), we (Jews) were consigned to the custody of a stern and rigid pædagogus, who repressed every attempt at self-emancipation, and held up the corrective rod perpetually before our eyes; but *after that faith came* the pædagogus was removed, and we were admitted to all the privileges of the enfranchised heir.' If we had nothing else to guide us (though the chain of reasoning is unbroken throughout), one might suppose that the marked transition of time from *the then future* to *the now past* should have sufficed to show that one subject occupied the Apostle's mind from first to last—the subject of 'justifying faith.' But the neglect of that index is the result of that minute system of investigation which wastes its energies in extracting fresh arguments from every verse, while the general scope of the Apostle's reasoning is for the most part misinterpreted or overlooked.

^b Ὑπὸ παιδαγωγόν, 'under pædagogus.' "The article is not here latent, after the preposition, but appears studiously omitted, the words being in fact equivalent to 'under tutelage.'"—ELLICOTT. The chief

design of the Epistle is to show that 'the ceremonial law' has no claim whatsoever upon the observance of Christians. In the prosecution of this design, the Apostle establishes *seriatim* the following points:—That the promise was originally of a free justification, through faith; that the law did not invalidate the promise; that it was instituted in aid of the promise; that it continued to act until the fulfilment of the promise, in Christ; that that end being accomplished, its obligation *de facto* ceased, and believers were released from its burden, in Christ. Such is an epitome of the Apostle's argument in this chapter.

Nothing can show more conclusively that 'the law' which is the subject of discussion throughout is 'the Jewish ceremonial law,' than the studied effort which St. Paul makes to establish the fact of its discontinuance in Christ—that its office terminates, and its ordinances are no longer obligatory—nay, rather, are positively proscribed, upon the attainment of the Christian state. For 'the moral law' is of perpetual obligation; its precepts as binding upon the conscience of every regenerate child of God to-day as they were four thousand years ago, when they were first proclaimed with a mighty voice from Sinai, or, graven upon two tables of stone, were committed to the hands of Moses for publication.

VERSE 26.—^a Πάντες γὰρ, κ. τ. λ., 'for ye are all,' &c. Reason assigned for the negation in the preceding clause—'no longer under tutelage, for ye are all sons of God' (not παῖδες, but υἱοὶ, *filij adulti*, 'full-grown sons'). The force of this declaration is not immediately perceptible. We might, indeed, have some indistinct idea of an accession of light and knowledge upon our admission into the adopted family of God, in Christ; but the ground of the prescribed relinquishment of the former system could be only imperfectly understood, without fuller information than could be supplied here, without detriment to the unity of the subject, and consequently to the perspicuity of the reasoning. This link of the chain, therefore, is reserved for future consideration, and made the subject of distinct and elaborate discussion, in the opening verses of the ensuing chapter.

^b Υἱοὶ Θεοῦ, 'sons of God.' We have here another result of faith—"Ye are all *sons of God*, through faith." We have already seen that 'justification' has been attributed to faith; 'the reception of the Holy Spirit,' to faith; the 'inheritance,' to faith; 'life,' to faith; and here, 'regeneration,' to faith. Truly, 'faith' is an inestimable virtue, which is the appointed channel of so many and so great blessings. No prayer should be more frequently or more fervently upon our lips than the prayer of the apostles—"Lord, increase our faith." That 'regeneration' should be ascribed to faith is no more than might have been anticipated, when we bear in mind that faith is not only 'the gift,' of the Spirit, but likewise 'the vehicle' whereby He is conveyed into the soul. Whatever communicates the abiding Spirit of God must necessarily be the instrument of the new birth; for what is the new birth but the acquisition of a new and heavenly nature, according to the purport of our Lord's words—"That which is born of the Spirit is *spirit*"?

‘Εστε, ‘ye are.’ The transition from the first to the second person in this place arrests attention, and demands explanation. In describing the office and operation of the law, the Apostle had been led into a brief statement, that by the testimony of Scripture (known only to them to whom were committed the oracles of God) all the families of the earth were declared subject to condemnation for sin, in order to prepare the way for a justification, in accordance with the terms of the promise, to be bestowed upon them that believe,—that the Jews, the peculiar people of God, were placed under the tutelage of the law, not to confer upon them any precedency in respect to the promise, or that they should attain to it in a way different from the rest of mankind, but for purely disciplinary purposes, that their lost and helpless state by nature being continually exhibited before their eyes in the ordinances of the law, accompanied at the same time with a foreshadowing of the way of deliverance through grace, they might be the more disposed to accept of salvation freely, when tendered to them through the faith of Christ. In submitting this brief sketch of the nature and office of the law, and the advantage derivable to the Jew therefrom, the Apostle, associating himself with his fellow-countrymen upon that branch of the subject, expresses himself in the *first* person; but now, the restraint of the law being done away, and the partition wall between Jew and Gentile being broken down, he addresses himself to mankind generally, and to every individual believer amongst them, in the *second* person—“Ye are all sons of God through the faith which is in Christ Jesus.”

^d Διὰ τῆς πίστεως ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, ‘through the faith (which is) in Christ Jesus.’ Much diversity of opinion exists as to the precise meaning to be attributed to these words—first, as to the structure of the sentence, whether we are to read ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ in connexion with υἱοὶ Θεοῦ or with πίστεως, that is, whether the Apostle’s declaration is to the effect, ‘ye are all sons of God in Christ Jesus, through faith,’ or that ‘ye are all sons of God, through faith in Christ Jesus.’ In either way the sense is good, and open to no objection, theological, grammatical, or contextual. But the position of the words in the sentence, independently of their peculiar appositeness (as we shall see) in that construction, favour decidedly the adoption of the latter; in which view also the most distinguished modern commentators concur.

But a second consideration, and one perhaps not so easily disposed of, demands our attention—accepting the words ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ as in union with ἐκ πίστεως, ‘ye are all the children of God, through faith in Christ Jesus,’ whether are we to understand thereby *Christ the object of faith*, or *Christ the locus standi* in which faith is exercised? Instances of either mode of construction could be easily adduced; but it cannot be denied that the latter is the more natural, and an example of it is furnished in the adjoining context (verse 28), where its meaning is incontestible. The latter view accords better, also, with the course of the Apostle’s reasoning. In verse 24 we are informed that “the law was our pædagogus into Christ, in order that we might be justified out of faith” (evidently the faith *of*, or in, Him). But *the* faith (aforementioned

of, or in, Him) having come, ye are no longer under tutelage; for ye are all sons of God through *the faith*' (the same doubtless) of, or *in, Christ, the position to which we have presently attained*: such, then, would naturally be the meaning of ἐν Χριστῷ.

A conclusion which derives further corroboration from the insertion of the article before πίστεως. That it is emphatic, there can be no manner of doubt; but how or why emphatic, if not to mark the *position* in which the faith is exercised? It can hardly be supposed that it is to distinguish 'faith in Christ' (objectively) from 'faith in any other object.' Thoughtless or infatuated as the Galatians might be, they needed not to be told that there was but one *object* of faith whereby they could be made the children of God—Christ Jesus the Lord. And if not to distinguish 'faith in Christ' from 'faith in any other object,' what purpose can be suggested but to distinguish 'faith as exercised in Christ' (*locally*), that regenerating faith, which is the gift of Christ, and exercised in union with Him, 'from that less efficacious faith which was exercised by the Jew under the law,' and which did not put any man in possession of the promised blessing, or constitute him *an adopted child of God*—a distinction which pervades the entire Epistle, and which, indeed, lies at the root of any sound scriptural apprehension of the vast difference which prevails between the privileges attendant upon the dispensation of the law and the dispensation of grace, and the transcendent excellency of the latter above the former.—See ver. 22^h.

The phrase διὰ τῆς πίστεως ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, is equivalent to διὰ πίστεως τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, where ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ marks, not *the object* on which we believe, but *the position* in which we stand while believing. And I am confirmed in this opinion by the course which the argument subsequently pursues; for, accounting for our privilege that 'we are the sons of God,' it connects it, not with our *faith on Christ* (which it should do, were the former construction to prevail), but with our *position in Christ*: "for as many of you (is added in the following verse) as are baptized *into Christ*, have put on Christ," and consequently sonship with Him.

VERSE 27.—^a Ὅσοι γὰρ, κ. τ. λ., 'for as many as,' &c. There can be no question that the sentence introduced by the exegetical γὰρ is explanatory and confirmatory of the truth enunciated in the preceding verse, and as such it has been invariably regarded by the best expositors. "Proof and confirmatory explanation of the preceding assertion,"—ELLICOTT; "FOR substantiates and explains the assertion of verse 26,"—ALFORD; and nothing else assuredly can it do. But the question is, how does it effect that object? "The force of the particle (γὰρ) is best explained (says Ellicott) by the Greek commentators, who refer it to υἱοὶ Θεοῦ, and base the argument on the fact, that Christ was the Son of God." But how is that argument educed in the text before us? In the preceding verse it is stated, 'ye are all sons of God through *the faith* which is exercised in union with Christ Jesus;' to establish which position we might expect to find, 'for as many of you as exercise *faith* in union with Christ Jesus have put on Christ, and are thereby made

the sons of God in Him.' But instead of that we read, 'for as many of you as were *baptized* into Christ have put on Christ, and are thereby made,' &c. &c. How are these two expressions to be identified (which they must be if the argument above stated is to hold good), unless we are prepared to admit that 'to exercise faith (not *on* but) *in* Christ,' and 'to be baptized into Christ,' were processes so intimately associated in the Apostle's mind, that he uses them indifferently one for the other? And, so, unquestionably they were. These two processes are so inseparably linked together, that it is impossible to disunite them; 'the gift of the Holy Ghost' and 'the gift of faith' (New Testament faith, styled above, the 'about-to-be revealed faith'), though the one dependent upon the other, are simultaneous in their origination, and instantaneous in their effects. Whatever consecutiveness may seem to exist in the order of their appearance, is purely in the ratiocination of our minds. He that is baptized by the Spirit into Christ, does, in the very article of being so baptized, exercise that faith *in* Christ which constitutes him at the moment a child of God. So that regeneration may be indifferently (as indeed it is in Scripture) ascribed to either; and the expression, 'baptized into Christ,' may have been selected by the Apostle in the latter instance, not only to mark the identity to which I have just referred, but as more distinctly illustrative of the *modus operandi* whereby assumption into the family of God is effected. "As many of you as are baptized into Christ have *put on Christ*" in His person, in His relationship to God, and in everything pertaining thereto; ἐνδύεσθαι τινα being a well-known and significant expression, as appears from the many instances adduced by Wetst., "denoting the complete assumption of the nature, &c., of another."—See ELLICOTT, *in loco*. A consideration which, if I mistake not, accounts for and removes any seeming inconsequentiality which may exist in the enunciation of the Apostle's argument.

^b Εἰς Χριστὸν, 'into Christ'—"Not in *Christo*, . . . but in *Christum*, or more strictly, into communion with Him, and incorporation into His mystical body," ELLICOTT. Compare also ch. ii. 16; Rom. vi. 3. Βαπτίζειν εἰς is, however, sometimes used in an inferior sense to denote a less close and intimate communion, but, according to the same authority, "the context always showing whether it be of the most complete and most mystical nature as here and Rom. vi. 3; or, as in 1 Cor. x. 2, necessarily less comprehensive and significant."—ELLICOTT, *in loco*.

^c Χριστὸν ἐνεδύσασθε, 'ye put on Christ.' A beautiful and illustrative figure to characterize the closeness and completeness of the believer's connexion with Christ. Its association in the context might lead one to suspect that it was an allusion only to the change of raiment which, according to ancient usage, accompanied the rite of baptism; but the same expression occurring in another place (Rom. xiii. 14), where no allusion of the kind is supposable, forbids the limitation of its significance here. A far deeper and sublimer meaning is involved. According to Calvin, the Apostle "employs a metaphor of a garment when he says that the Galatians 'have put on Christ;' but he means

that they are so closely united to Him, that in the presence of God they bear the name and character of Christ, and are viewed in Him rather than in themselves."—CALVIN, *in loco*. But precious as this truth is, it does not yet reach the full significancy of the figure. There is something more intended, than the bearing the name of Christ, or the character of Christ, or the being viewed in Him, even though it be in the sight of God. There is a reality about the change which is hardly exhibited in these terms. So real is the induelement of Christ, that believers are thereby constituted "one spirit with the Lord;" "partakers of the divine nature;" "members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones." So completely are they identified with their risen Head, that all His attributes are regarded as theirs. "He is made unto us wisdom, and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption." The oneness that subsists between the believer and Christ is only exemplified in that mysterious unity which subsists between the Father and the Son: our Lord's most gracious will is to this effect, "that they all may *be one*; as *thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee*, that they also may be *one in us*." Such is the nature of the induelement of Christ—a closeness of alliance which is far from being exhibited even in the impressive language of Calvin. Out of this unity of *nature* arises a daily-progressing assimilation and conformity to the *character* of Christ. The believer, as he advances in spiritual growth, exhibits more and more of the mind that is in Christ, the affections of Christ, the will of Christ, Christ's hatred of sin, and love of holiness. According to the measure of his stature, he exercises all the unofficial functions of Christ—believing, hoping, fearing, loving, living in Christ—such harmony of volition, of temper, of action with Christ, as warrants the inspired language of the Apostle when he exclaims, "to me to live is Christ;" and, "the life which I now live in the flesh, it is not I that live, but Christ liveth in me." Such it is 'to put on Christ.' No mere change of raiment; no empty, unmeaning, profession; no bare form of Christianity; no imputation of Christship; but an actual "putting off of the old man, and putting on of the new"—"the washing of regeneration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost." And this mighty change takes place at baptism; "for (as the Apostle argues) as many of you as *were baptized* into Christ have put on Christ."

"But the argument, that because they have been baptized, they have put on Christ, appears weak (says Calvin); for how far is baptism from being efficacious to all! Is it reasonable that the grace of the Holy Spirit should be so closely linked to an external symbol? does not the uniform doctrine of Scripture, as well as experience, appear to confute this statement? I answer, it is customary with Paul to treat of the sacraments in two points of view. When he is dealing with hypocrites, in whom the mere symbol awakens pride, he proclaims boldly the emptiness and worthlessness of the outward symbol, and denounces in strong terms their foolish confidence. In such cases he contemplates not the ordinance of God, but the corruption of wicked men. When, on the other hand, he addresses believers, who make a proper use of the

symbols, he then views them in connexion with the truth which they represent. In this case he makes no boast of any false splendour as belonging to the sacraments, but calls our attention to the actual fact represented by the outward ceremony. Then, agreeably to the divine appointment, the truth comes to be associated with the symbol."—CALVIN, *in loco*.

To which may be added, that the Apostle does not absolutely affirm that all those whom he addressed were baptized into Christ; but he puts the case conditionally, "as many of you as were baptized into Christ," intimating thereby that all might not have been so baptized; and yet, possibly, not an individual was there in the Galatian churches who had not been baptized in the name of Christ, and made a profession of allegiance to Him, and a promise to live to His glory. Hence we infer that the grace of regeneration is not so indissolubly tied to the outward ordinance of baptism, that they are not occasionally found apart. Nay, it is to be feared that, in a vast majority of cases, they do not accompany each other; that, as it was said of Israel of old, "they are not all Israel who are of Israel," so with equal point and propriety may it be affirmed of the professing Christian church, 'they have not all put on Christ who have been baptized in His name'—true baptism being (in its effects), "not the putting away of the filth of the flesh," by the laver of the baptismal font, but, as St. Peter describes it, "the answer of a good conscience towards God," by a clear, intelligent, trustful apprehension of the doctrine of the resurrection of Christ. It were much to be desired that Alford, in calling upon us "to observe here how boldly and broadly St. Paul asserts the effect of baptism in all the baptized," had proceeded to mark the distinction which St. Paul himself has drawn, "*as many of you as are baptized into Christ*," and showed, from the conditional form in which he puts it, that *all* are not contemplated as so baptized, and consequently that all have not necessarily put on Christ who have been presented at the baptismal font.

VERSE 28.—^a Οὐκ ἔνι, κ. τ. λ. Immediate and necessary consequence of the induement of Christ, the obliteration of all earthly distinctions *in Him*. The judaizing teachers had impressed the Galatians with the belief, that no man of another nation could be partaker of the blessing promised to Abraham and his seed, without being admitted into the family of Abraham by circumcision and the adoption of Jewish rites. The Apostle, on the other hand, inculcates that *all who believe* are the children of God (partakers of the promised blessing) *in Christ*; and that in Him all temporal distinctions are annihilated—country and race, condition and sex, all swallowed up in the mysterious union with Christ.

It has been acutely observed by commentators that 'the ethnical and social distinctions' are contrasted by οὐδὲ, whereas 'the distinction between the sexes' is marked by καὶ. And it has been attempted to be explained upon the principle of 'the alterable or unalterable character of the relations.'—See ELLICOTT and ALFORD, *in loco*. But perhaps it is susceptible of a simpler and more intelligible solution. In the observation which he makes, it is plain that the Apostle is looking at the

subject from a mere human point of view, no such distinction having place in the sight of the High and the Holy One who inhabiteth eternity, for "God is no respecter of persons." But in the sight of man there was a vast disparity between Jew and Greek in respect to religious advantages; and even between bond and free the difference was so marked, that in some places they did not even worship under the same roof. So that it was not impossible to conceive, according to prevailing notions, that the gospel might be a system provided for the Jew and not for the Gentile, or for the rich and not for the poor. To obviate this misapprehension, the Apostle, it would seem, writes, 'The Jew is not in Christ, nor is the Greek (the verb *ἐν*, contracted for *ἐνεστι*, to be repeated before each clause, in connexion with the common adjunct *ἐν Χριστῷ*); the bond is not in Christ, nor is the free,' intimating thereby that the one is not there *to the exclusion of* the other (the only sense apparently attributable to the words). But the notion of class distinction never ran so high as to imagine that the female should be excluded from any system of salvation accessible to the male, though at the same time a vast superiority was assigned to the one above the other; and therefore, in referring to the sexes, the Apostle does not proceed to say, 'the male is not in Christ *to the exclusion of* the female,' but 'the male is not in Christ *and* the female,' that is, so completely is all human disparity obliterated in Christ, that male and female are indistinguishable so much as by the conjunctive particle 'and.'*

A similar idea seems to have presented itself to the Apostle's mind when he wrote that obscure passage, 1 Cor. xi. 7-12. Having established the natural superiority of the man above the woman, as exhibited in her original derivation from him (ver. 8), and her being made for his especial comfort and support (ver. 9), and deduced therefrom the duty incumbent upon the female sex, not to uncover themselves in their religious assemblies, but to wear a veil upon their heads in token of subjection *διὰ τοὺς ἀγγέλους*, he immediately subjoins, 'nevertheless, notwithstanding this natural inferiority, *all distinction is at an end in Christ*; "for the man is not without the woman, nor the woman without the man, *in the Lord*.'" Whether any deeper or more mysterious meaning may be concealed under these words, I do not pretend to say, but this much at least is apparent upon the surface.

^b *Εἷς*, 'one'—"τὸ εἷς ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐν σῶμα—Theod." (Ellicott), but incorrectly: better it is to supply *ἄνθρωπος*, or "*καὶνὸς ἄνθρωπος*" (Alford); or, better still perhaps, *Χριστὸς*. Nor can it be regarded as a matter of indifference in what way the expression is completed. The

* If the above description could be applied to the resurrection state, the Apostle's affirmation might simply amount to this, that in heaven sexual distinction is unknown: "In the first creation God created mankind *ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ* ('male and female'); in the new creation, one divine nature is common to all."—BAGGE. But the Apostle is here speaking of the church in its mundane condition, and showing that the Galatians had no need of becoming Jews in order to their participation in the promise to Abraham; for, though national and other distinctions still exist, yet in the sight of God all are one—in Christ.

rendering *εἰς ἄνθρωπος*, or *εἰς Χριστὸς*, or *ἐν σῶμα*, may be exponents of very different theological systems. *Ἐν σῶμα* would indeed represent the Christian community as one, but in what respect one?—possibly no more than ‘one body in the faith of Christ,’ all looking to the same Saviour, and rejoicing in the same hope. I am not quite sure that such was not the notion of the great Reformer, Luther, when he penned his comment upon this verse—“We all have the same Christ, I, thou, and all the faithful, which Peter, Paul, and all the saints had . . . therefore Paul is always wont to add this clause—‘in Christ Jesu,’ who if he be taken out of our sight, ~~then~~ cometh anguish and terror.”—LUTHER, *in loco*. But I cannot subscribe to the statement that St. Paul *added this clause* with any such intent, or indeed, properly speaking, that he ‘*added*’ it at all, which is the very pith and marrow of his subject.

It is not enough for us to believe (though it is indeed an article of our faith) that ‘we are all *one body*, through the faith in Christ:’ *that* we might be, and have no spiritual communion with a risen and exalted head. It is not so that Paul is wont to express himself. At times, indeed, when inculcating social and relative duties, it may be sufficient to impress upon our minds that we are ‘all one body,’ and therefore ought to act with faithfulness and truth, with meekness and sincerity, with forbearance and charity, one towards another. But while representing us, as he is here doing, as “the sons of God *in Christ*,” and as having been “*baptized into Christ*,” and having “*put on Christ*,” it is not likely that he should content himself with speaking of the church as if it were a headless trunk, or as severed from the source of sonship. No; the phrase indicates (as indeed the masculine gender betokens) *one person*, or *one Christ*, a body of believers in fellowship one with the other, but all in connexion with one all-informing, overruling *Head*—all partaking of the same Spirit of Christ, from whence all holy inspirations, all good thoughts, and all worthy deeds do proceed—whose strength worketh in us both to will and to do—from whom, as our Head of influence, and life of our lives, were we to be severed but for a single moment, or the gracious communication interrupted, we should be as absolutely helpless for good, and incapable to please God, as the amputated limb is disqualified to serve its former master.

If we have fellowship amongst ourselves, it is in Christ that fellowship has originated: it is the being ‘one spirit with the Lord,’ as well as ‘one body amongst ourselves,’ that constitutes us the members of Christ. We must not, then, rest satisfied with any explanation of these words which should represent the church as ‘one body,’ and not also as ‘one person,’ ‘one Christ,’ the Head being as essential to the completeness of the body as the body is to the fulness of the Head. The edification of the body does not consist merely in the extension of church membership amongst themselves, but in the growing up of the whole constituency “*unto Christ which is the Head*, from whom the whole body, fitly framed together, and compacted by that which every joint supplieth, maketh increase of the body, unto the edifying of itself in love.” It is thus that “we all come (not only the church of the pre-

sent day, but the church of all ages, past, present, and future) unto *a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ.*"

^c 'Εν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, 'in Christ Jesus.' These words are to be mentally annexed to each distinct clause of the sentence, and not merely to the one immediately adjoining (πάντες γὰρ, &c.); and consequently, in translation, might be placed with better effect at the commencement of the sentence—"In Christ Jesus there is neither Jew nor Greek . . . but ye are all one."

VERSE 29.—^a Ὑμεῖς, 'Ye'—"ye all, whether Jews or Gentiles." So Bloomfield, at the sacrifice of the whole point of the passage. Ὑμεῖς unquestionably emphatic—"ye Galatians," whose delusion as to the mode of becoming interested in the promise to Abraham gave occasion to the writing of the present Epistle—to whom especially ("ye thoughtless Galatians") the argument in this chapter is addressed, and no less especially this passage, which is the conclusion and application of the whole matter—"If ye be members of Christ, ye need not trouble yourselves about circumcision, or any other ordinance of the Jewish church, to affiliate you; ye are Abraham's seed, and heirs according to promise."

Nor is the verse before us, properly speaking, "a resumption of the argument, after the short digression of verse 28" (Ellicott). There is no digression whatsoever in verse 28, but a direct prosecution of the subject. The Apostle had stated that "as many of you as were baptized into Christ have put on Christ;" and knowing the delusion in the Galatian mind, that no man could be interested in the promise who was not of the seed of Abraham, through the adoption of the Jewish law, he combats that delusion in verse 28, by showing that in Christ all national distinctions are at an end; 'and if ye (addressing himself, in conclusion, to the Galatians) are members of that happy community, by faith, then are ye, without any more to do, the seed of Abraham, and heirs according to promise.'

^b Χριστοῦ, 'of Christ'—"members of Christ." It is a weak and ignorant interpretation of M'Knight's—"Christ's brethren," or "Christ's people;" and weaker still upon the ground on which he rests it—"If believers are Christ's brethren *by imitating him in his virtues*, they are also Abraham's seed by reason of their relation to Christ." And again—"If ye be Christ's people *by possessing his virtues*." Miserable claim this to the distinguished honour which is here intimated! But the Apostle has sufficiently explained his meaning—"As many of you as were baptized into Christ have put on Christ," in whom all parties, Jew and Gentile, meet together on a common footing, and constitute 'one person in Christ;' and if ye, Galatians (or any others to whom this word cometh), be of that happy fraternity, *incorporated members of Christ, through the baptism of the Holy Spirit*, then are ye Abraham's seed, by personal identification with Him who is the natural descendant of Abraham, and the one of all his posterity to whom alone the promise was made.'

^c Τοῦ Ἀβραὰμ σπέρμα, 'the seed of Abraham.' "This is not intended

to convey the idea, that to be a child of Abraham is better than to be a member of Christ, but to repress the pride of the Jews, who gloried in their privileges as if they were the people of God." So Calvin. The first part of the observation is unexceptionable; the latter, erroneous. It was not "to repress the pride of the Jew," but 'to satisfy the scruples of the Gentile,' that these words were inserted. The Galatians conceived (the result of Jewish misteaching) that in no other way could they become invested with the character of Abraham's seed, and so interested in the promise, except by the rite of circumcision, and taking upon themselves the burden of the Jewish law, which therefore they were most zealous to do; but the Apostle here indicates a more excellent way, 'through faith in Christ,' whereby believers become *incorporate in the mystical person of Christ*, and, being '*members of Christ*,' are thereby constituted "Abraham's seed, and heirs according to promise."

^d Κληρονόμοι, 'heirs.' It seems to be the general impression among commentators that the 'inheritance' here implied is to be understood in the widest and most comprehensive signification of the term—"The heavenly country" (M'Knight); "The future rest and eternal inheritance" (Whitby); "The promised inheritance of life eternal" (Bloomfield); "Salvation and the kingdom of Christ" (Ellicott). But there can be no reason why we should depart from the line chalked out for us by the Apostle, and accept the term in any sense other or more comprehensive than that in which it has been uniformly presented to us throughout the whole course of the argument, that is, as *the subject of the promise*—"In thy seed shall all nations *be blessed*;" which 'blessing' has been already (verse 14) defined to be 'the blessing of the Holy Ghost.' This is "the inheritance" of the 18th verse, and the same, doubtless, is the 'inheritance' here. It was in reference to this 'inheritance' that the controversy in the Galatian church arose. In respect of it the question was put—"Received ye the Spirit out of legal works, or out of faithful hearing?" And the answer to that question is here brought out as the result of a long and elaborate disquisition, that the 'inheritance' is to be obtained *in Christ*, and consequently *through*, or *out of*, *faith*. The Galatians imagined that, to be "heirs," they should be incorporated into the family of Abraham according to the flesh. The Apostle instructs them that, to be "heirs," they must be incorporated into the body of Christ, the true seed of Abraham: and if "ye be members of Christ, then are ye Abraham's seed, and heirs"—of what? of that to which, according to the promise, the seed of Abraham were entitled—the *Holy Spirit of God*—the best and noblest '*inheritance*' which can fall to the lot of man to enjoy. See farther observations on 'the inheritance,' verse 18^c.

^e Κατ' ἐπαγγελίαν, 'according to promise,' that is, 'by way of promise.' There are no words in the sentence more important or more emphatic than these—"according to the way of promise." The Galatians had ignorantly imagined that 'the blessing' was to be secured through the works of the law, that is, through the performance of the

ceremonies of the Jewish church; and the Apostle, in combating that error, showed at verse 18 that, 'if the inheritance were to come *out of law*, then, from the nature of things, it could not be '*by promise*;' whereas, according to the announcement made to Abraham, 'by grace' it ought to be.' In the same strain of reasoning he now concludes that, according to the plan developed by him, that is, through incorporation into the mystical body of Christ, they are Abraham's seed, and heirs, not through the works of the law, in contravention to, but through faith in Christ, in accordance with, *the way by promise*.

The translation of the Authorized Version, "according to *the promise*," yields a good and competent meaning, and not inconsistent with the general scope of the Apostle's reasoning; but the contrast is not preserved between 'the way by works' and 'the way by promise,' which is the point of the entire Epistle. Besides, it would require the article prefixed to give it expression, upon which ground alone it should be unhesitatingly rejected.

We have now arrived at the conclusion of the principal argument of the Epistle, that which follows in the succeeding chapter being chiefly of a supplemental and auxiliary character, preparatory to *the application* in Chapter V. But the *one question*, upon the determination of which their 'inconsiderateness' was to hinge (see verses 2, 3), has now received a most minute, scriptural, and, I may say, strictly logical investigation; and the conclusion that 'the Spirit,' which is the subject of promise, is the attainment, not of 'legal works,' but of 'faithful hearing,' has been arrived at, by a course of reasoning the most sustained, the most elaborate, and the most systematic, which is, probably, to be met with in the sacred volume. In the language of Dean Ellicott, "The declaration of verse 7 (but more properly, he should say, of verse 2, where the declaration is implied, or of verse 5, where it is formally propounded) is now at length substantiated and expanded by 22 (26), verses of the deepest, most varied, and most comprehensive reasoning, that exists in the whole compass of the great Apostle's writings."

CHAPTER IV.

HAVING, in the preceding chapter, established successively the following heads—that, according to the terms of the promise, justification or the gift of the Holy Ghost, was ordained to be 'of faith,' and not 'of legal works' (verses 5–14); that the law, which was introduced 430 years after, could not annul, alter, or qualify the terms of the promise (verses 15–18); that the law was of a provisional nature, and only to continue until the seed should come, in whom the promise should take effect (verses 19, 20); that the law during its continuance was not opposed to, but rather subservient to, the purposes of the promise (verses 21–24); that the seed having come, the function of the law ceased, and believers

are made the sons of God in Christ, and *heirs of the promised blessing through faith* (verses 25–29)—having thus given a categorical reply to the question (proposed at verse 2, and repeated at verse 5), “Received ye the Spirit through legal works, or through faithful hearing?” the Apostle, in the commencement of this chapter, takes up a branch of the subject which had been insufficiently treated before (see ver. 26^a), to give it a full, clear, and emphatic elucidation.

VERSE 1.—^a Λέγω δέ, ‘But I say’—λέγω emphatic; not simple enunciation, but impressive affirmation, with a view to instruction and inculcation, in the same sense in which the verb occurs, ch. iii. 17; v. 16. Δέ adversative; the adversativeness of the particle to be traced in the latent antagonism between the view now about to be propounded and that generally entertained in the Galatian church.

^b Ὁ κληρονόμος, ‘the heir,’ indefinitely, not of any particular class or denomination, neither Jew nor Gentile, but the generic idea ‘heir.’ It has been debated whether ‘an heir’ during the life-time, or after the demise of his ancestor, is the subject of the present illustration. But upon a careful weighing of all the circumstances connected with the case,—his being denominated “lord of all,”—placed under “tutors and governors,” similar in office to our ‘guardians and trustees,’ curators of his person and of his property—but, above all, the period of his majority being defined (inconsistent, it would seem, with the idea of a life in being)—we are led to the conclusion that the case presented is that of an heir after the demise of his ancestor; the features of resemblance to be chiefly sought, in the accession to the inheritance and the discontinuance of the servile condition, *at the period appointed by the father*. At the same time (as Ellicott justly observes)—“The question is really of little moment; St. Paul is engaged so entirely in the simple comparison of the circumstances of the nonage of the earthly κληρονόμος with those of the nonage of believers who lived under the law (verse 3), that the subordinate question of the life, death, or absence of the father of the κληρονόμος passes wholly out of sight.”

^c Νήπιός, ‘an infant,’ properly, ‘a babe,’ or ‘a very young child,’ with the accompanying notion of weakness of intellect, immaturity of judgment, scantiness of information, &c. &c. (Matt. xxi. 16; 1 Cor. iii. 1; xii. 11), here to be understood in its legal acceptation, ‘an infant,’ or person under age—“A minor, one too young to inherit,” a use of the word, however, of which Bloomfield observes, “I know no example elsewhere in the New Testament, nor in the LXX., nor in the classical writers.” Possibly the selection of the word here is due more to the attraction of the object to which the illustration is applied, than of that from which it is derived; and that we are to infer therefrom the ignorance, imbecility, and waywardness of human nature antecedently to the origination of the spirit of adoption—a lesson, whether conveyed in the expression before us or not, of the utmost importance to be learned.

VERSE 2.—^a Ἐπιτρόπους καὶ οἰκονόμους, ‘guardians and stewards:’ ἐπιτρόπος, literally ‘an overseer,’ indifferently of person or of estate;

“ἐπιτρόπος καὶ τοῦ παιδὸς καὶ τῶν χρημάτων, ‘the guardian both of the child and of his property,’ Ælian”—ELLICOTT: οἰκονόμος (in the Authorized Version, “governor”) denotes more properly the manager of the property of the κληρονόμος—‘the steward or factor,’ an officer frequently attached to persons of large estate, but in the case of ‘minors’ charged with the entire management of their affairs. Both words are in classical writers used with considerable latitude. However, when associated together as here, I am disposed to think that οἰκονόμος, according to the etymology of the word, is more properly to be referred to the guardianship of the estate, and ἐπιτρόπος to the superintendence of the person.

^b Τῆς προθεσμίας, literally ‘appointed beforehand.’ “The term προθεσμία, scil. ὥρα, or ἡμέρα, is properly the term limited for bringing actions or prosecutions, the time fixed by the statute of limitations, thence *any appointed time or day*.”—ELLICOTT. Nor is it any objection to the assumed demise of the ancestor that in most countries the period of nonage is in such cases *defined by law*; for doubtless it was competent to a testator, within certain limitations (as with ourselves), to extend the period by *appointment*, the case presented here, as best suited to exhibit the sovereign will of God in fixing the time when his Son ‘should come into the world to confer upon us the adoption of sons.’

Upon the abolition of ceremonial observances, the truth insisted upon in this section, Calvin characteristically observes—“This passage will prove a most powerful battery for destroying the pageantry of ceremonies, which constitute the entire splendour of the Papal system. For what else is it that dazzles the eyes of simple people, so as to lead them to regard the dominion of the Pope, if not with admiration, at least with some degree of reverence, but the magnificent array of ceremonies, rites, gesticulations, and equipage of every description, contrived for the express purpose of amazing the ignorant? From this passage it appears that they are false disguises, by which the true beauty of the church is impaired. I do not speak of greater or more frightful corruptions, such as that they hold them out for divine worship, imagine them to possess the power of meriting salvation, and enforce with more rigid severity the observation of these trifles than the whole law of God. I only advert to the specious pretext under which our modern contrivers apologize for such a multitude of abominations. What though they object that the ignorance of the multitude prevails to a greater extent than it formerly did among the Israelites, and that many assistances are therefore required? They will never be able in this way to prove that the people must be placed under the discipline of a school similar to what existed among the people of Israel; for I shall always meet them with the declaration, that the appointment of God is totally different.

“If they plead expediency, I ask, are they better judges of what is excellent than God himself? Let us entertain the firm conviction that the highest advantage, as well as the highest propriety, will be found in whatever God has determined. In aiding the ignorant we must employ, not those methods which the fancy of men may be pleased to con-

trive, but those which have been fixed by God himself, who unquestionably has left out nothing which was fitted to assist their weakness. Let this shield suffice for repelling any objection: 'God has judged otherwise, and His purpose supplies to us the place of all arguments, unless it be supposed that men are capable of devising better aids than those which God has provided, and which He afterwards threw aside as useless.' Let it be carefully observed that Paul does not merely say, that the yoke which had been laid upon the Jews has been removed from us, but expressly lays down a distinction in the government which God has commanded to be observed. I acknowledge that we are now at liberty as to all outward matters, but only on the condition that the church shall not be burdened with a multitude of ceremonies, or Christianity confounded with Judaism."—CALVIN, *in loco*. The above observations are so just, masculine, and suited to the requirement of the present times, that no apology is offered for their introduction here. Such arguments are of eternal force, and must ever be resorted to when the unhappy tendency against which they are directed prevails.

VERSE 3.—*Οὕτως καὶ ἡμεῖς*, 'so also we.' The illustration being set forth in the preceding verse, we are now conducted to the application. By this the Galatians were taught that the state under the law, which was the object of their ambition, was not that perfect and advanced position which they credulously believed it to be, but rather calculated for a low and infantile state of religious experience; and that the ceremonial observances to which they attached such inordinate importance were little better or more efficacious than those heathen rites and ceremonies with which they are classed, under the derogatory appellation, "elements of the world." The obvious design of the Apostle, namely, to establish the point that the pædagogic function of the law terminated with the attainment of the higher privileges of adoption, might lead one to suppose that *ἡμεῖς* in this connexion should be referred to the Jews only; but, from the course which the argument subsequently pursues, it is evident that Jews and Gentiles, being alike subjected to ceremonial institutions, were alike included under the term. That the Jews were in bondage under the elements of the world (meaning thereby the ordinances of the Mosaic law), antecedently to their embracing of Christianity, is matter of unquestionable notoriety; and that the Gentiles were similarly circumstanced, is plainly intimated in the chapter before us, where they are addressed in these terms—"After ye have known God, how turn ye *again* to the weak and beggarly elements whereunto ye desire *again* to be in bondage?" verse 9. Whereupon Whitby observes—"The Galatians are said to '*return to these elements*,' not because they before observed *the Jewish ceremonies*, but because the ceremonies of the law being for the matter mostly the same with those *the Gentiles used to their heathen deities*, by returning to them they returned to those elements." So that in the *matter attributed* there is no inapplicability to either party; and we shall presently see, as we proceed with the inquiry, that in point of fact *it has not been limited* to either. *Ἡμεῖς*, then, we regard as denoting both Jew and Gentile, inclu-

sively, a view which is confirmed by the language subsequently employed (ver. 5), where the Jews, in the third person (τοὺς ὑπὸ νόμον), though included within the number, are manifestly not the whole of the constituency represented by ἀπολάβωμεν in the first.

^b Νήπιοι, ‘infants’—persons under age; having no reference to individual incapacity, but to the νήπιοι condition of the church previously to its attainment of sonship in Christ. As we before observed (ver. 1 ^c), the word (not being found elsewhere in the technical meaning ‘under age’) may have been adopted to characterize the natural estate of mankind, unenlightened in religious matters, incapable of appreciating aright the character of God, the nature of His requirements, the services which please Him—in a word, insensible of all those truths which constitute the peculiar subject of the Spirit’s teaching in Christ, which νήπιοι condition continues to the υἱοθεσίαν (adoption of sons), when the ignorance of nature gives place under the enlightening influence of the grace of Christ, “wherein He hath abounded towards us in all wisdom and spiritual understanding.”

^c Στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου, ‘elements of the world;’ στοιχεῖα, literally ‘little steps;’ hence, metaphorically, ‘the elementary parts of any science;’ here, ‘the elements or first principles of religion,’ the first steps or slight advances towards religious worship—τοῦ κόσμου ^d ‘of the world’—the men of the world, mankind in the aggregate (1 Cor. i. 20; iii. 19, &c.); gen. subjecti, ‘the world’s rudiments,’ because invented and practised by the people of the world; or κόσμου may be regarded as representing ‘the world physically,’ the abode of man (2 Pet. iii. 6), the locality in which those elementary rites are practised. But whether we understand thereby the men who practise, or the sphere in which they are practised, the meaning is substantially the same—‘the rites and ceremonies which constitute the religion of the natural heart.’ They may differ as to the matter of them—the rites and ceremonies of the Jews being incomparably more excellent than those of other nations, inasmuch as, being derived from above, they were free from the impurities and obscenities which debased the religion of the heathen, and shadowed forth deep and mysterious truths of inestimable value; but nevertheless in themselves, as instruments of service to God, they were “weak and beggarly elements,” as far inferior to the religion of the adopted heir as the shadow is to the substance, the type to the anti-type.

^d Ἡμεν. “The verb ἦμεν may be regarded either as in union with δεδουλ. and forming a compound tense, or as in more immediate connexion with ὑπὸ τὰ στοιχεῖα: the latter is most probable, as forming the best parallel to ὑπὸ ἐπιτρόπους ἐστιν.”—ELLICOTT. This construction is also favoured by the position of the verb in the sentence—‘as the heir under governors and stewards, so were we under the elements of the world—enslaved.’

^e Δεδουλωμένοι, ‘being in bondage,’ ‘enslaved’—a term equally applicable to the religious condition of the Jew and of the Gentile. The institutions of the Mosaic law were exceedingly burdensome in their na-

ture, "a yoke (as St. Peter describes it) which neither our fathers nor we were able to bear," Acts, xv. 10; not only grievously exacting in their demands, but, what rendered them more intolerable still, ineffectual in their operation, incapable to cleanse the conscience from sin, or "make the comers thereunto perfect." The abhorrent nature and condemnatory quality of sin were ever exhibited before men's eyes in the slaughter of innocent animals in their behalf, which, nevertheless, by their bloodshedding could not atone for the offence; so that the worshippers under the law were kept in a state of perpetual alarm, and consequent incapacity to serve God with a free spirit: in the expressive language of Scripture, "through fear of death they were all their life time *subject to bondage*," a condition so inseparable from the Levitical covenant, that it is characterized by St. Paul (verse 24) as "gendering to bondage."

VERSE 4.—^a Τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ χρόνου, 'the fulness of the time.' It being deemed expedient in the counsels of the Most High, before the introduction of the gospel dispensation into the world, to establish the utter incompetency of man, by any effort of his own, aided even by the light of divine revelation, to effect the renovation of his fallen nature, God was pleased for many ages to leave mankind to the exercise of their own resources, decreeing, when their insufficiency was fully proved, to interpose by the impartation of His Holy Spirit. It is not the selection, however, or the appointment of that time, which is the subject of allusion here, but the completion of it. When the time had fully arrived which God in his wisdom had seen fit to appoint, then He sent forth his Son into the world—the πλήρωμα τοῦ χρόνου in the providence of God, corresponding with the προθεσμία τοῦ πατρὸς of the example. Πλήρωμα is here used in the same sense in which it occurs in 1 Cor. x. 26, "the earth is the Lord's, and the fulness (πλήρωμα) thereof," where πλήρωμα represents that with which the earth is filled; as also in Mark, viii. 20—"How many baskets full (σπυρίδων πληρώματα) of fragments took ye up?" or *the fillings* of how many baskets. So likewise here, the period appointed by the Father to precede the coming of Christ is metaphorically compared to a vessel into which are poured the days, and weeks, and months, and years, which go to the completion of the appointed term; and when the last unit is poured in, then "the fulness of the time" (πλήρωμα τοῦ χρόνου) has arrived.

^b Γενόμενον ἐκ γυναικὸς, 'born of a woman' (for this use of γίνομαι, common in classical writers, see Gen. iv. 26; xxi. 3, 5, 9; xxxv. 26—LXX.; and Rom. i. 3). "Defining participial clause, added to attest the pure manhood of Christ."—ELLICOTT. "But the language was also intended to distinguish Christ from other men, as having been formed of the substance of His mother, and not by ordinary generation."—CALVIN. But though the words are capable of both these explanations, and though they are both truths in themselves, yet neither of them is the truth which the Apostle had in view when he introduced them into the passage before us. Granted that, according to the first, the perfect humanity of Christ was as essential to His mediatorial character as the perfect Divinity; and that, according to the second, the transmission

by ordinary generation of original sin should have been fatal to the great work which He came into the world to accomplish; and consequently when God resolved upon the redemption of mankind, He decreed that He whom He should send should inherit from His mother a perfect manhood without the intervention of a human father—admitting all this to be the fact, yet I maintain that these were not the considerations before the Apostle's mind when he wrote this sentence. Such considerations, it may be well supposed, influenced Jehovah when He pronounced the first promise—"I will put enmity between thee and *the woman*, and between thy seed and *her seed* (σπέρμα τῆς γυναικὸς): it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel," Gen. iii. 15. But it was not *to enunciate a doctrine*, but *to substantiate a fact*, 'that He whom God had sent into the world was qualified, according to the condition of the primeval promise, to accomplish the redemption here ascribed to Him,' that it is written in this place, "born of a woman."*

‘Ὑπὸ νόμον, ‘under law.’ It has been a subject of discussion whether we are to understand by these words ‘sub lege,’ with some, or ‘subjectum legi,’ with others. But there can be little doubt that the latter form, ‘under legal obligation,’ is the correct version of ὑπὸ νόμον (see chap. ii. 16^a). At the same time it is manifest that ‘subjectum legi’ involves the necessity of the condition ‘sub lege;’ and seeing that the law in such case should be the Jewish law, and none other, γεγόμενον ὑπὸ νόμον is, in the present instance, substantially equivalent to “natum inter Judæos legi Mos. obnoxios” (Schott), the interpretation approved by Ellicott. That the law of nature was not the law contemplated is evident; for, being so, the second clause, born under law, would have been superfluous, His birth ‘of a woman’ sufficiently attesting the fact of his subjection to the law of nature.

VERSE 5.—* Τοὺς ὑπὸ νόμον, ‘those under law,’ namely, ‘the Jewish people.’ It is a great misapprehension of the Apostle's meaning to stretch these words, as Bloomfield and others have done, to comprehend both Jews and Gentiles. Surely, if Christ “born *under law*” denotes, as is generally agreed, His subjection to *the Jewish law*, it was to deliver those who were subject to *the same law* that He was so born. Indeed, I question if in any part of Scripture the Gentile world is represented as being ὑπὸ νόμον (under law). In Rom. ii. 14, they are characteristically described as ἔθνη τὰ μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα (“the Gentiles which have not law”). Again, St. Paul's argument to the Romans (chap. v. 13, 14) proceeds upon this ground—"sin was in the world ἄχρι νόμου ('previ-

* “Made of a woman,” the rendering of our Authorized Version, was probably adopted to distinguish the miraculous operation of the Holy Ghost from the ordinary process of generation: “But the word ‘born’ expresses the nature and fact of the incarnation with far greater force and truth. For, setting aside that divine power and operation through which the Virgin was enabled to conceive, it implies that whatever in and from the moment of conception until the completion of parturition takes place in the ordinary human birth, took place in the case of Jesus. Otherwise He would not have been in every respect, and therefore truly, man, and the seed of the woman who should bruise the head of the serpent.”—BAGGE.

ously to law,' that is, before any legal obligation existed); but sin is not imputed (*scil.* unto death) where law is not; nevertheless (though sin is not imputed unto death where law is not), death reigned *from Adam to Moses*," evidently descriptive of a period *μὴ ὄντος νόμου* (when no legal obligation existed). Now, if mankind, during the long interval which elapsed between Adam and Moses, are represented as *ἀνόμος* (without law), upon what principle is it now to be assumed that they are *ὑπὸ νόμον* (under law), except so far as the obligation of the Mosaic law extended? In whatever aspect we view it, *τοὺς ὑπὸ νόμον* seems to be strictly limited to the Jewish people.

I am strongly of opinion that the clauses *γενόμενον ὑπὸ νόμον*, and *ἵνα τοὺς ὑπὸ νόμον ἐξαγοράσῃ*, should be connected together, and included in a parenthesis, the principal thought passing directly from *γενόμενον ἐκ γυναικὸς*, to *ἵνα τὴν υἱοθεσίαν ἀπολάβωμεν*, the latter *ἵνα* introducing the object, not that with which He redeemed *τοὺς ὑπὸ νόμον*, but that with which He took upon himself the nature of man, namely, 'that we (mankind generally, the peculiar case of the Jew being provided for in the parenthesis) might receive the adoption of sons.'

Christ's "being born of a woman" was the only qualifying condition (consistently with the terms of the original promise) to bruise the serpent's head, or, in other words, 'to redeem mankind from the effects of the fall.' Nor should other have been required, had it not been for the introduction of the Mosaic law, whereby the descendants of Jacob were placed in a position peculiar to themselves, and subjected to a discipline from which the rest of mankind were exempt, and from which they must needs be delivered before they could be in a condition to participate in the promised blessing. Hence the Redeemer of the Jewish people needed a further qualification, not only that He should be "born of a woman," which was generally necessary, but "born under law;" that having 'fulfilled all righteousness,' according to the strictest requirements of the Mosaic covenant, and having also endured the curse peculiar to that covenant, 'being hanged upon a tree,' He might "redeem those who were under law," that they might receive the adoption of sons.

It will be observed that the passage before us is of the same character with one which has already engaged our attention (chap. iii. 13), with this only distinction, that in this place the redemption is represented as being from *the bondage*, in the other, from *the curse* of the law, the requirement of the argument determining in both instances the extent to which the redemption applies. In the one case, the Jews were said to be redeemed from *the curse* of the law, in order that they might participate in *the promised blessing*; in the other, they are redeemed from *the bondage* of the law, in order that they might participate in *the liberty* of the adopted sons. The redemption, however, is but one, there being no delivery from *the bondage* unless the *curse* be at the same time removed; "one jot or one tittle of the law being in no wise to pass away until *all be fulfilled*."

Ellicott supposes a first and second gracious purpose of God, as in-

troduced by the two *ἵνα*s.—“The first gracious purpose of God’s having sent his Son thus, *γενόμεν. ἐκ γυναικ.*, and thus, *γενόμεν. ὑπὸ νόμον*, the ransom of those who were under the same religious obligations as those under which our Lord vouchsafed to be born” (namely, the Jews). “The second gracious purpose resulting from the first—the adoption as sons, not only of Jews, but of all men (*ἡμεῖς*)—of all those whose nature our Lord vouchsafed to assume.” According to this view of the passage, no ransom is noticed as having been provided for the Gentile world (a grave omission it would seem in a didactic passage like the present); but the ransom of those under the law of Moses is represented as inuring to the adoption, “not only of Jews, but of all men—of all those whose nature our Lord vouchsafed to assume.” Whereas, by dissociating as I have done *γενόμεν. ἐκ γυναικ.* from *γενόμεν. ὑπὸ νόμον*, the latter being placed in a parenthesis, we have the *general qualification* for the redemption of mankind in the former, and the *special qualification* for the redemption of the Jewish people in the latter (redemption being in both cases implied); and both conjointly preparing the way for the bestowal of the Spirit of adoption on Jew and Gentile indiscriminately—in Christ.*

^b *Τὴν υιοθεσίαν*, ‘the adoption of sons.’ Not ‘sonship,’ but ‘adoption into the family of God.’ God hath chosen his children, in Christ, *before the foundation of the world*, but He hath predestinated them to the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to Himself, *in the world*—Eph. i. 4, 5. Antecedently to that adoption they differed nothing from the rest of mankind, though being heirs of all; being uninformed of their privileges, they were unaffected by their mercies. But when, through the preaching of the gospel and faith in the word preached, Christ confers upon them the Spirit of adoption, then have they (1) “redemption through His blood, the forgiveness of sins;” and (2) “all wisdom and prudence” (as the context Eph. i. 7–12 plainly indicates), with respect to their future destiny. Or, as the same truth is expressed in different language (Rom. v. 1, 2), “being justified by faith” (which justification, as we have already seen (ch. iii. 8), is tantamount to the bestowal of the promised Spirit), we have—(1) “peace with God, through our Lord Jesus Christ;” and (2) we “rejoice in the hope of the glory of God,” the characteristic privileges of the adopted heir.

* It may be thought that the objection above raised to Ellicott’s interpretation of this passage would apply with equal force to St. Paul’s argument in chap. iii. 13, 14—“Christ hath redeemed us (Jews) from the curse of the law . . . that we (all—Jews and Gentiles) might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith.” But upon examination it will be found that such is not the case. In that place, the Apostle, having in the course of his argument introduced the circumstance that “as many as are of the works of law are under the curse,” proceeded to show that that curse must necessarily be removed, in order that *the blessing* might take effect upon all nations indiscriminately in Christ, which it could not do so long as the Jewish branch was excluded by *a curse*; for such a purpose he had only to advert to the particular redemption of the Jew. But here he is distinctly engaged in pointing out the provision which God made for the redemption of *all mankind* by Christ—an object which should have been but indifferently effected by providing for the deliverance of *a part*.

* Ἀπολάβωμεν. A good deal of discussion has taken place with respect to the exact force of ἀπὸ in ἀπολάβωμεν. Modern authorities (Ellicott and Alford) contend for the mere *local* meaning of ἀπὸ, and understand the verb as expressing no more than '*reception from*,' without any intimation as to the '*how*' or the '*wherefore*' it is received. Whereas Chrysostom, who should be admitted to be at least as competent a judge of the idiomatic usage of the verb as any modern writer can be, maintains that ἀπολάβωμεν implies receiving as *the result of promise*: his words are—"καλῶς εἶπεν, ἀπολάβωμεν, δεικνὺς ὀφειλομένην," "which, though logically admissible (Ellicott objects), does not harmonize well with the context, as the *υιοθεσία* is not *here* alluded to as the subject of promise." But, with all due deference to his opinion, *υιοθεσία* is here introduced in no other relation but as the subject of promise. The idea which pervades the entire of this context manifestly originated with the concluding words of the preceding chapter, where the Apostle affirms, "if ye be Christ's, then are ye Abraham's seed, and *heirs according to promise*." Thence he proceeds—"As *an heir* of an earthly inheritance differs nothing from a servant until he enters upon *actual possession*, even so *we heirs* of a spiritual inheritance were in bondage under the elements of the world until we received the *υιοθεσίαν*, where *υιοθεσία* is beyond all controversy substituted for *κληρονομία*, *the subject of promise* (see ch. iii. 18). So that there is no reason whatever why the interpretation of Chrysostom, which is "logically admissible," appropriate, and adequate to the exposition of the passage, should be set aside, upon the alleged ground that "*υιοθεσία* is not *here* alluded to as the subject of promise." Indeed, there can be little doubt that it is one of the many (see ch. iii. 21 *), and not the least conspicuous perhaps of the appellations bestowed upon *the subject of the promise*—"the blessing which was to come upon the nations in Jesus Christ."

VERSE 6.—* Ὅτι δὲ ἐστε υἱοί, 'but that ye are sons,' or, 'to show that ye are sons;' in other words, 'that God's purpose in sending his Son into the world has been accomplished in you.' Though the translation in our Authorized Version (ὅτι in its *causal* signification) presents an unexceptionable meaning, grammatically correct, and theologically true, yet I prefer, with most modern expositors (Alford *contradictente*), to understand it *demonstratively* (πρόθεν δῆλον ὅτι, Chrys., Theoph. Ocum., al.), 'whence it is plain that;' agreeing with Ellicott that in all cases of idiomatic construction the authority of the Greek commentators is of immense value; besides, as he justly observes, "the demonstrative ὅτι seems to accord better with the emphatic position and the tense of ἐστε." By this expression we are to understand, not that the Spirit was communicated *by God* as a proof of *pre-existing sonship*, but that it is referred to by *the Apostle* as a proof *that they are presently sons*.

St. Paul had just enunciated this truth, that the children of God, Jew and Gentile alike, scattered over the face of the globe, in bondage under the elements of the world, differing in no respect from servants, though being lords of all, had now in the fulness of time been redeemed

by the death of Christ, in order that they might receive the adoption of sons—investiture with the rights and privileges of the regenerated heir. He now appeals, in attestation of this truth, to the existence of the Spirit of adoption in the church, whereby they cry ‘Abba, Father.’ No emphasis to be laid upon the word “ye” in the translation, as though it contrasted with “we” (verse 3), it being only the sign of the second person plural, and requiring the insertion of the pronoun (*ὑμεῖς*) to make it emphatic. The purpose of the Apostle is to show, not that all the individuals in the Galatian church had been admitted to the privilege of Christ-membership, but that the Spirit of adoption had been exhibited in the church—a purpose which steers clear of any asseveration which might be deemed inconsistent with the condition of a large proportion of the (Galatian) professing church, or with the well-grounded apprehensions entertained for their eventual safety, as subsequently expressed.

Calvin, who takes the opposite view of this subject (*ὅτι causal*), ‘but because ye are sons,’ expresses himself in the terms following:—“This adoption must have preceded the testimony of adoption given by the Holy Spirit; but the effect is the sign of the cause.” A similar opinion seems also to have been entertained by Neander, as is plain from a quotation of Ellicott—“Neander traces a threefold gradation in this adoption: (a) as existing, but not appropriated; (b) as appropriated through faith in Christ; (c) as perfected by a full communion in His blessedness and glory.”—ELLICOTT on *νιοθεσίαν*, ver. 5. But there is a manifest inaccuracy in this conception. The sonship indeed of God’s people existed from eternity—adoption into the family of God is effected in time. The former is ascribed to election—the latter to predestination—“Being chosen in Him (as the Scripture expresses it) before the foundation of the world,” but “predestinated to the adoption of children by Jesus Christ, to himself”—Eph. i. 4, 5. Sonship prevailed in all ages of the church—adoption was introduced by Jesus Christ. Election and predestination are distinct and different acts of the Divine mind—the one of a present, the other of a prospective character. The same distinction, apparently, presents itself in the Epistle to the Romans—“Whom He did foreknow, He also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son (the image of his Son, in whatever light we view it, whether of constitution or of practice, originating in the person of Jesus Christ, conformity to that image subsequently ensued), that he might be the first-born among many brethren.”—Rom. viii. 29. Consistently with this view, we read, in the passage immediately preceding the text,—“When the fulness of the time was come, God sent forth his Son, made of a woman, made under the law, to redeem them that were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons” (verses 4, 5). Adoption is consequent upon the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, and the outpouring of the Holy Spirit, and effected by the impartation of the same. A patrician, for example, sets his affection upon the son of a plebeian, and mentally resolves to make that child his heir; but until the resolution is carried into effect, and the legal formalities completed, neither the boy himself nor

those with whom he associates may be aware of the distinction which is designed for him. So, in the eye of the Omniscient, the elect are his children from all eternity, sunk though they may be in the mire of corruption, or steeped to the lips in superstition; but neither in the apprehension of themselves nor of those around them do they belong to the household of God, until they are introduced by the conferring upon them of the Spirit of adoption. “We ourselves also were sometimes foolish, disobedient, deceived, serving divers lusts and pleasures, living in malice and envy, hateful, and hating one another. But *after that the kindness and love of God our Saviour toward man appeared*, not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us, *by the washing of regeneration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost*; which he shed on us abundantly through Jesus Christ our Saviour; that *being justified by his grace, we should be made heirs.*”—Tit. iii. 3, *et seq.**

All Scripture testifies to the same truth, that adoption properly so called had no existence, save in the contemplation of Deity, anterior to the resurrection of Jesus Christ, and the outpouring of the Holy Spirit by him. And consequently Calvin’s assertion, that “adoption preceded the testimony of adoption given by the Holy Spirit,” is not scripturally correct. Sonship, indeed, did; and of that, the sending of the Spirit of his Son into their hearts was at once the evidence and the seal. And indeed the testimony of the Apostle in this place (accepting even Calvin’s own interpretation of it) amounts to no more than this—“*because ye are sons*, God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying Abba, Father,”—an evidence, not of *pre-existing adoption*, but of *pre-existing sonship*.

ἃ Τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, ‘the Spirit of his Son.’ It is the uniform practice of commentators, ancient and modern, to assume that τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ designates clearly and exclusively the third person of the blessed Trinity, and many arguments for the distinct personality of the Holy Ghost have been founded upon this assumption. Notwithstanding the venerable nature of the authority, I hope I may be permitted, without incurring the imputation of presumption, to suggest that the phrase may be susceptible of a different interpretation without violating any sound canon of Scripture.

Whether ὅτι be understood *causally* or *demonstratively*, it is upon all hands agreed that the reception of the Spirit in question is here adduced in proof of *existing sonship*. Now whether, I ask, is the proof of existing sonship more directly and effectively sustained by pointing to the presence of the Holy Ghost within us, in *his distinct and several personality*, or to the existence of a *filial nature*, which God hath graciously implanted in ourselves? I should answer unhesitatingly—the latter. But, after all, is it the voice of *the Holy Ghost* which is heard

* It is observable that in this passage, as well as throughout the entire of the Epistle to the Galatians, the Apostle uses “the *washing of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost*,” and the “*being justified by his grace*,” as expressions of similar intent, the former being, as it seems, effective of the latter.—See also 1 Cor. vi. 11; 1 Tim. iii. 16.

within, exclaiming, “Abba, Father;” or is it not the outpouring of *the regenerated spirit*, which, from the seat of spiritual life, addresses its heavenly Father in accents of confidence and love? We are referred to the eighth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, verse 9, as furnishing incontestible evidence of the assumed identity, where *πνεῦμα Θεοῦ* and *πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ* are, as we are informed, used interchangeably. But let us examine that passage attentively, and see whether the position so confidently laid down is as satisfactorily sustained.

The indwelling of *τὸ πνεῦμα Θεοῦ* is in that passage referred to by the Apostle as proof that we are *ἐν πνεύματι*, or, in other words, ‘in a state of regeneration’—“If *the Spirit of God dwelleth in you*, ye are not *in the flesh*, but *in the spirit*.” And so far there can be no question, that by ‘the Spirit of God’ is to be understood the third person of the blessed Trinity. But it is immediately subjoined that “if any man have not the *Spirit of Christ*, he is none of His.” Who will venture to affirm that these are unquestionably convertible terms? or, in other words, that ‘the Spirit of God’ and ‘the Spirit of Christ’ (equivalent to ‘the Spirit of His Son’) are necessarily identical? What, if it be alleged that it is not the Spirit of God in his distinct individuality which is here denominated “the Spirit of Christ,” but (as indeed the words themselves indicate) ‘the *indwelling* Spirit of God,’ that is, the Holy Ghost in intimate and indissoluble alliance with the human spirit, *abiding* within, not as a visitor, but as a resident—a complex nature, neither simply divine nor simply human, but a union of the two natures, such as constitutes God’s children ‘a new creation’—‘inheritors of Deity’—‘partakers of the divine nature’—‘one spirit with the Lord’? Can any one deny that such a privilege appertains to the adopted family in Christ? And if it does, what prohibits that it should be recognised and expressed in the phrases under consideration—“the Spirit of Christ” and “the Spirit of His (i. e. God’s) Son”?

But, farther, we find the same spirit, a few verses forward, designated “the Spirit of adoption, whereby (*wherein*) we cry, Abba, Father,” Rom. viii. 15. Whatever be the nature of this spirit, it is unquestionably the same spirit which in the Epistle before us is described as “the Spirit of his Son, crying Abba, Father.” But what spirit, again I ask, is it? It is pointedly contrasted with ‘the spirit of bondage:’ “ye have not received *the spirit of bondage* again to fear, but ye have received *the Spirit of adoption*, whereby (*wherein*) we cry, Abba, Father.” Have we not reason to apprehend that these two expressions indicate two distinct and opposite conditions of the human spirit—the one while in bondage under the dominion of sin, and Satan, and the law, sensibly obnoxious to condemnation, and by reason thereof maintained in a state of perpetual disquietude and alarm; the other while translated by the bestowal of the Holy Ghost from the bondage of the natural estate into the liberty of an adopted son, and consequently exulting in the new-born privilege of love and devotedness to its heavenly Father? And if such be its meaning there, what is to hinder its representing ‘*the renovated spirit*’ in the passage under consideration?

But a further testimony awaits us. In Rom. viii. 15, the Apostle had referred to "the Spirit of adoption, *whereby (wherein) we cry, Abba, Father,*" precisely as he has done here, in evidence of our being "the sons of God." But anticipating, apparently, the objection that the testimony of the spirit that is within us to our adopted sonship, evinced by the cry, "Abba, Father," might not, from the fallible nature of the witness, be admitted as reliable evidence as to the fact affirmed, the Apostle establishes the unimpeachable character of the testimony, by the declaration that it is not, as it might seem to us, the fallible testimony of man's spirit that we have to rely upon in such a case, but the joint testimony with it of the Spirit of God. "The Spirit itself *cotestifieth with our spirit* that we are the children of God." So that the spirit of sonship, as enunciated in the cry, "Abba, Father," is the testimony of the Holy Spirit and of our spirit *conjointly*, which therefore *conjointly* constitute what is here denominated "the Spirit of adoption." "The Spirit of adoption" then, which, from the nature of the act attributed to it, is identical with "the spirit of His Son," may be none other, we conclude, than '*the Spirit of God in eternal fellowship with our spirit*; or, in other words, '*the regenerated human spirit.*' (For more upon this subject, see verse 19 °.)

° 'Αββὰ ὁ πατήρ, 'Abba, the Father.' Manifold are the conjectures which have been offered as to the ground of association of these terms. "Ὁ πατήρ, the Greek explanation of the Aramaic 'Αββὰ' (Beza, Alford); "An intimation that calling upon God is common to all nations and languages, *Hebræum verbum ad Judæos, Græcum ad gentes pertinet*" (Aug., Calvin); "The *solemnis formula* of the early Christian prayers" (Ellicott). But it is plain that none of these explanations go to the root of the matter; for none of them account for the formula as it is used by our blessed Lord himself (Mark, xiv. 36), and no solution can be accepted as satisfactory that does not reach that case. That ὁ πατήρ is no explanation of the Aramaic 'Αββὰ in the passage in St. Mark's Gospel, may be confidently asserted; for though many such explanations are interspersed throughout the New Testament Scriptures, they are invariably introduced in a different form, ὃ ἐστὶ μεθερμηνευόμενον, or the like (see Matt. i. 23; Mark, v. 41; xv. 22; Acts, iv. 36), so that we are constrained to look out for another and more competent explanation.

It seems not unreasonable to apprehend that, in accordance with the strict use of the cases (vocative and nominative), the former alone is to be regarded as 'invocation,' the latter as 'designation'—the former as the affectionate recognition, on the part of Jesus Christ, of the eternal and immutable relationship subsisting between him and the Father; the latter, as the designation of the character in which He presently addresses Him. Had the expression occurred, 'Αββὰ ὁ κτιστής, we should instinctively have apprehended that, though approaching God as father, it was nevertheless not in His paternal but in His creative relationship that the request was made to him. As if a king's son were to address his sire in these terms, πάτερ ὁ βασιλεύς, we would be at no loss to perceive that

the first was but the simple expression of the relationship in which they stood one towards the other, as father and son, while it was to his regal bounty or clemency that the appeal was made.

So likewise in our Saviour's address to God, 'Αββὰ ὁ πατήρ, we understand that in assuming manhood the original relationship was not dissolved, He being the eternal Son of an eternal Father; nevertheless, that it was not in that, but in the *covenant* relationship in which He stands towards His church (of which Jesus Christ was the representative and head—"I will be his father, and he shall be my son," 2 Sam. vii. 14)—that the approach was made unto him. In recognition of the same covenant relationship it was that our blessed Lord instructed his disciples when they prayed to say, "*Our Father*, which art in heaven," the common Father of the collective body in Christ. And when St. Paul would invoke the choicest blessings upon his Ephesian converts, he bows the knee (as he informs them) "*unto the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ*," intimating thereby that it was in virtue of that covenant relationship subsisting between God and his Son Jesus Christ (including therein all who are incorporated with Him), that the request was either preferred or granted. When, therefore, the soul, through the origination of the Spirit of adoption, is admitted into mystic fellowship with Christ, then, and not till then, is it entitled to approach God in the assured and familiar attitude indicated in these terms, 'Αββὰ ὁ πατήρ. Such is the idea that presents itself to my mind; however, upon this mysterious subject I desire to be understood to speak with diffidence and reserve.

We have already seen that 'the Spirit of adoption,' 'the Spirit of His (i. e. God's) son,' 'the Spirit of Christ,' are all used to designate the same subject, (—possibly, 'the regenerated human spirit'); we are now to inquire, what is the state of experience intimated in these terms,—“crying, Abba, Father.” Are we to understand thereby, 'a filial disposition towards God, evincing itself in a general love and admiration of His authority, and a dutiful obedience and submission to His holy will, such as characterizes the great body of those who, in the estimation of the church, are regarded as sincere believers'? or are we to take them to signify such a *sensible* and undoubting acquaintance with the fact of relationship to God as falls to the lot of comparatively but few? The purpose for which it is introduced by the Apostle—as *evidence* of existing sonship, and its association with 'the testimony of the Spirit' in the corresponding passage in the eighth of Romans, would strongly incline to the latter opinion; and then the question arises, is it to be inferred from the language of this passage that no person is to be accounted a child of God who has not an undoubting acquaintance with, or, as it is commonly called, a *full assurance* of, the fact of his sonship?

Such appears to have been the opinion of Calvin. In commenting upon these words he writes:—"Let it be observed that Paul ascribes this invariably to all Christians; for where this pledge of the Divine love towards us is wanting, there is assuredly no faith." And again, referring to the opposition which this doctrine meets with in the world,

he expresses himself thus:—"It is the more necessary to fix in our minds this doctrine of Paul, that no man is a Christian who has not learned by the teaching of the Holy Ghost to call God his Father."—CALVIN, *in loco*. But if this be a correct reading of God's holy word, and if it go the length ascribed to it above, which we have every reason to think that it does, then are the Lord's people but a little flock indeed, for few there are amongst them who are blessed with so high and happy a privilege.

But such an exposition is not necessary to the establishment of the Apostle's argument in this place: that *any* persons in the Galatian church should have been so favoured, was sufficient to attest that the time of adoption had arrived, and that the Spirit of adoption had manifested itself in the church. At the same time it is probable that the privilege in question (in common with the other *sensible* demonstrations of the Spirit) was much more extensively diffused in the early day than now, being peculiarly adapted to the exigency of the infant church in the many and sore trials to which it was exposed; even as in our own times it seems, principally, reserved for the support and consolation of the saints in their last mortal conflict, or while in cells and dungeons they are wearing out a miserable existence "for the word of God, and for the testimony of Jesus Christ."

But that such an experience is indispensable to salvation appears to be wholly at variance with the general testimony of Scripture. The truth inculcated in the Bible uniformly is, that *faith alone* saves—"he that *believeth* shall be saved," and "he that *believeth not* shall be damned:" yet how many are there who give unquestionable evidence of a sincere, scriptural, faith, who have never attained to this blessed stage of Christian experience—persons who are really and deeply interested in the things of God; have a spiritual perception of the exceeding sinfulness of sin, and their own vileness by reason of it; a clear apprehension of the suitableness of Christ as a Redeemer, to deliver them from the claims of the law; who look to Him, cleave to Him, trust in Him, hope in Him, for His sake have made a willing surrender of everything which constitutes the world's happiness and the world's good, and, if such a sacrifice were required at their hands, are ready to lay down their lives themselves in attestation of the truth they love; who, nevertheless, for lack of the inward testimony of which we speak, are going mourning all the day long, like the Jews in the land of their captivity, when they sat down by the waters of Babylon hanging their harps upon the willow-trees, unable "to sing the Lord's song in a strange land"!

All those passages, again, which speak of 'a day of small things,' of 'babes in Christ,' of 'growth in grace and in the knowledge of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ'—those, again, which distribute the Lord's people upon a graduated scale of spiritual advancement, 'little children, young men, fathers'—all these go directly to prove that 'sonship' is a grace altogether distinct from 'assurance;' that many are partakers of the one who, at least for the time being, have no experience of the other; as indeed St. John plainly intimates, when he informs his little

children (1 John, v. 13), "these things have I written unto *you that believe* on the name of the Son of God, *that ye may know* that ye have eternal life"—a grace, consequently, which does not necessarily accompany salvation.

Sonship is one thing, the knowledge of it another. Without it, indeed, no man can be justified, sanctified, or have eternal life abiding in him: "If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His;" but to "cry, Abba, Father" (at least in the impressive sense here attributed to it), is a privilege conferred upon few. The one is necessarily connected with salvation, the other is not; though with much of the comfort and fruitfulness of God's children it, unquestionably, is. When the Spirit testifies to the work of grace within, there is "joy unspeakable and full of glory;" there is holy boldness and confidence in our approaches to the mercy-seat; there is strength and freedom in the discharge of all our duties—prelibations of that eternal happiness which awaits us upon the heavenly shore, where we "shall see face to face," and "shall know even as also we are known"—a bliss which is unalterably ours, of which not all the powers of earth or hell can despoil us, for the testimony of the Spirit of adoption is an *infallible* testimony. Men, indeed, may make a boast of assurance which they never feel, or they may go the length even of deceiving their own selves, flattering themselves that they are His, while in deed and in truth they neither know God nor keep his commandments, and, falling away from grace, bring religion and the truth of the gospel into disrepute. But our delinquencies or our delusions cannot vitiate the force of the Apostle's reasoning, who is treating of things as they are, and not as they are not. The testimony of the Spirit of adoption can never deceive us; for it is not, as we have just seen, the testimony of erring man, but the irrefragable testimony of God. "The Spirit cotestifieth with our spirit that we are the children of God;" and if any man hath not this testimony, it is his duty earnestly to seek it, for unquestionably it is one of those "spiritual blessings" which God bestows upon his adopted family in Christ.

VERSE 7.—"Ὡστε, 'so then'—consequence from the preceding statement, 'so then, these things being so, it follows.' The statement in the preceding verse had been to the effect, that the presence of the Spirit of adoption in the church, crying, 'Abba, Father,' was *a proof of sonship*, consequently it follows, "that ye are no more a servant, but a son." The transition in this place from the plural to the singular number is worthy of observation. It is generally attributed to a desire to make the address more personal and cogent, many examples of which in the writings of St. Paul are adduced by Ellicott (such as Rom. xi. 17; xii. 20; xiii. 4; 1 Cor. iv. 7, &c.). Meyer, indeed, considers that "this individualization has been gradually proceeding from verse 5—ἀπολάβωμεν—ἐστε—εἶ."—ALFORD. That such a grammatical graduation does indeed appear upon the face of the Scripture is unquestionable, yet I can discover no trace of a purposed individualization; nor, if such there were, could I account for its hasty abandonment in the following verses, where the address becomes certainly not less personal and cogent. I rather

take it to be a return to the general form of instruction adopted in the early part of this chapter (see verses 1 and 2), in which *δοῦλος*, *υἱός*, *κληρονόμος* are to be received as abstract terms, denoting 'state or condition,' irrespective of any idea of personality—'God having sent forth the Spirit of His Son into your hearts, then is your condition changed; it is no longer that of a servant (verse 1), but of a son; and if a son, then an heir of God, through Christ.'—See ch. iii. 29.

^b *Οὐκέτι*, 'no longer.' Antecedently to their adoption in Christ, the Gentile world, as well as the Jews, were in bondage (*δεδουλωμένοι*, ver. 3), not indeed to Jehovah, the only true God, but to "those who by nature were no gods;" both alike, however, under one common denomination, "the elements of the world." But now that they had attained unto the dignity of sonship, that bondage was dissolved—'ye are no longer in the condition of a servant, but of a son.'

^c *Εἰ δὲ υἱός, καὶ κληρονόμος*, 'and if a son, also an heir.' No allusion I am persuaded is intended in these words to any human institution whatsoever, Roman, Greek, or Hebrew (Ellicott *e contra*), but a simple announcement founded upon the circumstances of the case—'If a son of God, as evidenced by the Spirit of adoption, then an heir of the promised inheritance in Christ.' Any reference to the laws of succession in different countries being absolutely out of place—'if a son, then an heir,' not merely *de jure*, of some expected inheritance, but *de facto*, and *in presenti*, of the inheritance promised in Christ—'If a son, also an heir, and heir as being a son.' A similar argument is presented at chap. iii. 26, *et seq.*—'Ye are all sons of God by the faith which is *in Christ* (*locus standi*, as we have before seen). For as many of you as have been baptized into Christ *have put on Christ*; and if ye are Christ's (that is, 'members of Christ'), then *are ye* Abraham's seed, *and heirs* of the promised blessing'—an inheritance to be enjoyed, not only in futurity, but now.

^d *Κληρονόμος Θεοῦ*, 'an heir of God,' gen. objecti. We have reason to apprehend that here, as also in the corresponding passage, Rom. viii. 17, *Θεοῦ* represents the inheritance with which, as God's adopted children in Christ, we are presently endowed—'God.' In the Epistle to the Ephesians (chap. i. 11) we read—"In whom also we have obtained an inheritance;" where but little argument is required to show that the antecedent to 'whom' is not, as is generally supposed, Christ, but God. We have therefore *an inheritance in God*, a statement which is confirmed in the sequel (verses 13, 14)—"Ye were sealed with that Holy Spirit of promise which is the earnest of our inheritance until the redemption of the purchased possession"—where, upon the acknowledged principle that 'an earnest' and that of which it is an earnest are *in kind* the same, the inheritance of which the Holy Ghost is an earnest must be—*God*. And the substance of the passage is this—that 'having been made partakers of the Divine nature' now, a farther and more abundant measure shall be conferred upon us at that glorious era, the resurrection from the dead.'

A dim foreshadowing of this sublime truth may be discovered in the

Old Testament history, where the Levites, the tribe of *the first-born, a holy priesthood*, the type of the elect church, were allotted no inheritance in Israel, upon the express plea that “the Lord God of Israel was their inheritance, as he said unto them” (Joshua, xiii. 33). Nor was David probably incognizant of his privilege, when in the spirit of prophecy he exclaimed—“The Lord is the portion of mine inheritance and of my cup” (Psalm xvi. 5). But however dimly it may be shadowed forth in the Old Testament, there is no obscurity overhanging it in the New. In the Epistle before us we are plainly informed that the blessing promised to Abraham was no other than the Holy Spirit (chap. iii. 14), which is accordingly styled “the inheritance” (ch. iii. 18). And admitting this to be the case, there can be no difficulty in entertaining the conclusion that ‘an inheritor of the Holy Ghost’ is equivalent to ‘an heir of God.’

• Διὰ Χριστοῦ, ‘through Christ.’ Hence we learn that the inheritance above mentioned is attainable only *through Christ*—not merely through the intervention of, but through communion with, Christ. In the immutable purpose of God, before the foundations of the world were laid, He predestinated the church (*εἰς υἰοθεσίαν*) to the adoption of sons (the admission to the privilege of sonship), *by Jesus Christ*, to himself, Eph. i. 5. Pursuant to that purpose, He communicated the gracious tidings to Abraham in these words:—“*In thy seed shall all nations be blessed;*” which have been abundantly proved throughout the entire of this Epistle to signify, ‘*in Christ shall all nations receive the Holy Ghost.*’ Accordingly, when the time for the fulfilment had arrived, the Apostle assures the Galatians that, “if ye be Christ’s (i. e. members of his body), then are ye Abraham’s seed, and *heirs according to promise*”—that is, in plain terms, “heirs of God (*διὰ Χριστοῦ*), through Christ.”

Κληρονόμος διὰ Θεοῦ, the reading adopted by Ellicott and Alford in the stead of κληρονόμος Θεοῦ διὰ Χριστοῦ, the *textus receptus*, has but little apparently to recommend it; for independently of the fact, that the argument from authority is not very decidedly in its favour (see Bloomfield, *in loco*), it is open to the serious objection, that it adopts an expression which is nowhere else to be met with in Scripture (for the inheritance is never represented as coming διὰ Θεοῦ), to the displacement of one which is, substantially at least, of repeated occurrence, and most peculiarly apposite (if not indeed absolutely indispensable) to the development of the Apostle’s reasoning in this place. It is to be recollected that, to conduct the reader to the conclusion that we are heirs of God, or recipients of the Holy Spirit, *only through Christ*, is the main scope and intent of this portion of the Epistle. The Galatians had sought to become Abraham’s seed, and obtain the inheritance, *through circumcision and the works of the law*. The Apostle assures them that it is only attainable *through faith*, whereby they are made members of *Christ*, and *heirs according to promise*. Having conducted them so far in the preceding chapter (verse 29), he diverges from the direct course in the commencement of the present, to explain more fully the pæda-

gogic character of the law, which he had glanced at but cursorily before, and the nature and intent of the obligation which it imposed upon its subjects until the period of their emancipation had arrived. But God having sent forth the Spirit of his Son into their hearts, the office of the law ceased, and they were no longer in the condition of a servant, but of a son; and if a son, then an "heir of God (the promised inheritance), *through Christ*"—the very point from which he had diverged, and to which, according to his invariable usage, he now reverts, in order to resume the direct thread of his discourse. Any *varia lectio* which would have the effect of disturbing this arrangement should, upon that ground alone, be regarded with suspicion; but, when weighed against one which effectually sustains it, should be rejected unhesitatingly as light.*

VERSE 8.—^a Ἀλλὰ τότε, κ. τ. λ., 'but then,' &c. Dr. Bloomfield incorrectly dates what he terms the "conversio sermonis," or change of address to the Gentile portion of the church, from this verse; whereas, in point of fact it has taken place two verses farther back, where the Apostle himself has marked the transition by a change from the first person to the second—ἀλλὰ adversative, and in the highest degree antithetical. There were manifestly two conditions present to the Apostle's mind when writing this passage—the 'then' when ye were servants—the 'now' that ye are sons. 'Then ye served "them who by nature are no gods," through ignorance of the true God; but now "that ye have known God," how can ye return again to the base and beggarly elements of mundane worship? Then indeed there might have been some excuse for your folly, for ye did it ignorantly in unbelief; but now it is inexcusable, being nothing short of apostasy from the living and true God.' Such appears to be the force of the contrast introduced by ἀλλὰ.

^b Οὐκ εἰδότες, 'not having known,' and consequently 'not knowing.' It was no peculiarity of the Galatian church that, in their unconverted state, they knew not God; such ignorance was proverbial of the whole Gentile world—"The Gentiles who knew not God." Not but that there existed amongst the Gentile nations learned and philosophical individuals, who employed their unrivalled talents in seeking and searching after God. Human nature had perhaps attained its culminating point of intellectual grandeur previous to our Lord's appearing in the flesh. Greece and Italy had produced men never surpassed, and seldom equal-

* Some little perplexity is apt to arise in the mind upon such expressions as these, "heirs of God," "joint heirs with Christ," being applied to the children of promise, and the privilege to which they are entitled being styled an "inheritance;" but the solution of the difficulty will be found in the interpretation above offered, that *the substance* of the inheritance is God, the blessing promised to Abraham and his "seed;" and that the application of the terms "heirs," "inheritance," originated in the mode whereby that blessing is to be attained, namely, as being *the seed* of him to whom the promise was made, a position attainable in Christ, the natural descendant of Abraham. The blessing, then, being to be attained by descent, is hence styled an "inheritance," and they who attain it "heirs:" "if ye be Christ's, then are ye *Abraham's seed*, and heirs according to the promise." See verse 29 of last chapter.

led, in the various departments of science and literature to which they devoted themselves; yet all their acquirements served only to point a moral, and to illustrate a truth, that “the world by wisdom knew not God,” nor ever could know Him. By the survey of the heavens above, and of the earth beneath their feet, and by the minute investigation of the multitudinous traces of the unseen Architect which surrounded them on every side, they might indeed, and they did, infer “the eternal power and Godhead” of the Creator, so as to leave them without excuse for the dishonour done unto his name. But a God whose character was ‘love’—the prevailing attribute of whose nature, mercy—whose most cherished appellation was, “The Lord God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering, and abundant in goodness and truth, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity transgression and sin,” was to them an “unknown God.” And unknown He will continue to be even in the blaze of gospel light, until that He “who commanded the light to shine out of darkness shall shine in their hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God *in the face of Jesus Christ.*”

‘Τοῖς μὴ φύσει οὖσιν θεοῖς,’ ‘to those who are not by nature gods.’ Τοῖς φύσει μὴ οὖσιν θεοῖς, the order, with some show of authority, adopted by recent editors, differs but immaterially from the *textus receptus*. The distinction advanced by Ellicott as a ground of preference, namely, that the text preferred conveys “an unconditional denial of their being gods at all,” whereas the *textus receptus* implies that “the false gods were thought to be true gods, though not naturally so,” seems more apparent than real; the introduction of φύσει involuntarily establishing a contrast between ‘those who were by nature gods,’ and ‘those who, though not naturally gods, were so regarded by men;’ to which latter class the parties before us are, by the negation, assigned. But even admitting the distinction to be a valid one, yet could it not afford any sufficient ground of preference; for unquestionably there were reputed—however erroneously reputed—deities amongst the heathen (see 1 Cor. viii. 5); and the recognition of that fact could not be objected as a fault, or a disparagement to the *textus receptus*. Alford’s translation of the improved (?) text, “to gods which by nature exist not,” is an admissible translation, and conveys somewhat more of an “unconditional denial of their being gods at all,” than that adopted by Ellicott.

But in my judgment both the reading and the rendering of the Authorized Version are altogether unexceptionable. A contrast is manifestly instituted between Jehovah, the self-existent Being, truly and essentially divine, and those imaginary deities which were the object of heathen worship, which, having no feature of divinity about them, “were not *by nature* gods,”—“A true description (as M’Knight observes) of the idols worshipped by the heathens; for either they had no existence, being mere creatures of the imagination, or, if any of them existed, they were dead men or evil spirits, or the luminaries of the heavens, deified by human folly; and, being destitute of divine perfections, they were utterly incapable of bestowing any blessing whatever on their worshippers.”—M’KNIGHT, *in loco*.

Such was the idolatry of the heathen world; but idolatry of a more subtle character prevails amongst ourselves. The charge comes home with unabated force to every professing Christian who sets his affections upon any other object than God. Every unconverted man serves those “who are not by nature gods.” Much as he may ridicule and despise the misshapen deities of heathendom, or much as he may inveigh against and condemn the scarcely less revolting idolatry of Rome, he is himself an idolater at heart (and under aggravating circumstances), until by the grace of God he is brought to know Him, whom to know is life eternal, and “to count all things but loss, for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus the Lord.”

VERSE 9.—^a ΓΝΩΝΤΕΣ Θεόν, ‘having known God.’ Γινώσκω coupled with Θεόν, denotes here, as it does uniformly in the New Testament, not merely a formal, external acquaintance with the existence and attributes of deity, but an inward experimental knowledge of God, *including admiration and love*—such knowledge, in short, as accompanies salvation, according to the tenor of the declaration, “This is life eternal, to know thee (ἵνα γινώσκωσί σε), the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent,” John, xvii. 3. Nor is it necessary to understand the affirmation in this verse to extend to all professing members of the Galatian church—it is enough for the purpose of the Apostle that some amongst them should be so endowed, whilst the profession was general—no more than it was necessary, at verse 6, to suppose that the Spirit of adoption was poured forth indiscriminately upon all, and that they were all, consequently, sons. Some amongst them could cry from the bottom of their heart, “Abba, Father,” sufficient to attest that the time of adoption had arrived, and that the gospel of the grace of God had reached even unto them, and was bringing forth fruit, as it did in all the world.

^b Μᾶλλον δὲ γνωσθέντες, ‘but rather having been known.’ The Apostle, having predicated of the Galatian church “γνόντες Θεόν,” immediately withdraws, as it were, the expression, and substitutes in its place γνωσθέντες ὑπο Θεοῦ, where the participle passive is evidently to be understood in the sense, of ‘being made the objects of knowledge,’ that species of knowledge which exhibits itself in beneficence and love (see last note); a sense in which the verb occurs also in the Septuagint: “You have I known (ὑμᾶς ἐγνων) of all the families of the earth,” Amos, iii. 2—where God’s peculiar knowledge of the Jewish people is inexplicable upon any other theory, but that He had made them the objects of his distinguishing favour and love. A similar use, apparently, of the word, is to be found in 1 Cor. viii. 3—“If any man love God, the same is *known* (ἐγνωσται) of him,” where the love of man to God seems to be attributed to *the preventing love* of God to man, according to the principle established by St. John—“We love Him, because he first loved us,” 1 John, iv. 19. See also Rom. viii. 29—“Whom He did foreknow (προέγνω) He also did predestinate.”*

* “The *knowledge* of Christ is to be understood as including all the affections which

Such, also, appears to have been the impression of Calvin;—"Paul reminds the Galatians, whence they had derived the knowledge of God. He affirms that they did not obtain it by their own exertions, by the acuteness or industry of their own minds, but because, when they were at the farthest possible remove from thinking of Him, God *visited them in his mercy*. What is said of the Galatians may be extended to all, for in all are fulfilled the words of Isaiah, 'I am sought by them that asked not for me, I am found by them that sought me not' (Isai., lxxv. 1). The origin of our calling is the election of God, which predestinated us to life before we are born; on this depends our calling, our faith, our whole salvation."—CALVIN, *in loco*.*

It is to be observed, that the insertion of *γνόντες* in the first instance, is not to be regarded as a lapsus plumæ, subsequently amended by the substitution of *γνωσθέντες*. But having selected the most suitable expression (*γνόντες Θεόν*) to describe the present condition of the Galatian church as he desired to present it, lest any misconception should arise as to the mode of its attainment, the Apostle immediately subjoins, by way of substitution, *γνωσθέντες ὑπὸ Θεοῦ*, whereby the origination of the power is distinctly attributed to God, and not to man, the two phrases, however, conjointly conveying the full meaning which he designed to impart—the Christian's love to God, dependent upon the preventing love of God to him.

* *Ἐπιστρέφετε πάλιν*, 'turn ye again.' The "weak and beggarly elements" contemplated in this passage are doubtless 'the institutions of the Mosaic law,' similar in kind to those practised by the heathen world,

ought to flow from it. In Scripture both His *knowledge* of His people and their *knowledge* of Him bears this pregnant sense. When He is said to *know* them, it is meant that He knows them as His; and His gracious favour and love towards them as His own are included in the meaning of the expression. And so, when they are said to *know* Him, it must be meant that they acknowledge and feel their relation to Him; and the feelings on their part which suit that relation are also intended to be conveyed in the phrase. And accordingly this is the language in which the Lord expresses the relation on both sides: 'I am the good shepherd, and *know* my sheep, and *am known* of mine,' John, x. 14. See, too, how this knowledge of Him is made the characteristic of believers, John, xvii. 3, 8, 25."—Bishop O'Brien "on the Nature and Effects of Faith," note L., page 390, second edition.

* In what point of view Ellicott regards the word (*γνωσθέντες*) it is not easy to discover: he tells us—"in the usual and regular meaning of the word in the New Test., 'known,' 'recognised,'" which he explains thus—"before the time of their conversion, the Galatians were not known of God—had not become the objects of His divine knowledge; now they were known by Him, and endowed with spiritual gifts." But how the Galatians were not 'known by God' before their conversion, except in the sense above attributed to it—'loved, and made the objects of His distinguishing favour,' it is not easy to comprehend; not in the sense 'approved of,' or even 'acknowledged as His own' which, besides that they are theologically objectionable, are expressly repudiated by himself. We are referred to 1 Cor. viii. 3, xiii. 12, as exhibiting the sense in which the Dean prefers to take it; but one of these passages is the same which I have already adduced as an instance of the highest acceptation of the term (—loved, and made the objects of His divine favour); and the other is incapable of any meaning that I can see, except the ordinary one, 'to understand' or attain to the knowledge of a truth.

hence designated, in common with them (ver. 3), “rudiments of the world,” in embracing which, instead of the spiritual services to which they were called, the Galatians might with truth be said ‘to *return again* to weak and beggarly elements.’

^d Ἀσθενῇ καὶ πτωχὰ στοιχεῖα—“ἀσθενῇ as having no power to justify or promote salvation—πτωχὰ as having no such dowry of spiritual gifts and blessings. Compare Heb. viii. 18.”—ELLICOTT.

^e Πάλιν ἀνωθεν, ‘again anew.’ M’Knight, to avoid redundancy, translates ἀνωθεν—“from the first;” representing “the Galatians as attached ever since their conversion to their formal carnal worship.” But such an explanation ill accords with the expressed astonishment of the Apostle (ch. i. 6); with the favourable reception given to himself and his doctrine adverted to in verse 15 of this chapter; and indeed with the distinct avowal, “ye did run well, who did hinder you?” ch. v. 7; all which clearly establish the fact, that no such hankering after ritual observances existed amongst them from the beginning.

Ellicott (and with him, apparently, Alford—“afresh”) regards πάλιν and ἀνωθεν as “expressive of two distinct ideas—*relapse* to bondage, and *recommencement* of its principles. The Galatians had been slaves to the στοιχεῖα in the form of heathenism; now they were desirous to enslave themselves *again* to the στοιχεῖα, and to commence them anew in the form of Judaism.”—ELLICOTT. But if πάλιν and ἀνωθεν are to be regarded as expressive of two distinct ideas, I should be inclined to take ἀνωθεν in the sense—‘from above,’ that is ‘from a higher position’ than that to which they desired again to return. In tracing the development of the great scheme of redemption, we find a gradual progress from beneath upwards—from things sensible and earthly, to things spiritual and heavenly. The “ministration of the Spirit” was an infinitely more advanced and spiritual system than that which preceded it, which is said to have “had no glory in this respect, by reason of the glory which excelleth.” The resumption of “the weak and beggarly elements” in the guise of Judaism, would be a manifest *descent* from the high and privileged position of the adopted heir, a descent which may not improbably be intimated and described in the use of the word ἀνωθεν. But, as we find the same combination of terms employed (Wisdom, xix. 6, LXX.), where no separate or distinct ideas can be attributed to them, I feel bound to regard them as a familiar idiomatic expression, the latter word being used to strengthen and intensify the former.

^f Δουλεύειν θέλετε, ‘ye desire to serve,’ or ‘to be in bondage.’ Θέλω may possibly in this connexion denote ‘to will,’ or ‘to choose,’ and not, as it is usually translated, ‘to wish,’ or ‘to desire,’ the object to which it refers being matter of ‘present engagement’ (*ye observe* days and months), rather than of ‘prospective desideration.’ But, the secession from gospel liberty being as yet incomplete, it is safer perhaps to adhere to the ordinary interpretation, “ye desire to serve.”

VERSE 10.—^g Παρατηρεῖσθε, ‘ye studiously observe.’ “The primary use of παρὰ in this verb is apparently *local*, and by implication *intensive*, *scil.*, ‘standing close by the side for the purpose of more effectually ob-

serving.”—ELLICOTT. Verification of the statement in the preceding clause, ‘ye are desirous to return again to the weak and beggarly elements; witness your scrupulous observance of days, and months, and seasons and years.’

^b Ἡμέρας καὶ μῆνας, κ. τ. λ. That this affirmation is to be limited to Jewish feasts and holidays, the whole tenor of the Apostle’s argument seems distinctly to show. There is no intimation expressed or implied of any tendency on the part of the Galatian church to relapse to the observance of heathen rites or ordinances properly so called; much less is there reference to the Sabbath, or Christian festivals, of which we read nothing in this connexion, which only applies to the observances of the Jewish law, with a superstitious assumption of which the Galatians are distinctly charged, and which act of inconsideration it is that has given occasion to the present remonstrance. M’Knight’s account of these terms, in the absence of any certain knowledge upon the subject may perhaps be deemed sufficiently precise:—“By days the Apostle means the Jewish weekly Sabbaths, fasts, &c., by moons their new moons, by seasons their annual festivals, and by years, their sabbatical years and jubilees.” Alford indeed states his belief that “each of these words is not minutely to be pressed, but all taken together as a rhetorical description of those who observed times and seasons.” But to urge (as he does) a presumed “rhetorical description,” conceived in terms characteristically Jewish, and introduced into a context wholly conversant with Jewish rites and ceremonies with a return to which, alone, the Galatians were charged, as an argument against “any and every theory of a *Christian Sabbath*,” is as illogical in reasoning, as it is unsound and pernicious in doctrine.

VERSE 11.—^a Φοβοῦμαι ὑμᾶς, ‘I am afraid of you’—ὑμᾶς the ordinary objective case—φοβοῦμαι, middle voice, ‘I am afraid of you for myself,’ or, ‘I fear for myself, on account of you’—definite, independent statement explained by the following words.

^b Μήπως εἰκῇ, κ. τ. λ., ‘lest haply I have expended upon you labour in vain’—explanatory clause; denoting the nature and extent of the apprehension. Μήπως with the indicative after verbs of fearing presents the object as though the writer was apprehensive that it had actually taken place (see Winer, Gr., § lvi. 2, b.); εἰς in its *local* signification, denoting the object *towards* which, and subsequently *upon* which, the labour had been expended. “The Apostle’s labour was directed *to* the Galatians; actually reached them, and so had passed *on* to them.”—ELICOTT. The apprehension expressed in this clause may appear at first sight but insufficiently accounted for by the incitement alleged (ver. 10). But a little reflection will suffice to show, that no censure could be too grave, or no amount of apprehension exaggerated, under the circumstances which had occurred. The leaning of the Galatian mind was, to substitute the merit of superstitious observances for the free salvation of the gospel, to put holy things in the place of Christ, and to expect final justification as the result of their own voluntary services and will-worship, in preference to, and consequently, to the dereliction of, the blood-stained

obedience of God's beloved Son : such error as this might well excite the apprehension that labour had been bestowed on them in vain.

VERSE 12.—We now enter upon a fresh topic, which is carried on through eight successive verses to verse 20, inclusive. In the first section of this chapter, the Apostle had given a more detailed account than in his direct argument (chapter iii.) he had been enabled to do, of the pædagogic character of the law, and the restraint which it imposed upon its subjects antecedently to their adoption in Christ. He next showed that, the Spirit having come, they were delivered from the thralldom of the law into the liberty of the adopted heir, intimating at the same time the danger they should incur, if, after the exalted privileges which they enjoyed they should again relapse into the “weak and beggarly elements” from which they had been so happily delivered.

In a distinct paragraph, he now addresses himself to their affections, in order to recover the authority in the church which through the machinations of the false teachers he had lost. It is quite manifest from the allusions in verses 16 and 17 that, through the artifice of designing and self-seeking men, the honesty and plain dealing of the Apostle had been misconstrued in the Galatian church into an indication of hostility and aversion. “Am I therefore become your enemy (he exclaims), because I tell you the truth?” To remove all such impressions, and re-establish himself in their good graces, he reminds them in the section before us of some affecting incidents in their early intercourse which could never be effaced from his memory, and demands a reciprocity of feeling upon their part, concluding one of the most pathetic appeals to be met with in Holy Scripture, with an expressed desire that ‘he were even now present amongst them, and could change his tone towards them, for indeed he was in great doubt and anxiety concerning them.’

* Γίνεσθε ὡς ἐγὼ. Considerable diversity of opinion has prevailed from the earliest period as to the precise meaning intended to be conveyed in these words. Three principal interpretations appear to have suggested themselves, two of them but slightly differing from one another, but both of them materially differing from the third. The first, which is that propounded by the most ancient commentators, proceeding upon the assumption of the *Judaistic* character of the ὑμεῖς, explains the meaning of the expression thus : ‘become ye free from Judaism as I am, for I was once as ye now are.’ To which “Meyer properly objects that ἡμῶν, which would in this case have to be supplied, must have been *expressed*, as being emphatic.”—ALFORD.

A second, and not very dissimilar interpretation, being that adopted by most modern commentators (Ellicott and Alford included) proceeding upon the recognition of the *Gentile* character of the ὑμεῖς, represents the force of the exhortation to be this : “become ye free from Judaism like me ; for I, though a native Jew, am become (and am) a Gentile like you.”—ELLICOTT. But unquestionably, to give full expression to this sentiment, ἡσθε would be as requisite in connexion with ὑμεῖς, as in the other instance ἡμῶν with ἐγὼ ; for in the condition in which they *now* stood St. Paul could have no possible assimilation with them. Nor will it be

an answer to this objection to say that, though infected with the errors of Judaism, they were nevertheless *Gentiles by birth*; for it is not in their *ethnical*, but their *religious* aspect, as free from the Mosaic yoke, that St. Paul could compare himself with them at all. In any other point of view there could be no sense in the declaration, "I, though a native Jew am become a *Gentile* like you."

The third, which originated with the early school of modern expositors (Luther, Beza, Calvin, Bengel, al.), exhibits the meaning of the Apostle in these words—'love me as (since) I love you,' or 'reciprocate the feeling of affection which I bear towards you;' an idiomatic usage which is fully sustained by scriptural example. When Ahab, king of Israel, inquired of Jehoshaphat, king of Judah (2 Chron. xviii. 3), "Wilt thou go with me to Ramoth-Gilead?" he expressed his full and hearty concurrence in the following terms: "ὡς ἐγὼ οὕτω καὶ σὺ" 'I am as thou art,' that is, 'we are of one heart and one mind upon the subject.' Ellicott objects to this construction "as certainly not in harmony with the use of γίνεσθε, and still less with the context, where *apprehension* (φοβοῦμαι ὑμᾶς) rather than *love* is at present uppermost in the Apostle's thoughts." In what the alleged incongruity as regards γίνεσθε consists, I profess myself at a loss to discover—'become ye kindly affectioned to me, because I have become (and am) kindly affectioned to you,' would seem a very natural, intelligible, and under existing circumstances pertinent, address to the Galatians; and how γίνεσθε is less capable of this usage when applied to the affections, than it is when applied (as the Dean himself understands it) to the religious persuasion of a party, I am unable, I repeat, to explain.

As to the second objection, 'the want of harmony with the context, where apprehension, not love, is the prevailing idea in the Apostle's mind,' it originates in a total misconception of the passage, overlooking the important fact that a complete change of subject has taken place subsequently to the preceding section, where apprehension is the feeling predominant in the Apostle's mind; and that the clause before us is introduced for the express purpose of conciliating the Galatian church by the assurance that his conduct towards them was influenced by no feeling whatsoever but that of the tenderest solicitude and regard, a communication with which 'be ye kindly disposed towards me, for I am so towards you,' is in strict and natural accord. It seems to me, that no sustainable objection can be raised to this construction. The clause in question is locally united with a series of expressions in which every trace of reprehension is studiously laid aside, and with which it is in perfect harmony and good keeping, whereas in the antagonistic versions the reprehensive strain is still supposed to be continued; and to give effect to the exposition, an addition is required to the text (ἡμῶν or ἡσθε as the case may be), which materially affects the sense—an alteration which no sound exposition can need, or no reasonable expositor demand.

^b Ἀδελφοὶ, δέομαι ὑμῶν, 'brethren, I beseech you,'—form of entreaty in connexion with the preceding clause in which the substance of the prayer is contained. In composition such a form ordinarily stands at

the commencement of a sentence; but under the influence of excited feeling or strong emotion a writer is not unfrequently hurried away to give expression to that which is *of the substance* first, leaving that which is *of form* to the last. Chrysostom and all the ancient commentators, following the ordinary usage of composition, unite these words with *the succeeding* context, but evidently they are mistaken; for there is no subject of supplication contained in the words which follow, whereas there is a perfectly intelligible one, and most apposite to the Apostle's purpose, in those which precede. Ellicott remarks that "this passage is curious, as one in which the best ancient and the best modern interpreters are, as happens but very rarely, in direct opposition to each other.

‘Οὐδέν με ἠδικήσατε, ‘ye in no wise injured me.’ No small discussion has arisen upon this clause also, as to *the intent*, and consequently as to *the mode*, of its introduction here. Calvin, followed by Bloomfield and others, explains it thus:—“This is intended to remove the suspicion which might have rendered his former reproofs more disagreeable. . . . So far as respects myself, I have no cause to complain of you. It is not on mine own account, nor from any hostility to you, that I feel warmly; and therefore, if I use strong language, it must arise from some other cause than hatred or anger.”—CALVIN. But though the sense thus attributed to them is not exceptionable in itself, and is even in a measure appropriate, yet from the position which the words occupy in the sentence, they seem to be connected much more naturally and effectively with what follows than with that which precedes. Indeed, I am of opinion that the introduction of a new subject in the antecedent clause effectually severs them from any connexion with ‘the reprehension’ in the preceding verse, that they should be regarded as a defence or an extenuation of it.

Ellicott's notion, that it is an allusion to their past behaviour, as a reason and motive why they should now accede to the entreaty just urged—“ye did not injure me formerly, do not injure me now by refusing to act as I beseech you to act”—appears to me to be puerile and improbable, and to comport very indifferently with the context which follows. Upon what he represents as “the usual interpretation, ‘there is nothing personal between us’ (δηλῶν ὅτι οὐ μίσους οὐδὲ ἐχθρας ἦν τὰ εἰρημένα, Chrys.),” his criticism is just; it is “both exegetically untenable, and grammatically precarious, as implying in ἠδικήσατε either the force of a present or a perfect.” And as to “the interpretation reproduced by Rettig., ‘ye have not injured *me*, but Christ (nihil me privatim læsistis’ Grot.),” “it implies (as he well observes) an emphasis on *με* which does not seem to exist (οὐδέν is surely the emphatic word) and equally tends to infringe the force of the aorist.”—See ELLICOTT, *in loco*.

But there is an explication behind, unnoticed by commentators, of which these words are fully susceptible, in connexion with the clause with which they are locally united, and that without the smallest violation either of grammar or of propriety. The Apostle had just said, ‘be ye kindly affectioned to me, for I am kindly affectioned towards you;’ and to mark the disposition of mind which he bore towards them, he

immediately subjoins, 'ye never injured me at all; on the contrary, ye showed me the most marked and disinterested attention—when I came amongst you at the first in great bodily weakness, ye bore with my infirmity, and received me as an angel from heaven, yea, as Christ Jesus himself. I bear you record that, if it were possible, such was your devotedness to me, you would have sacrificed your very eyes to serve me. And with such an impression on my mind, am I your enemy, forsooth, because I tell you the truth? Let no man persuade you into such a belief. There are many, I doubt not, who would gladly shut me out from your communion and favour, only that ye might cleave to them the closer. But be not alienated by such devices from your spiritual father and friend; regard me, I entreat you, with the same affectionate consideration which unquestionably I entertain towards you.'

In this view of the connexion, the introduction of the words "*οὐδέν με ἠδικήσατε*" is not only intelligible and apposite, but eminently politic and wise. The Galatians must have been sensible that they had lent a too willing ear to the judaizing teachers, and suffered themselves to be estranged in a greater or less degree from him to whom they owed their acquaintance with the truth; and he was too conversant with the frailty of human nature not to be aware, that there are no persons so difficult to conciliate as those from whom the provocation has been derived, consequently he begins his address with a seasonable assurance that he has no recollection whatever of any injury sustained at their hands—'they had never wronged him in any respect—on the contrary, there was on his mind the liveliest recollection of their unparalleled devotedness and respect.' By such means did the Apostle of the Gentiles, in his own impressive language "become all things to all men, that he might by all means save some."

VERSE 13.—^a *Οἴδατε δὲ*, 'but ye know'—*δὲ* adversative; 'ye injured me in no respect, but, *on the contrary*, as ye are well aware, ye received me as an angel of God.' Consequentially on his misapprehension of the former clause, Bloomfield has fallen, as a matter of course, into a misrepresentation of the Apostle's meaning in this:—"On the other hand (*δὲ*), *I feel but affection for you*, and as ye know on good grounds; for when under much bodily infirmity, ye did not reject me."—BLOOMFIELD. Whereas it is quite evident that the contrast here instituted is not between *any imputed ill feeling upon his part*, in opposition to the *real state of his affections towards them*, but, between *any supposed injury which they had inflicted upon him* and the *real regard which they entertained towards him*, as intimated in the following verses: 'Ye did not injure me at all, but on the contrary bestowed upon me the most distinguished consideration.'

^b *Δι' ἀσθένειαν τῆς σαρκὸς*, 'through a period of (or probably through a fit or attack of) infirmity of the flesh.' *Διὰ* with an accusative most commonly denotes 'the ground or motive of an action,' and seldom occurs (though there are instances of such usage in the classical writers, see Rob., *Lex.*) in the sense of 'through,' throughout either time or space, yet apparently it must be so understood here. Ellicott and Alford, feeling

the force of the grammatical inusitation, have preferred to translate the preposition according to its ordinary New Testament usage, "on account of weakness of the flesh," which the former explains, "i. e., on account of some sickness or bodily infirmity which caused the Apostle to delay longer with the Galatians than he originally intended." If indeed the expression had been accompanied with any such explanatory adjunct as Ellicott has felt himself called upon to supply (—"longer than he had originally intended"), then indeed, questionable as it might seem upon other grounds, we might have been bound to accept the interpretation. But in the absence of any such inducement, to admit that the purport of the clause before us is, to affirm that 'on account of bodily infirmity' the Apostle was led to preach the gospel to the Galatians at the first, which, if this translation hold good, is the fact here adduced, is more than we are prepared to do. The introduction of such matter would seem uncalled for and injudicious, being singularly uncomplimentary to the party in whose good graces he desired to establish himself, and consequently irreconcilable with Pauline good sense and good taste. Much more conducive to his end it would be, to say, that *in spite of*, or, *notwithstanding* his bodily infirmities he preached the gospel to them at the first, than that 'by reason of' them he was compelled so to do.' It is more reasonable to conclude that the Apostle has employed an expression here, unexampled it may be in the New Testament, though not without precedent elsewhere, than that he should have gone out of his way to introduce a circumstance so little calculated to advance the cause which he had so seriously at heart.*

* Τὸ πρότερον, 'at the first.' From many allusions which we meet with in the Epistle (ch. i. 9, iv. 16, v. 21), we have reason to apprehend that more than once, and from the use of τὸ πρότερον perhaps only twice, the Apostle had visited the Galatian churches at the time when this Epistle was written. In which case τὸ πρότερον, referring to the former of the two visits, may for the sake of brevity be translated, as in the English version, "the first time."

VERSE 14.—* Τὸν πειρασμὸν μου, 'my temptation,' 'my trial'—not a trial to the Galatians (Alford), but a trial to himself. Most expositors, ancient and modern, take the expression to refer to *the persecutions and afflictions* which the Apostle endured in preaching the Gospel. But there appear to be several conclusive reasons against such an application. In the first place, we observe that τὸν πειρασμὸν ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου is probably the same thing, be it what it may, which had been immediately before described as ἀσθένειαν τῆς σαρκὸς, 'an infirmity of the flesh'—an expression which, though it might well apply to some 'injury' which the Apostle had sustained at the hands of his persecutors, by which his bodily health had been impaired, could not, with due regard to the propriety of language, be spoken of 'the persecutions or trials' to which

* After a full consideration of the circumstances of the case, Bagge concludes his observations in these terms:—"I must therefore venture to consider that διὰ is used here as in διὰ νύκτα, διὰ τὸν χειμῶνα, to express the fact that he preached *during* a period or an attack of sickness."

he was habitually exposed, such infirmity being rather the result of his persecution, than the persecution itself. Again, 'persecution,' *per se*, could have no such effect as is here attributed to the *πειρασμός*, namely, to render him contemptible and loathsome in the sight of the Galatians, but on the contrary a direct tendency to awaken their sympathy and respect. That in the face of so many and so great dangers, regardless of personal security, he should manfully and courageously persist in what he conceived to be his duty towards God, would be a species of heroism which in all countries and in every age has attracted the admiration and commanded the homage of mankind. But failing even of that result, however it might awaken opposition and wrath, it certainly could in no wise expose him either to derision or contempt.

Nor indeed is it likely that the Apostle himself should choose to allude to the trials and persecutions which he underwent in the discharge of his sacred duties, as his "temptation in the flesh." The Christians of the early day rather rejoiced in tribulations, and congratulated themselves that they were accounted worthy to suffer such things for Christ's sake and the gospel's. So far from being ashamed of his sufferings in this behalf, or disposed to speak slightly of them, we find St. Paul himself, according to the exposition of some, with all the pride of a veteran soldier, glorying in his afflictions, and pointing to the scars and wounds which he had received in the conflict, as so many trophies of imperishable value which he had borne away from the battle-field: "Henceforth (he exclaims) let no man trouble me, for I bear in my body the marks of our Lord Jesus Christ." With much more apparent plausibility does 'the temptation in the flesh' refer to 'the thorn in the flesh,' alluded to in 2 Cor. xii. 7, by which, that he might not be elated above measure with the transcendancy of his privileges, Satan was permitted to buffet him.

Some eminent expositors (Ellicott, al.) have adopted a different reading in this place, "*τὸν πειρασμὸν ὑμῶν ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου*," but with what propriety appears to be more than questionable. In the first place, it has been well observed, 'it would require the article repeated before *ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου*, to sustain it.' But this objection has been attempted to be met by the suggestion that "*πειράζειν ἐν τινι* is apparently an admissible construction."—ELLICOTT. But, granting that it is, a temptation *ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου*, 'in the case of, or in reference to my flesh' (the force of *ἐν τινι* in such usage) can only be regarded as an exercise of the Galatian mind, in consequence of the infirmity of the Apostle's body, and *πειρασμός* could not be taken in such case to represent the infirmity or malady itself which was *the occasion* of the temptation. Such being the case, a farther objection applies with irresistible force—"a temptation which was only an exercise in the Galatian mind, could not be represented as an object of contempt or detestation to themselves. But it is said that, "whether referred to Paul or to the Galatians, the expression is equally elliptical, and must in either case imply despising that which *formed or suggested the πειρασμός*" (Ellicott on *ἐξεπτύσατε*). But with the translation of *ἐν τῇ σαρκί* assumed (i. e., *ἐν* denoting the ground in

which the temptation originated), *πειρασμός*, as we have just seen, is incapable of such an application. So that we are forced to abandon *ἐν τῇ σαρκί* in the *referential* sense, or *πειρασμός* as the *occasion* of the temptation. But either being given up, the *varia lectio* becomes untenable.

^b *Οὐκ ἐξουθενήσατε, οὐδὲ ἐξεπτύσατε*, literally, 'ye did not make little of, or spit out of your mouth,' a climacterical expression, the latter being a much stronger and more offensive term than the former—the one expressive of *contempt*, the other, of *disgust and loathing*.

^c *Ὡς ἄγγελον Θεοῦ, — ὡς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν*, 'as an angel of God, as Christ Jesus.' That the Apostle should have met with such a hearty reception at the hands of the Galatian people was most creditable to them, nevertheless, it was no more than he had a right to expect. He was 'a messenger of the Lord of Hosts,' carrying with him the gospel of salvation, a message of peace to rebellious man, and never angel sped from heaven's gate upon an errand of mercy or of love which was comparable to this. But more than that, they received him, not only as an angel of God, but even as Christ Jesus himself, nor in so doing did they exceed the bounds of their duty. He was "an ambassador for Christ," beseeching them in Christ's name, "be ye reconciled to God;" and as it is the privilege of ambassadors to be received with all the honours due to their sovereign, such dignity has the Lord conferred upon his ministering servants:—"He that receiveth you receiveth me, and he that despiseth you, despiseth Him that sent you."

VER. 15.—^a *Τίς οὖν ὁ μακαρισμός ὑμῶν*, 'how great then was your felicitation of yourselves!' *Οὖν* in its *reflexive* force ("takes up what has been said, and continues it, Donalds., *Crat.*, § 192,"—ELLICOTT); *μακαρισμός*, not the state or condition of, but the declaration and ascription of, happiness—Lidd and Scott. Locke considers that the context imperatively demands this ascription of blessedness to be referred to Paul, and translates it thus: "What benediction did ye then pour out upon me?" But it suits the context quite as well, and seems more natural, to understand, with the most eminent critics, the blessedness as ascribed to themselves—'how great then (*τίς* intensive) was your self-gratulation!' or, in other words, 'how happy did ye esteem yourselves to be!' Some expositors, attributing to *τίς* the force of *ποῖος*, *qualis*, read the passage thus—"what then (worth what, of what weight or value) (was) your congratulation (of yourselves)? i. e., considering your fickle behaviour since."—ALFORD. "'Quam levis, quam inconstans igitur erat,' FRITZ. Sorrowful inquiry, expressive of the Apostle's real estimate of the nature of their *μακαρισμός*."—ELLICOTT. But I can find no vestige of anything bordering upon reprehension in these words. The passage appears to be altogether of a commendatory character; preceded as it is by a warm and deserved eulogium upon their docility, and followed by an acknowledgment of their enthusiastic devotedness to himself.

Many manuscripts, and some of them of considerable authority, read *ποῦ* for *τίς*, which gives a different turn to the exclamation. According to this reading, the Apostle makes a forcible and feeling appeal to the consciences of his Galatian converts—"Where is the happiness which ye

once enjoyed, and so freely ascribed to yourselves? for I bear you witness, that at one time your state of feeling was such that it almost bordered upon the enthusiastic—a good and highly experimental sense; for no truth is more certain or more worthy of inculcation than this, that ‘the internal peace and happiness of the believer will always be proportionate to the simplicity of his reception of the gospel of Christ.’ The smallest admixture of legality, the most remote dependence on self, or confidence in the flesh, will effectually mar his sense of acceptance, and obscure his adoption in Christ. There is no *rest* for the soul save in Jesus; and there it is abundant and unfailing—“Come unto *me*, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and *I will give you rest*.” But independently of the external weight of evidence being against it, this reading does not harmonize so well with the current of thought apparently passing through the Apostle’s mind at the time.

^b *Μαρτυρῶ γὰρ, κ. τ. λ.*, ‘for I bear you record that . . . ye had plucked out your eyes, and given them unto me.’* The *ἀν* (*textus receptus*) here omitted with preponderating evidence, the omission having a ‘rhetorical’ effect (Herm.), marking more definitely “the *certainty* that the event mentioned in the apodosis would have taken place if the restriction expressed or implied in the protasis had not existed.”—ELLICOTT. For the nature and extent of the affirmation contained in this clause, see Appendix II.

VER. 16.—^a *ὥστε*, ‘so then,’ introducing a ‘consequence,’ from whatsoever source derived. Bloomfield’s suggestion that “*ὥστε* is here used, as occasionally in the classical writers, for *ἄτε* or *ὥσπερ*, ‘as it were,’ q. d., ‘am I become *as it were* your enemy by speaking to you the truth?’” seems harsh and uncalled for. Ellicott and Alford, accepting *ὥστε* in its ordinary signification, regard it as a consequence from the present state of things, as contrasted with the past: “so then, as things now stand, am I become your enemy?”—ELLICOTT. “An inference derived from their former love, and their present dislike, of him.”—ALFORD. But this interpretation is pointless and uncharacteristic, and derives no support whatsoever from the context. Much more reasonable is it to regard it as a conclusion from premises not openly stated, but easily inferrible from the following clause, ‘so then, forsooth! I am become your enemy because I tell you the truth! They who would persuade you into such a belief, may be indeed desirous of your communion, but do not take a very honourable course to its attainment’—where the conclusion manifestly has been adopted in the Galatian church at the suggestion of the false teachers; and only repeated here to give it a flat and unequivocal denial, by the exposure of the false grounds on which it rested.

* The genius of the English language is to dispense with the participial form as much as possible; consequently, when a verb and a participle in the nominative case come together, we are used, in translation, to attribute to the participle the time of the finite verb, and subjoin the *action* of the verb with a copula. Instead, for example, of saying, ‘Cæsar, *having come*, took command of the army,’ we say, ‘Cæsar *came*, and took command of the army.’

^b Ἐχθρὸς ὑμῶν, 'your enemy,' i. e. 'hostile to you.' According to the interpretation above offered, ἐχθρὸς can have none other than an active signification (*inimicus vobis*). At the same time, the passive signification (*invisus vobis*) has found favour with modern critics (Meyer, Alford), and not without some show of plausibility; the present aversion of the Galatian church contrasting well with the former devotedness to the Apostle. "Still, as the active meaning yields a good sense, and is adopted by most of the eminent Vv., and as there is also some ground for believing that ὁ ἐχθρὸς ἄνθρωπος (Clem., Recogn., i. 70, 71, 'ille inimicus homo') was actually a name by which the Judaists designated the Apostle, the active meaning is to be preferred."—ELLICOTT. Certainly, if there be any warrant for believing that ὁ ἐχθρὸς ἄνθρωπος was a well-known designation of the Apostle, it throws considerable light upon the passage, and renders the explanation in the preceding comment all but unquestionable.

^c Ἀληθεύων, 'speaking the truth,' or 'because I speak the truth'—a causal participle, presenting the assumed cause of the imputation in the foregoing member. The speaking of the truth, here referred to, cannot be in the present Epistle, for the effect of that upon the Galatian mind had yet to be tested; nor was it on the occasion of his first visit to Galatia, the impression then made being altogether of the most favourable kind. It consequently must have occurred upon some subsequent visit (probably that recorded, Acts, xviii. 23), when Judaism may be supposed to have acquired some footing in the church; and the Apostle's observations, honest and aboveboard as they would ever be, had exposed him to the uncharitable animadversion of his opponents: ἀληθεύων may possibly have reference to deeds as well as words—'dealing faithfully' with you.

VERSE 17.—^a Ζηλοῦσιν ὑμᾶς, 'they earnestly covet you,'—a sense in which the verb occurs, 1 Cor. xii. 31—"Covet earnestly (ζηλοῦτε) the best gifts." The translation, "they are paying you court," adopted by Ellicott and Alford, does not seem to accord well with the context; for, even admitting the force of the verb (ζηλόω) to pass out of the region of thought into the outer sphere of action, yet the conduct attributed to the parties before us is not so much '*court and flattery to the Galatians*,' as '*undisguised hostility to Paul*.' Besides, assuming the verb ζηλόω to maintain the same meaning throughout, it is inconsistent with its *application to Paul* in verse 18 (which appears in every way the preferable interpretation), to take it in that sense. Nor does there appear to be any contrast instituted in these words (ζηλοῦσιν ὑμᾶς οὐ καλῶς), between "the honest truthfulness of the Apostle and the interested and self-seeking court paid by the judaizing teachers"—ELLICOTT: but a simple announcement of fact, accounting for the impression which it was his object to erase, namely, 'that he was hostilely disposed towards them,' attributing it to its proper origin—the disreputable contrivance of certain parties, who sought them not for *their* advantage, but for *their own* selfish and sordid ends.

Though the parties alluded to are not named, the authors and

abettors of the calumny were too well known in the Galatian church to have subjected the allusion either to misapprehension or doubt.

^b Οὐ καλῶς, 'not honourably.' An example of this use of καλῶς will be found, James, ii. 3. In the same sense the adjective καλός is of frequent occurrence in Scripture. But the question is, are we to understand οὐ καλῶς of *motives*, or of *means*? Their motive certainly was not pure; for it originated not in a desire for the welfare of the Galatians, but rather to attract their adhesion to themselves. At the same time it must be admitted that the adversative clause seems to point more directly to the unworthiness of the *means* employed (the shutting him out by unfair representations), than to the *motives* by which they were actuated. Indeed, in the following sentence it is distinctly intimated that the simple desire to be an object of attraction to the church is not in itself objectionable, provided that it be pursued in an honourable and straightforward way. The quarrel is evidently not with the motives, but with the means, upon which ground I am of opinion that the force of the adverb is to be referred, not to the former, but to the latter.

^c Ἀλλὰ, 'but,'—clearly oppositive, contrasting the low and discreditable devices imputed to the false teachers with the clean and honourable conduct suggested by καλῶς.

^d Ἐκκλεῖσαι ὑμᾶς, 'to shut you out.' Expositors have differed very widely as to the object from which they desired to shut them out—'τῆς τελείας γνώσεως' (Chrys.)—'a Christo et fiducia ejus' (Luther)—'ab aliis omnibus' (Schott)—'e circulis suis, i. e., by affecting exclusiveness to make you court them' (Koppe comp. Brown)—'from Christian freedom' (Erasmus). Ellicott and Alford, relying upon an assumed force of ἐκκλείω which "must (according to them) bear the meaning of exclusion from a larger, and attraction to a smaller, viz., their own party" (Alford), understand by it,—the former, "from Paul, and the sounder portion of the church with which he associates himself"—the latter, 'from the community at large.' But, admitting by no means the distinction sought to be established in ἐκκλείω, which appears to be purely imaginary, I am disposed to limit it exclusively to Paul.* When we take into consideration the occasion, and the manner in which the clause is introduced—'So then, I am become your enemy, forsooth, because I tell you the truth! they who would persuade you to this effect, desire to gain you over to themselves, not by fair and honourable means; but by artful misrepresentations they would shut you out from—whom? or from what? from whom, doubtless, but from their spiritual pastor and guide—the man who, of all others, stood most directly in the way of their designs, and to damage whom in their estimation, they descended to those base and unworthy devices—from whom should it be with so much air of probability, as from the Apostle Paul himself?'—

Ellicott contends that "the position of αὐτοὺς suggests a marked

* If there be any distinction of the kind involved in ἐκκλείω, it would seem to be of a more generic character—from that which is regarded as *principal* in point of dignity or importance (not merely numerically); in which case it would be strictly applicable to Paul. Such, too (Alford *non obstante*), is the meaning of our word 'exclusive.'

personal antithesis;" and undoubtedly, if the latter part of the sentence, commencing with ἀλλὰ, were to be read by itself, we should be bound to admit that ὑμᾶς (the second) and αὐτοὺς were antithetically opposed; and no better interpretation, perhaps, could be offered than that suggested by Koppe, 'they would shut you out from their circle, that by affecting exclusiveness ye might court them.' But when the whole sentence is read in connexion, we find ample scope for the 'personal antithesis' without resorting to this interpretation. Ζηλοῦσιν ὑμᾶς, . . . ἵνα αὐτοὺς ζηλοῦτε, 'they zealously affect you, and take steps accordingly, that ye may zealously affect them,' where the 'personal antithesis' is much more plainly and logically preserved than in the construction proposed, leaving the *object* from which they were to be shut out to be determined by the context, which object I take to be the Apostle Paul himself.

* ἵνα αὐτοὺς ζηλοῦτε—ἵνα denotive of purpose. 'They would exclude you from communion with me, *in order that* ye might zealously affect, or desire, communion with them;' ἵνα joined to an indicative, (by a usage familiar with Paul, see 1 Cor. iv. 6), to express not merely 'objective possibility' (subjunctive), but 'objective reality'—'in order, not only that *ye might* (which is simply contingent), but that *ye might, as ye are presently doing*, zealously affect them.' Calvin's observation on this passage is just and sententious. "This stratagem is frequently resorted to by all the ministers of Satan. By producing in the people a dislike to their pastor, they hope afterward to draw them to themselves, and, having disposed of the rival, to obtain quiet possession."

VERSE 18.—* Καλὸν δέ, κ. τ. λ. A good deal of uncertainty has always attached to the exposition of this verse: many solutions of it have been offered, but none of them by any means satisfactory. Ellicott, in laying down a series of limitations within which he conceives a just interpretation to lie, instances the following—" (1), all interpretations which do not preserve a uniform meaning of ζηλόω, in both verses, must be rejected;" and in conformity with his own rule, which is unquestionably a sound one, he translates the words, "it is good *to be courted* in a good way at all times," which he subsequently explains to mean, "it is a good thing to be courted, to be the object of ζῆλος in an honest way (as you are by me, though not by them), *at all times*, and not merely when I happen to be with you;" terms which, at first sight, might seem to cast the imputation upon the Apostle himself,—'that he was not so assiduous in his courtship of the Galatians as he ought to be;' but the meaning of them I suppose to be this—"it is a good thing for you, Galatians, to be courted by your teachers in an honest way *at all times*, and not merely to receive such courtship when *I* (who alone court you honourably) happen to be present with you.'

But in this view of the passage the object of ζῆλος is the Galatian people, and not, as I have represented it, the Apostle Paul, a construction into which the Dean seems to have been drawn through conformity with the principle laid down by himself—" (3), that the object of ζηλοῦσθαι must be the Galatians, as in verse 17, and not St. Paul." But, surely, provided that the *uniform sense* be maintained, we can be under no obli-

gation to preserve a *uniform application* of the verb (a uniformity manifestly unsustained in verse 17), but must in that particular be guided by the requirements of the subject. Here, admitting ζηλοῦσθαι to be passive, which, from the alleged fact that no example of it in the middle voice has yet been discovered, we feel disposed to do, the application to St. Paul will be found more natural, and more consistent with the train of reasoning pursued in the context, than that to the Galatians. Having condemned the procedure of the false teachers who sought the adhesion of the Galatians to themselves οὐ καλῶς (not honourably), the Apostle proceeds to say—"but it is an honourable thing for a minister to be the object of respectful attachment to his people, in an honest and straightforward course (i. e., when he does not stoop to any dishonourable means to obtain it), at all times, and not merely (as in my case) when I am present with you"—where the specialty of the latter clause explains and qualifies the generality of the former, and shows that 'the teachers' not 'the taught,' are the subject of predication in both. A well-merited and well-administered rebuke of the fickleness of which he had been the victim—the truthfulness and permanency of the feeling constituting, in the Apostle's mind, an essential element in its value. It is but small praise for a minister of the gospel to be the object of a regard so inconstant and variable in its character as that which had been exhibited towards the Apostle Paul, by his converts in the Galatian church.

Alford's exegesis of this passage is eminently vague and indeterminate, attributing in the same breath, apparently two distinct meanings to the sentence, assuming ζηλοῦσθαι both in an active or middle, and in a passive signification, and ascribing it at one time to the false teachers, at another to the Galatians. "I think it much better" (he says, rejecting an alternative exposition,) "to explain thus: 'I do not mean to blame them in the abstract for τὸ ζηλοῦν ὑμᾶς,' (ζηλοῦσθαι, here, middle, and ascribed to the false teachers): 'any teacher who did this καλῶς, preaching Christ, would be a cause of joy to me; and it is an honourable thing (for you) to be the objects of this zeal ἐν καλῇ in a good cause' (here, ζηλοῦσθαι passive, and ascribed to the Galatians), 'at all times, and by everybody, not only when I am (or was) present with you;' and he winds up this heterogeneous explanation with the words, "q. d. I have no wish, in thus writing, to set up an exclusive claim to ζηλοῦν ὑμᾶς: whoever will really teach you good, at any time, let him do it and welcome"—a milk-and-water declaration, when compared with the pointed and spirited allusion of St. Paul.

VERSE 19.—* Τεκνία μου, 'my little children.' This verse has been regarded as "an appropriate introduction to the tender and affectionate address which follows."—ELLICOTT. But the following verse is too short, perhaps, to be regarded as a distinct address in itself. Besides, there are expressions in verse 20 which clearly connect it with verse 18, and which, consequently, forbid the severance. I doubt not that τεκνία μου is an ejaculatory *interjection*, full of the deepest pathos and feeling, wrung from the Apostle's heart by the reflection flashed upon his mind, of their former devotedness and present estrangement, the result of the

machinations of wicked and designing men, who would sever the children from the parent yearning over them with all the solicitude of parental love, until "Christ be formed within" them. Not τέκνα, but the diminutive τεκνία, 'my little children'—'my beloved children,' expressive of the strongest affection; not necessarily, or even probably, an allusion (as suggested by Calvin) to "the tender years of those who ought now to have arrived at full age;" for we find the same word applied by St. John (1 John, ii. 12), as a generic designation of believers, under which are included 'fathers, young men, and little children' (παιδιά).

^b Ὡδίνω, 'I travail.' Bloomfield refers this word to "the whole process of gestation, and formation in the womb," to the utter disregard of etymological and metaphorical propriety, such process being also incapable, in respect to the same offspring, of *repetition* (πάλιν). The word signifies, 'to travail in the throes of childbirth,' a figure expressive of the painful combination of grief, anxiety, fear, and hope, which racked the bosom of the Apostle at the contemplation of the unsettled condition of the Galatian church.

^c Πάλιν, 'again,' 'a second time.' Though metaphorical propriety forbids the idea of gestation a second time, and theological accuracy that of parturition or bringing to the birth a second time, there is no rule violated by a repetition of parturient throes. The seceders in the Galatian church, to whom the figure is applied, are not represented in these words as previously regenerated. The Apostle had, indeed, travailed with them before, and endured all the pangs of childbirth, without, as it now appears, the compensating result. He had undergone the same process of labour and travail, by night and by day, instructing, exhorting, rebuking, bearing with their ignorance, their impatience, their prejudices, their backslidings, their unbelief, which in so many other instances had been crowned with the desired success, but as yet Christ had not been 'formed within them;' and until that point be attained, there is no regeneration. Calvin was drowsy and oblivious of his theology, when he asserted that "the Galatians had already been conceived and brought forth; but after their revolt, they must now be begotten a second time." Such comment is inconsistent with his ordinary system of instruction, and certainly with the plain declarations of Holy Writ.

^d Ἀχρὶς οὗ μορφωθῇ, 'until that (Christ) be formed.' We observe that there is here no blending or confusion of metaphors, as at first sight might appear. The picture presented to the mind is not one *single* representation, 'the Apostle *travailing in childbirth until Christ be formed within them*,' an absurd and incongruous idea, but a combination of two distinct images, the latter representing solely the new birth; the former, labour continuing to, and terminating with, its accomplishment.

^e Μορφωθῇ, 'be formed.' Whether this word is to be understood in a literal or a metaphorical sense, must depend entirely upon contextual considerations. The question is, to what process is it to be referred? Not certainly "till the Christian doctrine and disposition be thoroughly formed in your minds"—or, "until the very image of Christ be impressed upon your hearts," the very insufficient sense attributed to it by

Bloomfield. Nor yet, as I apprehend, according to the more plausible interpretation of Ellicott, “until the new man Christ in us receive, as I doubt not he will, his completed and proper form,” which, from the observation appended (—“the obvious meaning of this word seeming to show that the metaphor is continued, though in a changed application”), I take to apply to progressive sanctification, rather than to regeneration; but, as I submit, to the actual and *literal* formation of Christ in the soul, which takes place at, and constitutes the very essence of, the new birth.

As I have already (v. 6^b) ventured to suggest, ‘the Spirit of Christ’ is ‘the anointed human spirit’—‘the human spirit in a bond of never-to-be-dissevered union with the indwelling Spirit of God, the impartation of the Holy Ghost not only marking the period at which it takes place, but being of the very essence of regeneration. When this union has been effected, and not till then, is “Christ formed within” us. It is the *anointing Spirit*, prefigured in the old dispensation by the holy anointing oil, which, not only in the case of God’s *peculiar Son*, the man Jesus Christ, but in the case of every one of his *adopted children*, entitles them to the appellation of ‘Christ.’

St. John in his first Epistle (ch. ii. 20), apparently in this view of the case, writes to his little children: “ye have an unction (*χρίσμα*) from the Holy One, and ye know all things.” By which ‘unction’ is to be understood not merely ‘a holy influence’ shed upon them from on high, enlightening their minds to understand, and disposing their hearts to receive “the things which belong to their peace,” but, ‘an actual communication of the Holy Ghost,’ according to our Lord’s gracious promise to believers, ‘to guide them into all truth,’ John, xvi. 13, xiv. 26—a fact established in a subsequent verse (27), where the same *χρίσμα* is described as ‘a living, indwelling, abiding, teaching, Spirit,’ discharging all the functions ascribed to the Comforter, ‘taking of the things of Christ, and showing them’ to them, making them independent of the teaching of man, consistently with the promise—“they shall be all taught of God.” Such is the *χρίσμα* of St. John’s Epistle, and it is the consummated union with this Divine *χρίσμα*, that constitutes a human soul, in the expressive language of the New Testament *Χριστός*. From the moment that union is effected “we are one with Christ, and Christ with us.” He dwelleth in us by the indwelling *Χριστός*, and we in Him, as the incorporated members of His mystical body. The ‘Christ’ thus formed within us is not a separate and independent Spirit in each believing member, but a constituent part of that all-pervading Spirit which animates the elect Church of God, and constitutes us individually and collectively “one Spirit with the Lord,” and by reason of that ‘one Spirit,’ one body in Christ.

To see this blessed union consummated in his beloved disciples, was the earnest wish of the Apostle’s soul; till then he travailed with them in pain and sorrow, perplexity and fear. But that accomplished, his travailing should cease, and his remaining efforts be directed to ‘feed them as new-born babes with the sincere milk of the word,’ until, at

a more advanced stage of Christian experience, they should be susceptible of "the strong meat" provided for them in the perfecting doctrines of the grace of God.

VERSE 20.—^a Ἡθελον δὲ παρῆναι, 'and would that I were present;' δὲ 'continuative,' retaining at the same time, as usual, somewhat of its 'adversative' force. "This opposition Meyer traces in the tacit contrast between the subject of his wish to be present with them, and his actual absence and separation."—ELLICOTT. "There is a contrast in the δὲ, between his present anxiety in absence from them, and his former παρῆναι, v. 18."—ALFORD.

I before observed (v. 19^a) that verse 20 is in intimate connexion with verse 18, constituting the intervening sentence an ejaculatory parenthesis, standing apart from both contexts. We now proceed to trace the connexion. The Apostle had declared, 'it is an honourable thing to be zealously affected (that is, to be the object of ζῆλος) in an honourable course, and that at all times, not only when I am *present with you*;' a train of thought abruptly broken off (by the flashing across his mind of the change which had been wrought in them, which elicited the affecting apostrophe in the parenthetical clause), and now resumed in the words before us. 'And would that *I were present with you at this moment* (in evident allusion to the παρῆναι of v. 18), and had changed my tone, for indeed I am perplexed concerning you.'

^b Καὶ ἀλλάξαι τὴν φωνήν μου, 'and had changed my tone.' Numerous are the conjectures as to the meaning of these words—"To temper my voice as your affairs require."—WHITBY. "To speak sometimes gently, and sometimes harshly, as the case might demand."—LUTHER. "He was prepared most cheerfully to assume a variety of form, and even, if the case required it, to frame a new language."—CALVIN. Others, again—"To change my tone (to praise instead of censure, which I cannot do), for I am in doubt about you."—BLOOMFIELD. "To change my voice, *scil.*, to a milder, not necessarily to a more mournful (Chrys.), still less to a more severe tone (Michael.)"—ELLICOTT, with whom is ALFORD. Such is a sample of the explanations which have been offered of this much-debated phrase—some of them, it will be admitted, far-fetched and unlikely enough, while the one that lies at the threshold, pointed out by the Apostle himself, has been unaccountably passed over unnoticed. The Apostle's words are these:—"Would that I were with you at this moment, and had changed my tone, *for I am perplexed concerning you*.' What is this but a plain intimation, that he desired that he might be at liberty to change the tone of doubt and despondency which characterizes the entire Epistle, into a note of thankfulness and joy? "I am afraid of you, lest I have bestowed upon you labour in vain," is the mournful expression of his feeling now: "I thank God for you, knowing, brethren beloved, your election of God," is what he would fain have it to be. The past tense of the verb (ἀλλάξαι) indicates, that not merely a recent change, but one of some standing and maturity, is the object of the Apostle's desire.

^c Ἀπορούμαι ἐν ὑμῖν, 'I am in great doubt (amounting to absolute

‘perplexity’) concerning you,’ expressive of a situation of extreme difficulty and distress of mind, out of which one sees no possible way of escape (*a*, privative, and *πόρος transitus*);—ground assigned of the desire expressed in the preceding clause; ‘*Because I am in great perplexity concerning you* (manifested indeed in all that he had written), I would that being present with you now, and having witnessed your steadiness and establishment in the faith, *I had seen reason to alter my tone.*’ For this use of *ἐν*, not usual, see Matt. vi. 7; Luke, i. 21; Eph. iii. 13.

VERSE 21.—*Λέγετέ μοι.* We now enter upon a new section of the Epistle, which is continued throughout the remainder of this chapter—in the course of which the Apostle still further illustrates and establishes his position (that we are made the children of God, and inheritors of the Holy Ghost, not through legal works, but by grace through faith), by reference to the Abrahamic history. Recent commentators (Ellicott and Alford) regard this section merely as an “*illustration of the relative positions of the law and the promise*, by an allegorical interpretation of the history of the two sons of Abraham;” (Alford) “*intended to destroy the influence of the false apostles with their own weapons, and to root it up out of its own proper soil.*”—MEYER, quoted with approval by ALFORD. But there can be no question that it is a direct auxiliary argument, addressed to the legalistic portion of the Galatian church, in support of that which is the main subject of the Epistle, the doctrine of justification by faith only, without the works of the law, deduced from the symbolic history of Abraham and his two wives.

Many persons have represented this portion of the Epistle as defective in point of authority, and doubtless so it would be, had it proceeded from any other pen but that of an inspired writer. But carrying with it the impress of ‘Scripture’—the testimony of one who had “received the Spirit which is of God, that he might know the things which are freely given us of God, which things he also spake, not in the words which man’s wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth, comparing spiritual things with spiritual” (1 Cor. ii. 12, 13)—there is no portion of God’s Word more interesting, more instructive, or more authoritative. It partakes of the nature of an *argumentum ad hominem*, an appeal to the testimony of the law, addressed to those who were professed admirers of the law; and from the abrupt manner in which it is introduced, it sounds like a final effort (which in point of fact it turns out to be) to convince them by argument.

Bloomfield assures us, that “the Apostle now turns to the judaisers.” But there is no trace of a *conversio sermonis* in this place. They are the same parties who are before us still, the infatuated portion of the Galatian church, who, ‘having begun with the Spirit, would now perfect themselves with the flesh;’ whom a little farther on he exhorts to ‘stand to the liberty whereunto Christ hath made us free;’ and for whose sake he ejaculates the wish,—“I would they were even cut off which trouble you.” Neither from the language employed, nor from the nature of the argument itself, have we the smallest reason to apprehend that a change has taken place in the parties addressed: they

are 'the troubled,' evidently, not 'the troublers;' nor indeed in the whole course of the Epistle is there a single direct appeal to the judaizing teachers.

^b Θέλουντες, 'desirous;' something more than mere passive or inactive willingness, denoting perhaps deliberate choice and purpose: in which sense it occurs also in verse 9.

^c Τὸν νόμον, the law.' Ὁ νόμος, though ordinarily (while standing by itself) designating the institutions of Moses, yet in some places represents the whole system of divine revelations as they are recorded in the Jewish Scriptures, see John, x. 34, xii. 34, xv. 25; Rom. ii. 17-20, al. In other places it is used, in a more restricted application, to comprehend only the five books of Moses, as in Luke, xxiv. 44, Rom. iii. 21; in which sense it is to be received here. The passage being found in one of the books of Moses, and the argument being addressed to those who were strenuous upholders of the Mosaic economy, but, above all, the contrasted form in which the sentence is put, leave not a shadow of doubt upon the subject. Observe here the double use of νόμος—abstract and concrete; and distinguished, as usual, by the use of the article.

^d Ἀκούετε, 'give heed to.' This verb is susceptible of a variety of shades of meaning, according to the requirement of the context. First, simple 'hearing,' or perceiving by the ear—in which sense, the meaning would be, 'do ye not *hear the law read* in your public assemblies every Lord's day?' But though it must be supposed that the Old Testament Scriptures were generally read in the Christian churches on the Lord's day, after the fashion of the Jewish synagogue, yet such an interpretation cannot be admitted here; for the allegory as explained by the Apostle, and which would be the substantial subject of the inquiry, was never heard or read in any church, until it was revealed by the Apostle Paul himself in the place before us. The same objection lies to the second shade of the verb ἀκούω, 'do ye not *listen to*, or hear with attention, *the law*?' For no attention could fathom that which was, up to the moment in which he wrote, a mystery (comparatively speaking, see Eph. iii. 5) in the breast of the Omniscient. And would also lie to the third, 'do ye not *submit your judgment to* the truth conveyed in the law?' were we not able to meet the objection by the reply, that 'the purport of the inquiry is not, whether ye receive as an undoubted truth *the allegory* which is to follow, but, is it your profession and habit to defer implicitly to *the authority of Holy Scripture*? or, more properly, to that portion of the Scripture which is here designated 'the law'? for, if so, I will show you what the law says upon the point at issue.' In this view, ἀκούετε partakes of the ethical form so common in the Pauline writings.

This mode of interpretation, which is perfectly simple and legitimate, at once disposes of the cavils of Mr. Clerk, as though "St. Paul argues from some received midrash, vulgarly known; for if that allegory, whereof he here speaks, had not been before heard of, he would have had no occasion to wonder that the Galatians had never collected any

such thing from the story which he refers to.”—See Whitby, *in loco*. But the plain answer to this sophistry is, that the question refers, not to *the allegory* which is the subject of the present discussion, but to *the customary attention and submission* which they yielded, or did not yield, to that portion of Holy Scripture designated ‘the law.’

VERSE 22.—^a Γέγραπται γὰρ, ‘for it is written’ (Gen. xvi. 15, xxi. 2). Ellicott and Alford allege that the question which we have been considering, “do ye not hear the law?” implies a negation, ‘nay, ye do not,’ and that the words before us are “an explanatory proof from the law of the negation involved in the foregoing question.” But this appears to be a total misconception of the scope of the Apostle’s reasoning. So far from “a negation,” I maintain that there is a positive ‘affirmation’ implied in the previous words; ‘do ye not respect the testimony of Scripture? I know that ye do; and, *taking it for granted that ye do*, I will inform you what the Scripture says—“it is written that,” &c. &c.; and then he proceeds to unfold one of the most beautiful, complete, and instructive allegories to be met with in the compass of the sacred volume.

It would be but an indifferent “proof” that ‘they did not hear the law’ (put what construction you please upon the phrase), to allege, or imply, that they were ignorant of the symbolic character of the history of Abraham and his two wives—a piece of information which either was not revealed at all, or revealed in such mystic terms as no human being could decipher until he was instructed by the Holy Ghost. Whereas to those who admitted the authority of the Scriptures (the ‘affirmation’ implied in the question), no proof could be more plain, strong, or convincing, in support of the general doctrine of the Epistle, than the allegorical history introduced by these words, only supposing the explanation to bear, as it does bear, the impress of divine authority. In this view γὰρ is elliptical and argumentative, introducing an argument founded on the implied admission in the previous clause, ‘do ye not hear the law? for (taking it for granted that you do) *it is written that*, &c. &c., which is decisive upon the point at issue.’

^b Τῆς παιδίσκης, ‘of the bondwoman;’ παιδίσκη, not always so restricted. Sometimes it means no more than ‘a young woman;’ but here, being contrasted with τῆς ἐλευθέρης, and referred to the well-known bondwoman ‘Hagar’ (ἣν δὲ αὐτῇ παιδίσκη Αἰγυπτία ἣ ὄνομα Ἀγάρ, Gen. xvi. 1), there can be no question as to the propriety of the translation. In the LXX. it is almost exclusively used in this sense.

VERSE 23.—^a Ἀλλὰ, ‘but.’ “The full force of this particle may be felt in the statement of the complete opposition of character and nature between the two sons which it introduces. ‘Abraham had two sons;’ though sprung from a common father, they were, *notwithstanding*, of essentially different characters.”—ELLICOTT.

^b Κατὰ σάρκα, ‘according to the flesh’—after the ordinary course of nature; evidently contrasted with the preternatural mode suggested by διὰ τῆς ἐπαγγελίας—‘by virtue of the promise.’

^c Διὰ τῆς ἐπαγγελίας, ‘by the promise,’ instrumentally; which El-

licott explains thus—"Through the might, and by virtue of the promise (see Gen. xviii. 10), Sarah conceived Isaac, even as the Virgin conceived our Lord, through the Divine influence imparted at the annunciation." If it is intended by these words to institute a comparison generally between the conception of Isaac and the conception of our blessed Lord (and I really do not see what other construction can be put upon them), it is clearly unwarranted by Scripture. Though the conception of Isaac, like that of our blessed Lord, was unquestionably supernatural, yet did it take place through the ordinary process of procreation; the effect of the promise being, through faith and the impartation of miraculous energy thereby, to quicken and invigorate the effete bodies of the aged couple, and make that possible which, according to the course of nature, could not be. Other or greater power never has been, nor ever can be attributed to the promise; and it is power of a different type altogether from that which was displayed at the annunciation. At the same time it must be admitted that the fallacy of the observation lies, not in the lowering of the standard of our Lord's conception to that properly ascribed to the conception of Isaac—which would be an error of a graver sort—but in the undue exaltation of the conception by promise beyond any thing which is countenanced by Scripture.

VERSE 24.—^a *Ἀλληγορούμενα*, 'allegorized;' or, according to the translation of the received version, which is substantially correct, "are an allegory." "*Ἀλληγορεῖν* properly means, 'to express or explain one thing under the image of another,' and hence in the passive, 'to be so expressed or explained.'"—ELLICOTT. According to this definition, we learn that the two covenants and their adherents have been prefigured in the Old Testament under the image of the two wives of Abraham and their respective progeny. By which we understand, not that Moses shaped his narrative with a view to the allegory, of which it is possible that he had not the most distant conception himself—much less that the mystic or symbolic sense is to prevail, to the exclusion of, or in contravention of, that which is plain and literal—that the story of Abraham and his family was one whit less truly or impartially narrated because it was the type and exemplification of other facts of a deeper and more mysterious character, which, in the course of events, were afterwards to arise; but that God had brought it to pass, that the lives and circumstances of those symbolic personages were so shaped and fashioned by His overruling providence, as to afford apt and striking illustration of other objects, and other events, which were subsequently to appear.

The deceitful handling of the word of God, which would sacrifice the truth of the type for the sake of the antitype, has been noticed and commented upon by Calvin with his usual vigour:—"As the Apostle declares that these things are 'allegorized,' Origen, and many others along with him, have seized the occasion of torturing Scripture in every possible manner away from the sense. They concluded that the literal sense is too mean and poor, and that under the outer bark of the letter there lurk deeper mysteries, which cannot be extracted but by beating out allegories." Unhappily this school of exposition is not yet extinct. There are (sad

it is to think it) in the ministry of our own church, and in high places therein, eating the bread of the Establishment (as recent publications have fully proved), mystics, as ingenious and successful in distorting the record of Scripture, and reducing the plain facts of revelation into an idle and worthless myth, as their master, Origen, himself. But such license (as Calvin truly characterizes it) is none other than “a contrivance of Satan to undermine the authority of Scripture, and to take away from the reading of it the advantage.”—CALVIN, *in loco*.

A safe practice in interpreting the word of God is, ‘to account nothing in the history of the Old Testament as *properly allegorical*, but such as by an inspired writer is distinctly declared to be so.’ Alford stigmatizes this rule as “the shallow and indolent dictum of M’Knight,” which “no one who reads, marks, learns, and inwardly digests the Scriptures can subscribe to.” But, notwithstanding the authority of such a name, I feel persuaded that it is a safer and more God-fearing course than to give the reins to, it may be, an unsanctified imagination, and discover a mystery of religion in every historical fact. It may be very well to accompany the license with an admonition to proceed discreetly and cautiously in the exercise of our judgment, and “to follow the analogy of faith.” But who, I should like to know, is the accepted judge of what is to be regarded as cautious and discreet in the allegorization of Scripture? or whose faith is to be the standard of the analogy? Under the mask of ‘faith’ the most absurd and fanatical interpretations have been obtruded upon the ears of a reluctant church, to the great discredit of religion, and to the everlasting injury, it is to be feared, of weak and unstable souls. Much safer policy it is, and more suited to the adventuresome times in which we live, ‘to admit of nothing as a revealed truth which is not categorically stated in Scripture.’

Upon that ground, and that alone, we maintain that Abraham’s two wives represent the two covenants—that their children are the types of persons living under these covenants, and that the circumstances which befel them are emblematic of the condition and prospects of those respective classes. Were it not for such authority, though we might have seen and admired the *coincidence*, and used it in *illustration* of divine truth, yet could we by no means have derived, or argued in support of, any doctrine, therefrom. We could not have *proved*, as St. Paul has here done, that ‘*because* the Scripture hath said, “cast out the bondwoman and her son, for the son of the bondwoman shall not be heir with the son of the free woman,” *therefore*, they who are of legal works shall not be fellow heirs with those who are of grace through faith.’

^b *Αὗται γὰρ εἰσιν*, ‘for these women,’ or ‘these mothers are,’ or ‘represent’—*εἰσιν* being used similarly as in Luke, viii. 11, “the seed ~~is~~ the word”—Mat. xxvi. 26, “This is my body,” &c. &c.

^c *Εἰς δουλείαν γεννῶσα*, ‘bearing children unto bondage,’ i. e., “to pass under, and to inherit the lot of bondage.”—ELLICOTT. The children following the condition of the mother, here introduced for the purpose of identification. ‘As Hagar, the bondwoman, brought forth children unto bondage, so likewise did the Sinaitic covenant bring forth

children unto bondage; consequently, the one a fit representative of the other.

^d ἥτις ἐστὶν Ἄγαρ, 'this is (or, is identical with) Hagar.' ἥτις specific, in its differential sense, 'this from Mount Sinai:' see Jelf, Gr., § 816. 4. The antecedent to ἥτις is διαθήκη. Considerable difficulty has been supposed to exist in determining the construction of this sentence, an estimate in which I cannot say that I share. The construction is, to my mind, both natural and lucid. 'One (διαθήκη) indeed, from Mount Sinai, bearing children unto bondage; this (διαθήκη) is identical with Hagar (for the name Hagar, in Arabia, designates Mount Sinai), and corresponds (the same διαθήκη still) with the present Jerusalem, for she (διαθήκη) is in bondage with her children.' By this translation the utmost simplicity is attained, both of structure and of meaning—the same subject (διαθήκη) governing the three verbs, and the meaning being obvious, and consistent with the purpose in hand. By recent and esteemed commentators, three distinct nominatives have been assigned to the three verbs respectively, and obtained, as we shall presently see, not without considerable violence to the text, and without any compensating advantage to the sense. The relative merit, however, of the constructions will be more appreciable as we proceed with the exposition.

VERSE 25.—^a Τὸ γὰρ Ἄγαρ, 'for the name Hagar'—"Τὸ not agreeing with Ἄγαρ, but referring to it in its abstract form; and ἐν τῇ Ἀραβίᾳ, not supplying a mere topographical statement, but serving to define the people by whom Sinai was so called."—ELLICOTT. The explanation conveyed in this clause ("no parenthesis"—Alford, "added almost parenthetically"—Ellicott), according to the view here submitted, is altogether parenthetical, introducing not so properly "*the etymological reason* for the foregoing statement of the allegorical identity of Mount Sinai and Hagar" (Ellicott), as *the etymological proof and confirmation* of it. We cannot imagine that St. Paul was influenced by any etymological consideration whatever in making the statement he did. It was not from the similarity of name that he concluded the identity of the subjects; but, being divinely instructed as to all the particulars of the case, he pointed to the similarity of name as, in the providence of God, a pre-existing, or pre-ordained, confirmation of the mystery which he revealed. "That Agar was an appellation of Sinai, among the people of the surrounding country, we have the testimony of Chrysostom, and the ancient commentators, which is also confirmed by the accounts of modern travellers; and it might well have it, since راس in Arabic signifies a rock or rocky mountain, and, as Sinai is remarkably such, it might be κατ' ἐξοχὴν called τὸ Ἄγαρ."—BLOOMFIELD. Ellicott, however, conceives 'that the evidence from the modern appellation of the mountain is not so conclusive as it is here represented to be.' But it is enough for our purpose to know, that at the time when the Apostle wrote, it was commonly so called. How far it may have retained the appellation in modern times, is matter rather of curiosity than of importance.*

* "It is distinctly asserted by Harantius (Ap. Busching Deser. Asiæ, p. 535, see

^b Συστοιχεῖ δὲ, ‘and corresponds with’—keeps pace with, a metaphor taken from soldiers marching abreast in the same rank. Ellicott and Alford make the nominative to this verb to be Ἄγαρ, but whence derived it is not easy to conjecture. Not, certainly, from the so-called “semi-parenthetical,” but in truth ‘pleni-parenthetical, addition;’ for the subject of that clause is not Hagar, but *the name Hagar*, which with no propriety of thought or language could be represented as corresponding to “the Jerusalem that now is.” And the Hagar of verse 24, being the predicate of that clause, is incapable of becoming, without some distinct intimation of the change, the subject of this. Indeed, Ellicott himself, in his translation, effectually cuts it off from συστοιχεῖ, by the insertion of a full stop after Hagar. So that I am at a loss to discover from what source the nominative Hagar has been derived. But in the construction proposed, διαθήκη, without any violation either of grammar or of sense, is the common subject of both verbs (ἐστὶν and συστοιχεῖ)—‘This (διαθήκη) is identical with Hagar, and (the parenthesis being shut off) corresponds with the presently-existing Jerusalem.’ To which construction (suggested by De W.) Ellicott demurs, “as there would be no point of comparison (δουλεία) between the subject of συστοιχεῖ and ἡ νῦν Ἱερουσαλήμ.” But here, again, we must take leave to differ; for not only is there a plain point of comparison, but one distinctly indicated by the Apostle himself as the middle term of resemblance. But of this, hereafter in its proper place, when we come to the consideration of the ensuing clause.

^c Δουλεύει γὰρ, ‘for she is in bondage.’ “The reading δὲ is rightly rejected by most recent editors, with preponderant external evidence.” —ELLICOTT. And certainly it would seem that internal evidence is not any more in its favour, γὰρ serving much more appropriately to mark the ground of the correspondence. The subject of δουλεύει, according to Ellicott and Alford, is ἡ νῦν Ἱερουσαλήμ. But again we ask, whence obtained? Included in τῇ νῦν Ἱερουσαλήμ, no doubt would be the response. But, in the absence of the relative pronoun, such a construction is inadmissible. Nor is there any occasion to deviate from grammatical propriety. The syntax is natural and obvious. Διαθήκη, the nominative which, upon the score of grammar, is open to no possible objection, is equally fortunate as regards the sense. ‘This (διαθήκη) is identical with Hagar, and corresponds with the now-existing Jerusalem, *for she (διαθήκη) is in bondage with her children*’—the latter clause serving to direct attention to the ground of correspondence, to wit, “she is in bondage with her children.”*

Rosenmul., *in loco*), that Sinai was so called (κατ’ ἐξοχήν.) So the Schol. Gr. ap. Matthæi says of Sinai, τοῦτο τῇ τῶν Ἀράβων γλώσσῃ Ἄγαρ καλεῖται.—BAGGE.

* It is contended by some (Bagge) that “there is no authority for taking Jerusalem to represent here the Jewish church or dispensation,” but that the Apostle is “speaking of the civil bondage of Jerusalem to Rome, which then, at the very time when the liberty of the spiritual Israel was revealed, presented so remarkable a parallel to the spiritual bondage of the Jews.” But this is to the subversion of the whole point of the allegory, which is to show that as Hagar and her offspring were

The object of the entire passage is, plainly, to infer from the history of the two wives of Abraham, and their respective offspring, that the Jews (in their religious aspect), the constituents of the Jerusalem that now is, being in servitude under the ordinances of the law, should not be fellow-heirs with the children of God by promise, the heirs of the heavenly Jerusalem. This object is effected, not, by an *immediate* comparison of the two women and the two Jerusalems—for the history of the two families of Abraham had no ostensible relation to the destinies of Jews and Christians,—but, *through the medium* of the covenants; the two women representing allegorically the two covenants, and in so doing corresponding with the two Jerusalems, the seats (if I may so call them) of the two covenants. The phrase ἡ γεννῶσα εἰς δουλείαν (ver. 24), establishing the allegorical identity of the Sinaitic covenant with *the bondwoman* Hagar, and δουλεύει μετὰ τῶν τέκνων αὐτῆς ver. 25), the correspondence of the same covenant with *the Jerusalem that now is*. So that there is no want, as Ellicott complains, of a middle term “of comparison (δουλεία) between the subject of συστοιχεῖ and ἡ νῦν Ἱερουσαλήμ.”

VERSE 26.—^a Ἡ δὲ ἄνω Ἱερουσαλήμ, ‘but the Jerusalem above.’ Ἄνω, as νῦν in the preceding verse, is here used adjectivally, see Jelf, Gr. Gr., 456, 2, a, b. Had the analogy been completed, we may suppose it to have run thus:—‘The other covenant, namely, the Abrahamic, bringing forth children unto freedom, *this* is identical with Sarah, and corresponds with the Jerusalem above, for she (the covenant) and her children are free.’ But having in the first instance shown by what process the allegory was to be developed, the Apostle contents himself, in the case before us, with merely suggesting the point of comparison—“but the Jerusalem which is above *is free*,” leaving only the identification of the Christian church with the Jerusalem which is above, to be accomplished, to render the application complete, which identification is effected in the following words:—“This (Jerusalem) is the mother of us all.”

The member which I have above supplied—“the other covenant, namely, the Abrahamic,” &c. &c., as well as its counterpart in the text, at first sight appear to read defectively for want of a principal verb in the sentence, by which “the one covenant” and “the other” should be governed; for in both instances the words which follow (—“*this* is identical with Hagar, and corresponds with the present Jerusalem, for she is in bondage with her children,” and the corresponding words to be supplied in the second clause), are evidently but subordinate and descriptive, the principal verb being apparently omitted. But upon closer inspection it will be found that such is not the case, “the one” and “the other,” with their respective adjuncts, being in apposition with αἱ ἐκτεθειμέναι, and nominatives after the verb εἰσιν—‘the two women represent the two covenants, the one from Mount Sinai, which is so and so; the other, the Abrahamic, which is so and so.’

cast out and excluded from any share in the inheritance of Isaac, so the Jewish church and her children should not participate in the blessing with those who are the heirs by promise—a direct blow at the judaizing tendencies of the Galatians.

As to the meaning of the phrase ἡ ἄνω Ἱερουσαλήμ, there can be little question that it is to be understood of the "heavenly Jerusalem," so called from its *locality*, above (ἄνω) in the heavens. Some expositors give ἄνω a *temporal* signification, "the ancient Jerusalem, the Salem of Melchisedeck" (Michæl.). But, as Ellicott justly observes—"such a reference is inconsistent with a context which only points to later periods."*

^b Ἡτις, 'this,' distinctive and emphatic, see verse 24 ^a. The antecedent is Ἡ ἄνω Ἱερουσαλήμ.

^c Πάντων. Many copies omit this word; but independently of the usual argument, that 'an omission is more easily accounted for than an addition,' the word seems to have a special appositeness in this place, for the whole force of the quotation that follows turns upon the point that "Jerusalem above is the mother of *us all*"—πάντων not more in its numerical, or collective, than in its indiscriminate, signification, "all," Jews and Gentiles alike, men of every tribe, and people, and nation, and language.

VERSE 27.—* Γέγραπται γάρ, 'for it is written.' The introduction by γάρ would lead us naturally to conclude, that the quotation which follows should be a confirmation from the prophetic writings, of the statement in the preceding verse, that "the Jerusalem above is *the mother of us all*," that is, of *the elect church of Christ*; and yet such is not the result attained in the ordinary method of interpretation, the almost universal *consensus* of commentators explaining the στεῖρα ἡ οὐ τίκτουσα, and the τῆς ἐχούσης τὸν ἄνδρα (the subjects of the quotation before us) of *the two churches*, the Jewish and the Christian church, and not, as they should properly be, of *the mothers of the churches*. Dr. Bloomfield, assuming that the passage from Isaiah, "in its literal sense represents the Jewish state," at the same time conceives that "it is to be referred, at least in a sublimer sense, to the Christian Jerusalem—*the church*." Dr. Chandler, indeed, maintains that "*the Gentile world* is here represented as a forsaken, unmarried woman, because the Gentiles were not constituted *the Church* of God, nor taken into a special covenant with Him, but were generally abandoned to idolatry and vice, and she is or-

* "The heavenly Jerusalem, a material city, the final dwelling-place of glorified bodies as well as souls, the abode of God and the Lamb,¹ and therefore of the church, the body of the Lamb;² the metropolis of that heavenly inheritance, of which the militant church has already received an earnest;³ the centre of the worship, hopes, and desires⁴ of the saints; the city which hath foundations,⁵ and which is prepared in a heavenly country⁶ for Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,⁷ in common with the last of their spiritual race; the city in which the saints on earth exercise even now the privileges and taste the joys of citizenship,⁸ but of which the glories we, with our finite powers, can neither describe nor imagine; for 'eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love him.'"⁹—BAGGE.

¹ Rev. xxi. 22, 23.

⁴ Col. iii. 1, 2.

⁸ Phil. iii. 20.

² Heb. xxii. 22, 23.

⁵ Heb. xi. 10.

⁹ 1 Cor. ii. 9.

³ Eph. i. 14.

⁶ Heb. xi. 16.

⁷ Heb. xi. 9.

dered to shout for joy for that happy alteration God intended to make in her circumstances, as by espousing her to Himself, and giving her at length a more numerous posterity than the married wife, viz., than *the church* of the Jews could ever boast of, who are represented as betrothed to God, because they were under His peculiar protection, and brought into a special covenant with Him."

But so far as "the Gentile world" is distinguished from 'the Christian church,' this exposition is only the farther removed from the truth, there being no trace in Scripture of the taking of "the Gentile world" properly so called, into alliance with God—that is, of a purely Gentile church; but only of a united church of Jews and Gentiles, which (*in the present dispensation*) constitutes the church catholic of Christ. To represent "the barren that beareth not," which is apostrophised in this passage, and "her that hath the husband," as the Christian and Jewish *churches*, betrays a laxity of interpretation wholly incompatible with an intelligent apprehension of the subject; for these are plainly the mothers of the churches, not 'the churches' themselves.*

I have no hesitation in stating, that the subjects of this prophetic vision are none other than the two symbolic women already presented to our view; "the barren that beareth not" being Sarah, or the Abrahamic covenant, now, at the period to which the prophecy adverts, about to come into bearing, and bring forth children unto God. Hitherto barren and unproductive, waiting for (according to the apostolic adaptation) the *first* advent of Him in whom the promise ('covenant,' as we have seen, ch. iii. 17) should take effect, who, by His humiliation even unto death (the burden of the previous chapter, Isaiah, liii.) redeemed us from our sins, that "the blessing of Abraham might come upon the nations in Christ"—or, in other words, that the Abrahamic covenant might receive its primary fulfilment in Him. And by "her who had the husband," is to be understood Hagar, or the Sinaitic covenant—the mother of the Jewish church (i. e., the Israel within Israel), which (Hagar), antecedently to the redemption of Christ, was in bondage, with her children, under the law,—few in number, and mean in privilege, when compared with the goodly company of saints gathered out of all nations, which constitute the new-covenant church (whether Christian or Messianic). In this view, the allegorical character of the two women did not originate with St. Paul, but was communicated by Isaiah long before; and the prevalence of the Gentile element in the Christian church demonstrates it to be the offspring of Sarah—of "her who had not (previously) travailed;" the symbol (according to the adaptation before mentioned) of "Jerusalem which is above," which is consequently

* It is unnecessary, perhaps, to explain, that by 'the churches,' we understand 'the communities, or collective bodies of believers;' and by 'the mothers of the churches,' the systems, whether of law or of grace, from whence they spring: here represented by the covenants ("ye are the children of the covenant," Acts, iii. 25).

In a somewhat different sense, the two Jerusalems are represented as 'the mothers of the churches' ("Jerusalem which is above is the mother of us all," Christians), as being the seats, respectively, of their habitation.

“the mother of us all.” For farther observations upon this prophecy, and its adaptation to the subject before us, see Appendix III.

VERSE 28.—^a ‘*Ἡμεῖς δὲ*, ‘but we’ Christians; the same parties contemplated in ‘*Ἡμῶν*’ of verse 26: *δὲ*, ‘resumptive,’ taking up the train of thought suspended by the intervention of the quotation from the Old Testament. Dr. Bloomfield has been rather unfortunate in his explanation of the purpose with which this clause is introduced. “Here (he says) the Apostle adverts to the promise of offspring held out to the heavenly Jerusalem, i. e., the Christian church: q. d., if you would know *who* it is that are meant by the Prophet, it is, *we Christians*.” But a very little reflection would serve to show that the Apostle’s object is not to determine “who are meant by the prophet,” for that he had sufficiently determined, by the selection of this prophecy to establish that “Jerusalem above is the mother of us all,” *Christians*; who consequently (according to apostolic accommodation) are the subjects of the prophecy; but rather to pursue the comparison between Sarah’s son and the Christian church, in order to the conclusion at which he aims—“Cast out the bondwoman and her son, for the son of the bondwoman shall not be heir with the son of the freewoman.”

It will be seen by reference to verse 22, that the subjects of comparison in this passage are the two sons of Abraham, Ishmael and Isaac—“Abraham had two sons.” To connect the history of these two sons with the destiny of the two churches is the business of the present paragraph. This object has been partially effected already; for we have the Sinaitic covenant (identical with the bondwoman Hagar) corresponding with “Jerusalem which now is,” and consequently the mother of the Jewish church (Ishmael). In like manner the Abrahamic covenant (identical with the freewoman Sarah) has been assumed to correspond with “Jerusalem which is above,” and consequently the mother of us all, Christians (Isaac). The allegorical identity of the two churches and the two sons being thus established, the Apostle proceeds, in the passage before us, to show, that as these two sons were born, respectively, the one after the flesh, and the other after the Spirit, so is it with the churches which they represent. The ordinary generation of the Jewish church being a matter unquestioned, it is naturally pretermitted in this proof; and the extraordinary or spiritual generation of the Christian church, being the burden of the foregoing chapters, is simply asserted in these words—“But we brethren, as Isaac was, are children of promise.”

^b Nor is the Doctor more felicitous in his comment upon the words themselves. “We are the *ἐπαγγελίας τέκνα* (for *τὰ τέκνα τὰ ἐπαγγελ- μένα*), children divinely promised, not *κατὰ σάρκα* like the Jews”; for though indeterminable by the mere force of the words themselves, the similitude to Isaac is to be sought in, and explained by, *διὰ τῆς ἐπαγγελίας* of verse 23, and *κατὰ πνεῦμα* of verse 29, both expressions demonstrating the same truth, that Isaac was not only ‘a promised son,’ but ‘a son by promise,’ that is, engendered supernaturally through the power of the Holy Ghost; so likewise are we Christians children as Isaac was, not through ordinary procreation, but by the operation of God.

VERSE 29.—^a 'Αλλ' ὥσπερ, κ. τ. λ., 'howbeit as, &c.'—ἀλλὰ adversative, establishing a contrast with what precedes. 'Howbeit, notwithstanding their high descent, they must suffer persecution from the inferior class;' introducing a further coincidence between the type and the antitype;—'as Ishmael persecuted Isaac, so do the Jews the Christians.' Not indeed (as Bloomfield suggests) to prepare the Galatians for envy and its natural consequence, persecution, that they should "comfort themselves with reflecting that the persecution of Ishmael did not prevent Isaac from being the free-born son of Abraham, and the persecutor's superior;" but simply to complete the allegory, by allusion to a well-known circumstance connected with the present history of the two parties, and introduce the conclusion at which the Apostle aims, that "the son of the bondwoman shall not be heir with the son of the freewoman."

^b Ἐδίωκεν, 'persecuted.' What the precise nature of the annoyance was, to which Isaac was subjected at the hands of Ishmael, does not appear. The Scripture only informs us that—"upon the day that Isaac was weaned, Abraham made a great feast, and that Sarah saw the son of Hagar "mocking" (not too strong a term for the Hebrew—Alford), wherefore, she said unto Abraham—"Cast out the bondwoman and her son."*"

But we may be assured that the jealousy and ill-feeling which could vent itself so offensively upon a festive occasion, was not likely to be confined to a solitary instance; and we well know how a series of petty annoyances, insignificant in themselves, may amount in the aggregate to positive persecution. Besides, it is to be remembered that the Apostle would use the most forcible term which the facts of the case would admit of, to bring the offence under one denomination with the more substantial injury which the spiritual seed of Abraham sustained at the hands of those who were his seed according to the flesh.

Calvin is of opinion that the persecution of the Gentiles had reference to the assaults made on their faith, and their confidence in the promise of God, rather than to any bodily harm which they sustained at their hands. And so far as the Galatian church was concerned, he is possibly correct; and he very justly remarks that "nothing ought to wound our minds so deeply as contempt of God, and reproaches cast upon His grace, nor is there any kind of persecution more deadly than when the salvation of the soul is assailed."—CALVIN, *in loco*.

^c Κατὰ πνεῦμα—scil., γεννηθέντα, 'according to the Spirit, "i. e., 'by virtue of the promise which was given by the Spirit,' or, 'by virtue

* "The best explanation¹ given of this is, that Ishmael, seeing the great feast with which Abraham celebrated the day on which Isaac was weaned, made either it, or Isaac himself, the subject of mockery, intimating that, notwithstanding all this, he was the first-born and the heir. Sarah, seeing this, and fearing lest in process of time he should actually take the inheritance, said, "Cast out this bondwoman and her son, &c."—BAGGE.

¹ See Pauli Burgens. Addit. in Gen. xxi. 9. Cf. also Hieronym. Quæst. Heb. in Gen. app. tom. ii., p. 524.

of the Spirit's agency,' but the other is the better."—ALFORD. The latter appears nearer to the mark, but neither of them exhibits the exact meaning of the text. The sense of the phrase is best learned by the contrast, and the way *κατὰ σάρκα* evidently contrasts with the way *κατὰ πνεῦμα*. The former signifies, 'after the fashion of the flesh—fleshwise;' the latter, consequently, 'after the fashion of the Spirit—Spiritwise.' "*Κατὰ σάρκα* refers to the *natural* laws, according to which Ishmael was born; *κατὰ πνεῦμα* to the *super-natural* laws, according to which Isaac was conceived and born."—ELLICOTT.

VERSE 30.—* 'Αλλὰ, 'nevertheless'—"Strongly consolatory declaration, introducing a distinct contrast with the preceding declaration of the persecution, and calling away the thought of the reader to a totally fresh aspect."—ELLICOTT.

^b 'Ἡ γραφή, 'the Scripture,' not here referred to, it would seem, as the record of the Abrahamic story, for the words of Sarah as such could have no such prophetic significance, but as the testimony of God Himself. Seeing that she was a symbolic personage, we may well suppose that, on so important an occasion, Sarah was moved by the Holy Ghost to express herself after the manner which she did, and consequently the words she uttered are attributed to God, the author of Holy Scripture. This Scripture is quoted to show that it is God's unchangeable purpose, that they who are of the law, in bondage under the elements of the world, shall not be fellow-heirs with those who are of faith—with this object the allegory has been adduced. 'Tell me, ye that desire to be under the law, do ye not attend to what the law says, the son of the bondwoman shall not be heir with the son of the freewoman? Why, then, subject yourselves to the discipline of the law? Ye do it to obtain righteousness; but, if God's word be true, the righteousness which ye seek cannot be attained that way. They of faith, the children of promise, free from the shackles of the law, unfettered with the yoke of ceremonies, they, and they only, shall inherit the blessing.' Such is the force of the Apostle's reasoning in this place.

We cannot conclude the chapter better than in the words of an old and sententious writer:—"Let us be instructed by this beautiful passage not 'to fret ourselves because of evil-doers, neither be envious against the workers of iniquity' (Psalm xxxvii. 1), when they hold a temporary habitation and rank in the church, but patiently look for the end that awaits them. There are many spurious Christians, or aliens, who usurp a place in the church, but have no steadfast faith, as Ishmael, who, proud of his birthright, at first reigned, but like a stranger, with his posterity, was cast out."

CHAPTER V.

BEGINNING AT CHAP. IV. 31.

VERSE 31.—^{*}*Ἀρα, ἀδελφοί, κ. τ. λ.* The bearing of this clause has been very generally misapprehended. Our translators, and those who divided the Epistle into chapters, as well as some modern expositors, have regarded it as a conclusion from the foregoing context, and the winding up of the subject; (—"the conclusion from what has gone before"—Alford.—A conclusion not expressed but hinted, "simply expressing what may serve to *suggest* it"—Bloomfield). But it is no such thing, being neither the conclusion which might reasonably be expected from the Scripture quoted; nor that to which the whole drift of the allegory, manifestly, tended; which should properly have been presented thus:—"So then, brethren, they who are the children of the bondwoman shall not inherit with us who are the children of the freewoman"—a conclusion, however, which the Apostle has safely trusted to the inference of his readers.

Ellicott, who reads *διό* ('wherefore') for *ἄρα* (admitting, at the same time, the difficulty of deciding upon the exact connexion), regards it as "the commencement of a short semi-paragraph stating the consolatory application of what preceded, and passing into an exhortation in the following verse," and his impression is exhibited in the following terms:—"It seems most probable that St. Paul was about to pass on to an application of, not a deduction from, the previous remarks and citation. He commences with *διό*, but, the word *ἐλευθέρας* suggesting a digression, he turns the application by means of *τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ* into an inferential exhortation, verse 1, and recommences a new parallel train of thought with *Ἰδὲ ἐγὼ*." But this is a very far-fetched and arbitrary solution. ^{*}*Ἀρα*, which I take to be the preferable reading ("Internal evidence strengthens external authority in favour of *ἄρα*"—Bloomfield), is clearly illative, introducing an inference from the preceding context, but not the principal one or conclusion, and denoting, according to the familiar usage of St. Paul, 'continuation and progress.' In the case before us, it selects, and brings forward inferentially, that portion of the preceding statement, which the Apostle designs to enlarge upon and to enforce—"Well then, to proceed with our subject, we are the children not of the bondwoman but of *the free*; stand, therefore, to *the freedom* whereunto ye have attained;" and the argument proceeds henceforth without any vacillation or digression whatsoever.

The passage under consideration occupies a much more important position in the general plan of the Epistle than is commonly assigned to it, being in fact the transition-point from one principal line of argument to another. It will be borne in mind that the heresy of the Galatian church consisted in a senseless endeavour, after being admitted to the

privilege of adoption, through the communication of the Holy Spirit, to compass 'perfection' through the ordinances of the law. Against this error the Epistle is mainly directed, and the whole force of the argumentation lies in an appeal to the understanding (ch. iii. 3):—"Are ye so foolish? *having begun with the Spirit*, are ye now being made perfect through the flesh?" An appeal, founded upon the assumption that the commencement of the divine life was *the reception of the Holy Ghost*; an assumption, however, quickly brought to the test—"He, therefore, that ministereth to you the Spirit, doeth he it out of legal works or out of faithful hearing?" (ch. iii. 5), an inquiry which, now at length, after the course of two chapters of close reasoning, has been conducted to a conclusion; the last argument establishing the point that, 'so strictly is the bestowal of the Holy Ghost connected with the exercise of 'faith,' that 'they of works,' the children of the Sinaitic covenant, cannot inherit conjointly with 'the children of promise.'" This question being set at rest, the Apostle in the passage before us passes on, according to his original intent, to exhibit the *folly and inconsiderateness* of the Galatian conduct, representing it as nothing short of a voluntary departure from Christ; a process of reasoning which constitutes the subject matter of the ensuing section. Such is the place which this verse occupies in the general arrangement of the Epistle.

^b Παιδίσκης τέκνα, 'children of the bondwoman.' It has been observed that the article is omitted with παιδίσκης, while in the case of ἐλευθέρας it is retained. Many suggestions have been offered as to the probable ground of the omission. After a review of some of them, Ellicott introduces his own opinion, thus:—"As παιδίσκη appears in every other place with the article (even after the preposition in ver. 23), the present omission is perhaps more probably regarded as intentional, and as designed to give a general character to the Apostle's conclusion." Unquestionably so it is; and not only is it "intentional and designed," but imperatively called for by the exigency of the case. In every place where it has occurred throughout the context, ἡ παιδίσκη has represented one and the same thing, namely, the Sinaitic covenant, or, tantamount thereto, the representative woman herself. Now, it is not difficult to apprehend that a man may be in no way whatever bound by the obligation of the Sinaitic covenant, and yet not be the son of the freewoman. Any system of works, that, for instance, under which the Galatians laboured while "in bondage under the elements of the world," would be, equally with the Mosaic yoke, destructive of the privilege of sonship. Consequently παιδίσκη should, from the very necessity of the case, be written without the article; to include every kind and species of servitude, as well as that originating in the Mosaic institute. Whereas, 'the freewoman' is but one, the ἡ ἐλευθέρα of the text, 'Sarah,' or 'the covenant of grace,' under which system alone liberty can be enjoyed, and could not be otherwise designated than with the article.

VERSE 1.—^a Τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ (οὖν). "There is here an inference from the preceding, and therefore this verse ought not to have commenced a new chapter."—BLOOMFIELD. The entrance upon a new subject having taken

place in the preceding verse, the chapters ought properly to have been divided there.

Τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ στήκετε, 'stand to the liberty.' There is some uncertainty as to the exact construction of this sentence. Τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ is apparently a 'dative of reference,' and, according to Ellicott and Alford, reference of a very close kind; "not to be translated too laxly ('as regards the freedom'), as it seems to call attention to the exact sphere *in which*, and to which, the action is limited."—ELLICOTT. But I take it to be a reference of a different character; betokening, not, 'the sphere in which,' but, 'the object to which,' we are 'to stand' or adhere (see Winer, Gr., § xxxi. 1, κ.). The Apostle had immediately before deduced the general conclusion, 'well then, brethren, we (Christians) are the children not of the bondwoman but of the *free*'; and now follows it up with the personal exhortation, 'stand, therefore, to the *freedom*,' &c. &c.; an exhortation framed upon the assumption that though assailed and hard-pressed by their judaizing opponents, the Galatians had not yet finally abandoned the position of gospel liberty to which they had been called, which he now exhorts them to stand to and maintain with vigour and perseverance.

^b Ἡ ἡμᾶς Χριστὸς ἠλευθέρωσεν, 'whereunto Christ liberated us'—Ἡ, neither a dative commodi 'for which' (Ellicott), nor an ablative dative 'with or by which' (Alford), but a dative of the object 'to which'—'whereunto, Christ, in the process of liberation, hath conducted us'—a form of construction but slightly varying from εἰς ἣν ἠλευθέρωσε (a usage to be met with, Rom. viii. 21); the action of the verb extending not only to emancipation ἀπὸ δουλείας, but to introduction εἰς ἐλευθερίαν, a transference from a state of bondage into a state of liberty.

The process of liberation has been already described (ch. iv. 3, et seq.)—"We, when we were children, were in *bondage* under the elements of the world: but when the fulness of time was come, God sent forth His Son, born of a woman (born under law that he might *redeem* those under law) that we might receive the *adoption of sons*. . . . *Wherefore*, thou art no more a servant but a son"—the result, manifestly, of redemption and the outpouring of the Spirit of adoption.

^c Στήκετε, 'stand to,' literally 'stand,' but here metaphorically employed, 'stand to'—"abide by"—'adhere to;' with the notion implied that their steadfastness should be the result of *effort*, the successful resistance of inducement, either by force or by fraud, to give way.

^d Μὴ ἐνέχεσθε, 'be not entangled,' literally 'be not held in,' as with ropes and nets. Bloomfield suggests that the ἐν in ἐνέχεσθε "may have reference to the insertion of the neck in a noose or yoke, and thus the sense will be 'do not again thrust your neck into the yoke of bondage (to the law)'" ; but it is preferable to take it in its more general application.

^e Πάλιν, 'again.' Though the Galatians had never been subject to the law of Moses, yet had they been in *bondage* under "the weak and beggarly elements of the world," to which they desired *again* (πάλιν) after their liberation through Christ (*in a new form* however), to submit themselves.

‘ *Zυγῶ δουλείας*, ‘in *a* yoke of bondage,’ not “*the* yoke,” (Ellicott and Alford). *Zυγῶ* anarthrous, not merely upon grammatical considerations,* but upon considerations of a higher nature. *Zυγῶ* with the article would denote either the yoke to which they had formerly submitted, or *κατ’ ἐξοχὴν* the yoke of the Mosaic law. To the former they had no disposition to return; to the latter, never having been subject, they could not with propriety be said to *return*; whereas *ζυγῶ* anarthrous, being indefinite, is applicable to any yoke, the context, however, and the general scope of the argument, sufficiently attesting the yoke contemplated in this place, namely, ‘the Mosaic ceremonial law.’ In commenting upon the liberty which is the subject of this passage, Calvin judiciously observes:—“The liberty of which Paul speaks is exemption from the ceremonies of the law, the observance of which was demanded by the false apostles as necessary. But let the reader at the same time remember, that such liberty is only a part of that which Christ has procured for us. For how small a matter would it be, if He had only freed us from ceremonies! This is but a stream which must be traced to a higher source. ‘That Christ was made a curse that he might redeem us from the curse of the law’ (Gal. iii. 13)—That he has revoked the power of the law, so far as it held us liable to the judgment of God, under the penalty of eternal death—that, in a word, he has rescued us from the tyranny of sin, Satan, and death. Thus, under one department is included the whole class.”

VERSE 2.—* *Ἰδὲ*, ‘behold,’—‘observe.’ The Apostle, in the use of this word, directs attention to what is to follow, as a most important and weighty declaration, deserving of their most careful consideration and regard.

^b *Ἐγὼ Παῦλος*, ‘I, Paul’—‘Not one of your unauthorized teachers, to whom ye have been accustomed thoughtlessly to give heed; but ‘I, Paul,’ “the Apostle of Jesus Christ, and God the Father who raised him from the dead”—I, ‘whom it pleased God to call from my mother’s womb, and reveal His son in me, that I might preach Him amongst the Gentiles,’ behold, with all the authority with which my sacred office invests me, “I, Paul, say unto you”’—a most solemn and awakening introduction.

^c *Γέγω ὑμῖν*, ‘I say unto you,’ with the notion attached not merely of communication but of inculcation (Mat. v. 34), almost equivalent to ‘I solemnly declare unto you.’

^d *Ἐὰν περιτέμνησθε*, ‘if ye be circumcised’—the form of the verb (pres. subj.) indicating that the case contemplated by the Apostle is, not the state of being circumcised, but the presently submitting to the rite. The entire aim of the judaizers seems to have been, to induce the Galatian Christians to circumcise, not from any inordinate value which they

* Alford, in support of his translation (“the yoke”) adduces the rule, “an anarthrous noun or personal pronoun following another noun in the genitive, often deprives that other noun of its article.” But such a rule can only apply when the article, *when required by the sense*, is omitted in the text, which is not the case here.

attached to the ordinances of the law (for they observed them but indifferently themselves), but that they might enjoy the dignity and emolument of teachers without incurring odium or persecution for the cross of Christ (see ch. vi. 12). We may here observe that it is not with the rite of circumcision itself that the Apostle quarrels, but with the object with which it was resorted to. The Gentile Christian who submitted to circumcision, professed to take upon himself the obligation to observe the ceremonial law, upon the plea that Christ alone was insufficient for his salvation. If he did not rest upon his own works exclusively, they at least formed a part, and no inconsiderable part, of his dependence; but the most infinitesimal reliance upon the flesh is incompatible with, and vitiates, the whole scheme of gospel salvation, which is purely and exclusively of grace. The man who will not trust to Christ *alone*, need not think to trust in Him *at all*. He endured the cross without a fellow, and He will not share the glory with another. Upon this ground only was circumcision objectionable.

That it was a matter purely indifferent in itself is inferrible from the fact that Paul circumcised Timothy to make him acceptable to the Jews (Acts, xvi. 3), a step which he could not have consistently taken, were circumcision in itself contrary to the will of God, or derogatory to the glory of Christ. But Timothy was the son of a Jewess, and entitled by birth, as a descendant of Abraham, to the *distinctive* privilege of circumcision, and no religious principle was consequently involved. But it was otherwise in the case of the Gentiles, with whom it could only be resorted to as a *religious* ceremony; and consequently we find the same Apostle strenuously resisting the circumcision of Titus, "because he was a Greek;" and to circumcise him would be a virtual acknowledgment that circumcision was necessary to salvation, which he scrupulously avoided to make.

"As the preservation of Abraham's posterity a distinct people from the rest of mankind answered many important purposes in the Divine government (Rom. xi. 15), their observance of the rite of circumcision, declared by God Himself to be the seal of His covenant with Abraham, was necessary to mark them as his descendants, as long as it was determined that they should be a distinct people. . . . And therefore, while the Jews practised this rite according to its original intention, for the purpose of distinguishing themselves as Abraham's descendants, and not for obtaining salvation, they did what was right. But the Gentiles, not being of Abraham's race, were under no political obligation to circumcise themselves; consequently, if they received that rite, it must have been because they thought it necessary to their salvation, for which reason the Apostle absolutely prohibited it to all the Gentiles."—M'KNIGHT, *in loco*.

* Οὐδὲν ὠφελήσῃ, 'will profit you nothing'—'will render you no assistance whatever,' but will leave you to bear the burden of your own responsibilities.

VERSE 3.—* Μαρτύρομαι ἐνάλιν, 'and I testify again'—μαρτύρομαι a solemn form of asseveration, like as of a man giving evidence in

a court of justice. In the former verse, the Apostle had expressed himself in a general way; he now repeats his declaration in language more personal and more explicit, addressing himself to every individual amongst them who submitteth to the rite of circumcision, not merely (as before) that Christ shall profit him nothing, but, with a more positive averment still, that in so doing he assumes to himself the responsibility of fulfilling the whole law of Moses. There is no reason to apprehend that *πάλιν* refers to any communication made upon a former occasion, but only to the declaration in the preceding verse, which is now repeated with greater emphasis and individualization.

^b *Περιτεμνομένῳ*, 'being circumcised,' or 'submitting to circumcision.' The force of the pres. part. is not to be disregarded. It is not every circumcised person, as such, who is obnoxious to the consequence above stated, but he who is presently submitting to the rite of circumcision with a view (of course) to self-justification. If *περιτεμνομένῳ* were regarded as the participle of the middle voice, the meaning, perhaps, would be better conveyed—'to everyone who is circumcising himself'—see ch. vi. 13 ^b.

^c *Ὁφειλέτης ἐστίν*, 'is a debtor.' *Ὁφειλέτης* denotes one morally bound to the fulfilment of any engagement; here, figuratively, 'a debtor.' When the Mosaic law became the covenant between God and the Jewish people, circumcision was adopted as the seal of the covenant, whereby those who were circumcised engaged to fulfil all the precepts and ordinances of the law blameless, and God upon his part promised that upon fulfilment thereof they should become entitled to justification or life,—“He that hath done these things shall live by them;” Lev. xviii. 5. Consequently, in his Epistle to the Romans, we find St. Paul arguing with the unbelieving Jews upon this principle—“Circumcision verily profiteth, if thou keep the law (that is, fulfil your part of the engagement, for then you shall be entitled to the recompense of obedience); but if thou be a breaker of the law, thy circumcision is made uncircumcision” (Rom. ii. 25); that is, the covenant being unfulfilled, you shall take no benefit under its provisions. Every circumcised person, therefore, from the very nature of the transaction, was “a debtor to do the whole law.”

^d *Ὁλον τὸν νόμον*, 'the whole law'—an expression which is capable of being understood in diverse senses, but all of them comprised within the full scope of the Apostle's declaration:—(1.) a debtor to do *the whole law*, that is, in all its departments—not merely the ceremonial and ritual, with which alone the Galatians desired to trouble themselves, but also the moral and preceptive, for they never could be disunited; (2.) a debtor to do *the whole law*, perfectly and unremittingly—not merely with a desultory and defective obedience, but in all its entirety and completeness, for “he that offendeth in one point is guilty of all.” To which, perhaps, may be added a third—a debtor to do the whole law, personally and solely, without any aid or assistance from another—a responsibility not the least needful to be insisted on, for, in betaking themselves to circumcision, at the instigation of the judaizing teachers, the Galatians

had no intention whatsoever of relinquishing their interest in Christ, but, being under the delusion that Christ alone was insufficient, they desired, with the aid of the Holy Spirit, to contribute to their own perfection by the observance of the rites of the law—an impression obviously upon their minds, from the nature of the remonstrance addressed to them, ch. iii. 3. However, the Apostle here testifies, and repeats his testimony in the most solemn manner, not only to them, but to every human being (*παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ*), of every age and country, imbued with similar propensities, that they must make their election between Christ and self. If Christ is to be their Saviour, they must cease altogether from self. If any confidence is to be placed in their own works, they must rest upon 'works' exclusively, and expect no assistance from Christ. "This true and serious consequence of circumcision the false apostles had probably at least dissembled."—MEYER.

VERSE 4.—^a *Κατηργήθητε ἀπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ*, 'ye were undone from Christ.' It is no easy matter to effect an exact rendering of this phrase into English. *Κατηργήθητε ἀπὸ* is a 'constructio pregnans,' where the force of two phrases is compressed into one. An approximation, however, to it may be deemed to be the translation presented above—'ye were undone from Christ'—an expression implying, not only 'separation from,' but 'ruin consequently incurred.' The period to which the action of the verb refers is the time when they first entered (at circumcision) upon a course of self-justification. This clause supplies an emphatic corroboration of the declaration in the preceding verse—'a debtor, I say, to do the whole law, *for* (this particle omitted in the original, to add strength and emphasis to the sentence) there is nothing to be expected from Christ; whosoever of you are being justified *ἐν νόμῳ*, 'ye are undone from Christ' in whom all your legal engagements were undertaken and met, and are cast upon the strength of your own resources.'

Bloomfield suggests that "*κατηργήθητε* may be, perhaps, a metaphor taken from a ship which has parted from the tow-line, has let go its hold by it." But, from whatever source the metaphor is derived, it is something more impressive than this. The ship may have parted its cable, and be tossed to and fro upon the angry billows, and nevertheless eventually make the port; but the soul that is severed from Christ is ruined and undone for ever, and can find no place of refuge any more (Heb. vi. 4, et seq.).

^b *Οἷτινες*, 'whosoever,' denoting *a class* of persons to whom the observation applies.

^c *Ἐν νόμῳ*, 'in law'—descriptive of the sphere or element in which they move who seek justification by works—'in law,' as contradistinguished from 'a state of grace.'

^d *Δικαιοῦσθε*, 'are being justified.' That no man is justified *ἐν νόμῳ* is an axiom of theological science which cannot be controverted (see ch. iii. 11). The verb then, is to be understood 'subjectively,' not of the reality of the thing, but of their own impressions concerning it. "*Δικαιοῦσθε* is correctly referred by the principal ancient and modern commentators to the feelings of the subject (*ὡς ὑπολαμβάνετε*, Theophl.—

‘ut vobis videtur,’ Fisch.).”—ELLICOTT. They were being justified, *as they fondly imagined*—ἐν νόμῳ—where ἐν νόμῳ is not to be regarded as representing any part of their own imagining or belief, but is a term applied by the Apostle himself to characterize *the position* in which they stood. Doubtless, had they been interrogated upon the subject, they would have answered—‘not ἐν νόμῳ but ἐν Χριστῷ’ (see ch. ii. 16). All that they were conscious of doing, and all that they desired to do, was to avail themselves of the benefit, as they accounted it, of the Mosaic ritual, without renouncing or forfeiting their position in Christ; but inasmuch as they had taken upon themselves the obligation ‘of works,’ they were *de facto* ‘undone from Christ;’ the Apostle stamping the condition to which they had reduced themselves, with its proper appellation—“ἐν νόμῳ.” It is to be feared that not a few of the professing members of the Reformed Church of the present day, from the low and unscriptural notions which they entertain of evangelical truth, might be addressed, not inappropriately, in the language of St. Paul to the Galatians—ἐν νόμῳ δικαιώσθε.

* Τῆς χάριτος ἐξεπέσατε, ‘ye are fallen from grace’—a reiteration and confirmation of the previous statement—‘ye are undone from Christ;’ in terms suggested, probably, by the antagonistic nature of the two states, the state of law, and the state of grace. To have ‘fallen from grace’ is equivalent to the being ‘undone from Christ,’ in whom all the *gracious* purposes of God to man are exclusively fulfilled. By τῆς χάριτος we are to understand here ‘the state or dispensation, grace,’ as contradistinguished from, and contrasted with, ‘the state or dispensation, law’—states so opposite in their nature, that to be included in the one is, necessarily, to be excluded from the other.*

VERSE 5.—* Ἡμεῖς γὰρ, ‘for we.’ Ἡμεῖς emphatic, contrasted with the parties before contemplated, who, seeking justification by works, had ‘fallen from grace;’ ‘we, on the contrary, who are of grace, and consequently unsevered from Christ (the condition manifestly supposed in the following verse) seek, &c.’ Γὰρ causal, assigning the ground of the foregoing assertion, ‘ye have fallen, I say, from grace; *for* we, who are of grace, seek justification in a different way, i. e., not by the works of the law, but by the Spirit through faith.’

ὁ Ἐλπίδα δικαιοσύνης, ‘the hoped-for righteousness.’ In order to arrive at a certain conclusion with respect to this complicated, and at the

* “Wetstein says here—‘Si omnino fieri non posset, ut quis gratia excideret, absurde hæc dicerentur,’ and Dr. Bloomfield (Recens. Synop.) calls this a ‘shrewd’ remark. The simple fact, however, is, that this verse has no bearing whatever upon the doctrine of the final perseverance of the saints. All that the Apostle means to say is, that inasmuch as the salvation offered through Christ is χάριτι, by grace, the person who, having openly accepted Christ and His salvation, seeks for justification as a reward of works, is fallen from a position in which justification is of the free grace of God. The grace which is the characteristic of this dispensation is one thing, and that which gives vital union with Christ is another. The professing Christian accepting Christ is in a state of grace; and if he openly and avowedly seeks for salvation through works, he is fallen from that state of grace, and therefore openly separated from Christ.”—BAGGE, *in loco*.

same time important passage, it will be needful, in the first place, to determine what is the import of this phrase, which is evidently the *subject* of the declaration, that we may be in a position to understand what is *predicated* concerning it. What construction, then, are we to put upon ἐλπίδα δικαιοσύνης? Alford limits the inquiry to two points—"Is this genitive *objective*, the hope of righteousness, i. e., the hope whose object is perfect righteousness—or genitive *subjective*, the hope of righteousness, i. e., the hope which the righteous entertain, viz., that of eternal life?" And for himself he "certainly" concludes that it is the former, ἐλπίδα being emphatic, and the expression ἐλπίδα δικαιοσύνης ἀπεκδέχομεθα contrasting with ἐν νόμῳ δικαιούσθε of the preceding clause: "ye think ye *have* your righteousness in the law; we, on the contrary, anxiously *wait for* the hope of righteousness (full and perfect)." But, not to dwell upon the theological anachronism of representing the Christian state as one of *expectancy of 'a hope of righteousness,'* a hope to which the believer in Christ is introduced simultaneously with believing (comp. Rom. v. 2, 1 Peter i. 3), and which it is the privilege of all professing Christians to entertain, this exposition is open to the lexical objection, that the verb ἀπεκδέχομαι is nowhere to be met with in Scripture in connexion with ἐλπίδα representing 'the affection'—hope. Nor do any of the examples or parallelisms of the learned commentator support the assumption: ἐλπίδα the object of ἀπεκδέχομαι in the New Testament is invariably, not 'the hope' itself, but '*the thing hoped for*;' and consequently, in the expression before us, "the hope of righteousness" is not, as it is alleged to be, "the hope *whose object* is perfect righteousness," and the genitive, consequently, is not '*genitive objective*.'*

Nor is it more properly genitive *subjective*, "the hope which the righteous entertain, viz., that of eternal life;" for the same objection holds good here, viz., that ἀπεκδέχομαι is never coupled with ἐλπίδα in such a sense, nor ever need be, 'the believer *entertaining* the hope of eternal life,' and not *expecting to entertain it*. Ellicott, indeed, admits that—"If the genitive be *subjecti*, ἐλπίδα δικαιοσύνης must be 'ipsum præmium quod speratur, scil. vitam æternam' (Grot.)—'coronam gloriæ' (Beza), ἐλπίς being used μετανυμικῶς for *the thing hoped for*." But, even with this modification, the construction is objectionable. The Apostle's argument does not turn upon that which is *the hope of righteousness*, 'the crown of glory, or eternal life,' but upon *righteousness itself*. The question at issue is (see the preceding verse), 'how is righteousness to be attained?' 'The Galatians' sought it by the works of the law, and, so doing, fell from grace; 'we' who are of grace seek it, not by the works of the law, but by the Spirit through faith. Consequently, any exposition which diverts attention from *righteousness*, the subject of the Apostle's dissertation, to that which is *the hope of the righteous* (namely,

* I except also, emphatically, to the 'contrast' represented by Alford as being exhibited in this sentence between the legalist and the Christian—"the one thinks (he says) that *he has* his righteousness in the law, and the other *waits for* the hope of righteousness;" whereas, indeed, it is that 'the one *expects righteousness by the works of the law*, the other *expects it by the Spirit through faith*.'

‘the crown of glory, or eternal life’), which is not immediately in contemplation here, is necessarily a defective exposition. The question then must be put in a more comprehensive form—‘what genitive is it?’ To which I reply, ‘genitive of apposition’ (ἐλπίδα δικαιοσύνης, a construction similar to σημείον περιτομῆς, Rom. iv. 11; ὁρῶντες τὸ πνεῦμα, 2 Cor. v. 5; ἐπαγγελίαν τοῦ πνεύματος, ch. iii. 14, al.), ‘the hope which is righteousness;’ where ἐλπίδα represents, not the affection itself—‘hope,’ but that which is the object of hope, in plain terms—‘the hoped-for righteousness;’ which *we* Christians expect, not through the works of the law, but by the Spirit, through faith.*

* Πνεύματι ἐκ πίστεως, ‘by the Spirit through (or out of) faith.’ Πνεύματι, an instrumental dative, probably here used *modally* (see ch. iii. 3, v. 18, 25).† The Spirit is here presented as the agent or instrument by or with which God justifies the nations (see ch. iii. 8), according to the tenor of the promise, “in thee shall all nations be *blessed* ;” where the *blessing* of Abraham is distinctly affirmed to be ‘the gift of the Holy Ghost’ (see ch. iii. 14’). Ἐκ πίστεως, ‘out of faith,’ ἐκ denoting the source, not remote but immediate (as in ch. iii. 8, 22), the medium through which the Spirit, the justifying agent, is received by the church. According to this interpretation, the parties before us are represented as ‘expecting to obtain righteousness, the object of hope, by the Spirit, through or out of faith.’ Considerable difficulty, it must be confessed, attaches to the exposition of this passage, arising principally from the variety of senses in which the expressions are capable of being understood, leaving it no easy matter to distinguish which of them it was that the Apostle had specifically in view, when he penned the sentence. However, a close investigation may do something to disentangle the difficulty.

Contemplating the words as they stand, without any contextual consideration, and with the information already acquired with respect to the meaning of ἐλπίδα δικαιοσύνης, viz.,—‘the hoped-for righteousness,’ the first idea that would probably suggest itself to the reader’s mind would be, ‘we expect the hoped-for righteousness (in other words, we hope to be justified) by the Spirit, through faith’—an exposition in strict accordance with the truth inculcated throughout the greater portion of

* Alford would, no doubt, pronounce the synonym ἐλπίδα δικαιοσύνης *pro δικαιοσύνην τῇν ἐλπίζομένην*, “the old absurdity which would destroy the logical form of the sentence” (see his strictures upon a similar version in ch. iii. 14’); but it is not pretended that here, any more than in ch. iii. 14, the paraphrase adopted is the exact rendering of the gen. appositionis (the very expression, indeed, ἐλπ. δικ. *pro* δικ. τῇν ἐλπίζ. is evidence that it is not so regarded); nor that the gen. app. is generally capable of such a mutation; but only that, from the peculiarity of the subjects, in both these instances it is: ‘the hope’ (that is, ‘the object of hope’), ‘righteousness,’ is, to all intents and purposes, ‘the hoped-for righteousness,’ as in the other instance ‘the promise’ (that is, ‘the subject of promise’), ‘the Spirit,’ is, in like manner, ‘the promised Spirit.’

† The Apostle’s object in this place being, not to *establish the fact* of ‘justification by the Spirit through faith,’ but only to *refer to it as the mode* whereby we expect to be justified, πνεύματι, though strictly an *instrumental* dative, may, possibly, be here regarded as of a *modal* signification.

this Epistle. The Scripture, foreseeing that God would *justify* the nations *through faith*, announced the glad tidings to Abraham—"in thee shall all nations be *blessed*" (that is, receive the Holy Ghost, chap. iii. 14);—a subject which engages the Apostle's attention to the conclusion of the following chapter. To be justified, then, according to the purport of this teaching, is 'to receive (*the justifying agent*) the Holy Spirit, through faith;' which thing consequently becomes an object of scriptural expectation to the church. For more on this subject, see ch. iii. 14^f.

But this exposition, scriptural and natural as it might seem, is open to the grave objection, that the parties of whom the predication is made are represented as being already *in Christ*, and consequently *already justified* through the faith which is in Him; whereas the justification here contemplated is manifestly future, being to the believer *an object of expectancy and hope*. We must, therefore, look out for another interpretation, more in conformity with the circumstances of the case, and at the same time consistent with this, the only construction which the words will properly admit.

Have we, then, any ground for apprehending that another and more complete act of justification still awaits those who have been previously justified in Christ, to which the declaration in the text may be taken to apply? That the Christian is one whose salvation, though inchoate, is by no means perfected in the present life, is a truth which I believe few will be disposed to gainsay. Every term expressive of privilege which is applied to him now will be applicable, with tenfold force and propriety, at the period of his consummation, the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. To give some examples of what I mean:—Salvation is a term applied to the believer now—"by grace *are ye saved*, through faith"—"*receiving* the end of your faith, even *the salvation* of your souls;" but the Christian looks forward to a more complete and exemplary salvation, when the Lord Jesus Christ "shall appear a second time, without sin, *unto salvation*"—a "salvation," consequently, "nearer to us now than when we believed." In like manner, 'adoption' is a term applied to the believer in the present life—"ye have received the Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father;" and yet with respect to adoption, the attitude of the church is one of expectancy and hope—"waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of the body." Presently we are 'the children of God'—"ye are all the children of God, by faith, in Christ;" but we shall be more eminently God's children when we shall become "*the children of God*, being the children of the resurrection." Now are we 'risen with Christ,' but still we press towards the mark, "if by any means we might attain unto *the resurrection* of the dead." Already are we 'redeemed,' "*having redemption* through His blood;" nevertheless "we are sealed with that Holy Spirit of promise, which is the earnest of our inheritance, *until the redemption* of the purchased possession."

And so it is with respect to justification. We are justified in the present life, when, by the bestowal of the "first-fruits" of the Spirit, we are incorporated into the body of Christ, and are made partakers of the righteousness which is in Him—a righteousness peculiarly and exclu-

sively His own; which is ours neither by impartation nor by imputation, but simply by investiture.* “As many as have been baptized into Christ have *put on* Christ,” and are clothed with the righteousness of God’s own Son. “He was made sin for us, who knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God *in Him*.” Consequentially upon this blessed change of condition, wherein we are united to Christ, and made partakers of the righteousness which is *in Him*; we have imparted to us by the Spirit, through faith (and proportionately to the measure of our faith), a conscious remission of sin and acceptance of our persons, in Christ—the characteristic feature of New Testament justification: “being justified by faith, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ, and rejoice in hope of the glory of God.”

But we shall be justified hereafter, when God shall pour into our souls a more abundant measure of His Holy Spirit; to which the portion to which we have at present attained is no more than a sheaf of corn to the entire harvest—an earnest to the full price; by which Spirit our mortal bodies shall be quickened from the dust of the earth, and we shall stand up in the glorious likeness of Christ; in that happy state of consummation, sin shall be no more, and every vestige of imperfection obliterated

* I take it that the distinction between Old Testament and New Testament justification may be briefly stated thus:—Under the former dispensation, the Spirit being not yet given, nor the believer, consequently, baptized into Christ, investiture with the righteousness of Christ did not actually take place; but ‘faith,’ which, if exercised under the better dispensation, would lead to ‘communion’ (1 John, i. 3) with Christ, and participation in His righteousness, was ‘imputed,’ or reckoned, to the believer for righteousness: whereas, under the gospel dispensation, the believer is, by faith, engrafted into the person of Christ, and *ipso facto* arrayed in the righteousness of his Head.

As to the matter of present privilege, New Testament justification appears to occupy an intermediate place between that which preceded it and that which is to follow after. Under the Jewish dispensation, righteousness was by *imputation*, unaccompanied by any saving knowledge of the fact (see Rom. i. 16, 17; iii. 21, 22), and consequently without any cleansing effect upon the conscience (Heb. x. 1-3). Under the Christian dispensation, ‘faith’ is indeed imputed unto righteousness (Rom. iv. 24); but we have more than imputed righteousness—a righteousness by *investiture*, having “put on Christ,” and in Him “the Lord our righteousness;” and when living up to our privilege, we have a conscious acquaintance with our acceptance. But still our righteousness is only in Christ; *inherent* righteousness we have none, no change in the moral habit of the soul having taken place of sufficient consequence to constitute the righteousness of the creature. But in the dispensation to come, at the appearing of our Lord Jesus Christ, without losing the righteousness which we have by investiture, in Christ, a farther boon shall be conferred upon us, namely, a righteousness by *impartation*, whereby we shall be made, not merely putatively, or representatively, but personally and morally righteous—the perfection, doubtless, which was the object of the Galatians’ pursuit, and not only of their’s, but of St. Paul’s himself, as distinctly appears in his Epistle to the Philippians, ch. iii. 11-15.

The righteousness of the Jew may be said to be *in foro Dei*, unknown to himself or to his fellows; the righteousness of the Christian, not only *in foro Dei*, but *in foro conscientiæ* also, whereby he becomes consciously, though not openly, righteous; the righteousness of the risen saint will be not only in the sight of God and of his own conscience, but in the sight of an admiring universe.

for ever. The righteousness then *imparted* to the saints will vary in excellence “according to the deeds done in the body” (see Appendix IV. *). Some “shall shine as the firmament;” others, “as the stars for ever and ever;” for, “as one star differeth from another star in glory, so also is the resurrection of the dead.” Then shall the righteousness of the believer, now hid within the secret chamber of his own breast, be proclaimed as it were upon the house-top; God’s secret ones shall be revealed, and all creation shall rejoice together at “the manifestation of the sons of God.” Such is the testimony of Scripture upon this momentous subject; and, being so, we have reason to apprehend that another and more signal act of justification does, indeed, await the believer at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ; which righteousness, antecedently to His advent, is an object of expectation to the church, and may be not unfitly designated the “hoped-for righteousness.”

But, before this exposition can be acquiesced in satisfactorily, a condition remains to be fulfilled—Can it be affirmed of the righteousness to be attained upon that day, that it will be imparted by the Spirit’s agency, *through faith*? And I know nothing in Scripture to discountenance the supposition. That the soul is unconscious in its separate state we have no reason to apprehend; that it shall be less capable of exercising faith in the promises of God when in the more immediate presence of the Saviour, than when conversant with the things of this outer world, would be contrary to all reason to believe (Rev. vi. 10). But even granting the faculties of the soul to be suspended during the sleep of death, who can doubt that on the resurrection morn, “when the Lord shall descend from heaven *with a shout*, and *with the voice of the archangel*, and *with the trump of God*, when they who are in their graves shall *hear His voice*, and come forth,” that faith shall be in its holiest, liveliest exercise, and the *final impartation* of the Spirit be effected through *the accustomed channel, faith*? Such would seem to be a literal, scriptural, and by no means inappropriate explication of this most interesting passage—‘we, who are Christians, expect the hoped-for righteousness by the Spirit, through faith.’

But, before we proceed with our investigation, it may be well to observe, that commentators generally give a totally different turn to the passage from that which is here adopted. “The whole clause (says Ellicott) may be paraphrased thus—‘by the assistance of the Holy Spirit we are enabled to cherish *the hope of being justified*; and the source out of which that hope springs is faith.’” But it is needless to go over the same ground again: “*the hope of being justified*” can never be an object of *expectation* to the church; and though Ellicott in his paraphrase has endeavoured to evade the difficulty, by substituting the word ‘to cherish’ in the room of ‘to wait for’ (“we are enabled *to cherish* the hope of being justified”), yet is the substitution not countenanced by the original text, nor indeed insisted upon in his own translation, which runs thus—“are *tarrying for* the hope of righteousness.” Upon this portion of the sentence I really do not see that there should be any hesitation in arriving at the conclusion that the only construction which will stand,

consistently with theological propriety, is the one which has been proposed, 'gen. appositionis,'—'the hoped-for righteousness.'

But with this modification, it may be asked, does not Ellicott's translation commend itself to our judgment—'we *by the assistance of* the Holy Ghost are enabled to expect (or wait for) the hoped-for righteousness, through faith'? I will not go the length to say that the translation is indefensible, but certainly it is not such as the order of the words invites. Πνεύματι ἐκ πίστεως seem naturally linked together as 'source' and 'channel of communication;' besides, according to the view proposed, the sentence would be more naturally, and doubtless less ambiguously framed thus—ἡμεῖς γὰρ πνεύματι, ἐλπίδα δικαιοσύνης ἐκ πίστεως ἀπεκδεχόμεθα. But waiving the *textual* objection, upon purely *exegetical* grounds, I assert that the translation is not to be maintained. The object of the Apostle in this passage is evidently not to show by what means Christians *are enabled to expect*, or wait for, the hoped-for righteousness (which possibly would not be questioned by either party), but from what source, and through what channel, *do they expect to obtain it*. This is the point at issue throughout the entire context, and this is the true point of contrast here. The legalist expects to obtain it 'by the flesh, through the medium of works'—the evangelical, 'by the Spirit, through the medium of faith;' and to divert attention from this, which is the material point in discussion, to another, which is only secondary and subsidiary, is not to elucidate, but to obscure. I repeat, that no translation can be maintained, with due regard to the scope of the Apostle's reasoning, but that which has been here adopted—'we expect the hoped-for righteousness by the Spirit through (or, out of) faith.'

Such, then, being the translation, are we prepared to stand by the explanation above offered as its true and proper signification? I submit that we cannot do so. That explanation is rendered more than questionable by the declaration immediately subjoined—"for in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, but faith working by love"—a declaration clearly *confirmatory* of the preceding statement, and as clearly demonstrative that to the attainment of the hoped-for righteousness, the only available thing is "faith *working* by love"—a form of expression by which faith is much more distinctly presented as *the instrument by which* righteousness is to be wrought out, than (which was the prominent idea in the former exposition) *the channel through which* it is to be conferred.*

* The declaration that 'we are justified by the Spirit, through faith,' is equally true, whether it be predicated of justification primary or final, and true also in the same sense. It is God's unvarying plan of justifying the nations, whether it be by the communication of *the first-fruits* of the Spirit, in the life present, whereby we are brought into a state of fellowship with Christ, and are made partakers of "all spiritual blessings" which are in Him; or of *the full measure* of the Spirit, in the life to come, whereby we attain to the consummation of bliss both in *body* and soul. In both instances it is effected through faith, and faith as the *channel* of communication. But in the passage before us the Apostle is treating, not, of the mode whereby God justifies His people, but, of the mode whereby the *meetness* for that justification is

VERSE 6.—“*Ἐν γὰρ Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, κ. τ. λ.*, ‘for in Christ Jesus,’ &c.—*γὰρ* (consistently with its primitive import, see Winer, Gr., § liii. 8, a.) introducing matter *confirmatory* of the mode whereby righteousness is to be attained, as set forth in the preceding clause—‘we expect the hoped-for righteousness by the Spirit, *through faith*; for in Christ Jesus nothing availeth but *faith*—faith working by love.’ From the manner in which the declaration is introduced (by the confirmatory particle *γὰρ*), we have reason to apprehend that “faith working by love,” is but an expanded form of what the Apostle had within narrower compass compressed in the preceding words. The full meaning of the passage, then, is this—‘we who are of grace expect the hoped-for righteousness from love, called into existence, and maintained in operation, by the Spirit’s agency, through faith.’

^b *ἰσχύει*, ‘availeth,’ *scil.* to the attainment of the hoped-for righteousness, or, in other words, to ‘final justification;’ the subject presently under discussion. The Galatians sought ‘perfection’ by *circumcision* and the works of the flesh; but the Apostle teaches them that “in Christ Jesus neither *circumcision* availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, but *faith working by love*.” Alford insists that “no passage can be produced where St. Paul says we are justified by faith working by love, but it is ever by faith only.” As regards *primary* justification—that act of God whereby he justifies the ungodly, the topic usually handled by St. Paul in his epistles, the observation is unquestionably true—it is invariably represented as being altogether irrespective of works of any kind whatsoever; but here the subject is the same as that handled by another apostle (St. James), and the doctrine is consequently identical too, that “by works a man is justified, and not by faith only,” James, ii. 24.

^c *Δι’ ἀγάπης ἐνεργουμένη*, ‘working by love.’ The verb *ἐνεργεῖσθαι* is capable of a twofold acceptation—(1) passive, in which sense the meaning of the words would be, ‘faith perfected (that is, wrought out, and carried into action,) through love’—the sense generally adopted by the older Romanist divines, and by some Protestant interpreters too; (2) middle, as maintained by most modern expositors, when the sense would be, ‘faith energizing, displaying its activity, through love.’ The latter is probably to be preferred, as harmonizing better with the usage of the word in the New Testament. But as regards the sense of the passage, it is of comparatively little moment which way we take it—

acquired; and this also is attributed to the agency of the Spirit, through faith, but faith represented not so distinctly as the *channel* of communication through which it is conferred, as the *instrument* by which it is wrought out. But, after all, the difference is more apparent than real. Faith, as *the instrument* by which the meetness is wrought out, is nothing more than faith as *the channel* through which the influences of the Divine Spirit, by which all our good actions are performed, are communicated. Whatever is in Scripture attributed to faith is in fact the work of God, operating in us and by us, through faith. However, the distinction is sufficiently marked to indicate the subject to which the Apostle refers—not the act of God whereby righteousness is conferred, but the act of God whereby the meetness for the reception of that righteousness is acquired.

whether as 'faith perfected by works,' or 'faith producing works;' in either way, works are distinctly brought into account—righteousness is attributed to *the operation* of faith.

In order, it would seem, to avoid the difficulty of making works in any manner subsidiary to righteousness, commentators have fallen upon the expedient to regard πίστις δι' ἀγάπης ἐνεργουμένη as descriptive of 'the faith which justifies,' rather than of 'a qualifying process for justification.' "To preclude the supposition that a bare faith was meant, the Apostle cautiously subjoins the limitation ἐι' ἀγάπης ἐνεργ., meaning 'what shows itself—exerts its efficacy *in action*, as opposed to mere speculation; what is operative, as opposed to what produces no fruit.'"—BLOOMFIELD. But unquestionably, to give expression to such a sentiment, the insertion of the article (after πίστις) would be indispensable; πίστις ἐι' ἀγάπης ἐνεργουμένη (the verb being taken in an active sense) is capable of no other interpretation than that which has been attributed to it above—'faith working by love.'

It is with unfeigned concern that, in the exposition of a passage of such immense doctrinal importance, I find myself constrained to differ so widely from many able scholars and sound divines who have preceded me in the task of investigation, whom I should infinitely prefer to find battling for the truth of God by my side. But really I see no way whereby the objections which have been raised to existing interpretations can possibly be surmounted, or how any other meaning can be attributed to the words consistently with grammatical and exegetical propriety, than that which is here assigned to them; and, though the view preferred does, admittedly, involve conclusions not generally regarded with favour by the more enlightened—that is to say, the evangelical portion of the religious world—yet that circumstance should afford no sufficient ground for its condemnation, provided that it be found consistent with the literal, natural, and, I will venture to add, unavoidable construction of Holy Scripture. In such a case, it becomes us rather to reconsider our systems, and make them to square with the ascertained testimony of God's word, than to fall into the dangerous and unphilosophical alternative of straining the language of Scripture to bolster up our preconceived notions of the truth. As regards the doctrine more especially involved in the text before us, there are many passages both in the Old Testament and the New which appear to favour distinctly the view which is here set forth, and maintained, without the smallest infringement, it is verily hoped and believed, upon the fullest, the freest, and the most unconditional enunciation of divine grace. For the sense in which works are represented as instrumental to *final* justification, and for some further observations upon the subject generally, the reader is referred to Appendix IV.

From the contemplation of this passage we learn that justifying faith is no mere barren, speculative opinion, unaccompanied with corresponding results; but an active, enterprising principle, calling into existence love, and under the influence of its benign sway performing all its works. Faith has been well compared to the mainspring of a watch.

If the mainspring be broken, there is no motion of the hands at all; if it be weak or out of order, the motion will be desultory and irregular. So is it with faith: when faith is strong and vigorous, it diffuses health and animation throughout the entire system. Love is in the ascendant, and all the faculties and powers of our nature are in active and ancillary co-operation. We go forward in firm and well-founded confidence, steadfastly performing every duty in the face of whatsoever opposition, resisting every temptation, enduring every hardship, and braving every danger. If, on the other hand, faith is weak and wavering, everything connected with our conversation is deranged; our walk is worldly and inconsistent, our services cold and lifeless, and our performance of duty languid and constrained. All experience testifies, that proportionately as faith flourishes or decays, there is a corresponding advance or retrogression in our spiritual progress; and, consequently, as we are here taught, in our meetness for the righteousness to be conferred upon us at the last day.

Another inference which may be easily deduced from this passage is, that it is not faith in every revealed truth, indifferently, that constitutes, in New Testament contemplation, 'justifying faith.' "Thou believest that there is one God; thou doest well: the devils also believe, and tremble." A man may hold (if it were possible to conceive so extreme a case) all the articles of the Christian faith save one, and, nevertheless, for lack of that one, fall short of justification; nay, it might be confidently affirmed that the more he knew of God, and the more he believed concerning Him, if his faith embraced not that one essential article of the Christian faith, the farther would he be removed from justification. "God out of Christ is a consuming fire;" and the more any man realizes of the nature and attributes of Deity, unreconciled in Christ, the more occasion will he find for fear and trembling, than for the exercise of confidence and love.

There is but one revealed truth in the Bible, such is the disordered state of the human heart, capable, through the grace of God, of engendering and fostering love; and that is the doctrine of the atonement; "We love God *because He first loved us*;" and upon the cross alone was that love *affectingly* displayed. "Hereby perceive we the love of God, *because He laid down His life for us*." He that does not admit this truth and cherish it in his inmost soul, as all his salvation and all his desire—that 'Christ Jesus laid down His life upon the cross, a ransom, and *an all-sufficient ransom*, for sin,' whatever other knowledge he may possess, or whatever zeal and activity he may display, even about spiritual things, is a stranger to justifying faith; and the peace which he enjoys (if any) is a false and delusive peace; for "being justified by faith (and thus only) have we peace with God, and rejoice in hope of the glory of God."

When St. Paul would set before us, Christians, justifying faith, he tells us (Rom. iv. 24, 25), "to us it shall be imputed (that is, faith for righteousness), if we believe on Him who *raised up our Lord Jesus Christ from the dead, who was delivered for* (*διὰ*, on account of) *our sins*,

and raised again for (διὰ, on account of) *our justification*—a faith, consequently, incapable of being exercised until after the sacrifice was made, and the acceptance of it acknowledged by the resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ from the dead. The Jews who lived antecedently to that event, from the obscure notions which they entertained of the nature of Messiah's work, had (as may be inferred from the entire of this Epistle) no *subjectively* justifying faith, but “through fear of death were all their life-time subject unto bondage.” But we, who have attained unto “*the about-to-be-revealed faith*” (ch. iii. 23), have “received, not the spirit of bondage again to fear, but the Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father.” It is not, however, to be concluded from this observation that believers under the Old Testament dispensation were not *heirs of salvation*—the contrary is acknowledged to have been the fact; but what is insisted upon is this, that, in the defective dispensation under which they lived, they had *no present sense of acceptance*, not being in spiritual communion with Christ; and consequently, during the whole course of their earthly existence, they were devoid of that inwrought peace of mind, and that rejoicing of hope, which constitute the distinguishing feature, the birthright privilege indeed, of *the adopted family in Christ*.

VERSE 7.—^a Ἐτρέχετε καλῶς, ‘ye were running well,’ a natural association of ideas—their happy progress formerly, contrasted with their present lamentable defection—‘running’ a metaphor, taken from a race, to which the Christian's life is so frequently and so aptly compared. The Apostle by this figure intimates that all had been going on prosperously at first; they were in the right road and making fair progress therein—who did hinder them? Every word in this context is calculated to facilitate their return to the path of duty. It was no small encouragement to be informed that the course prescribed was not an impracticable one, but one which they had been already pursuing with infinite satisfaction to themselves, and with the unqualified approbation of their teacher.

^b Τίς ὑμᾶς ἐνέκοψεν, ‘who did hinder you?’ A continuation of the previous metaphor. These words are to be regarded, not interrogatively, as though it were the Apostle's object to ascertain the individual at whose door the provocation was to be laid, but rather as an exclamation of disappointment and surprise that any hindrance from any quarter should have arisen. The verb ἐνέκοψεν, which properly signifies ‘to hinder by beating back,’ and now universally discarded upon mere textual considerations by the best modern editors, might possibly be regarded as too strong an expression for the occasion; for, however the Galatians may have been ‘impeded’ or ‘interfered with’ (the sense of ἐνέκοψεν) in running the race that was set before them, they certainly were not forcibly assailed, or ‘driven away from’ their Christian profession. Ellicott regards the primary meaning of the verb ἐγκόπτειν as ‘hindering by breaking up a road,’ and quotes Greg. Nazianz., Or., xvi. p. 260, as an example in point. But however it may have occasionally been employed in that sense, the original idea seems to be that ‘of

cutting into,' or, 'making an incision with a sharp instrument,' hence, figuratively, 'to hinder by maiming or disabling.' We observe here, as in chap. iii. 1, for the purpose of conciliation, the blame is laid indirectly at the door of others, rather than at that of the defaulters themselves.

* Τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μὴ πείθεσθαι, 'that ye do not obey the truth'—the present result of ἐνέκοψεν; μὴ not redundant, but, as Alford observes, "The construction so often occurring of a negative after verbs of hindering is in fact a pregnant one, μὴ πείθεσθαι being *the result* of the hinderance." The expression τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μὴ πείθεσθαι is evidently to be understood here in the same sense in which it occurs in ch. iii. 1, 'that ye submit not yourselves to *the truth*,' the characteristic truth of Christianity, 'justification by faith only without legal works.' This was the failing of the Galatian church, and against this failing the exhortation is directed.

VERSE 8.—* Ἡ πεισμονή, 'this persuasion.' The article has a certain, demonstrative, force, pointing out the persuasion to which allusion is made, 'this persuasion,' not directly 'to disobey the gospel,' for that they never entertained, but 'to observe Jewish rites and ceremonies,' which was a virtual dereliction of 'the truth.' The word πεισμονή is susceptible of a twofold acceptation, *active* and *passive*. In the former it denotes 'the act of persuading,' in the latter, 'the state of being persuaded.' Commentators are divided as to the sense to be attributed to it here. The Greek expositors, whose authority should be all but conclusive upon points of usage, generally concur in understanding it in the latter. Modern critics (Alford and Ellicott), with insufficient reason, as it seems to me, incline to the former. The question, however, is not very material. Whether it is to be regarded as an act in operation, or a result accomplished, the meaning of the text is substantially the same. But, from the circumstances of the case, the latter would seem the more pertinent. Πεισμονή, it may be observed, does not, strictly, denote 'the conviction of the mind,' but rather 'the disposition of the will;' the result, it may be, of conviction, or it may be directly in the teeth of conviction, or altogether irrespective of it; but conviction, properly, it is not. In the present instance, we have reason to apprehend that it is the result, not of argument addressed to the understanding, but of flattery and delusion practised upon the feelings: "O foolish Galatians, who *hath bewitched* (fascinated) you, that ye should not obey the truth?"

Ἐκ τοῦ καλοῦντος, 'from him that calleth you.' The act of calling is usually ascribed in Scripture to God (Rom. viii. 30, ix. 24; 1 Cor. i. 9, vii. 15, 17; 1 Thess. ii. 12; 2 Thess. ii. 14; 2 Tim. i. 9; 1 Pet. i. 15, ii. 9, v. 10; 2 Pet. i. 3); and where there is no qualifying adjunct, such as occurs at chap. i. 6 (ἐν χάριτι Χριστοῦ), it may be safely concluded of—God. The tense (pres. part.) is not, perhaps, without its significancy, partaking of the encouraging character which distinguishes the entire of the context, ("non desinit etiam nunc vocare"—BEZA): 'However they may have swerved from the right path, the same gra-

cious invitation is addressed to them still—if they have not believed unto salvation before, let them believe now.’ The phrase ἐκ τοῦ καλοῦντος is more emphatic than if the Apostle had simply written ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, being an ‘*expressio pregnans*,’ suggestive of the antagonistic nature of ‘works,’ and ‘calling’ (“not of works, but of Him that calleth,” Rom. ix. 11). A persuasion to seek justification by works (being inconsistent with the notion of grace,) proceedeth from some other source than from ‘Him *that calleth*.’ If it had been simply said—‘from God,’ we might have supposed it to be a contrastive allusion to the author of evil, from whom all new-fangled doctrines are derived; for an instance of a negative pregnant in this sense, see Rom. vii. 18. Calvin observes upon this place:—“Such an admonition would not be entitled to much regard, were it not supported by the authority of the speaker.” But possibly the pronouncement was not quite so dogmatical as he supposed it to be, being explained by the verse following.

VERSE 9.—“Μικρὰ ζύμη, κ. τ. λ., ‘a little leaven, &c.’ A proverbial expression, but whether to be regarded in the light of a *warning*, or of a *simple affirmation* accounting for the fact of their defection, it is not easy to decide. If ζύμη be referred to *doctrine*, then probably the former acceptation should prevail—if to *men*, possibly the latter: ‘widespread and general as the defection is, it may nevertheless be traced up to the machinations of a few evil and designing persons.’ In whichever way we receive it, the proverb is applicable and pertinent. Calvin advocates the application to *doctrine*, and admirably illustrates its force. “A little leaven (he says) refers to doctrine, not to men. It guards them against the mischievous consequences which arise from corruption of doctrine, and warns them not to consider it, as is commonly done, to be a matter attended by little or no danger, Satan’s stratagem is, that he does not attempt an avowed destruction of the whole gospel, but he taints its purity by introducing false and corrupt opinions. Many persons are thus led to overlook the seriousness of the injury done, and therefore make a less determined resistance. The Apostle proclaims aloud that after the truth of God has been corrupted, we are no longer safe. He employs the metaphor of *leaven*, which, however small in quantity, communicates its sourness to the whole mass. We must exercise the utmost caution, lest we allow any counterfeit to be substituted for the pure doctrine of the gospel.” Whether to the point before us, or not, nothing can be more true or more deserving of attention than these observations.

But notwithstanding so respectable an authority, and so strong an inducement to concur, we seem precluded from such an application here. For, not to dwell upon the possible explanation conveyed in the ὁ παράσσω of the succeeding verse, it is hardly conceivable that the error of the Galatian church, which involved *a separation from Christ* and *a falling away from grace*, could under any circumstances be designated “a little leaven.” If such be “a little leaven,” one should like to be informed what is the mass? If the whole system be corrupt, what remains to be vitiated? Nor will it help, to suggest that the evil

in the Galatian church might be traced back to a small beginning, to which the Apostle's observation applies; for the error from first to last was one and the same, the error of self-dependence, a reliance upon legal works for justification, and not on faith only—an evil which partakes more of the nature of the “dead fly which causes the ointment of the apothecary to stink,” than of “leaven,” which makes its advances slowly and imperceptibly, corrupting the adjacent particles, until finally the whole mass is depraved. Upon this ground I am induced to prefer *the concrete* reference to *persons* to *the abstract* reference to *doctrine*—‘a few bad men teaching perverse doctrines, do, by their example and precept, contaminate a whole community—and such I take to be the case with you.’

Ellicott (upon somewhat questionable grounds) arrives at the same conclusion, and cites Clem., Hom. viii. 17, as a case in point—“Where the race of men living before the flood are characterized as a *κακὴ ζύμη*.” Alford advocates a mixed application both to doctrine and persons: “nor can there be any objection (he says) to taking it (*ζύμη*) abstract, and (*φύραμα*) concrete; a little false doctrine corrupts the whole mass (of Christians),” adducing Chrysostom (unwarrantably as it seems to me) in support of his notion. But it is hard to conceive of any *proportion* subsisting between doctrines and men, or indeed, strictly speaking, of any *assimilating process* being carried on between them. 1 Cor. v. 8 may at first sight be taken as an example of a mixed application, but upon closer investigation it will be found that such is not the case.

VERSE 10.—^a Ἐγὼ, ‘I for my part’—“emphatic, and not without a reassuring contrast.”—ELlicott. ‘Notwithstanding all that has happened, that you have been hindered and deflected from the right course, I put my trust in the Lord concerning you, that ye will not be otherwise minded.’

^b Ἐν Κυρίῳ, ‘in the Lord.’ “The element or sphere in which his confidence is conditioned.”—ALford. “Serves to designate the ground of the hope.”—ELlicott. At the same time that he explains himself in terms (—“and to show that it was not an earthly and doubtful, but a heavenly and certain, assurance which St. Paul entertained”), as well befitting *the sphere in which* the hope was exercised, as *the ground upon which* it rested. But there can be little question but that ἐν Κυρίῳ represents the ground upon which the confidence was entertained, not any persistent quality in the Galatians themselves—for the Apostle knew well that man in his best estate is unstable as water—but the Lord's goodness, that He would be graciously pleased to preserve them from falling finally away. “Whereby (as Calvin observes) he reminds them that repentance is a heavenly gift, and that they must ask it from God.” Nothing can be more encouraging to weak believers than to know that good hopes are entertained of their spiritual estate, by those who watch over them in the Lord.

^c Οὐδὲν ἄλλο φρονήσετε, ‘ye will be no otherwise minded.’ To the question ‘than what?’ Ellicott responds, “either *specially* than the subject or purport of the words immediately preceding, or *generally* than

the doctrines which St. Paul has propounded." But in the words immediately preceding, we find no enunciation whatsoever of doctrine to which the expression can with any show of plausibility refer; to which circumstance Alford seems to advert, while adopting the alternative explanation himself; "Other (he says) than I enjoin you, *not in verses 8 and 9 only, but in this Epistle, and in his preaching generally.*" But the general doctrine of St. Paul is quite too vague a reference for an allusion apparently so special. We must look farther back in the context for the true subject of reference. St. Paul had announced in verse 5 what is the doctrine of the church upon the subject of perfection or ultimate righteousness—"we who are in Christ expect the hoped-for righteousness by the Spirit, through faith, and not by legal works"—immediately subjoining, 'in which way ye once sought it yourselves; who hath hindered you, that ye do not seek it so still? a few bad members, I am well aware, have been the occasion of all this disturbance; and now continues—"I put my trust in the Lord concerning you, that ye will not be otherwise minded' than, what?—"than ye once were, when ye held the truth, and prospered accordingly.' Throughout the entire of the Epistle it will be observed that the defection of the Galatian church has been treated as incomplete. They are represented as in a transition state (μετατίθεσθε, θέλοντες μεταστρέψαι, ch. i. 6, 7). And in the passage before us the Apostle expresses an earnest hope, or desire, that with the Lord's help they will be preserved from the great guilt of apostacy, and that the judgment will fall upon the head of him to whom it is due.

^d 'Ο δὲ ταρασσων, 'but he that disturbeth you'—disquieteth your minds, unsettles your religious opinions. Δὲ adversative, introducing an antithesis—"not only that ye shall not finally forego the truth, and incur the displeasure of God, but, that the judgment may fall upon his head, whosoever he may be that disquieteth you"—the government of ὅτι extending to both members of the sentence. 'Ο ταρασσων (as Elliott critically remarks) "not being used on the one hand for οἱ ταρασσοντες (Brown), nor, on the other, in reference to some *one particular false teacher* (Olsh.), but, in accordance with the exact selective and definitive force of the article, to the one who, for the time being, comes under observation." At the same time it must be admitted, that while the sentence is so constructed that it cannot be alleged to point distinctly to *one*; the chief offender, whosoever he might be, could hardly fail to take it as an especial warning to himself.

* Βαστάσει τὸ κρίμα, 'shall bear the judgment.' Βαστάζω, 'to bear as a heavy weight.' Κρίμα, not, strictly speaking, equivalent to κατάκριμα; much less, to be translated (cause for effect) 'punishment;' but, literally, 'judgment'—τὸ κρίμα 'the judgment' in the sight of God befitting so heinous an offence; and to follow, it would seem, as a matter of course—a much more startling announcement than if he had specifically defined it. "Let all who introduce confusion into churches, who break the unity of faith, who destroy their harmony, lend an ear to this; and, if they have any right feeling, let them tremble at this word."
—CALVIN.

^f ὅστις ἂν ᾖ, 'whosoever he may be.' "With the usual *inclusive* reference of the formula."—ELLICOTT. But not, it would seem, without a mental application to one or more, who, more prominently than the rest, were the agitators of the Galatian church—the high-sounding pretensions of the judaizers making it incumbent upon the Apostle with more than ordinary energy to defend his doctrine, "and not to spare any one who dared to raise his voice against it, however eminent, or however distinguished."—CALVIN.

VERSE 11.—^a Ἐγὼ δὲ, ἀδελφοί, 'but I, brethren'—Ἐγὼ emphatic, as in the preceding verse. The connexion between this and the preceding verse is confessedly obscure, at least it is not marked by any very striking or indisputable bond of association. Ellicott and Alford represent it thus:—"The use of the expression ὁ ταρασσων appears to have suggested the remembrance that he himself was open to the charge of being a subverter, inasmuch as he had circumcised Timothy." But this is an unreasonable and far-fetched explanation. Timothy was the son of a Jewess, and entitled by birth to the *national* ordinance of circumcision; and the circumcising of him was a very different matter from the imposing of circumcision upon the Gentiles; nor could it with any reason have exposed the Apostle to imputation upon that head. The connexion is of a much closer and more reliable character than that. From ὁ ταρασσων, the agitator of the public mind, the transition was easy and natural to the principal instrument by which he wrought—the allegation that the Apostle preached the same doctrine himself—an allegation against which he defends himself at large in the second chapter, and now introduces it again to give it a short and conclusive reply:—"If I still preach circumcision, why am I still persecuted? Surely in that case the offence of the cross has ceased, and my persecution should cease too! Away with the unfounded imputation."

^b Εἰ περιτομὴν ἔτι κηρύσσω, 'if I still preach circumcision.' The force of ἔτι is very effective in establishing the sense of the passage above attributed to it; having reference, not 'to ante-Christian times' (Olsh.), the period before the coming of Christ; nor to any period subsequent to St. Paul's embracing of Christianity, which is distinctly negatived throughout the whole of the second chapter; nor yet, as Ellicott and Alford conjecture—"To the period prior to his conversion 'still' in contrast to my former Judaism" (Ellicott), for, as Olsh. well observes, "κηρύσσω could not be used of that period"—an objection which these authors endeavour to meet with the replication that, though "the Apostle might not have *preached* circumcision before his conversion, he strenuously advocated all the principles of Judaism" (Ellicott). But this is a surrender of the point at issue. If he did not *preach* circumcision before his conversion, his advocacy of its principles did not extend beyond the pale of his own church, where they were already known and recognised, and consequently could not be referred to in the use of the verb κηρύσσω. It was not the policy of the Jewish church to enjoin proselytism upon those without. The utmost stretch of bigotry and persecution attributable to Saul reached no further than to those of his own

persuasion, who, by professing Jesus, impugned the sufficiency of the law of Moses. The words then, at no period of his history being applicable to St. Paul, are consequently not to be regarded as his own proper language at all, but rather, as I before explained, the calumny of the false teachers ('to this very day Paul preaches circumcision') taken up and reiterated by himself in order to a short and conclusive refutation.

^c Τί ἔτι διώκομαι, 'why am I still persecuted?' According to Ellicott and Alford, ἔτι is here "*logical*," almost tantamount to "why am I to be," as in Rom. iii. 7. But I can discover nothing of this deprecatory tone here, unbecoming, I would almost submit, the dignity of the Apostle; nor is there any occasion to depart from the ordinary '*temporal*' signification in which the word has occurred in the preceding clause, and in which, naturally, it should be taken here; 'if I *still* preach circumcision, as my maligners untruthfully allege, why am I *still* persecuted? let them answer me this question; if to the present hour I am the victim of the unrelenting persecution of the Jews, what stronger evidence could be adduced, that to this present hour I preach not circumcision, nor impose the yoke of the Mosaic law upon the Gentiles?'

^d Ἄρα κατήργηται τὸ σκάνδαλον τοῦ σταυροῦ, 'then indeed the offence of the cross is done away with.' Ἄρα an inferential particle, introducing a plain inference from what preceded. 'If I still preach circumcision, then indeed (it follows) the offence of the cross is done away with, and all ground of persecution is removed. But the persecution is not removed, the offence of the cross then has not ceased, and consequently, I do not preach circumcision.' An argument than which nothing can be more plain or unanswerable. Τὸ σκάνδαλον τοῦ σταυροῦ,* "the offence of the cross," to the Jewish people was not, chiefly, the *ignominious death* of the reputed deliverer, but *the doctrine of indebtedness to the work of another for righteousness*, and not to the works of the law: whosoever would preach circumcision as essential to salvation, would thereby strip the cross of half its offensiveness.

VERSE 12.—^a Ὅφελον, κ. τ. λ., 'I would that,' &c. "Indignant wish, called forth by the last deduction, and by the thought of the antagonism of circumcision to the cross of Christ."—ELLCOTT. But, indignant wish, in truth, it is—called forth by the base and slanderous devices of the false teachers, by misrepresenting the Apostle's doctrine, to overthrow 'the truth' of the Gospel.

^b Καὶ ἀποκόψονται, 'that they would even beat themselves away.' A great deal of criticism has been expended upon the exposition of this passage, and still it is involved in obscurity. That ἀποκοψόνται cannot bear a passive sense, seems to be universally agreed upon by the best

* Σκάνδαλον, a later form for σκανδάληθρον, "means properly, the stick in a trap on which the bait is placed, and which, being touched by the animal, springs up and makes the trap shut. Hence it means anything of a physical, moral, or spiritual nature, which is, becomes, or is made, the cause or occasion of evil, physical, moral, or spiritual."—BAGGE.

modern critics. That it is a word of contrast is also generally conceded. but what it contrasts with is the question. The principal patristic and most modern commentators "recognise (as Bloomfield states it) a *sarcastic paranomasia* between περιτέμνεσθαι and ἀποκόψασθαι; q. d., 'I would that they who are so fond of circumcising would not only *circumcise*, but *even cut off* the parts usually circumcised"—an exposition which ascribes most certainly sufficient *intensiveness* to καὶ; accords well with the primitive classical meaning of the verb; and, it must be admitted, with a mystic sense in which it occurs in the LXX. and some old writers (apt examples of which have been accumulated by Alford). But that St. Paul, without the smallest inducement or provocation thereto, should go absolutely out of his way to perpetrate such a filthy witticism as this, is altogether incredible—being not only unexampled in his writings, but positively derogatory to his character as an author and as a man. Against the very idea of it every feeling of modesty, and every sense of what is due to the solemnity of Holy Scripture, recoils in indignant repudiation.

But if not with περιτέμνεσθαι, with what does it contrast? And I answer, without hesitation—with ἐνεκόψε in verse 7, with which it constitutes a complete verbal antithesis; yielding a sense no less agreeable to the subject-matter in hand; equally exhibitory of the *intensive* force of καὶ; and far more consistent with the purity and good taste which distinguish the writings of our accomplished author. The contrast with ἐνεκόψε is so palpable and striking, that even Alford, while arriving at a different conclusion—that "in spite of the protests raised against it, this sense (the indelicate allusion above referred to) must be adopted," is obliged to confess that "there is certainly an allusion to ἐνεκόψε in verse 7; so that *in reading aloud* the Greek, the stress would be ὄφελον καὶ ἈΠΟκόψονται, οἱ, ἀν. ὑμ."—his ear leading him to an exposition which his constructive powers have failed to establish.*

Why, then, not direct our attention to this point, rather than follow mechanically in the wake of others who have so signally failed? In the preceding context, the Apostle had presented the idea of persons running in a race, and other parties cutting or striking at them with swords or

* In continuation of the above extract, Alford proceeds:—"But this allusion is one only of sound; and on account of the καὶ, all the more likely to be some well-known and harsh meaning of the word, *even as far as to which* the Apostle's wish extends." But it is singular that the allusion being to ἐνεκόψε, though "only in sound," it did not occur to the astute critic, that the harsh and unusual straining of the verb (ἀποκόψονται) should be in the direction of ἐνεκόψε, to which "allusion" is made, and not of περιτέμνεσθαι, with which it has nothing on earth to do. Had he only followed out the investigation in that direction, which, upon his own showing, he was bound to do, he would, doubtless, have arrived at the conclusion which is here maintained. However, his observation is valuable, as affording a disinterested plea in extenuation of the unusual application here assigned to ἀποκόψονται—the insusitation, however, being found, not so much in the action to which the verb is referred, as in the reflexive character of that action, conveyed in the middle voice. Among the meanings set down for ἐγκόπτω and ἀποκόπτω respectively, are *interpello* and *repello*.

staves, and thereby obstructing them in their course. Nothing had intervened since, but animadversion upon the conduct of the disturbing parties, and the means to which they resorted. What could be more natural, these observations being concluded, than to desire that they should not only Ἐγκόπτειν, but Ἀποκόπτειν—with this further difference, that, instead of exhibiting their prowess upon others, they should now practise upon themselves (ἀποκόψονται, the middle voice), and beat themselves fairly out of the stadium? I am sure that whatever difficulty may attend this explanation on account of the unwonted application of ἀποκόψονται (and we must remember that it has been forced into the service by reason of its phonetic contrast with ἐνεκόψε), it is more unexceptionable in itself (being more legitimately attained), and certainly more in accordance with Pauline good taste, than the indecent exposition which is so gratuitously and pertinaciously obtruded upon our ears by some.*

The view above submitted affords ample scope for the emphatic operation of καὶ (—‘I would that, instead of *intercepting* the progress of others, ye would *even make away with* your own selves’). It is unobnoxious to the charge of *severity*, not, perhaps, without some show of reason preferred against the interpretation of those who would represent the sense of the passage to be—“may be cut off by some disease, or even suffer perdition from God;” and it is preferable also to that of others (both these interpretations, it will be observed, require ἀποκόψονται in the *passive* signification)—“I would that they were even cut off from your society by excommunication, and were thus prevented from giving you any farther trouble” (see Bloomfield, *in loco*)—a desire which, if really entertained by the Apostle, would not, probably, have been left to the zeal of the Galatians to put it into execution, but (as in the instance 1 Cor. v. 3–6) have been made the subject of positive injunction.

Scott, indeed, suggests that “the infection had spread so wide in the churches of Galatia, the persons to be censured possessed so great influence, and so very many were concerned in some degree, that there was little prospect, except by the intervention of miracles, that such a command would be obeyed.”—BLOOMFIELD, *in loco*. But it would seem that, through “the intervention of” that divine power with which, as an Apostle of the Lord Jesus Christ, he was invested, St. Paul could, at any time, in despite of the opposition of men, carry into effect any dis-

* It is confessedly no easy matter to devise a translation for ἀποκόψονται which will commend itself to English ears; for it is manifest that the verb is not selected from its peculiar fitness to *the subject in hand*, but from its antithetical relation to another word, which had been already *figuratively* employed. Unless, then, we can discover some English term standing in the same relation to the preceding one, both as to sound and to sense, the point of the expression cannot be fully exhibited; and the translation will, consequently, appear strained and unnatural. The difficulty, too, is not diminished by the distance which intervenes between the occurrence of the two verbs; so that, were it not for the attraction of the sound (unpreservable in translation), the connexion would probably have escaped detection altogether.

cipline which the upholding of his sacred office or the welfare of the church might require.

* Οἱ ἀναστατοῦντες, 'they who unsettle you'—a more forcible expression than that previously employed (ὁ ταρασσων), descriptive of persons 'who would go so far as to turn one out of house and home'—a strong metaphor to depict the hapless condition of those who are moved away from the roof-tree of the truth of the gospel. Leave but the ark of *grace*, and we are houseless and defenceless indeed. Like Noah's dove that flitted over the face of the waters, there is no rest for our feet, nor peace for our souls, till we find it in 'the free salvation of Christ.' Impressed with the conclusiveness of the argument, and disgusted with the manifest insincerity of his opponents, St. Paul dismisses the subject with the indignant exclamation—'Would that they would even sever themselves from our communion, who unsettle you.'

VERSE 13.—* Ὑμεῖς γὰρ, 'ye therefore.' We have now arrived at the conclusion of the argumentative portion of the Epistle; what remains is, for the most part, fragmentary and preceptive. The paragraph on which we are now entering, and which reaches to the conclusion of the chapter, enforces the duty of Christian humility and love, especially on the part of those who affect to be teachers in the church. Ellicott apprehends that, anticipating the tendency of the carnal mind to abuse the doctrine of Christian liberty, the Apostle in this place "hastens to trace out the ineffaceable distinctions between true spiritual freedom and carnal and antinomian license." But as we proceed with the inquiry we shall find reason, I doubt not, to conclude that his object is of a more close and personal character, and suggested by the angry and disputatious spirit which had already evinced itself in the church.

Γὰρ, inferential. According to recent commentators (Ellicott and Alford) γὰρ is *causal*, and in immediate connexion with the preceding sentence, serving to account for and to justify the expressed desire with respect to the disturbing elements in the church, that they would detach themselves from their communion; "for (says Ellicott) ye were called to a state with which they have nothing in common"—"because (says Alford, they were striking at the very root of their Christian calling, which was for liberty." But we have already represented the preceding words as the hasty and indignant dismissal of a concluded subject, and not likely, therefore, to be made, themselves, the occasion of any lengthy explanations. Nor can we see anything in the observations which have been offered to induce us to alter our opinion.

Γὰρ, in this view, is not explanatory, but, according to its original signification (γε ἅπα), *inferential*; and we must go back so far as the last verse of the preceding chapter (the first, as I make it, of this) to discover the ground of the inference: "Well then, brethren, we are not the children of the bondwoman, but of the *free*'—a deduction immediately followed up by the exhortation, 'Stand, therefore, to *the freedom* whereunto ye have attained;' when, having showed the baneful consequences of departure therefrom, and concluded with a strong personal application, the Apostle, in the passage before us, resumes *the inference*,

to make it the starting point of a further exhortation—‘Ye have been called, *then* (as aforesaid), to liberty; see that ye make not liberty an occasion to the flesh.’ It is much more natural, and in accordance with the structure of the sentence, to make “ye have been called unto liberty” *the ground of the exhortation which follows*, than *the reason of the exclamation which precedes*, which, under such exposition, loses all its fire and energy, and becomes absolutely frigid and spiritless.

^b ‘Ἐπ’ ἐλευθερίᾳ, ‘unto liberty.’ According to Ellicot, “‘for freedom’—ἐπὶ here denoting the *purpose* or *object* for which they were called.” Alford, more enigmatically—“‘on condition of,’ hardly ‘for the purpose of,’ liberty.” But there seems to be no reason why ἐπὶ should not be taken in its *local* signification to denote simply ‘the state or condition *to which* they were called;’ καλέω being, in theological acceptance, a verb of *motion*, and capable, therefore, of being joined with ἐπὶ in such a construction. See ch. i. 6 °, *.

° Μόνον μὴ, ‘only make not’—μὴ with the verb omitted, and an accusative; an ordinary idiomatic ellipsis, of which Alford adduces many plain examples from the ancient classics. “The ellipsis in this clause is thus supplied by Bos., μόνον ὁρᾶτε μὴ παραλάβητε τὴν ἐλευθερίαν εἰς ἀφορμὴν τῇ σαρκί.”—BAGGE.

^d Εἰς ἀφορμὴν, ‘for an occasion. Εἰς here points to ‘the condition into which a thing is brought’—a by-no-means unusual construction in the New Testament (Acts. ii. 20; Eph. ii. 21; Heb. vi. 6; Rev. xi. 6). See Winer, Gr., § xlix. εἰς. c. β. The meaning of the precept is this—‘make not, or convert not, your liberty into an occasion for the flesh.’

Alford expounds it as of “an opportunity for giving way to carnal desires,” at the sacrifice of the entire point of the metaphor. Ἀφορμή denotes, not, an opportunity *to ourselves of yielding* to the desires of the flesh, but, an opportunity *to the flesh of forcing* its desires upon us. Ἀφορμή literally imports, ‘the solid ground from which an impetus is derived,’ such as ‘the place from which a spring is taken;’ hence, generally, ‘a basis of operations’—in this sense it is to be understood here: ‘make not your liberty a position to be taken advantage of by the flesh, to stir up within you wrath, malice, envy, and every uncharitable feeling.’ Liberty is taken advantage of by the flesh, when we are induced to give unbridled license to our passions, upon the consideration that we are released from the penalties of the law—the sentiment embodied by the Apostle when he asks, “Shall we sin, because we are not under law, but under grace?”—Rom. vi. 15. It seems to be taken for granted by commentators, that the injunction before us is of indefinite application—‘make not your liberty an occasion or ground of *licentiousness* generally;’ in which view Calvin makes some excellent and pertinent remarks. But I apprehend that in this context it has reference to a distinct class of offences, which were principally, if not solely, before the Apostle’s mind when he penned the sentence, and which are only discernible in the light of the adversative member ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης δουλ., κ. τ. λ.

* *Διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης*, ‘by the love.’ “By the love ye evince—your love.”—ELLICOTT. But I am disposed to believe that *διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης* represents ‘the love’ *κατ’ ἐξοχήν*, which is the characteristic of the Christian; the mainspring of all his actions, the medium (as represented in verse 6) through which faith operates—a love which is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Spirit which is given unto us. It is not unusual with the New Testament writers to express the moral state or condition in which a thing is done by the preposition *διὰ*, imparting to it thereby the notion of ‘medium,’ or ‘instrumentality,’ as *δι’ ὑπομενῆς ἀπεκδεχόμεθα*, ‘in and with patience we wait for it,’ Rom. viii. 25; *διὰ πίστεως περιπατοῦμεν*, ‘in and by faith we walk,’ 2 Cor. v. 7. So here *διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης δουλεύετε*, ‘in and by love, serve one another;’ where *ἀγάπη* denotes, not merely that by the exercise of which the *δουλεία* is rendered, but also the source from which it springs—the service originating in, and being prosecuted in, a spirit of heaven-born love.

‘*Δουλέεστε ἀλλήλοις*, ‘serve one another.’ The antithesis in this sentence is obvious, between the state of *liberty* to which they were called, and the *servitude* enjoined. ‘Use not your liberty to the prejudice of your fellow-men, but, contrariwise, serve one another by love’—in other words, ‘Be not *freemen* to injure, but be ye *servants* to aid and assist, one another,’ for in so doing ye fulfil the law. Chrysostom observes that *δουλεύετε* is here used as indicative of ‘the extreme of love.’ But I rather think that it is selected with a view to the contrast above suggested. Christian liberty is not incompatible with a state of outward dependency, being seated in the conscience, and having respect, not unto man, but unto God.

It is in this place that we discover the first trace of the restricted nature of the precept. “The occasion to the flesh” contemplated by the Apostle is evidently in things contrary to the *δουλεία* enjoined. Had licentiousness generally been the object in view, the adversative clause would have taken a wider range, even to all purity and godliness of living, whereas it is distinctly limited to duties of the second table—an observation confirmed by the exemplification which immediately ensues, “but if ye bite and devour one another (the works of the flesh especially in contemplation at the time), take heed that ye be not consumed one of another.” The abuses against which this paragraph is principally levelled were, the lust of power and predominancy in the church—a fruitful source of malice, hatred, jealousy, and all uncharitableness: and also, that disputatious spirit which had been exhibited on either side, as well by those who zealously advocated the truth, as by those who inclined to Judaism—a spirit which (as the Apostle warns them) tends more directly to mutual havoc and destruction (*ἀναλωθῆτε*) than to godly edifying (*δουλεύετε*) which is in love. In the following verses, the Apostle points to the remedy for this and every other moral and social evil, concluding the paragraph in the same strain in which he commenced it, “let us not be desirous of vain-glory, provoking one another, envying one another”—a plain intimation of the nature of those lusts against which his exhortation is principally directed.

VERSE 14.—^a ‘Ο γὰρ πᾶς νόμος, ‘for the whole law.’ Ellicott regards this clause as a “*confirmation* (query, enforcement?) from Scripture of the command immediately preceding, διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης, κ. τ. λ.”—as much as to say, ‘serve one another through love, for the Scripture enjoins upon you so to do.’ But it is more agreeable to the context to understand it as an *inducement* to comply with the injunction, ‘for in so doing ye fulfil the law;’ the more especially, perhaps, as being addressed to parties who were zealous advocates for the law.

When it is said that the Galatians were zealous advocates for the law, it is not to be supposed that they were desirous to take upon themselves the burden of *the whole Mosaic law*, in order to justification. Doubtless the declaration of the Apostle (ver. 3), that “every man who is circumcised is a debtor to do the whole law,” would fall like a thunderbolt upon them. The extent of their delusion (as is plain from the remonstrance addressed to them at chap. iii. 3—“having begun with the Spirit, are ye now being made perfect by the flesh?”) reached no farther than this, that ‘perfection, according to the law of the new covenant, was to be achieved by attention to outward religious ceremonies;’ whereas the Apostle instructs them ‘that ceremonies are nothing worth, but that faith working by love is the fulfilling of the law.’ Accordingly, while enjoining, in the passage before us, a specific duty, ‘serve ye one another by love,’ he commends it to their approval by the consideration that ‘this is the true way of fulfilling the law;’ ‘all that is required of you to be done is this.’ Or it may be regarded as an *independent* assertion, calculated to produce obedience to the foregoing injunction.

^b Πληροῦται, ‘is fulfilled.’ There is a difference of opinion amongst commentators, both as to the meaning and as to the application of this word. It is generally, however, agreed that it is to be taken in the ordinary sense of ‘fulfilment,’ and by most modern commentators it is applied to the law of Moses. “The question how the Apostle can rightly say of the *whole* law, that it is fulfilled by loving one’s neighbour, must not be answered by understanding νόμος of the *Christian* law (Koppe), or the *moral* law (Estius, al.), or of the *second* table of the decalogue (Beza, al.), or of every divinely-revealed law in general (Schott.); for ὁ πᾶς νόμος cannot, from the circumstances of the whole Epistle, mean any thing but ‘*the whole law of Moses*;’ but by placing ourselves on the lofty spiritual level from which St. Paul looked down, and saw all other commandments so far subordinated to the law of love, that whoever had fulfilled *this* command must be treated as having fulfilled the whole.”—MEYER, quoted with approval by Ellicott and Alford.

But, notwithstanding the lofty spiritual eminence from which he surveyed it, I am slow to admit the notion that St. Paul was so far obnubilated as to the well-known maxim of the Mosaic law—“Cursed is every one who continueth not in *all things* which are written in the book of the law to do them”—as to express himself to the effect that the fulfilment of one commandment could be regarded as equivalent to the fulfilment of all, when the law made not even allowance for the smallest failure or shortcoming in any one of its requirements; and least of all

that it should be done upon the principle assigned by Meyer—that of *subordination*. We must seek, then, some other interpretation, more in accordance with Pauline orthodoxy.

That “the explanation of Vorstius and others, πληροῦσθαι=ἀνακεφαλαιοῦσθαι, Rom. xiii. 9, here falls far short of the full spiritual meaning of the passage, and also is at variance with the regular meaning of πληρ. in the New Testament” (Ellicott), I am not prepared to dispute. At the same time it might be a question whether ‘to fully enunciate’ may not be an *admissible* rendering of πληροῦσθαι. But that “ὁ πᾶς νόμος cannot, from the circumstances of the whole Epistle, mean anything but ‘the whole law of Moses,’” is a postulate not so easily conceded. Surely it will not be contended that no other law but the law of Moses has engaged the Apostle’s attention in the Epistle to the Galatians? Have we not *express mention* of “the law of Christ” in verse 2 of the succeeding chapter? And is it not plainly *referred to* in verse 6 of the chapter before us? So long, indeed, as the argument was confined to the question introduced at chap. iii. 2, “Received ye the Spirit by legal works, or by faithful hearing?” whenever the expression ‘the law’ occurred in the Epistle, there could be no doubt but that it had reference to ‘the law of Moses,’ and to nothing else; but that subject being concluded (at ch. iv. 30), and the Apostle being now engaged in exhorting ‘the brethren who had been called unto liberty,’ to make not their liberty an occasion to the flesh, but on the contrary to “serve one another by love,” upon the distinct inducement that in so doing *they should fulfil the law*; of what law could it possibly be predicated, but of ‘the law of liberty,’ which, unlike the law of Moses, regards not the completeness of the performance, but only the spirit in which it is undertaken and pursued, “love” being “the fulfilling of the law”? Rom. xiii. 10.

We must be slow, by any interpretation of ours, to enrol St. Paul in the company of those vain wranglers whom he himself describes in his Epistle to Timothy (ch. i. 6, et seq.), who desired to be teachers of *the law of Moses*, understanding neither what they said nor what they affirmed. He knew that the law was good, if a man use it lawfully. But he at the same time knew that the law was not appointed for a righteous man (δικαίος, query, a justified person?) but “for the lawless and disobedient, for the ungodly and sinners, for unholy and profane, for murderers of fathers and murderers of mothers, for manslayers;” and, if there be any other sort of reckless characters, for them. It is not to be imagined that, in the teeth of his own inhibition, he should propose ‘the law of Moses’ to his Galatian converts as an object of fulfilment; but rather that he should direct attention to ‘the law of Christ,’ that ‘royal law’ under which the whole family of the Great Potentate are ruled and governed—a law all whose requirements may indeed be fulfilled in this one commandment—“Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.”

But, accepting the application to ‘the law of Christ,’ in what sense, it may be inquired, is it to be understood that “the whole law is fulfilled in this one word, thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself”? Unques-

tionably 'the law of Christ,' in its demands upon its subjects, is identical with 'the moral law,' the one unvarying exhibition of the will of God to man, in every successive dispensation; the spirit of which was so admirably interpreted by our blessed Lord in his interview with the rich young man, as recorded in St. Matthew's Gospel—"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind; this is the first and great commandment: and the second is like unto it, thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself:" (Mat. xxii. 37, et seq.)—a law, therefore, consisting of two distinct branches, our duty towards God, and our duty towards our neighbour. In what sense, then, can it be affirmed of such an institution, that "the whole law is fulfilled in this one word (or commandment), thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself"?

Not, certainly, in the sense attributed to it by Meyer, 'that all other commandments are so "*subordinate*" to this one, that the performance of it is equivalent to the performance of all the rest;' for the observance of the first table can never be accounted subordinate to the observance of the second: but upon the principle of '*inclusiveness*'—that the performance of all the rest is implied in, and absolutely secured in, the performance of this one. No man can love his brother as himself, who does not at the same time love God supremely; both these affections proceed from one and the same source, "the Holy Spirit which He hath given unto us;" and are inseparable in their exercise, as St. John distinctly intimates—"Every one that loveth Him that begat, loveth him also that is begotten of Him." The fulfilment, therefore, of either may be regarded as evidence of the fulfilment of both, especially when it is borne in mind that the law of the new covenant is *fulfilled*, not by the completeness of the observance, but by the spirit from which it emanates, the defects of our performance being atoned for by "the blood which cleanseth us from all sin," being "elect (as St. Peter expresses it (to *obedience, and the sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ.*" In this sense it may be truly affirmed of the law of Christ, that "it is fulfilled in this one saying, thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." But our next inquiry is, 'who is our neighbour?'

• Τὸν πλησίον σου, 'thy neighbour.' It is maintained by some (Meyer and others) that this word is to be restricted in its application to 'fellow-Christians.' It cannot be denied that to such, in the present instance, the Apostle applies it. But that it had a wider scope in that comprehensive summary of human duty which obtained the stamp of our Lord's approval, and which is the subject of quotation here, is most plain from our Lord's own explanation of it, Luke x. 30, et seq. As the precept first occurred in the Mosaic code, there was apparent reason for supposing (and in point of fact it was so understood by the Jewish doctors), that it did not apply beyond the pale of their own nation and church ("The children of thy people" Lev. xix. 18). But from our Lord's comment, there can be little question that, even in the true spirit of the Jewish law, much more as a Christian ordinance, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" is a precept of universal application, em-

bracing every partaker of a common humanity. "The word 'neighbour' (as Calvin well interprets it) includes all men living; for we are linked together by a common nature, as Isaiah reminds us, 'that thou shalt not hide thyself from thine own flesh' (Isai. lviii. 7). The image of God ought to be particularly regarded as a sacred bond of union; but, for that very reason, no distinction is here made between friend and foe; nor can the wickedness of men set aside the right of nature." But another question arises, in what sense is the precept to be understood,—"thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself"?

^a Ὡς σεαυτὸν, 'as thyself'—ὥς to be understood in its most comprehensive meaning, as including both *manner* and *degree*. Bloomfield admits that "we are to love others in the same *manner* as we love ourselves, and so may justly be required to do to others as we would that they should do unto us. But to love them to the same *degree* (he contends) were, from the principle of self-love, wisely implanted in us by the Creator, impossible, and *therefore could not have been enjoined*." But, whether possible or impossible, the argument proceeds upon fallacious grounds, namely, 'that God lowers His requirements to the level of man's capacity;' which is not His way. We are required to love God "with *all* our heart and *all* our soul, with *all* our mind, and with *all* our strength"—a requirement as much beyond man's ability, in his present fallen state, to perform, as it is 'to love our neighbour *as* ourself.' No; the highest imaginable standard is uniformly set before us in God's holy word—"Be ye perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect." Anything short of this would be defective, and consequently unworthy of its divine Author.

Calvin, it would seem, goes a step farther than Bloomfield, in rejecting the standard of self-love. "If the love of ourselves (he argues) were the rule, it would follow that it is proper and holy, and is the object of the divine approbation. But we shall never love our neighbour with sincerity according to our Lord's intention, till we have corrected the love of ourselves; the two affections are opposite and contradictory; for the love of ourselves leads us to neglect and despise others—produces cruelty, covetousness, violence, deceit, and all kindred vices—drives us to impatience, and arms us with the desire of revenge. Our Lord therefore enjoins that it be changed into the love of our neighbour." There is, however, more plausibility than soundness in the above observation. Love of self, though in the natural man perverted, and become the source of all the evils here attributed to it, is not in itself an evil affection. That love which is the adopted symbol of Christ's sympathy for his church, cannot but be the object of divine approval, and as such it is set before us in this place. If Calvin's argument were to hold good, love of self would be equally objectionable as a standard of *manner* as of *degree*, yet unquestionably it is proposed to us, *in some sense*, as the pattern of our love to our neighbour. Ὡς, then, is to be regarded in its widest and most comprehensive extent, as inclusive of both these ideas.

VERSE 15.—^a Δάκνετε καὶ κατεσθίετε, 'ye bite and devour.' The introduction of this clause clearly discovers the precise object which the

Apostle had in view in the foregoing exhortation—"make not your liberty an occasion to the flesh." No doubt the church suffered materially from the dissensions and disunion which so unhappily prevailed amongst its members, and from the fierce and vindictive passions to which their doctrinal differences gave birth, which made it incumbent upon the Apostle, not only to warn them against the pernicious consequences which would ensue, but also to arm them with the remedy, the only efficient remedy, against the assaults and provocations of the flesh. *Δάκνετε* and *κατεσθίετε*, metaphorical expressions, taken from the habits of wild beasts; the latter more forcible than the former. Chrysostom distinguishes them thus:—"These words are used by him emphatically; for he did not merely say 'bite,' which denotes an angry person, but likewise 'devour,' which denotes one who persists in wickedness. He who 'bites' has exhausted his angry passion, but he who 'devours' has given a demonstration of extreme cruelty." It is not improbable that something of the same sort may have been present in the Apostle's mind, when he wrote that passage in his Epistle to the Philippians (ch. iii. 2), "Beware of dogs, beware of the excision; for we are the circumcision, &c. &c.," where it is manifest that the parties in contemplation were, as here, the pseudo-circumcision, whom, from their angry and disputatious qualities, he compares to dogs, and applies to them the degrading appellation—"the excision." 'Beware of those snarling, growling, fighting, devouring beasts, who set up to be 'the circumcision,' but are more appropriately designated 'the excision,' whose habit is not to edify or to build up, but to mutilate and to destroy'—an idea not very dissimilar from that presented in *ἀναλωθῆτε* in the present context.

^b *Βλέπετε μὴ ἀναλωθῆτε*, 'take heed that ye be not consumed.' *Βλέπετε μὴ*, an idiomatic usage, whereby one word is put for another; here, what might properly be the antecedent for the consequent, 'look to it' for 'the caution which should properly ensue.' *Ἀναλωθῆτε*, 'utterly consumed,' a continuation of the metaphor above applied, 'as ravenous wild beasts tear and devour their prey until nothing be left, see to yourselves that ye be not mutually instrumental to the destruction of one another's souls.' While the effect of brotherly love is mutually to support and to build up; strife and contention contrariwise lead to disruption and ruin. It is essential to the upholding of divine truth, that controversy should sometimes be maintained, but it needs much love, and more than ordinary humility, to conduct it with advantage to ourselves or to others: one maxim of the divine word should never be lost sight of, if we desire to engage in controversy with success—"The wrath of man worketh not the righteousness of God."

VERSE 16.—^a *Λέγω δὲ*, 'but I say.' Ellicott and Alford refer these words back to the first portion of the command in verse 13, *Μὴ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν εἰς ἀφορμὴν τῇ σαρκὶ*, "repeating and explaining it, q. d. what I mean is this."—ALFORD. But this arises from attributing too wide a range to the exhortation in that verse, and consequently overlooking the connexion between it and the subsequent context, which constitutes with it one continuous subject, to which *λέγω δὲ* imme-

diately refers. The adversativeness of *δέ* is perceptible, not in its contrast with any specific declaration of, but with the general tenor of, the antecedent context—‘But, as a remedy for the unhappy state of things above described, I say, walk by the Spirit.’ In this one injunction we have the preventive or cure of all those social evils to which the Apostle had adverted, and of every moral evil to which corrupt humanity is exposed, introduced by that weighty formula (*λέγω δέ*) employed by St. Paul only upon occasions of peculiar gravity and importance (see ch. iii. 17, iv. 1).

^b *Πνεύματι*, ‘by the Spirit.’ Alford’s annotation is good—“*Πνεύματι* not ‘man’s *spiritual part*,’ as Bez., Rück., De W., al.; nor is *πνεύματι* ‘after a spiritual manner,’ Peile,—nor will *ἡ ἐνοικοῦσα χάρις* give the force of *πνεῦμα* (Thdrt); it is (as in verse 5) ‘the Holy Spirit of God.’ . . . The history of the verbal usage is, that *πνεῦμα*, as *χριστός* and *θεός*, came to be used as a proper name; so that the supposed distinction between *τὸ πνεῦμα* as the objective (the Holy Ghost), and *πνεῦμα* as the subjective (man’s spirit), does not hold.” *Πνεῦμα* is doubtless here ‘the Spirit of God’ dwelling personally in the believer, inducting him (at the outset) into the path of righteousness, and assisting him while walking therein. Ellicott and Alford represent *πνεύματι* as a ‘dative normæ,’ of the rule according to which a thing is done, Win., Gr., § xxxi. 6^b, but, it would seem, incorrectly. Such a construction but ill represents the meaning conveyed in the injunction *πνεύματι περιπατεῖτε*. So far indeed as instruction, suggestion, direction, guidance, extend, the internal teaching of the Spirit may possibly be regarded, figuratively, as ‘the rule’ by which the Christian shapes his course, ‘walk after the Spirit’ being a suitable exponent thereof; but as the agent who worketh all our works in us, and without whom we can do nothing right, nothing acceptable, by far the most important portion of the idea, the ‘dative normæ’ is defective; nor will any dative answer but ‘the dative of the instrument,’ the Spirit, though the agent, being regarded as the instrument by which we walk.* *Πνεύματι*, though a dative of the instrument, may, nevertheless, be here used as a dative of *the mode*. See Win., Gr., § xxxi. 7.

^c *Ἐπιθυμίαν σαρκὸς*, ‘the desire of the flesh’—‘the inclination and craving of depraved human nature.’ By *σὰρξ* we are to understand, not merely ‘flesh,’ the material of which our bodies are composed; nor yet the ‘animal portion’ of our being, as distinguished from ‘the spiritual;’ but, human nature, fallen, corrupt, sinful, humanity, which, from the predominance of the inferior or animal portion, is denominated ‘flesh;’ a remnant of which “old man” continues even in the regenerate, a subject of daily and unceasing crucifixion.

^d *Οὐ μὴ τελέσητε*, ‘ye shall not fulfil.’ Some eminent expositors in-

* “Passive verbs take a dative of the agent, or subject of the active notion, considered as *the instrument* whereby the state, &c., is produced, *not as the cause* whence it springs.”—Jelf, 611 a.

“This dative, joined with neuter verbs, gives them a passive force.”—Jelf, 611 b.

interpret these words *imperatively*—‘and (copulative) see that ye do not fulfil.’ But the construction which has been most approved both in ancient and in modern times is τελέσητε used as a *future*; which appears certainly the more natural (if not also the more grammatical*) and in accordance with the succeeding context,—‘and (consecutive) ye shall not fulfil’; the following verse exhibiting the ground of the injunction (“walk by the Spirit”), namely, ‘the inability of unrenewed nature to contend successfully with the lusts of the flesh’ (see Ellicott’s useful note upon the construction). Calvin desires us to “mark the word ‘fulfil,’ by which he means that, though the sons of God, so long as they groan under the burden of the flesh, are liable to commit sin, they are not its subjects or slaves, but make habitual opposition to its power. The spiritual man may be frequently assaulted by the lusts of the flesh, but he does not *fulfil* them, he does not permit them to reign over him.” The same also says St. Paul, Rom. viii. 12, et seq.—et ubique.

VERSE 17.—* Ἡ γὰρ σὰρξ ἐπιθυμεῖ, κ. τ. λ., ‘for the flesh lusteth,’ &c. Considerable difficulty, it must be admitted, exists, and great diversity of opinion consequently, as to the meaning and bearing of this declaration. In seeking to arrive at a conclusion, the first step to be taken is, unquestionably, to ascertain of what state of experience does the Apostle speak, when he employs these terms? Is it of man in his purely natural condition, or of man under obligation of law, or of the emancipated Christian?—Not of the first, for in such a person the conflict here described has no place.—Not of the last, because, to such the result supposed (“so that ye cannot do the things that ye would”) is inapplicable.† We are shut up then to the conclusion, that the state presented to our notice in this passage is that of a man under obligation of law, not necessarily that arising from ‘the law of Moses,’ but in that transition-state of legality (of which the state of the Jew was an example) which usually precedes regeneration, or—in (as Ellicott not improperly designates it) “the earlier and more imperfect stages of a Christian course.” In this state, the conflict is described between the flesh and the Spirit, or, in other words, between nature and grace, the result of which conflict, as depicted by Alford and others is, that the unhappy subject, acted upon at the same time by opposite and conflicting forces, the flesh and the Spirit, is unable to bring to a successful issue any pro-

* “The best explanation of the construction appears to be, that after οὐ some such expression as φοβητέον or ἐνθυμητέον is to be understood, e. g. οὐ (φοβητέον) μὴ τοῦτο γένηται, “it is not to be feared lest this should happen,” which is equivalent to the statement, “this cannot by any means happen.” So that a very strong negative is implied.¹

† “The state of the true believer is conflict, but *with final victory*—a truth that was felt even by the Jews, among whom Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and more especially Joseph, were cited as instances of a victorious issue—Schoettg. de luctâ carnis et Spiritus.”—ELLICOTT on ἡ δὲ θείλητε, same verse.

¹ “See a note of Astius on Plato, Pol. i. 341, B; and Jelf, Gr. Gr., 748, 2, a; and the whole of the section.”—BAGGEX.

ject which he may entertain, whether it be good or bad, the motions of the flesh being resisted by the grace of the Spirit, and the grace of the Spirit, in its turn, by the motions of the flesh.*

But, though such a meaning may unquestionably be deduced from the language of the text, yet it seems more consonant to the spirit of the context, and likewise to experience,† to ascribe to it a sense in conformity with the Apostle's teaching in another place, where the same conflict is, evidently, described, and the inability to succeed is limited to *things which are good*—a man under law striving, and striving unsuccessfully, against the adverse dominion of indwelling sin; the desire to do good, awakened and stimulated by the holy law of God in his mind, resisted and overpowered by the predominant influence of the law of sin in his members, so that after an ineffectual struggle he is compelled to abandon the contest, with the mournful exclamation—"Oh wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from this body of death?" Rom. vii. 24.

In the description of the conflict set forth in the seventh of Romans, 'the will' (θέλω) is represented as enlisted on the side of virtue, a will instructed and excited by the pure and holy law of God, but (the Holy Ghost being not yet given, and, consequently, power not yet imparted,) incapable to cope with the tyrannic influence of sin reigning in the flesh, and the conflict consequently resulting in uniform discomfiture and defeat. And such, I apprehend, is the case presented to our notice here. The persons addressed by the Apostle, under the teaching indeed of the Holy Ghost, but, nevertheless, not spiritual men, "for whereas there was amongst them envyings, and strife, and divisions, were they not carnal" (1 Cor. iii. 3), and walked they not after the flesh?—disposed, it may be, to attend to the injunction "serve ye one another by love," but, from the infirmity of nature incapable to fulfil the same (precisely the case stated Rom. vii.), to whom, therefore, the Apostle enjoins "walk by the Spirit"—yield yourselves unreservedly to the dictation and guidance of God's Holy Spirit (the characteristic of *an established Christian*, Rom. viii. 1), and ye shall not fulfil the lusts of the flesh; 'for' (to show you the necessity of such an injunction) without an unqualified surrender of yourselves to God, ye cannot, from the antagonistic nature of the demands of the flesh and of the Spirit, accom-

* "Τὸ πνεῦμα impedit vos, quo minus perficiatis τὰ τῆς σαρκός (ea quæ ἡ σὰρξ perficere cupit), contra ἡ σὰρξ adversatur vobis ubi τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος peragere studetis" (Winer)—and "Spiritus obnititur carni et actioni malæ; caro, Spiritui et actioni bonæ, ut (ἵνα) neque illa neque hæc peragatur," (Bengel)." — ALFORD.

† Experience teaches, that though in the conflict carried on between the flesh and the Spirit, in the *intermediate* state (i. e. in the state which intervenes between unassisted nature and the grace of Christ), it is morally impossible, from the prevalence of corrupt nature, to carry out the godly aspirations of the Spirit; yet there is no positive hindrance from the Spirit in the way of the fulfilment of the lusts of the flesh; as the Apostle distinctly testifies, "the good that I would I do not; but the evil which I would not, *that I do*." And again, "I see a law in my members warring against the law of my mind, and *bringing me into captivity to the law of sin* which is in my members," Rom. vii. 19, 23.

plish the good that ye would; but if ye be “led by the Spirit” (the course to which I would persuade you) your difficulty is at an end, for “ye are not under law, but under grace,” and consequently sin shall no more have dominion over you (Rom. vi. 14): such appears to be the plain purport of the teaching of this much-disputed passage.

The connexion ordinarily assigned to this sentence—“*reason for the foregoing declaration*, that walking after the Spirit will preclude the fulfilling the lusts of the flesh” (ELLICOTT)—“*substantiation of the preceding*—that, if ye walk by the Spirit, ye shall not fulfil the lusts of the flesh” (ALFORD)—“*The cause why* he who fully obeys the Spirit will not render obedience to the flesh” (BLOOMFIELD), though defensible upon the bare ground of lexical possibility, is by no means so free from difficulties, nor so consistent with the context which follows (ver. 18), as the connexion here proposed; where the verse under consideration is regarded, not as the reason why *the declaration is true*, but as the reason why *the injunction is needed*, namely, the moral impossibility which exists, without a complete surrender of ourselves to the guidance of the Holy Spirit, in plain terms, without plenary conversion to God, to do the good that we would.

Indeed, the interpretation commonly adopted, which refers these words (ver. 17) to *the regenerate* state, is open to objection in whichever way we view it. If we understand the foregoing expression, “Ye shall not fulfil the lusts of the flesh,” in its plain *literal* signification, in which sense it is logically consistent with the declaration subjoined, the amount of privilege set before the Christian church is no more than this—‘Ye shall not indeed be subject to the flesh, but no more shall ye be competent to fulfil the dictates of the Spirit’—an utterance which but ill accords with those Scriptures which demand not only a negative withdrawal from the service of the flesh, but a positive yielding of our members instruments of righteousness unto God. And if we take the expression (as we are equally entitled to do) in its *implied* signification, ‘Ye shall achieve a complete victory over the flesh,’ then the declaration subjoined does not sustain the assertion; for it only goes the length to show, that we shall serve neither the one nor the other, a sentiment very far removed from the object proposed.

Calvin, indeed, aware that “carnal men have no battle with depraved lusts, nor proper desire to obtain the righteousness of God,” and evidently not adverting to the distinction which St. Paul establishes in the seventh and eighth chapters of his Epistle to the Romans, between a man under the grace of *the law* and one who has attained to the full liberty of *Christ*, understands it necessarily of *the regenerate*, and explains the meaning of the Apostle thus:—“Believers so long as they are in this life, whatever may be the earnestness of their endeavours, do not attain such a measure of success as to serve God in a perfect manner. The highest result does not correspond with their wishes and desires.”—CALVIN, *in loco*. A truth unquestionable in itself, and of the first order of importance to be thoroughly understood and pondered; but, nevertheless, not the truth which the Apostle was called upon to incul-

cate here,—which was to point out the only effectual means whereby a victory over the flesh could be achieved, and not the inadequacy of those means, through human frailty, to accomplish *a complete success*. Besides, if such were the object in view, the explanatory clause should have been introduced by some more fitting word than γὰρ, ἐὲν for instance, ‘but’ nevertheless, notwithstanding your utmost exertions, complete success is not to be expected, though at the same time your imperfect efforts will be accepted, for ye are not under law, but under grace.’

Upon the whole, I maintain that it is more scriptural and more consonant with the general scope of the Apostle’s reasoning, to understand the passage as I have explained it, *not of the regenerate man, but of a man under law*, who, however he may consent to its precepts that they are good, or however desirous he may be to carry them into effect, yet from the impracticability of depraved nature, and the consequent weakness of the law through the flesh, can never succeed in accomplishing his righteous purpose, until, by a complete change of heart, ‘the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus sets him free from the law of sin and of death’; the truth inculcated in the precept of the Apostle—“Walk by the Spirit (indicating a complete newness of life), and ye shall not fulfil the lusts of the flesh”—a view of the passage which we will find further sustained when we come to the consideration of the ensuing clause—“*but, if ye be led by the Spirit, ye are not under law.*”*

† Ἐπιθυμεῖ κατὰ τοῦ Πνεύματος, ‘lusteth contrariwise to the Spirit.’ The idea presented in these words is by no means ‘*direct hostility*’ (as is commonly assumed) between the flesh and the Spirit; “the object and end of the τὸ ἀντικείμενον on the part of each principle, is to prevent man’s doing what the other principle would lead him to” (ELLICOTT), but simply ‘*contrariety*’ between the desires of the flesh and of the Spirit.’ Κατὰ with the genitive is used distinctly in this sense, 1 Cor. xv. 15, where ἐμαρτυρήσαμεν κατὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ implies, not ‘we have testified against God,’ but ‘we have testified in contravention to some attribute or work of God.’ And so it is here, ἐπιθυμεῖ κατὰ τοῦ πνεύματος means, not ‘lusts against (with the idea of hostility to) the Spirit,’ but ‘lusts after things contrary to those which are the objects of the Spirit’s desire.’ Indeed, the idea of ‘hostility’ or ‘antagonism’ enters not at all into the conception of the word ἐπιθυμέω, but only ‘the desire of self-gratification.’

* In the same way ‘the things’ which are represented as in opposition (ταῦτα ἀντίκειται) one to the other are, not ‘the flesh and the

* The point which is sought to be established in these observations is, that the experience described in verse 17 is not the experience of *the regenerate character*; at the same time it is not denied that the parties to whom it is attributed may, nevertheless, like those we read of, 1 Cor. iii. 3-6, be “babes in Christ”—“in the earlier and more imperfect stages (as Ellicott expresses it) of a Christian course”—or even in a state of temporary relapse; but in either case they are living below the privileges of the child of God, which are not described in this passage. But, whatever their condition may be, whether Christians or no-Christians, the remedy is one and the same—a closer walk with God.

Spirit,' but '*the respective desires or motions*' of the flesh and of the Spirit, which are so contrary the one to the other, that the flesh being predominant (that is, while in a low state of Christian experience, or, in a totally unrenewed state), ye cannot do the good that ye would. This consideration also decides the controversy as to the *telic* or the *ecbatic* force of *ἵνα*. If it be true that the flesh exercises no direct hostility against the Spirit (or at least is not here represented as so doing), but only desires to accomplish its own ends, which are contrary to the ends of the Spirit, then it is obvious that *ἵνα* occurs not in its *telic*, but in its *ecbatic* sense—the disability to do the good that we would, being, not *the aim*, but *the consequence or result*, of the desires of the flesh.

VERSE 18.—^a Εἰ δὲ, 'but if.' A marked contrast between the states indicated in the two successive clauses. '*But if ye be led by the Spirit, ye are not under law.*' Hence we infer (as before from other considerations) that the state represented in the preceding clause was a state *under law*.

^b Πνεύματι ἄγεσθε, 'ye be led by the Spirit.' Πνεύματι dative of the instrument, as in verse 16: see verse 16^b *. 'To be led by the Spirit,' and 'to walk by the Spirit,' are evidently synonymous expressions, indicating not an isolated act, or series of acts, but the general course and habit of one's life; the committing of one's self, heart and soul, to the suggestions, guidance, energizing of the Holy Spirit, the distinguishing feature of the true believer in Christ. "Who can doubt, says Müller, that πνεύματι ἄγεσθε here entirely corresponds in the mind of the Apostle with Rom. viii. 14, πνεύματι Θεοῦ ἄγονται; and that the fuller and deeper meaning of πνεῦμα must be maintained throughout this paragraph?"—ELLICOTT.

^c Οὐκ ἐστὲ ὑπὸ νόμον, 'ye are not under law.' "Not, on the one hand, because there is now no need of its beneficial influence (Chrys. et. al.), nor, on the other, because it is now become an alien principle (Usteri et. al.), but simply—"because it finds nothing in you to forbid or to condemn."—ELLICOTT. The infelicity of this comment is obvious. The two rejected expositions are true; the one preferred in their place is untrue. Surely it will not be contended that there is no sin in the believer! And if there be sin in the believer, there is in him something for the law to take hold of and to condemn. It were but a poor claim for immunity from the law to plead, "that it could find nothing in us to forbid or to condemn." No; we are delivered from the law (as the Apostle himself testifies) "*that being dead wherein we were held*"—"the old man," the alone subject of the law, "*being crucified with Christ*," and the new man raised up in us. So that indeed, from the change of person which he has undergone, "the law has become an alien principle (Usteri)" to the believer.

It is by reason of *the altered position* in which they stand (in Christ), and not of *the faultlessness of their character*, as above alleged, that they who are led by the Spirit of God are not under law. And if not under law, then emancipated from the thralldom of the flesh, so that they can do the good that they would, for "sin shall not have dominion over you, for

ye are not under law, but under grace"—a line of argument which goes far to establish the view above submitted, that the subjects of the conflict represented in the preceding verse, are not the regenerate, but those still under law.

Though delivery from the trammels of the law is *immediately* attributable, as we have just seen, not to *the immaculacy of the believer's character*, but to *the altered position* in which he stands—no longer in the old Adam, but in the new; yet has it a deeper, or more remote, foundation, in the change of nature which invariably accompanies the change of state—the infusion of the Spirit of Christ into the soul, whereby the regenerated man becomes “a law unto himself,” the impulses of the renewed nature leading him spontaneously to the adoption and the performance of such things as are conformable to God's holy will. “This is the covenant which I will make with the house of Israel after those days, saith the Lord, *I will put my laws into their mind, and write them in their heart.*” Heb. viii. 10. “Whosoever is born of God does not (consequently) commit sin; for his seed remaineth in him, and he cannot sin, because he is born of God.” 1 John, iii. 9. So that the law has, indeed, lost “*its beneficial influence*” (Chrys.) to the believer, there being no further occasion for its services.

Not that the most established Christian may not be overtaken by a fault (the case indeed supposed, ch. vi. 1), and occasionally come under the influence of the flesh; but he will no longer “walk after the flesh.” Sin will not be his occupation, nor the service in which he is engaged—it will be the exception, not the rule, of his conduct. The bias of renewed nature being thus towards God and holiness, it needeth no law to enforce obedience, but the discipline of a wise and considerate Father to restrain and to counteract the occasional outbursts of the old man in the flesh. “Knowing this (says St. Paul) that the law is not for a righteous man, but for the lawless and disobedient.” 1 Tim. i. 9. The child of God, then, being righteous not only by position but by disposition, when, yielding to the solicitations of the flesh, or the surprises of the enemy, he falls into sin, needeth but to be reminded of his duty by the admonition of his Father's word, or the chastening of his Father's rod, or by some of those manifold appliances which a gracious and all-wise Providence has at His disposal for the reclaiming of His erring children, that they be not condemned with the world. “If his children forsake my law, and walk not in my judgments, if they break my statutes, and keep not my commandments, then will I visit their transgression with the rod, and their iniquity with stripes; nevertheless, my loving-kindness will I not utterly take from him, nor suffer my faithfulness to fail: my covenant will I not break, nor alter the thing that is gone out of my lips.” Psalm lxxxix. 30–34.

VERSE 19.—* *Φανερά δὲ ἐστίν.* The Apostle, having in the preceding paragraph exhorted the Galatians to “walk by the Spirit,” that they might not fulfil the lusts of the flesh; and having based the expediency, indeed I might say the necessity, of the exhortation, upon the moral impossibility that exists that any man can overcome the desires of the

flesh without such a full and unconditional surrender of himself to the dictation of the Spirit as accompanies a thorough conversion to God, now proceeds to enumerate the products of the flesh and of the Spirit, respectively, that they might the better understand the nature of those things which they were called upon to follow, or to eschew. And first he points out the sins against which we are called upon to contend, in order that we might not walk after the flesh—not indeed a complete enumeration of them, as is plainly intimated at the conclusion of the catalogue, but such a specimen of their nature and character as will enable us to judge of the rest.

Φανερά emphatic. According to the explanation of Alford, “plain to all, not needing, like the more hidden fruits of the Spirit, to be educed and specified; and therefore more clearly amenable to law, which takes cognizance of τὰ φανερά.” And were it not for the catalogue which is annexed, one might be disposed to take the same view of the subject,—that the works of the flesh were so manifest and plain to the most ordinary observer, that “they needed not, like the more hidden fruits of the Spirit, to be educed and specified,” in order to their being known. But from the subsequent enumeration of those sins, exceeding in number by nine ‘the more hidden fruits of the Spirit,’ I am constrained to think that the emphasis is to be laid upon a different point; either that ‘the works of the flesh are for the most part external and objective, whereas the fruits of the Spirit are internal and subjective,’ or, which is more probable, ‘that the works of the flesh are from their very nature so palpably of an evil stock, that to an enlightened mind, there can be no question as to their corrupt and fleshly origin, whereas the fruits of the Spirit are not so clearly and demonstratively traceable to divine influence, that they might not (however erroneously) be regarded as the offspring of our better nature.

^b Τὰ ἔργα τῆς σαρκός, ‘the works of the flesh.’ “That some of these may very properly be called works of the flesh, cannot be doubted; but seeing some of these sins seem chiefly to consist in errors of the *mind*, as ‘heresy,’ and ‘idolatry,’ and others of them to derive from evil dispositions of the spirit, as ‘envy, malice, witchcraft,’ it seems not easy to perceive with what propriety they are here called ‘the works of the flesh.’—WHITBY, *in loco*. But the explanation is not difficult, notwithstanding. The term *σάρξ* includes not merely the inferior portion, but the whole system of corrupt nature (see v. 16°), “extending (as Doddridge justly observes) to the powers of the *mind*, as well as the appetites of the body, and opposed to the new nature communicated by the renewing of the Holy Spirit.” The products of the flesh are rightly denominated “*the works of the flesh*,” seeing that they originate in the desires, and are consummated by the powers, of corrupt nature—the offspring exclusively of the flesh.

^c Ἀτινα ἐστίν, ‘such are’—“almost equivalent to ‘for example.’”—ALFORD. “‘Such for instance as,’ ὅστις having apparently here its classifying force.”—ELLICOTT. It has been observed that the vices enumerated under this head (the works of the flesh), “may be grouped into

four classes:—(1) sensuality, (2) idolatry, not merely spiritual, but actual, (3) malice, (4) excesses.”—ELLICOTT. But though specimens may be adduced under each of these denominations, the classification does not seem to be very studied or artificial.

^a Πορνεία, ‘fornication.’ “Observe the prominence always given to condemnations of this deadly sin, it being one of the things which the old pagan world deemed as merely ἀδιάφορα: see Meyer on Acts xv. 20.”—ELLICOTT.

^b Ἀκαθαρσία, ἀσέλγεια, ‘impurity, wantonness.’ “Ἀσέλγεια does not seem to include necessarily the idea of ‘lasciviousness.’” “Demos-thenes, making mention of the blow which Meidias had given him, characterizes it as in keeping with the well-known ἀσέλγεια of the man (Meid., 514) ‘Trench, New Test. Synonyms,’ p. 64.”—ALFORD. For the philological distinction between these words, see Ellicott’s instructive note.

VERSE 20.—^c Εἰδωλολατρεία, ‘idolatry.’ Some commentators, associating the word with the preceding verses, understand by it ‘sins of lust.’ But such sins having been already included under the generic term ἀκαθαρσία, and ‘idolatry properly so called’ being one of the most prevalent and abominable of the works of the flesh, it is not likely that it should have been passed over unnoticed in so specific an enumeration as that before us. It is fitter, therefore, to connect it with φαρμακεία, with which it has a close affinity, and understand it in its literal and ordinary signification.

^d Φαρμακεία, ‘sorcery.’ This word may be translated either ‘poisoning’ or ‘sorcery.’ “The latter (sorcery) is preferable, as more frequently its sense in the LXX. and New Testament, and because (Mey.) Asia was particularly addicted to sorceries. Acts, xix. 9.”—ALFORD. In this sense the word would include “charms, divinations, incantations, fortune-telling, and attempted intercourse with evil spirits, whether real or pretended; together with other acts employed sometimes by the Heathen priests (and he might have inserted by the priests of the Church of Rome, at the present day), for the support of their superstition.”—BLOOMFIELD.

^e Ἐχθραὶ, ἔρεις, ζήλοι, θυμοὶ, ‘hatreds, strifes, jealousies, heats of passion.’ “It would seem that the terms (above mentioned) are meant of *private* enmities, bickerings, emulations, and angry disputes; and ἐριθείαι, διχοστασίαι, αἵρέσεις, and φθόνοι, of *public* and party strifes, and its results in uncharitable divisions or separations, and sectarianism in general.”—BLOOMFIELD.

^f Εριθείαι, ‘caballings’—“Not ‘strife,’ as English version, and commonly, in error, but ‘cabals,’ unworthy compassings of selfish ends.”—ALFORD. See Ellicott’s critical observations on this word.

^g Διχοστασίαι, ‘divisions’—severances, standings apart, and assuming opposite sides upon a question.

^h Αἵρέσεις, ‘factions’—literally, ‘selections, choosings,’ the natural result of the afore-mentioned διχοστασίαι—a determinate taking up and adopting of one side in opposition to the other, always used in an

unfavourable sense ; an example of which may be found, 1 Cor. iii. 4, "for while one saith, I am of Paul, and another, I am of Apollos, are ye not carnal?" More commonly, however, it is used ecclesiastically of "espousing a false doctrine out of disgust, pride, or envy, or from worldly principles, or to avoid persecution or trouble in the flesh."—WHITBY. Here, however, to be understood in its ordinary non-conventional meaning.

VERSE 21.—* Φθόνοι, 'envyings.' Upon this word and ζήλοι (v. 20), which, with our English translators, he renders 'emulations,' Calvin remarks—"The following distinction between them is stated by Aristotle in his second book on Rhetoric:—He who *emulates* is grieved that another should excel him, not because the virtue or worth of that person, in itself considered, gives him uneasiness, but because he would wish to be superior. The *envious* man has no desire to excel, but is grieved at the excellence of other men. None, therefore, he tells us, but low and mean persons indulge in envy, while emulation dwells in lofty and heroic minds. Paul declares both to be diseases of the flesh."—CALVIN, *in loco*. Envy would bring down another to the level of ourselves. Emulation would exalt us to the level of another.

^b Μέθαι, κῶμοι, 'drunkenness, carousals.' "The last group is μέθαι, κῶμοι, joined also in Rom. xiii. 13, and often in the classical writers. By the latter are denoted those *nocturnal revellings* usually attendant on an evening of debauchery, consisting of licentious singing, dancing, and parading the streets with drunken riotings."—BLOOMFIELD.

*^a Ἀ προλέγω ὑμῖν, 'as to which I tell you beforehand'—^δ an accusative of reference, a construction similar to what we meet, John, viii. 54, 'ὅν ὑμεῖς λέγετε ὅτι Θεὸς ὑμῶν ἐστὶ.' Προλέγω and προεῖπον, the προ in both instances evidently referring to the same period—"The great day of retribution" (Alford); but more simply "the event" (Ellicott)—'I tell you beforehand, as I told you beforehand.' Bloomfield, indeed, refers the first προ (προλέγω) to the day of retribution ("I forewarn you"), the second προ (προεῖπον) to the present time ("I have told you heretofore"); but without much show of probability. Upon this sentence Calvin observes—"He instructs us by his example to press these exhortations and threatenings, agreeably to the words of the prophet, 'Cry aloud, spare not, proclaim to my people their sins' (Isai. lviii. 1). "What can be conceived more dreadful (he continues) than that men should walk after the flesh, and shut themselves out from the kingdom of God?—who will dare to treat lightly the 'abominable things which God hates?' (Jer. xlv. 4)."

^d Τὰ τοιαῦτα πράσσοντες, 'who practise such things as these.' "The article with τοιοῦτος denotes a known person or thing, or the whole class of such, but not an undefined individual of the class; as in that case τοιοῦτος is anarthrous."—ELLICOTT. If it be said, 'all then are cut off from the hope of salvation, for who is there who is not chargeable with some such sins as these?' it is answered that οἱ πράσσοντες denotes, not, those who occasionally fall into temptation, but, those who *practise*

(habitually live in the commission of) such sins. Again, we observe that the present tense (*πράσσοντες*) denotes *a continuance in such practices*, as Calvin well remarks, “St. Paul does not threaten that all who *have sinned*, but all who *remain impenitent*, shall be excluded from the kingdom of God. The saints themselves often fall into grievous sins, but they return to the path of righteousness, and therefore are not included in this catalogue.”—CALVIN, *in loco*.

* Βασιλείαν Θεοῦ οὐ κληρονομήσουσιν, ‘shall not inherit the kingdom of God.’ ‘The kingdom of God,’ a state of ineffable bliss, projected in the Divine counsels from eternity—made known graciously, with more or less of distinctness, to mankind in all ages, and in every dispensation of the church. The Jews as a body, though expectants of the kingdom, had no conscious intimation of present membership. When Jesus Christ ascended up on high (the preliminary work being accomplished), He opened the kingdom of heaven to all believers. Henceforth every true believer is admissible to conscious fellowship in the kingdom, an heir by title now, an heir by fruition “at the appearing of our Lord Jesus Christ and his kingdom.” Κληρονομέω primarily ‘to possess by lot,’ secondarily ‘to possess by hereditary right’—in which sense it is here appropriately used of the members of the kingdom of God, whose title has accrued to them by sonship (sonship in Christ): “*if children, then heirs*, heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Christ.” Rom. viii. 17.

VERSE 22.—* ‘Ο ἐκ καρπὸς, ‘but the fruit.’ It is observable that the vices enumerated in the previous catalogue are designated “the *works* of the flesh,” whereas the virtues included in this are described as “the *fruit* of the Spirit.” Bloomfield cites a passage from Chrysostom in explanation of this distinction—“Evil works come from ourselves alone, therefore they are called ‘*the works of the flesh* ;’ but virtuous ones require not our own exertions alone, but the aid of divine grace ; therefore the Apostle calls them the ‘*fruit of the Spirit*.’ ” So far may pass, if received with discrimination ; but the concluding words—“the seed (namely, the intention) being from ourselves, but the fruit resting with God”—are manifestly objectionable. The flesh, the corrupt nature of man, is equally incapable of the ‘*intention*,’ as it is of the *performance* of what is good. Every acceptable thing in us is distinctly attributable to God, from whom all holy desires, as well as all just works, do proceed. It is “God that worketh in us *both to will and to do*, of his good pleasure.” In accordance with which truth, our blessed Lord addressed his disciples—“I am the vine, ye are the branches ; he that abideth in me, and I in him, *the same bringeth forth much fruit : for without me ye can do nothing*.” John xv. 5. Seeing then that we can do nothing of ourselves, that all our fruitfulness is of God, that which is wrought in us by the grace of his Spirit is fitly designated, not indeed ‘*the work*’ (for that might savour of independence of human agency altogether, whereas we are “fellow-workers with God”), but (inasmuch as the power is derived to us from Him) “the *fruit* of the Spirit.” The same idea is, possibly, presented by Ellicott, who sees in this expression “a significant reference to their *organic development* from the root—the Spirit.”

^b Ἀγάπη, 'love.' Love at the head of the list, being the most comprehensive and the most active of all graces, and lying at the root of all the rest—love to God, and love to man, leading most directly and efficiently to the discharge of every duty respectively to both. "Love (says Bishop Saunderson) is so comprehensive a grace, that it includes all the rest, and so is the fulfilling of the whole law (Rom. xiii. 10). There is a thread of love which runs through all the particular duties and offices of a Christian's life, and strings them, like so many rich pearls, in one chain."—BLOOMFIELD..

^c Χαρά, εἰρήνη, 'joy, peace.' 'Joy,' in the apprehension of Calvin, "does not here denote that 'joy in the Holy Ghost' (Rom. xiv. 17), of which he speaks elsewhere, but that cheerful behaviour towards our fellow-men, which is the opposite of *moroseness*." In like manner, 'Peace' is regarded by Ellicott—"not so much *here* in reference to peace with God, as in accordance with the associated and partially contrasted terms ἔχθραι, κ. τ. λ. (v. 20), peace with one another." But I am of opinion, with Alford, that "we must not seek for a detailed logical opposition in the two lists, which would be quite alien from the fervid style of St. Paul." It is, indeed, hardly conceivable that, however partially contrasted the lists may be, St. Paul could enumerate 'joy and peace' amongst the fruits of the Spirit, and wholly discard from his contemplation that "joy unspeakable and full of glory," and that "peace of God which passeth all understanding," which are so frequently associated in his writings (comp. Rom. v. 1, 2; xiv. 17), as the characteristic privilege of God's faithful people.

^d Μακροθυμία, 'long-suffering'—forbearance, which disposes us to bear long with one another—to take all things in good part—to be not easily offended; ascribed by St. Paul to the influence of love, ἡ ἀγάπη μακροθυμεῖ, 1 Cor. xiii. 4.

^e Χρηστότης, ἀγαθωσύνη, 'kindness, goodness.' The difference between these two words is not very distinctly perceptible. The former appears to denote that kindliness of disposition, commonly known as 'goodness of heart'—'benevolence,' which disposes a person to wish well to his neighbour—to sympathize with him in his trials—to avoid giving him pain or uncasiness—usually associated with the quality here denominated ἀγαθωσύνη, namely, an aptitude to do good, which exhibits itself in acts of benevolence and charity, constituting a man a beneficent as well as a benevolent member of society.

^f Πίστις, 'faith,' not merely 'fidelity' or 'faithfulness to engagements,' but "trustfulness (Conyb.), faith in God's promises and mercies, and loving trust towards men; comp. 1 Cor. xiii. 7, πάντα πιστεύει, where, like μακροθυμία and χρηστότης (ver. 4), it stands as one of the characteristics of ἀγάπη."—ELLICOTT.

^g Πραότης, ἐγκράτεια, 'meekness, moderation.' Πραότης, 'placidity of temper'—a being not easily put out—submissiveness to existing circumstances, which, when it proceeds from a feeling that God's will is done, is a virtue of rare and inestimable value. Ἐγκράτεια, 'self-control,' 'moderation in all things.' "It is distinguished by Diog. Laert.

from *σωφροσύνη* as implying a control over the *stronger* passions, whereas the latter implies a self-constraint in what is less vehement."

—ELLICOTT.

VERSE 23.—^a Κατὰ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστιν νόμος, 'against (the doers) of such things law is not'—does not exist—or there is no obligation of law. A question has been raised with respect to the application of *τοιούτων* in this place; some regard it as *neuter*, having respect to the virtues previously recited; others as *masculine*, in reference to those who practise them. The Greek commentators (Chrys., Theod.) adopt the latter construction; modern expositors (Ellicott, Alford), the former: "Τῶν τοιούτων answers to τὰ τοιαῦτα above, and should therefore be taken as neuter, not masculine."—ALFORD. But though no grammatical reason can be assigned why this interpretation should not hold good, yet certainly it does not accord well with the context.

Indeed, accurately speaking, law cannot be said to be 'against such things' (neuter)—law does not deal with 'things,' but with 'persons' in respect of things. Besides, there is an apparent contrast instituted between this verse and verse 21; and there, distinctly, it is not of the works themselves, but of those who do them, that the affirmation is made—"they shall not inherit the kingdom of God."

So sensibly indeed is it felt that it is the *parties themselves* who are before us, that Ellicott, who, upon sundry considerations, inclines to the neuter acceptance, is constrained, while explaining his own view, to express himself in terms much more becoming the masculine than the neuter interpretation which he adopts:—"St. Paul (he tells us) draws a contrast between the legal judgment under which the *former class* lay, and the freedom from it which *those who are led by the Spirit* enjoy." And Calvin still more explicitly affirms—"Some understand these words as meaning, simply, that the law is not directed against good works—'from evil manners have sprung good laws.' But Paul's real meaning is deeper and less obvious, namely, that where the Spirit reigns, the law has no longer any dominion."—CALVIN, *in loco*. I would further remark that there is a peculiarity in the phraseology of the text, by no means undeserving of notice; the Apostle does not say, 'against such ('things,' it might be) *the law is not framed or directed*,' but 'against such ('persons' as it would seem) οὐκ ἔστι νόμος, *legal obligation does not exist*,' or, in other words, 'they are under no obligation of law.' (On the distinction between νόμος with, and νόμος without, the article, see observations, ch. ii. 16^a).

The difficulty, however, is, how to extract this meaning, without violence, from the words before us. That *τοιούτων* would naturally refer to the virtues enumerated in the preceding verse is, I think, undeniable, no other relative appearing within reach to attract its application; how, then, is it to be taken masculinely? For my part, I am disposed to think that the sentence is elliptical, τῶν ποιητῶν or some such words suggesting themselves to his mind, but they not precisely suiting the nature of the subject in hand (the fruits of the Spirit), and no other expression, without considerable circumlocution, offering, the Apostle has contented

himself with the omission of the word altogether, leaving to be supplied in thought what could not be conveniently expressed in terms—the context, however, clearly defining the sense in which the passage is to be understood. For a similar ellipsis, and apparently upon like grounds, see Rom. vi. 5, and again v. 18, where two instances occur in the same sentence.

However it is to be accounted for, the *personal* interpretation of the sentence is strongly commended by comparison with the context; the drift of the paragraph may be briefly stated thus:—The Apostle admonishes the Galatians, hard pressed by besetting sins, “Walk by the Spirit, and ye shall not fulfil the lusts of the flesh” (ver. 16); for otherwise, from the antagonistic nature of the desires of the flesh and of the Spirit, ye cannot do the good that ye would (ver. 17); but if ye attend to my admonition, and are led by the Spirit, ye are emancipated from the power of the flesh, being *not under law* (ver. 18). From this point (to give them an idea of the nature of the deeds to which he refers) he diverges momentarily to enumerate the products of the flesh and of the Spirit, and concludes the catalogue of the latter in these terms—‘against those who bring forth such fruits there is *no obligation of law*’ (verses 22, 23); thus reverting, according to custom, to the position (“ye are not under law”) from which he sets out (ver. 18)—a conformity to his ordinary usage which is not maintained in the *neuter* interpretation of the words.

VERSE 24.—^a Δὲ, ‘but,’ simply adversative—contrasting the statement now to be introduced with *the implication* in the preceding clause. ‘Against such there is no obligation of law, and consequently *no subjection to the flesh*, “but” on the contrary, they of Christ (the same parties under a different denomination) *have crucified the flesh* with its affections and lusts’—a connexion strongly corroborative of the view above maintained, that the subject of the preceding verse is not the virtues themselves, but those who practise them.

^b Οἱ τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ‘they of Christ’—‘members of Christ’ (see ch. iii. 29 ^b), before designated ‘they who walk by the Spirit’—‘who are not under law.’ The expression οἱ τοῦ Χριστοῦ to be regarded here, not simply as *designation*, though it does indeed designate the parties in question, but also as *description*, declaratory of *the position* of those who, bringing forth the fruit of the Spirit, are, consequently, not under law—they are *in Christ*. The Spirit, as an indwelling, soul-directing, fruit-producing principle, extendeth not beyond the person of Christ. No man can “walk by the Spirit” who is not, at the same time, a ‘member of Christ’—a truth deducible from sundry declarations of Scripture:—“The blessing of Abraham (the promised Spirit) cometh upon the nations *in Christ*,” and in Him alone, ch. iii. 14; “*as many as are led by the Spirit of God*, they are the sons of God,” Rom. viii. 14, and “ye are all the sons of God through faith—*in Christ*,” ch. iv. 26; consequently, “as many as are led by the Spirit of God” are “*in Christ*.” When, therefore, the Apostle exhorted the Galatians to ‘walk by the Spirit, that they should not fulfil the lusts of the flesh,’ he virtually

exhorted them 'to put on Christ,' and so be delivered from "the lusts of the flesh;" for "the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus sets us free from the law of sin and of death."

^c Τὴν σάρκα ἐσταύρωσαν, 'crucified the flesh.' If it be inquired to what period of the Christian's experience the action of this verb refers, I answer, to the period of his conversion. The infusion of the Spirit of life into the soul, which baptizes into Christ, baptizes into His death (Rom. vi. 3). Henceforth the believer may say, 'I am dead with Christ'—"I am crucified with Christ." The act of faith whereby he lays hold upon Christ, is the act whereby he 'crucifies the flesh with its affections and lusts.' But though the *predominance* of 'the flesh' is for ever done away at conversion, yet is 'the flesh' not absolutely extinct, but still lives on, a subject for continual and daily mortification, never to be consummated until the warfare is ended in the grave. Nevertheless, this protracted mortification is not that to which, in the passage before us, the Apostle adverts, as is clearly deducible from the aoristic form of the verb, which points to an accomplished fact, and not to one progressive and incomplete during the whole period of our earthly existence. It also accords well with the design of the Apostle in this place, which was to show that 'they who bring forth the fruits of the Spirit were delivered from the dominion of the flesh' (see preceding note), and he would consequently point to that especial act of theirs by which their deliverance was achieved.

^d Σὺν τοῖς παθήμασιν καὶ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις, 'with the passions and lusts.' It would seem that a distinction is here recognised between what are denominated the 'passions' and the 'desires' of the flesh—the latter, possibly, representing the spontaneous effusions of depraved nature, the cravings of the corrupt heart; the former, those motions which are the result of temptations from without. In the one class, 'the flesh may be regarded as active, in the other as comparatively *passive* (παθήματα). We read (Rom. vii. 5) of the "passions of sins (τὰ παθήματα τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν) which were *by the law*"—by which we understand (the Apostle himself being interpreter) those sinful affections which, though inherent in the flesh, were nevertheless dormant and inactive until roused into antagonism by the notification of God's holy will, and consequently rightly attributed to the exciting influence of the law. All those sinful emotions, then, which, though natural to man, are not actually in exercise until evoked by temptation from without, such as 'envy, malice, hatred, revenge,' &c. &c., constitute, in all probability, that class of offences which are here denominated τὰ παθήματα τῆς σαρκὸς.

VERSE 25.—^a Εἰ ζῶμεν Πνεύματι, 'if we live by the Spirit. 'If,' not *conditional*, but *absolute*, assuming it as an unquestionable fact that we do so live, as in the following examples:—"If I be a Father, where is my honour? If I be a master, where is my fear? saith the Lord of Hosts," Mal. i. 6. So here, 'if we live by the Spirit, let us also walk by the Spirit.' A previous encouragement to the same course had been already held forth, namely, the *advantage* derivable therefrom—"if ye walk by

the Spirit, ye shall not be enslaved by the flesh.' But here a new motive is adduced, the *reasonableness* of the thing, that the same Principle which has been the author and originator of our new life, should be also the guide and sustainer of our walk. Some diversity of opinion occurs as to the form of the dative (πνεύματι). Alford insists that it is a species of dative normæ, "probably employed here as corresponding more with the dative in the other member (which he decidedly regards as a normal dative) than with strict accuracy;" while Ellicott adheres to the ordinary explanation as most satisfactory—"According to which πνεύματι is to be regarded as a form of the instrumental or ablatival dative, and is here adopted rather than διὰ with the accusative (John, vi. 57), as thus forming a sharper antithesis to the dative which follows." There can be little doubt but that the latter is the true construction, the instrumental dative being employed, not only as more in accordance (as above suggested) with the dative in the succeeding member, but as more adequately representing the Apostle's meaning (than διὰ with the accusative), which was to indicate, not the remote ground in reference to which we live, but the agent, instrumentally regarded, whereby we live, that is, 'that we live by the Spirit as the originator of our new life,' and not simply that 'because the Spirit lives, we live also,' the idea conveyed by διὰ with the accusative. See Winer, Gr., § xlix. διὰ c. At the same time, though an instrumental dative, it appears to be used here *modally*: see ch. iii. 3, v. 5.

Modern expositors connect this verse with the preceding, regarding it as an hortatory injunction from what had been stated therein—"If, as we saw, having slain the flesh, our life depends on the Spirit" (let our practical walk, &c. &c.)—Alford. But the fact that 'we live by the Spirit' is far too remote, and too obscure an inference from the declaration, 'we have crucified the flesh with its affections and lusts' to have been assumed and made the ground of the practical injunction which follows. Nor, indeed, is it absolutely asserted of the Galatian church, that they *had* 'crucified the flesh with its affections and lusts,' but only affirmed as a general proposition that 'they who are Christ's have so done.' We must, therefore, seek some more substantial ground for the injunction than that which is thus suggested. Nor is it difficult to find it, in the 'general tenor of the Epistle.' "Are ye so foolish? *having begun with the Spirit*, are ye now being perfected by the flesh?" is the question with which the Apostle sets out (ch. iii. 3). And the whole drift of the argument has since been to prove that the divine life of the believer is the fruit, not of the works of the flesh, but of *the Spirit*, through faith. Nothing, then, could be more natural or more allowable than, at the conclusion of such an argument, to *assume as an established fact* that the Spirit is the source of the Christian's life, and to draw from that fact the reasonable deduction that the Spirit should also be the guide and energizer of the Christian's walk.

ὁ Πνεύματι καὶ στοιχῶμεν, 'let us also walk by the Spirit'—not merely "*in harmony with* that higher life in which we live before God, by faith, and in the Spirit" (Alford), the very inadequate notion pre-

sented by his favourite dative normæ, but ‘by the direction, guidance, inworking of the Spirit,’ the sense conveyed by the instrumental dative for which we contend. Ellicott insists that “the second πνεύματι is obviously the dative normæ,” at the same time that in his note upon στοιχῶμεν he admits that “the hortatory imperative is not without some doctrinal significance (Ust.); the Apostle evidently assuming the union and coexistence of the *divine* and *human powers* in the heart of the true Christian.” But, if so much be admitted, it might not unreasonably have occurred to him that the dative normæ was an inadequate exponent of the exercise of such a power; ‘to walk *by the power* of the Holy Ghost,’ being clearly beyond the province of that dative to describe. It would have been more natural also to conclude that the two coterminous datives pointed to the same thing, namely, the *divine power* by which the true believer both lives and walks. The idea is substantially the same here as that presented in verse 16. But στοιχῶμεν may possibly be considered a more precise term than περιπατεῖτε, implying that not only should the Christian’s walk and conversation *generally* be ordered under the guidance and influence of the Holy Spirit, but that *every particular step he takes* should be taken in the strength and power of the same.

VERSE 26.—^a Μὴ γινώμεθα κενόδοξοι, ‘let us not become vainglorious.’ It has been observed that γινώμεθα, not only in the person, but in the choice of the verb, expresses a *mild* but solemn warning, implying that, though the fault to which it refers may not have yet been a settled habit in the church, yet there was reason to apprehend that without the greatest care and circumspection it would ultimately become so. The attentive reader cannot fail to perceive that one leading idea pervades the entire of this context, commencing with verse 13 to the present passage, though not formally and fully developed until now. The abuse of liberty to which the Apostle refers (ver. 13), though expressed in general terms, is manifestly in the direction of ‘ambition, love of pre-eminence and notoriety in the church,’ the fruitful source of bickering, contention, and strife, denounced in the strong terms, “if ye bite and devour one another, take heed that ye be not consumed one of another;” for which the remedy is provided, “Walk by the Spirit”—an injunction enforced, first, by the consideration of *the benefit* accruing therefrom—the victory to be achieved over the flesh; and secondly by *the reasonableness* thereof—that the Spirit, which is the originator of our new life, should also be the strength of our walk. The Apostle now concludes the subject by adverting in plain terms to the evil which he had in contemplation throughout, ‘let us not *become vainglorious*, provoking one another, envying one another’; through mildness, and to avoid giving offence, classifying himself with the rest.

^b Ἀλλήλους προκαλούμενοι, ‘provoking one another.’ Προκαλέομαι literally signifies ‘to call forth to oneself’—‘to challenge.’ By which word we do not necessarily conceive here of any express or direct provocation given by one to the other; but only that the ambitious views and projects of the offending party were calculated indirectly to excite

emulation, contention, strife, on the part of others, and so to convert the church of God into an arena for the exhibition of the basest and meanest passions of mankind.

^c 'Ἀλλήλοις φθονοῦντες, 'envying one another.' Ellicott regards φθονεῖν as "the correlative act on the part of the weak to προκαλεῖσθαι on the part of the strong: the strong vauntingly challenged their weaker brethren, the weak could only retaliate with *envy*." But it is needless, as we have just observed, to conceive of so direct an antagonism between the parties as is indicated in these terms. The same morbid love of pre-eminence which provoked emulation and jealousy on the part of those behind, would vent itself in envyings and detraction of those before, the same party being the guilty originator of either passion.

Calvin well remarks:—"The special exhortations which were addressed to the Galatians were not more necessary for them, than they are adapted to our own time. Of many evils existing in society at large, and particularly in the church, ambition is the mother. . . . The heathen philosophers do not condemn every desire of glory; but among Christians whoever is desirous of glory departs from true glory, and therefore is justly charged with idle and foolish ambition. It is not lawful for us to glory but in God alone—every other kind of glorying is pure vanity." "God forbid that I should glory, save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom the world is crucified unto me, and I unto the world," is the passionate exclamation of one who knew better than most other men what is the alone object worthy of the Christian's boasting. May grace be given unto us, individually, to follow the Apostle Paul, not only in his faith, but in his practice!

CHAPTER VI.

NOTWITHSTANDING the injunction in the preceding paragraph, to 'walk by the Spirit, and so to escape the tyranny of the flesh,' the Apostle, anticipating the event that temptations would arise, and offences, consequently, ensue, instructs his Galatian readers, in the verse under consideration, how they should conduct themselves in such circumstances;—that they should not cast off their erring brother, but in a spirit of meekness and circumspection restore him to the position in Christ which through inadvertence or indiscretion he had lost.

VERSE 1.—'Ἀδελφοί, 'brethren.' It may be questioned whether ἀδελφοί is to be regarded as a simple equivalent to ἀδελφοί μου, or that, being about to inculcate duties appertaining to believers as members of the same community, children of the same heavenly father, the Apostle may not remind them in this term of the relationship subsisting amongst themselves as *brethren*, evoking thereby a more than ordinary measure of Christian sympathy and love. Whether this is the spirit of Beza's observation—"latet in hoc etiam uno verbo *argumentum*"—I will not

take upon me to say. However, upon a comparison with the numerous passages in St. Paul's writings where the same expression occurs, it would seem that such a meaning cannot be confidently pressed, but that it may be more safely regarded as a conciliatory mode of address, bespeaking more than ordinary attention to, or enforcing with more than ordinary impressiveness, the truth which is immediately to follow. Ἀδελφοί, when standing at the head of a sentence betokens, in most cases, transition to a fresh subject.

^b Ἐὰν καὶ προληφθῇ ἄνθρωπος, 'if a man be even overtaken.' Recent commentators object to all those interpretations of προληφθῇ, wherein *the more strict temporal* meaning of πρὸ is adhered to in translation (—"antea," whether referred to the arrival of the Epistle (Grot.), to a recurrence of the offence (Winer), or to the attempt at restoration—the λαμβάνεσθαι taking place before the καταρτ. (Olsh.)"—ELLICOTT) as obscuring both the emphatic position of προληφθῇ, and the intensive force of καὶ. The idiomatic application (adopted by Chrys., Auth. Vers., al.) to the *unexpectedness* of the fault (—"overtaken," 'surprised,' before he had time for deliberation or resistance) is also rejected by the same writers upon the ground that "this meaning of πρὸ would tend to excuse and qualify, whereas καὶ seems to point out an aggravation of the offence." "If, however, πρὸ be referred to '*the power of escape*'—"be caught before he could escape"—'flagrante delicto'" (Ellicott), all these proprieties they think would be preserved. But there appears to be but little ground of preference upon this score, the emphasis being laid, not upon the peculiar force of πρὸ in προληφθῇ, but upon the occurrence of the fault at all, in whatever sense the πρὸ be understood. If a man be so uncircumspect in his walk or conversation as not only *to expose himself to temptation*, but *even to go so far as to be actually overtaken in a fault*, he does not thereby forfeit his claim upon the sympathy and the kind offices of his fellow-Christians, but it becomes the bounden duty of those amongst them who are spiritually minded to restore such an one in a spirit of meekness—an exposition which is, at the same time, in keeping with the *idiomatic usage* of προληφθῇ, and allows full scope for the *intensive* operation of καὶ. Whereas the assumed sense of προληφθῇ (as though his being taken 'flagrante delicto' constituted an aggravation of the offence) is unsatisfactory and pointless, and even upon their own admission "rare" and "unusual."

^c Ἐν τινὶ παραπτώματι, 'in any fault.' Παράπτωμα denotes 'a particular act' of sin, in which respect it differs from ἁμαρτία, which denotes sometimes 'the act of sinning,' sometimes 'the principle of sin,' and sometimes, again, 'the state or condition of sinning.' Τινὶ emphatic, denoting sin of any kind or character whatsoever. In the absence of the pronoun, παραπτώματι would be naturally referred to the faults before mentioned (ἀλλήλους προκαλούμενοι, ἀλλήλοις φθονοῦντες). But it being the Apostle's intention to make the precept of universal application, he prefixes the indefinite pronoun, τινὶ. The literal meaning of παράπτωμα is 'a falling aside of, or away from, a mark,' primarily employed in respect to unintentional transgressions, originating in igno-

rance or inadvertence. But inasmuch as the word is of frequent occurrence in St. Paul's writings in the sense of 'sin' generally (comp. Rom. iv. 25, v. 15, 16, 20), we are not at liberty to limit its application here to sins of ignorance or inadvertence, but only to such sins as are committed hastily, inconsiderately, without premeditation or design, under the pressure of sudden and unexpected temptation; and even that sense is to be derived rather from the context (*προληφθῇ*, 'overtaken,' 'surprised'), than from the force of *παράπτωμα* itself.

Luther discovers a mitigatory power in the introduction of the word *ἄνθρωπος* into this sentence,—“as if he should say, what is so proper unto man, as to fall, to be deceived, and to err? So saith Moses in Lev. vi. 3—‘they are wont to sin like men.’” The whole passage, indeed, he conceives, and rightly, to be “full of heavenly comfort,”—“forasmuch as the saints in this life do not only live in the flesh, but now and then, also, through the enticement of the devil, fulfil the lusts of the flesh, that is to say, fall into impatience, envy, wrath, error, doubting, distrust, and such like, therefore Paul teacheth how such men that are fallen should be dealt withal, namely, that they which are strong should raise up and restore them again, with the spirit of meekness.”—LUTHER, *in loco*.

^d Ὑμεῖς οἱ πνευματικοί, ‘ye the spiritual ones,’ or ‘ye who are spiritual.’ Ellicott suggests that οἱ πνευματικοί denotes, not the subjectively but the objectively, in the estimation of the church, spiritual; but except so far as office-bearers may be contemplated, such designation would seem to be altogether too vague and indeterminate for the purposes of the present injunction. Others understand the term of ‘the possessors of spiritual gifts,’ who, before the appointment of a stated ministry, discharged all spiritual offices in the church (Whitby, al.). But those gifted individuals were not necessarily converted men (see Mat. vii. 22), and consequently but ill qualified, as a body, to discharge the duty herein prescribed. In my apprehension a contrast is instituted in this term between οἱ πνευματικοί and ὁ σαρκικός, ‘ye the spiritual ones,’ and he ‘the carnal one,’ the individual supposed to have fallen, though temporarily, under the power of the flesh; and that the injunction is addressed without distinction to every member of the Christian community, whether lay or clerical, eminent or ordinary, who, being upheld by the grace of Christ’s Spirit, felt himself in a position to raise up and restore by advice, consolation, admonition, prayer, or by any other means, a weak and fallen brother.*

* Καταρτίζετε, ‘restore’—‘set right.’ I am disposed to agree with recent commentators, that the technical meaning of *καταρτίζειν*, ‘repo-

* Σαρκικός, though ordinarily denoting a person under the domination of the flesh, a natural, unconverted man, and so distinguished from *πνευματικός*, one habitually under the influence of the Holy Spirit, or a regenerate person, is occasionally applied to weak Christians with whom the flesh is unduly influential, or even prevalent for the time being. A person fallen under the temptation of the flesh would, until raised again by the Spirit of divine grace, be in this sense of the word—*σαρκικός* (see 1 Cor. iii. 1), and a fit subject of contrast with οἱ πνευματικοί.

nere in artu luxata membra' (Steph., *Thesaur.*), though by no means inapplicable, is not to be insisted upon here, "examples of the simple ethical sense being sufficiently common."—ELLICOTT. Bloomfield, while noticing that "the metaphor is derived from 'setting right a dislocated limb,' an allusion to the erring member of Christ's body, the church," does not seem to attach much weight to his own observation; for he immediately subjoins, "καταρτίζετε is for διορθοῦσθε, or ἐπανορθοῦσθε," in which words certainly no trace of the surgical figure is to be detected.

⁷ Ἐν πνεύματι πραότητος, 'in a spirit of meekness.' "Not merely a meek spirit, but a spirit of which the principal constituent, or *characterizing quality*, is πραύτης."—ELLICOTT. Though the spirit in contemplation is evidently the spirit of the πνευματικός, yet is it unquestionably his spirit energized by the Holy Spirit of God, one of whose fruits (as enumerated ch. v. 23) is πραότης. The recovery of a lapsed brother should never be undertaken in a severe or haughty spirit, or with sharp or reproachful language. While we must never shrink from bearing a faithful and manly testimony against sin, we must not at the same time forget (in the expressive language of an old divine) "to mix oil with the vinegar." The spirit of the exhortation is well embodied by Luther—"Brethren (says St. Paul), if any man be overtaken with sin, do not trouble him, or make him more sorrowful; be not bitter unto him; do not reject or condemn him, but amend him, and raise him up again, and by the spirit of lenity and mildness restore that which in him is decayed by the deceit of the devil or by the weakness of the flesh; for the kingdom whereunto ye are called is a kingdom not of terror or heaviness, but of boldness, and joy, and gladness."—LUTHER, *in loco*.

⁸ Σκοπῶν σεαυτὸν, κ. τ. λ., 'looking to thyself,' &c. It is not easy at first sight to decide upon the precise meaning to be attributed to this clause, more than one element of uncertainty being mixed up in it. In the first place, the participle σκοπῶν may be diversely applied. It may be used in its purely *temporal* signification, to denote the mental attitude in which the πνευματικοὶ should approach the duty prescribed, 'looking *all the while* to themselves'—that is, 'being well upon their guard whilst performing the duty, lest they be tempted unexpectedly themselves. Or σκοπῶν may be applied in its *causal* signification, to suggest *the consideration* by which they should be moved willingly to undertake the office, 'having in view themselves, lest they also be tempted'—in other words, 'bearing in mind their own liability to err,' and that they might need the same assisting hand to be stretched forth for their relief to-morrow. And this is apparently the sense adopted by Ellicott:—"The πνευματικοὶ (he observes) were reminded of their own liability to fall into temptation, . . . to urge them . . . to evince their Christian spirit by restoring one who had fallen only, after all, as they themselves might."

For my part, I incline to the former application; regarding it as a cautionary address—"looking well to thyself, lest even thou be tempted," where the participle occurs in its *temporal* signification, either *ethically*,

as descriptive of the habit of circumspection which becomes the Christian at all times and in all places, or *literally* in respect to the particular occasion to which it refers; there being no time, perhaps, when we stand more in need of watchfulness and circumspection against the surprisals of the flesh than when we take upon ourselves the duty to comfort or to reprimand our fellow-sinners—the very duty itself constituting a temptation to fall into self-sufficiency and pride.

Calvin understands the participial clause in its *temporal, literal* signification, as a warning given by Paul, that, in correcting others, we should not ourselves commit sin (that is, *by harshness and severity of treatment*). “There is a danger (he says) here which deserves our most careful attention, and against which it is difficult to guard; for nothing is more easy than to exceed the proper limits.” But I prefer the *ethical* meaning, as above explained—the expression being of too comprehensive a character, and the caution too generally required, to admit of circumscription within such narrow bounds. The transition from the plural in the preceding clause to the singular in this, is not undeserving of attention—imparting point and impressiveness to the admonition. Though addressed to the *πνευματικοὶ* collectively, the Apostle deals with them singly and separately, advancing such considerations as are of personal and individual application.

^h *Μὴ καὶ σὺ πειρασθῇς*, ‘lest that even thou be tempted,’ or ‘that thou be not tempted thyself’—a translation preferable, it seems, to that usually adopted, “lest thou also be tempted” (Ellicott and Alford), as being not only conformable to the relative position of the words, but also as educing a more emphatic meaning, not only, ‘lest thou fall into error as well as he,’ but, ‘lest thou, spiritually minded and secure as thou imaginest thyself to be, may fall into temptation.’ “There is no sin (saith Augustine) which any man hath done, but another may do the same.” If we are proud and self-confident, and neglectful of the duty of watchfulness, there is nothing so easy as to fall. It is needless, perhaps, to remark, that *πειρασθῇς* by metonymy signifies, not only ‘the being tried,’ but ‘*the falling by temptation*’—a sense in which the word is of frequent occurrence in the New Testament; as Matt. vi. 13, where we are taught to pray that we “enter not into temptation;” 1 Cor. vii. 5, where the Apostle exhorts married persons to live together, “that Satan tempt ye not for your incontinency;” and again, where he is solicitous about the welfare of the Thessalonians, “lest the tempter have tempted you, and our labour be in vain.”—1 Thess. iii. 5. Indeed, it would appear, according to the definition of St. James, that such is distinctly the scriptural acceptation of the term: “Every man is tempted (*πειράζεται*) when he is drawn away of his own lust, *and enticed*,” James, i. 14.

· VERSE 2.—^a *Ἀλλήλων*, ‘of one another.’ In the verse before us, there is an extension of the precept contained in the preceding clause: ‘If a brother be overtaken by a fault, restore him; and not only so, but in everything, and in every possible manner, bear ye one another’s burdens.’ Upon this word Alford pertinently remarks, “*ἀλλήλων*, pre-

fixed and emphatic, has not been sufficiently attended to." At the same time, he has failed (in company with Calvin) to exhibit the true and proper force of the emphasis. According to them, the antithesis is to this effect, "You want to become the disciples of the law, which imposes heavy burdens on men; if you will bear burdens, bear *one another's* burdens."—ALFORD. But there is no contrast, manifestly, intended in these words, between the old law and the new, nor any allusion to the doctrinal error of the Galatian church, that subject having been long since disposed of, and dismissed from the Apostle's mind, who is now dealing with the *πνευματικοὶ ἀδελφοὶ* in respect to the duty appertaining to them as subjects to the law of Christ—a law to be fulfilled, not merely in bearing patiently the burdens imposed upon themselves, but in assisting their neighbours to bear their burdens also, being enunciated in this one word, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself."

According to Alford, "the position of *ἀλλήλων* fixes this meaning (that is, the imputed contrast between the old law and the new), by throwing *τὰ βάρη* into the shade, as a term common to the two laws." But in my judgment it fixes the meaning here assigned, by throwing *τὰ βάρη* into the shade, and giving prominence to *ἀλλήλων*—indicating thereby, that it is not the bearing of burdens generally that is represented as constituting the fulfilment of the law of Christ, but the bearing of *one another's* burdens.

^b *Τὰ βάρη βαστάζετε*, 'bear ye the burdens'—a metaphor taken from travellers by the way. If one faints or wearies in the road, his comrade takes his burden and carries it for him; so also should we do by our fellow-travellers in the heavenward journey. "The weaknesses or sins under which we groan are called burdens. This phrase is singularly appropriate in an exhortation to kind behaviour, for nature dictates to us that those who bend under a burden ought to be relieved. He enjoins us *to bear* the burdens. We must not indulge nor overlook the sins by which our brethren are pressed down, but relieve them; which can only be done by mild and friendly correction."—CALVIN.

We best bear the burdens of our fellow-Christians when we bear them upon our consciences as though they were our own—when we bear them upon our hearts before the throne of grace in prayer—and when we bear them upon our shoulders by sympathy and brotherly aid.

But, after all, it is He only who bore our sins in His own body upon the tree, who can bear our burdens effectually; and He has invited and encouraged us to cast them freely upon Himself, with a promise that He will sustain them. It is the bounden duty of Christians to sympathize with each other in every time of trial or affliction; but the relief must come from the Lord.

^c *Καὶ οὕτως ἀναπληρώσατε*, 'and in so doing fulfil.' "The compound *ἀναπληροῦν* is not simply synonymous with *πληροῦν* (Rück., al.), but appears in all cases to denote a *complete* filling up."—ELLICOTT. But that it points "to a *partial* rather than to an entire vacuum," the farther assertion of the same authority, I am disposed to question upon etymological no less than upon theological considerations; *ἀναπληροῦν*

literally signifies 'to fill completely from bottom to top : '—and, certainly, 'love' is not *the complement*, but '*the fulfilling*, of the law.'

^d Τὸν νόμον τοῦ Χριστοῦ, 'the law of Christ,' not only as being the law propounded by Christ, but 'the law also which rules and governs the whole body of Christians'—"the law of the Spirit of life, which is in Christ Jesus:" a law which is fulfilled in one word—love. He that sympathizes with his brother in distress, and helps him in the spirit of Christian charity to sustain his burden, has in so doing fulfilled the law. It has been already observed that no antithesis is intended in this passage between the law of Christ and the law of Moses, which the Galatians affected to serve. But it is a substantive averment that he that acts kindly and considerately towards a fallen brother, restoring him in a spirit of meekness, has in so doing fulfilled the law of the new covenant under which he is placed—which regards not the extent of obedience, but the principle of love from which it emanates—"faith *working by love* being the fulfilling of the law."—See observations, ch. v. 14 ^b.

VERSE 3.—^a Εἰ γὰρ δοκεῖ τις εἶναι τι, 'for if any man thinketh that he is something'—confirmation of the *implication* involved in the preceding verse. The Apostle commanded that Christians should bear *one another's* burdens; and declared that in so doing they should fulfil the law of Christ—evidently implying, that all men had burdens to be borne, and were more or less dependent upon the kind offices of their fellows, the duty being a reciprocal one, which every man owes to his neighbour. To justify this *implication*, he now avers that no man is above the need of sympathy and help from his fellow-Christian, "for if" any man thinks that he is somebody—exempt from the common frailties and weaknesses of humanity, and so secure in his position that he cannot fall, while in deed and truth he is nothing—that man deceiveth his own self.

^b Μηδὲν ὄν, 'when he is nothing'—ὄν part. pres. in its ordinary *temporal* sense, '*being all the while nothing*.' Calvin justly observes, that "there is an ambiguity in the construction, but Paul's meaning is clear. The phrase, 'when he is nothing,' appears at first sight to mean 'if any man, who is in reality nothing, claims to be something,' as there are many men of no real worth who are elated by a foolish admiration of themselves. But the meaning is more general, and may be thus expressed—"Since all men are nothing, he who wishes to appear something, and persuades himself that he is somebody, deceives himself." Alford discovers "a fine irony in the use of the subjective *μηδὲν* (rather than the objective *οὐδὲν*), being, if he would come to himself, and look on the real fact, nothing." Ellicott, however, objects that "this notion is somewhat precarious, as the use of the subjective negation is the prevailing usage in the New Testament." At the same time, the distinction (between *μηδὲν* and *οὐδὲν*) suggested by Alford is generally admitted to be a sound one (see Winer, Gr. § lv. 1), and not to be rejected when the sense of the passage plainly admits of its application, which is unquestionably the case here, though not precisely in the manner presented by him. The subjective *μηδὲν* represents, not *the absolute fact* that he

to whom the Apostle refers is nothing, but *the impression upon the writer's mind* with respect to that fact (a suggestion which may possibly account for the prevalence of the subjective usage in Scripture), and so, indirectly, the position which he occupies *in the sight of God*, by whose inspiration the knowledge of that fact was imparted.

The exposition above offered of the passage is more pertinent to the subject in hand, and more consonant also to experience, than that submitted by Whitby—"that he is nothing, to wit, in himself, but by the grace of God he is what he is;" for the man who by the grace of God is anything will be the very last to affect that he is something, but will subscribe to the declaration of one of the wisest and most exalted of Christians—"I am the chief of sinners." Such is God's estimate of man. In himself he is nothing, has nothing, can do nothing—nothing right or acceptable in His sight. Verily man in his best estate is altogether vanity!

^c Φρεναπατᾶ, 'inwardly deceiveth'—a word occurring but once in the New Testament, the nearest approach to the sentiment being found in ἀπατῶν καρδίαν αὐτοῦ, James, i. 26. The distinction between ἀπατᾶ and φρεναπατᾶ suggested by Ellicott, is by no means an improbable one—"The former may imply a deception which had something objective to rest upon; the latter, a more studied inward working, and purely subjective deception." For though, doubtless, they are "both subjective deceits" (as Alford adversely observes), yet is there this difference between them, that they are arrived at by different processes—the one through the intervention of external objects, the other through the in-working of the mind upon itself. But, after all, the difference between the two words may be rather as to the measure of *completeness* than as to the *grounds* upon which the deception is founded. Oftentimes do we impose upon ourselves, flattering ourselves that the opinions which we entertain, or the courses we are pursuing, are right and expedient, and that no evil is to be apprehended therefrom, when all the while there may be doubt, and uncertainty, and misgiving within; at other times, the heart itself is taken captive by the delusion, so that it can raise no warning voice against the error, or in favour of the truth. Such was the case of the idolater described by Isaiah, "whom *a deceived heart* hath turned aside, that he cannot deliver his soul, nor say, is there not a lie in my right hand?"—Isaiah, xliv. 20. The former condition might be adequately expressed by ἀπατᾶ, the latter by φρεναπατᾶ. Delusion, under whatever circumstances, is an evil thing; to be the dupe of others is sad enough, but to be deluded by one's own conscience is almost hopelessly lamentable.

VERSE 4.—* Τὸ δὲ ἔργον ἑαυτοῦ, 'but (let every man test) his work'—δὲ adversative; in opposition to this pernicious habit of self-deception, let every man test his work, and then, if he finds occasion of rejoicing, it will be upon sure grounds, in reference to himself *absolutely*, and not himself *by comparison* only with others. Hence we infer that one chief source of self-sufficiency and pride is the fallacious standard by which men measure themselves,—the imperfect attainments of other men, and

not the high and immutable standard of God's holy word. "The singular (*ἔργον*) with the article is apparently here used collectively (De W., Mey.), *scil.* 'τὰς ἑαυτοῦ πράξεις,' Theophyl., 'τὰ βεβιωμένα αὐτοῦ,' Œcum.; 'universam agendi rationem complectitur,' Schott.; comp. Rom. ii. 15, 1 Pet. i. 17."—ELLCOTT. 'Εαυτοῦ, the ordinary reflexive pronoun, 'his own'—the work of himself; and not 'his own' in contradistinction to the work of others (more properly expressed by *ἰδίον*)—the meaning inaccurately assigned to it by commentators. "To prevent so fatal a mistake (the exaggerated notion of their own excellencies), and effectually dissipate the delusion, the Apostle bids them, *instead of censuring the failings of others*, to examine and try *their own actions* by the test of God's laws."—BLOOMFIELD. But the injunction has no reference to the "censuring the failings of others," nor of testing "their own actions" as contradistinguished from the actions of others; but simply 'let every man test the work of himself (*ἑαυτοῦ*), and (if approved) he shall have ground of rejoicing in reference to himself positively, and not himself in reference to others.'

^b Δοκιμαζέτω, 'let (each person) test' his own work; and, if approved, he shall have, &c. &c.; or δοκιμάζειν may be taken, in a secondary sense, to signify directly, 'to approve of;' in which case the injunction would amount to this, 'let every man so act that he may have the approval of his own conscience, and then,' &c. &c. But the former is preferable, as being more natural, and certainly not an unusual form of ellipsis.

^c Τὸ καύχημα ἔξει, 'he shall have the ground of rejoicing.' Ellicott justly observes, that the sense of the passage has been somewhat obscured by inattention to the force of the different terms employed in it. In the first place, "the concrete καύχημα, *gloriandi materies* (Rom. iv. 2, 1 Cor. ix. 15, 16, al.)," is to be distinguished from "καυχῆσις, *gloriatio* (Rom. iii. 27, al.), the distinction between them being apparently always observed in the New Testament." Secondly, "the article is not used κατ' ἐξοχήν, but (as he affirms) pronominally (Middleton, ch. v. 3), 'his ground of boasting,' the καύχημα which properly belongs to him." But I incline to accept τὸ in its simple and ordinary usage—the definite article 'the καύχημα, to wit, that which upon examination he may find.'

Some, attributing to καύχημα the evil sense—'boasting,' discover in these words a strain of irony, "whatever matter of *boasting* he finds, after such testing, will be, &c. &c."—ALFORD. But I understand the passage in its plain, matter-of-fact meaning; and though καύχημα is undoubtedly susceptible of two significations, a good and a bad, and occurs perhaps as frequently in the New Testament in the one as in the other, yet I conceive, in the present context, 'ground of rejoicing' is much the more suitable exponent: 'boasting' may suit the character of one who estimates his own attainments by the shortcomings of others; but to the man who measures himself by the standard of God's holy word, and approves himself to his own conscience, 'rejoicing' is the more congenial attribute. Indeed, a just appreciation of gospel truth

effectually excludes 'boasting;' for "where is boasting? (says the Apostle) it is excluded: by what law? of works?—nay; but by the law of faith," Rom. iii. 27. The man who believes that he has nothing that he has not received, and received too, not as a debt, but as a matter of favour, can find but little room for 'boasting,' be his attainments what they may. But 'rejoicing' is of a different stamp; the rejoicing of the Christian is consistent with the most complete abnegation of self, and exaltation of the grace of God. It is, in fact, the acknowledgment of the heart to God, that from Him all our mercies proceed, and that we are filled even to overflowing. 'Rejoicing' is the privilege of God's people. "Our rejoicing is this (says St. Paul), the testimony of our conscience, that in simplicity and godly sincerity, not with fleshly wisdom, but *by the grace of God*, we have had our conversation in the world."

^d *Εἰς ἑαυτὸν μόνον, καὶ οὐκ εἰς τὸν ἕτερον*, 'in reference to himself alone, and not in reference to the other.' *Εἰς*, 'in reference to,' similarly employed in both members. *Ἐαυτὸν μόνον*, 'himself alone,' and not himself in comparison with another. *Τὸν ἕτερον*, not simply equivalent to *ἕτερον* (Auth. Vers. 'another'), but '*the other*,' the imaginary person with whom his actions are supposed to have been compared. It is to be noted that the Christian's ground of rejoicing is not here affirmed to be *ἐν ἑαυτῷ*, but *εἰς ἑαυτὸν*, not 'in himself,' but 'in reference to himself;' his rejoicing is "in the Lord" (2 Cor. x. 17), or "in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ" (v. 14); "as it is written, he that glorieth, let him glory in the Lord" (1 Cor. i. 31)—"in the Lord," however, *in respect to* His dealings with himself.

VERSE 5.—^a *Γὰρ*, 'for'—*γὰρ* elliptical, assigning the reason for a statement which is suppressed—the suppressed statement being—'which (namely, comparative rejoicing,) is worthless,' for, every man shall answer for himself in the sight of God, and not for another.

^b *Τὸ ἴδιον φορτίον*, 'his own (peculiar) load.' Ellicott and Alford understand *φορτίον* of "the load of infirmities, imperfections, and sins, which each one as a wayfarer carries"; but not so well, such allusion being apparently irrelevant to the Apostle's argument, who is treating in this place of the Christian's *rejoicing*, and showing upon what ground it is to be sustained—not relative but absolute attainment; 'for every man (he adds) *shall be accountable for himself*.' *Φορτίον* denotes a load adjusted to the back, and never, therefore, insupportable, being always proportionate to the strength of him who bears it. In this respect it differs from *βάρος*, and should be distinguished in translation. *Βάρος* is a *heavy* burden, a weight disproportionate to one's strength, and consequently always oppressive and grievous, and only tolerable through the aid and co-operation of others. *Φορτίον* (to apply the metaphor) represents the amount of responsibility imposed by an all-wise Creator upon each one of His rational creatures, in no two persons, possibly, alike, for no two can be found existing under precisely similar circumstances, and hence, probably, *Τὸ ἴδιον φορτίον*, 'the load *peculiar* to each individual.' It matters not, then, according to the purport of this teaching,

how a person may stand with respect to his fellow-creature. Every man is accountable to God for the discharge of his own duties; and his rejoicing in this world and in the world to come will be in proportion to the account which he can render upon this point, at the bar of conscience here, and at that still more august tribunal before which we must all appear hereafter, “when God shall judge the secrets of men, by Jesus Christ.”

VERSE 6.—“Δὲ, ‘and’—‘moreover’—in an ordinary usage, introductory of new matter distinct from, but not opposed to what preceded. “Exhortation to the duty of sharing temporal blessings with others, *placed in contrast (δὲ) to the foregoing declaration* of individual responsibility in spiritual matters.”—ELLICOTT. But I am unable to recognise any such contrast with the foregoing declaration. The things specified are too dissimilar methinks to admit of comparison—a declaration of individual responsibility to God, and an exhortation to mutual liberality towards fellow-men. The exhortation before us seems more properly connected with the subject of verse 2, the intervening matter being of a supplementary character, and naturally concluded in the preceding verse. In the commencement of the chapter the Apostle enjoins upon the Galatian church the duty of sympathizing with, and assisting one another to bear their spiritual burdens, with an especial eye to the trials, temptations, infirmities, and sins, by which they might be beset, and now appends, ‘and, moreover, let him that is taught in the word participate with him that teacheth in *all* good things,’ not merely, it would seem, in things spiritual, as before enjoined, but also in things temporal and worldly—exhortations of a kindred character, and naturally associated together.

^b Κοινωνεῖτω, ‘let him (that is instructed) share with.’ There is considerable difficulty, it must be confessed, in determining the construction of this sentence. That the verb is capable of a transitive and an intransitive signification, is admitted upon all hands. Recent commentators insist (and rightly) that in the New Testament it is only found intransitively. But, assuming it to be so, we are not so strictly bound by precedent that, if a strong case be made out, we should not be at liberty to accept it in a different signification here. And certainly it does seem most reasonable (and consistent with the Apostle’s teaching elsewhere, see 1 Cor. ix. 1–14), that the laity should contribute out of their worldly substance to the maintenance and support of their spiritual pastors and guides; the inestimable value of the treasure imparted (infinitely exceeding anything which can be conferred upon them in return), and the dedication of themselves to their service to the neglect of temporal avocations, fairly entitling them to such consideration at their hands. In this view of the precept, Whitby very pertinently remarks—“If this was their duty towards such teachers as had no need of books or study to fit themselves for the work, they being enabled for it by immediate assistance and gifts of the Holy Ghost, how much more towards them who spend much time and money to fit themselves for that work, and must be still employed in studying and read-

ing, to make themselves such workmen as need not to be ashamed!"—
WHITBY, *in loco*.

On the other hand, it may be contended, that the invariable usage of the New Testament furnishes strong presumptive evidence in favour of the 'intransitive' meaning of the verb, a meaning admirably in keeping with a very probable scope of the Apostle's teaching in this place; for certainly nothing more effectually tends to the recommendation of spiritual services, than a kind and generous liberality in things temporal upon the part of those who teach. Indeed, it is difficult to persuade a man that we are truly and heartily concerned about the welfare of his soul, if we are altogether callous and insensible to the claims of the associated body. Add to this, that the Apostle having been addressing himself in the immediate context to *the spiritually-minded*, instructing them how they should comport themselves towards their weaker brethren, it is not unreasonable to suppose (nothing to the contrary appearing) that the same train of ideas may be in possession of his mind still, and that the exhortation is addressed, not to the weak, but to the strong, to the teachers, and not to those who are being instructed by them. Upon these grounds, I faintly incline to the 'intransitive' meaning of the verb; if it be not, indeed, allowable to retain both senses, the ambiguity of the expression leading to the apprehension that it may have been the Apostle's intention to have left it open to either construction, and that he would thereby inculcate an interchange of kindly offices in all things temporal between the catechumens and their spiritual instructors.

^c Κατηχούμενος, 'he that is being instructed.' Ellicott traces the meanings of this verb, from its root upwards, through three successive stages (*sono, sono impleo, vivd voce erudio*) until it eventuates in *edocceo*, apparently its meaning here: "the idea of oral teaching being merged in that of general instruction, however communicated."

^d Τὸν λόγον, 'in the word'—an accusative of reference; τὸν λόγον κατ' ἐξοχήν—"the word of the gospel," Acts, xv. 7; under which term is included the entire system of New Testament revelation, all the doctrines appertaining to life and godliness.

^e Ἐν πᾶσιν ἀγαθοῖς, 'in all good things'—ἐν indicating the sphere in which the κοινωνία is to be enjoyed, 'all *temporal* good things,' as from the context is apparent. Ἐν πᾶσιν ἀγαθοῖς necessarily suggests a contrast. If the exhortation be addressed to the laity, then the emphasis should be laid, apparently, upon ἀγαθοῖς, by which we should understand 'all useful and profitable' things, in which sense the word occurs, Rom. xv. 2; Eph. iv. 29. In this view of the case, the laity would not be required to minister to the extravagance or luxurious living of their spiritual teachers, much less to assist them in things morally improper or unseemly, but in all things reputable and becoming the godly service in which they are engaged. But if, as I incline to take it, the exhortation be addressed to the instructors, the emphasis would fall, and with more propriety, upon πᾶσιν. Being before exhorted to have fellowship with their weaker brethren in things spiritual (—"bear ye one another's burdens"), the same fellowship is now enjoined in respect

to things temporal, or perhaps (to seek the contrast nearer still)—‘having made them partakers of the good word of the gospel (τὸν λόγον) let them share with them, not only in *that*, but in *all other* ‘good things.’”

VERSE 7.—^a Μὴ πλανᾶσθε, ‘deceive not yourselves.’ Continuation of the same subject in general terms, not without a specific reference, however, to the precept especially in hand. This emphatic mode of address is only resorted to by St. Paul when he desires to be more than usually impressive, or when the subject upon which he treats is peculiarly liable to misapprehension or abuse. See 1 Cor. vi. 9, xv. 23. There is no point upon which the professing Christian world are more apt to deceive themselves, or stand more in need of divine instruction and admonition, than that which is introduced by these emphatic words,—the duty of self-dedication to the service of God. Satisfied with an empty profession themselves, they are fain to believe that God may be put off with the like. Ready enough to yield Him what costs them nothing, when any sacrifice is required at their hands, when the world is to be given up, or the lusts of the flesh mortified, or self to be abased, or mammon to be surrendered, for Christ’s sake and the Gospel’s, then, like the disciples of old, they are tempted to go back, and to walk with Him no more. But the Apostle assures all such fair-weather disciples, that the delusion is practised, not upon God, but upon their own selves—that as their conversation is in this world, such will be their condition in the world to come.

Nor is there any branch of the duty more frequently or more flagrantly evaded, than that which is *especially* enforced by the admonition in the text—the duty of *pecuniary* sacrifices, when required for the glory of God, or the benefit of our fellow-men. Individuals are to be met with every day, loudly and pertinaciously declaiming on the great truths of the gospel, readily acknowledging the duty of Christian beneficence, prodigal, it may be, of their time and of their talents in the advocacy of Christian principle and projects, but inflexibly tenacious of their purse. But the Christian who will not yield his pelf, when called upon to do so, in the service of God, may be well assured that, if the occasion demanded it, he would not yield his life. “And if any man come to me (says the Saviour), and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, *yea, and his own life* also, he cannot be my disciple,” Luke, xiv. 26. Not without reason, then, does the Apostle introduce his exhortation upon this head with the emphatic terms—“deceive not yourselves.”

^b Οὐ μυκτηρίζεται, ‘is not mocked.’ Μυκτηρίζω from μυκτήρ, ‘the nose,’ an allusion to the vulgar habit of persons who, while narrating a plausible story, put the finger to the nose, to indicate to the bystanders that it is spoken only in derision or deceit. In this way God cannot be mocked; for, however we may think to impose upon Him by a hollow and professional allegiance, He estimates at its proper value the service, and will recompense us accordingly.

^c Γὰρ, κ. τ. λ., ‘for, &c.’ Confirmation of the preceding assertion “God is not mocked”, ‘for every man will be dealt with according not

to his profession, but to the actual amount of his service'—an intimation conveyed in an allusion to an ordinary natural phenomenon: probably a proverbial expression; see Job, iv. 8; Prov. xxii. 8.

^a Τοῦτο καὶ θερίσει, 'that shall he also reap.' Καὶ emphatic, implying 'accession,' something over and above; as much as to say, 'He may be satisfied to sow, but I will take care that he shall *also* reap.' A more solemn consideration cannot engage the thoughts of man, than that which is suggested to us by these words—'the present, the seed-time of eternity!' The destiny of man in the future state is much more intimately and inevitably linked with the engagements of the present life than many of us are in the habit of thinking. There is nothing arbitrary in God's dealings with His creatures. Every day and every hour of our lives we are employed in sowing seed which is destined to bear fruit in eternity. Such as we sow, the same shall we also reap. How many hours of precious seed-time has the most diligent amongst us squandered away unimproved! How many hours have we been engaged in sowing seed, the produce of which we should never wish to meet hereafter! How sedulously, then, should we redeem the time that remains, that our harvest may be neither scant nor unacceptable! Our day of grace is quickly passing away—summer and winter, seed-time and harvest, chase one another down, with the rapidity of a post. Hardly have we entered upon the spring-time of life, when we find ourselves far gone in the sere and yellow leaf. Sad will it be, when our appointed course is run, if we shall be forced, in the emphatic language of the prophet, to exclaim, "The harvest is past, the summer is ended, and we are not saved," Jer. viii. 20.

VERSE 8.—^a Ὅτι ὁ σπείρων εἰς τὴν σάρκα, κ. τ. λ., 'for he that soweth unto the flesh.' Confirmation and amplification of the statement in the preceding clause. Though 'the flesh' and 'the Spirit' are unquestionably regarded as fields from which the produce is reaped, yet the consignment of the seed to the ground forms no part of the imagery here presented to us, that portion of the figure being passed over *sub silentio* as matter for implication. The inconvenience attendant upon an attempted representation of that process has been sufficiently exhibited by the incongruous and unscriptural meanings which have been attributed to ὁ σπείρων εἰς τὴν σάρκα and ὁ σπείρων εἰς τὸ πνεῦμα by those who have regarded them as indicating the fields in which the seed is scattered. Σπείρειν εἰς τὴν σάρκα is not (εἰς local) 'to sow *in* the flesh' (*seminare in carne*), but 'to sow *unto* the flesh' (*seminare carni*), i. e., 'with a view to the accommodation of the flesh,' in other words, 'to lay oneself out for self-gratification.' Ellicott has clearly shown, by reference to the several passages where the same idea occurs, that the prepositions employed in the New Testament in a *strictly local* sense are ἐν and ἐπὶ—the former in reference to the enclosure *in* which the seed is sown, the latter to the spot *on* which it is cast." (See his instructive note on this subject.)

Though the kind of seed sown in the two fields, respectively, is not specified in the text, yet is it easily deduced from the nature of the sub-

ject (the idea that 'the flesh' and 'the Spirit' constitute the kinds of seed sown (Ellicott) is too preposterous to be entertained). 'To sow to the flesh,' is to employ that which is committed to our keeping—our time, our talents, our substance, our opportunities generally, in the service of the flesh, with a view to self-indulgence, present or to come. On the contrary, 'to sow to the Spirit' is to devote all our faculties—mental, corporeal, moral, and incidental, to the advancement of our spiritual interests; in scriptural language, "to set our affections on things above," and to exert every power which God hath graciously bestowed upon us, earnestly and perseveringly for their attainment. To apply the observation to the particular subject in reference to which the dissertation occurs; 'to sow not unto the flesh, but unto the Spirit,' imports—'instead of squandering away our substance on worthless and unprofitable objects, dress, equipage, costly entertainments, personal or family aggrandizement, the pomps and vanities of this wicked world—to expend it in charitable and beneficent uses—the support and education of the poor, the advancement of spiritual religion, the extension of God's kingdom on earth, the maintenance of His ministering servants, in short, the temporal and spiritual interests of ourselves and our fellow-creatures in the many ways which a bountiful Providence has provided for the converting of "the mammon of unrighteousness" into a friend which, when we depart hence, shall receive us into everlasting habitations.'

^b 'Εαυτοῦ, 'his.' It is observable that in referring to ἡ σὰρξ the pronoun is inserted, which in the case of τὸ πνεῦμα is omitted. In the judgment of Alford, the presence of the pronoun "is not apparently with any *especial* emphasis." Ellicott more reasonably concludes that it is an intimation "of *selfishness* as well as carnality;" and cites Aquinas to the effect that "the flesh is part of ourselves, of our own nature, whereas the Spirit is not of ourselves, but from God." But possibly a deeper theological meaning lurks beneath the surface, namely, that 'the flesh is peculiarly one's own, the Spirit is shared in common with the whole body of Christ;' in accordance with this notion, the Apostle exhorts believers to "keep *the unity* of the Spirit, in the bond of peace," Eph. iv. 3 (see also verse 18 of this chapter).

^c Φθοράν, 'corruption.' Selected in preference to the more specific term ἀπώλειαν, which occurs in Phil. iii. 19; according to some as more applicable to σὰρξ, "because the flesh is a prey to corruption, and with it all fleshly desires and practices come to nothing."—ALFORD. Ellicott advocates a wider range of application, embracing "the whole man, both body and soul, not merely in the narrower physical sense of 'decay,' but also in the fuller ethical sense of 'corruption of soul,' in which, of course, eternal death and 'destruction' are involved and implied." But it seems to me that φθορά is employed generically to comprise not only 'the disorganization of the bodily frame,' and 'the ultimate destruction of soul and body in hell,' but 'all those transitory and ephemeral results which flow, even in this mundane state, from the gratification of the flesh—joys which perish in the using, as well as

the sorrows, troubles, and disappointments, to which flesh is heir.' As all worldly things are, in scriptural language, from the unsatisfactoriness and unprofitableness thereof, included under the abstract title, 'vanity' (Eccl. i. 2), so may all the products of the flesh, from their frail and perishing nature, be in like manner comprehended under the generic term 'corruption.' "All flesh is grass, and all the glory of man as the flower of grass. The grass withereth, and the flower thereof falleth away: but the word of the Lord (the contrasted *σπορὰς ἀφθάρτου* of the preceding verse) endureth for ever," 1 Pet. i. 24.

^a *Ζωὴν αἰώνιον*, 'eternal life,' contrasting circumstantially with *φθοράν*, the produce of the flesh. As the one represents misery and disappointment, empty and fading delights, commencing here and terminating in endless misery and destruction of soul and body hereafter; so doth the other represent life, and light, and liberty, the privileges of the present time, to culminate in everlasting life, and ineffable felicity throughout the endless ages of eternity.

VERSE 9.—^a *Τὸ δὲ καλὸν ποιοῦντες*, 'but in well doing,' literally, 'while doing the good thing'—the agricultural metaphor continued still. *Τὸ καλὸν*, the excellent thing, namely, that prescribed in the preceding verse, 'the dedication of ourselves and all we possess to the service of the Spirit.' *Δὲ* adversative, contrasting the course about to be prescribed with a possible, imagined, result. 'Let us sow unto the Spirit, *but* let us not be discouraged (*as naturally we might be*) by the length of time which may elapse before we reap the fruits—in the fitting season we shall reap.' Of course this admonition, though partaking of the *generality* of the preceding verse, has, like it, a *special reference* to the duty enjoined in verse 6—namely, that of contributing to the temporal necessities of God's people. Upon this application of the passage, Calvin has some sensible remarks—"This precept is highly necessary, for we are naturally reluctant to discharge the duties of brotherly love. And many unpleasant occurrences arise, by which the ardour of the best-disposed persons is apt to be cooled. We meet with many unworthy and many ungrateful persons. The vast number of necessitous cases overwhelm us, and the applications which crowd upon us from every quarter exhaust our patience. Our warmth is abated by the coolness of other men. In short, the world presents innumerable hindrances, which tend to lead us aside from the right path: most properly, therefore, does Paul admonish us, not to relax through weariness."—CALVIN, *in loco*.

^b *Μὴ ἐγκακῶμεν*, 'let us not be faint-hearted.' Modern editors generally concur in reading *ἐγκακῶμεν* in preference to *ἐκκακῶμεν*, the text of the Auth. Vers., internal evidence being apparently in its favour. See Bloomfield, Ellicott, *in loco*. As the latter, however, observes, the difference between them is not very material: "*ἐκκακεῖν* may perhaps, mean 'to retire from fear out of any course of action (nearly *ἀποκακεῖν*); *ἐγκακεῖν*, 'to behave cowardly—to lose heart, while in it.'"

^c *Καιρῷ ἰδίῳ*, 'at the proper time,' of which God alone is the judge. It may also bear allusion to the metaphor before used. As every seed

has its own peculiar period for arriving at maturity, so is there a time appointed in the providence of God for the recompense of deeds done in the body. The general recompense, no doubt, will take place at the coming of the Lord: "Thou shalt be recompensed at the resurrection of the just," Luke, xiv. 14. Nevertheless, by those who have the wisdom and the courage to spy out the land, many a goodly bunch of the vintage of the heavenly Canaan may be gathered by the way, before they come into actual possession of the land of promise.

^d Μὴ ἐκλυνόμενοι, 'if we relax not,' a conditional participial clause; 'provided that now (pres. part.) we relax not.' Ἐκλυνόμενοι, a metaphor taken from the loosening of the tendons of the joints from unduly-prolonged exertion, or from excessive straining; aptly applied to persons running in a race, or engaged in some active pursuit requiring more than ordinary effort. A stronger expression than ἐγκακῶμεν before employed, the former implying extreme discouragement in the work; the latter, a total discontinuance of effort.

VERSE 10.—^a Ἄρα οὖν, κ. τ. λ., 'so then'—inferential exhortation, arising out of the preceding paragraph; ἄρα οὖν, with its proper collective force, gathering up the substance of the previous statements, and carrying it onwards another stage in the argument; 'seeing that these things are so, let us consequently, &c. &c.'—"the weaker ratiocinative force of ἄρα being supported by the collective power of οὖν."—ELLICOTT.

^b Ὡς καιρὸν ἔχομεν, 'as (i. e., in proportion as) we have opportunity'—"ὥς not 'while' (Olsh., al.), nor, 'according as,' i. e., quotiescunque, nor 'since,' causal (De W., Winer, al.),—but 'as,' i. e., 'in proportion as:' let our beneficence be in proportion to our καιρὸς."—ALFORD. A good and a relevant meaning would be—ὥς 'prout,' i. e., 'quandocunque et quotiescunque' (Wolf, al.); but I rather think, had such been the Apostle's object, he would have written the words in the subjunctive form—ὥς ἂν καιρὸν ἔχωμεν, the opportunity being regarded as hypothetical—"according as opportunity (if any) may occur;" whereas it is taken for granted, according to the indicative construction, that the opportunity presently exists. Ellicott recognises in καιρὸς the connecting link between this and the preceding verse:—"As there is a καιρὸς for τὸ θερίζειν, so is there one for τὸ σπείρειν; as we have it, then, let us act accordingly, and make the most of it;" but there is no statement in the preceding paragraph to the effect (nor is it even a necessary inference from it), that there is a καιρὸς for τὸ σπείρειν, though unquestionably there is (contingent upon the time of sowing), a καιρὸς for το θερίζειν, whereas ἄρα οὖν would seem to intimate an inference from previous statements. It is more probable that the figure, having discharged its office, is altogether laid aside, and the Apostle proceeds in ordinary and appropriate language to apply the result; 'seeing then that, according to the figure above presented, those who sow unto the Spirit (the Apostle having an especial view to the subject in hand, 'liberality to the saints,' ver. 6), shall reap the fruit of it hereafter, let us then, in proportion to our opportunity, do good unto all men, more especially to

the household of faith ;' an exhortation which follows, naturally and unconstrainedly, from the statements which had been previously made.

^c Τὸ ἀγαθόν, 'that which is kind,' literally, 'the kind thing.' Ellicott justly observes that the distinction between τὸ καλόν, as denoting 'the highest excellency,' and τὸ ἀγαθόν, 'kindness, beneficence,' is not uniformly sustained in Scripture; and cites Rom. ii. 10, as a case in point, where τὸ ἀγαθόν is unquestionably used equivalently with τὸ καλόν. But that is no reason why a suitable occasion, such as the present, occurring, the primary meaning should not be, in preference, maintained. The Apostle had been inculcating the duty of Christian liberality upon (as I conceive) the teachers of the Galatian church, enforcing the precept by the metaphorical adage, 'such as a man soweth, the same shall he also reap,' expanding and expounding it in the succeeding verses; he now subjoins the conclusion—'These things being so, let us do the kindly act unto all men,' evidently adverting to his original theme, and employing τὸ ἀγαθόν in its proper and primitive signification.

^d Πρὸς τοὺς οἰκεῖους τῆς πίστεως, 'towards those who are of the household of faith.' Οἱ οἰκεῖοι literally denotes 'the inmates of a house'—'members of the same family,' Anglice 'the household.' "Faith," or more properly '*the* faith (of the gospel)', being the common bond of union between the parties, is here personified and represented as the head of a family, all believers in the Gospel constituting 'the household.' From the many examples of this word to be met with in latter writers in a laxer usage (e. g. οἰκεῖοι φιλοσοφίας, ὀλιγαρχίας, γεωγραφίας, τρυφῆς), Ellicott assumes that "the adjective has lost its meaning of *peculiar*, and only retains that of general, though close connexion," and accordingly translates the phrase "them who belong unto the faith," in which he is also supported by Alford. But it seems a very unwarrantable assumption. From the *general* usage which has obtained, we cannot, indeed, argue from the use of the word οἰκεῖοι to the *peculiar* relationship of the parties, but the relationship being known, we can contend for the primitive and peculiar force of the word. Upon the same principle it might be assumed, that because the appellative υἱοὶ is oftentimes used in the Old Testament to designate the *disciples* of the prophets, it has thereby lost its peculiar and proper signification of *sons*, and consequently, when we meet the expression υἱοὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ in Scripture, we are bound to translate it, not 'sons,' but 'disciples,' of God. It were more reasonable to conclude, that in all the examples which have been adduced, the general relationship is metaphorically presented under that which is more close and particular, than that the word, having been occasionally used in a laxer way, should henceforth be held incapable of its primary and proper signification. Nor can it be said to be a matter of indifference in which way the expression is translated here. There is, unquestionably, a strong argument involved under cover of the relationship. "There are duties (says Calvin) which we owe to all men, arising out of a common nature, but *the tie of a more sacred relationship*, established by God Himself, binds us to believers."

VERSE 11.—^a Ἰδετε, ‘behold.’ We have at length arrived at what may be regarded as the concluding sentence of the letter proper, what follows partaking rather of the nature of a postscript than of the Epistle itself. Ἰδετε may be construed either indicatively or imperatively, but the latter, being the more emphatic, is to be preferred.

^b Πηλίκους γράμμασιν, ‘with what large letters.’ A good deal of discussion has taken place, from the earliest times, upon the precise import of this clause, and that upon two several points—first, as to πηλίκους γράμμασιν, whether to be understood in reference to the Epistle itself, or only to the characters in which it is written. That γράμματα, like the Latin ‘literæ’, is susceptible of the former construction, is undeniable, having, moreover, scriptural authority in its support, where the Jews say to Paul, “we have received no letters (γράμματα) concerning thee” (Acts, xxviii. 21). But then it is replied that it is not found in that sense in the writings of our author, but that, having occasion no less than seventeen times to refer to ‘letters’ in his Epistles, he has invariably resorted to another form (ἐπιστολαί), so that Pauline usage is distinctly against it. And with respect to πηλίκους, Ellicott satisfactorily shows (and I would refer to his admirable notes upon the entire of this clause), that πηλίκος is a word of geometrical magnitude, and to confound it with πόσος or ποῖος, or any such word, is distinctly “uncritical,” and that no translation can be correctly assigned to it, but simply—‘how large.’ Upon this ground, then, we seem to be shut up to the conclusion that πηλίκους γράμμασιν refers, not to the Epistle itself (which indeed is not a long one), but to the characters in which it is written.

^c Ἐγραψα, ‘I wrote,’ idiomatically, ‘I have written.’ The second point at issue, and possibly not so easily determined, is in respect to the application of this verb, whether it is to be taken as applying to the entire Epistle, or only to that portion of it (commencing with ἰδετε) with which it is in immediate connexion. That St. Paul usually wrote by an amanuensis, merely subscribing the concluding paragraph and the salutation with his own hand, is not attempted to be denied. But whether the Epistle before us be not a departure from his ordinary practice, is the point in dispute. Alford, in support of the affirmative, observes, “that there is no break in the style, as in Rom. xvi. 25, 2 Thess. iii. 17, al., indicating where the dictated portion ceases, and that which is written commences.” And certainly that is a strong point in favour of his position. Again, we have no instance in the New Testament where ἔγραψα is used *exclusively* in reference to that which follows, the aorist in all cases seeming to preserve its proper force “either in reference to a former letter (1 Cor. v. 9; 2 Cor. ii. 3, iv. 9, vii. 12; 3 John, 9); or in reference to an Epistle now brought to its conclusion (Rom. xv. 15; 1 Pet. v. 12); or to a foregoing portion of the Epistle (1 Cor. ix. 15; 1 John, ii. 21)” (Ellicott), but never to that which is to come after. So that upon this ground also we have reason to incline to the opinion, that the Epistle was written wholly by the hand of the Apostle.

At the same time, it must be admitted that the use of *ἐγγραψα* even in this view is somewhat exceptional, referring, though not exclusively yet, apparently, inclusively to a portion of the Epistle which had not yet been written. But this may be accounted for, possibly, upon the supposition of Alford, that the verb is here used as of the time when the Epistle should come to hand, and not that when it was written: or, more probably, as it occurs to me, that the aorist is used with its proper historical force, as of an Epistle already brought to a conclusion, that which follows being either altogether an after-thought, and not contemplated when the word was committed to paper, or designedly reserved for the '*postscript*.'

Upon the whole, we conclude, that the evidence adduced, though not amounting exactly to a demonstration, is amply sufficient to warrant a strong conjecture, that St. Paul wrote the Epistle to the Galatians exclusively with his own hand; and that the clause before us is introduced, not "simply to attest the genuineness" of the production (Bloomfield, Olsh., al.), but to ensure, by allusion to a well-known infirmity (enhancing considerably the difficulty of the performance), a favourable reception for its contents, as being the result of much personal inconvenience and labour, and consequently of a solicitude for their welfare, not evinced in the case of any other community. That the infirmity in question was a defect of vision, which would adequately account for the unusual dimension of the letters, is a conclusion to which upon sundry and independent grounds (see Appendix II.) we have been induced to arrive.

VERSE 12.—^a "Ὅσοι θέλουσιν, κ. τ. λ., 'as many as desire,' &c. In this section the Apostle administers a parting blow to his adversaries, the judaizing teachers—contrasting the low, selfish, pusillanimous motives by which they were actuated, with the pure, and holy, and high-minded principle which animated his breast.

^b *Εὐπροσωπῆσαι*, literally 'to be handsome,' 'to look well;' hence 'to make a fair show,' 'to put on a specious appearance:' figuratively applied to such persons as shine in society—hold a conspicuous place in the estimation of their fellows. Alford discovers a hitherto (I should think) unnoticed link of connexion between this and the preceding verse—"As my Epistle, so my practice: I have no desire to make a fair show outwardly; my *γράμματα* are not *εὐπρόσωπα*; and I have no sympathy with those *θέλοντες εὐπροσωπῆσαι ἐν σαρκί*." But to an ordinary reader the connexion is not obvious, nor indeed is the subject such as, naturally, to admit of such playfulness.

^c *Ἐν σαρκί*, 'in the flesh'—the preposition pointing out the element or sphere in which the appearance is to be maintained—'in the flesh;' where *σάρξ* represents 'the state or condition of man, with all its concomitant circumstances, in this nether world.' "The words *ἐν σαρκί* are commonly explained either 'in observatione rerum carnalium,' with *physical* reference to circumcision, or 'apud homines,' with reference to the *judgment* and opinions of others. Both interpretations, however, seem distinctly insufficient, as they put out of sight that more profound

and far-reaching meaning of *σάρξ*, 'the earthly existence and condition of men, *'notio universa rerum externarum'* (Schott.), which pervades the whole Epistle."—ELLICOTT. The construction put upon *ἐν σαρκὶ* by Bagge is—"while still in their unregenerate nature, devoid of the true spiritual obedience which flows from affections and desires renewed by the in-dwelling Spirit of God and Christ." To the exposition which refers it to 'men and their worldly condition,' he objects that "this is clearly and necessarily implied in the word *ἐνπροσωπῆσαι*." But, however redundant it may seem, the expression 'to make a specious appearance in the world,' is too familiar and of every-day use to be called for a moment in question.

The characters against whom this imputation is levelled were not such as desired, by a decent attention to religious observances, to maintain a respectable appearance in the estimation of the world—the ordinary class of professing Christians; but those who affected to shine above the rest—who set up to be preachers and expounders of the gospel, and who, by the assumption of superior wisdom and zeal, acquired for themselves that pre-eminence in the church which was the ultimate object of their ambition. It will, doubtless, have been observed, that the phrase *ἐνπροσωπῆσαι ἐν σαρκὶ* is not used to exhibit the *avowed* object of the judaizing teachers; that is, they did not openly and *professedly* desire 'to put on a specious appearance in the flesh;' but it is the Apostle's estimate of their character. There was nothing spiritual or heavenly in their conversation; it was altogether carnal and worldly, and assumed with a view to the attainment of things earthly and transitory.

^d *Ἀναγκάζουσιν ὑμᾶς περιτέμνεσθαι*, 'they compel (or, are compelling) you to be circumcised'—a continuing action; not, indeed, by open force and violence (see ch. ii. 3 ^d), but by the scarcely less effectual means of flattery and delusion (ch. iii. 1). *Περιτέμνεσθαι*, 'to submit to circumcision' the initiatory rite of the Jewish covenant; with *a view* only to ceremonial perfection; but, as St. Paul assures them, with *the effect* of taking upon themselves the obligation to do the whole law.—See ch. v. 3 ^e.

^e *ἵνα τῷ σταυρῷ τοῦ Χριστοῦ μὴ διώκωνται*, 'that they should not suffer persecution for (on account of) the cross of Christ'—τῷ σταυρῷ a dative of the cause (comp. Rom. xi. 20, *ἐξεκλάσθησαν τῇ ἀπιστίᾳ*, "because of unbelief they were broken off"): see Winer, Gr. § xxxi. 6. c. By "the cross of Christ," we are to understand in this place, 'the *preaching* of the cross,' the advocacy of the doctrine of the atonement; a doctrine which flings contempt upon every effort of man towards self-justification—reduces the noble and the ignoble, the learned and the unlearned, the moral and the immoral, to one common level of spiritual destitution and helplessness—"to be justified freely by grace, through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus"—a doctrine so disparaging to the boasted dignity of man's nature, and consequently so distasteful to the pride of the natural heart, that it has subjected its advocates in all ages and in every country to the scoffs and derision, the hatred and persecution of mankind. But, besides this, which is of universal appli-

cation, there were other causes conspiring to render the preaching of the cross peculiarly obnoxious to the Jews. It wounded in the tenderest point their national sensibilities, abrogating at one stroke the law of ceremonies which they had received “through the disposition of angels”—obliterating all distinction between them and the surrounding nations—placing the families of mankind, without distinction, upon the same platform of moral destitution and dependence—circumstances which, with their exalted notion of themselves, could not fail, in the nature of things, to render ‘the preaching of the cross’ an offence and a stumbling-block to the Jew.

Persecution upon this head occurs early in the history of the church. Even in our Saviour’s lifetime, the chief priests and scribes had become inveterate opponents of Jesus; and not long after his death we find Paul himself, armed with authority from the high priest, with the most relentless fury persecuting the followers of “this way,” not only in Judea, but even unto foreign cities. To recommend themselves, therefore, to the rulers at Jerusalem, who stirred up the unbelieving Jews everywhere against Christians, the judaizing teachers “fell upon the scheme of blending Judaism with the gospel; and, as the Apostle informs us, urged the Gentiles to receive circumcision, merely that they themselves might not be persecuted *for the cross of Christ—or gospel doctrine of salvation through a crucified Messiah.*” —M’KNIGHT, *in loco*.

Should it be objected to this explanation that the false teachers in Galatia, having no ministerial calling in the church, were under no obligation to *preach the gospel*, or to expose themselves to any peril for the ‘cross of Christ,’ other than what was incidental to an ordinary profession of the faith, it must be borne in mind that, “being desirous to make a fair show in the flesh”—that is, setting up to be teachers and spiritual directors in the church—had their zeal flowed in the legitimate channel, they should have been indeed exposed to persecution for *the preaching* of the cross. But, in order to evade that consequence, they taught that circumcision was essential to salvation; and while vehemently contending for its adoption, they at the same time maintained their position in the church as earnest and exemplary teachers, and, ingratiating themselves with the authorities, escaped the persecution attendant upon a faithful advocacy of the cross.

VERSE 13.—^a Οὐδὲ γὰρ, κ. τ. λ., ‘for not even,’ &c.—confirmation of the assertion in the preceding clause, ‘no other or nobler motive can be attributed to them than an unworthy desire to escape the persecution of the cross; *for*, as to the law, they observe not its institutions themselves, and consequently it is with no view to advantages resulting from it that they insist on the circumcision of the Gentiles.’

^b Οἱ περιτεμνόμενοι αὐτοὶ, ‘the circumcisers themselves’—περιτεμνόμενοι the pres. part. mid., literally, ‘they who are circumcising for themselves’ (see Winer, Gr., § xxxviii. 2. b.). With the article, here used substantively (see Winer, Gr., § xlv. 7), ‘the circumcisers for themselves’—‘they who hold to circumcision, and advocate it as necessary to salvation;’ in plain terms, ‘the circumcision party.’ Ellicott and Alford,

who adhere to the participial form of construction—"those who are having themselves circumcised," find some difficulty in explaining the use of the pres. part., but think that it may be accounted for on the ground that "St. Paul includes in the idea, not merely their conformity to the rite (which strictly becomes a past act), but their endeavour thereby to draw others into the same state, which is a present and continuing act."—ELLICOTT. But it is difficult to conceive how this meaning can be extracted from the part. pres. *pass.* without an unnatural straining of the word.

Sensible, it would seem, of this objection, Ellicott admits "that the reading *περιτετμημένοι* would give a more appropriate sense; external authorities, however, are distinctly in favour of the more *difficult* reading, *περιτεμνόμενοι*." But, with all due respect, the allegation might be with advantage reversed; the *difficult* reading would, indeed, be *περιτετμημένοι*, 'they who have been circumcised,' which would exhibit a sense at variance with the manifest intention of the Apostle, which is to designate, not 'the whole body of the circumcised,' which would be necessarily included in that reading, but those amongst them who "compelled them (the Galatians) to be circumcised, only that they might glory in their flesh;" critically the parties who are presented by *περιτεμνόμενοι*, accepted as the part. pres. *mid.*, 'they who are circumcising for themselves'—that is, 'for their own ease and advantage,' or, joined with *αὐτοὶ* and read substantively, 'the circumcisers themselves.'

* *Νόμον φυλάσσουσιν*, 'observe law,' i. e., 'conform to the requirements of law'—*νόμον* anarthrous here, as everywhere throughout the Epistle, representing, not 'the provisions' of the law, but 'the obligation' arising out of the law (see ch. ii. 16^a). The law to the obligations of which they did not attend, is not here the moral law, but the law of ceremonies. The Apostle's intention is, obviously, to show, that the *avowed* motive for imposing circumcision upon the Gentiles was not the *real* one; for that the advocates of circumcision did not, in conformity with that motive, observe their legal duties themselves. Now, seeing that the judaisers made no profession of, nor indeed entertained the remotest idea of, imposing the whole law of Moses upon their converts (as is manifest from the treatment of the subject, ch. v. 2-4), it follows that the law by the neglect of which their insincerity appeared was not the moral, but the ceremonial law. That the judaisers did not observe the ceremonial law is clear from the testimony of the Apostle; but that it was attributable "simply to their consummate hypocrisy" (the supposition of Ellicott) is more than *problematical*. "For how, sayeth Theodoret, could they in *Galatia* religiously observe the *Jewish* feasts, or offer sacrifices, or cleanse themselves from their defilements by touching any thing that was unclean?"—WHITBY, *in loco*. The argument is conclusive, nor is there any reason why we should desire to evade its force. There is no necessity to implicate the false teachers in the aggravated iniquity of wilful disobedience or neglect, to effect the purpose which the Apostle has in view. It is enough to show that the pretext assigned for the imposition of circumcision, namely—the benefit to be

derived from the Jewish ritual—was a pretended one, inasmuch as in that benefit they neither did, nor could they by possibility, participate themselves. Consequently the Apostle's position was established; no other motive could they have had but the one assigned—that 'they might not suffer persecution for the cross of Christ;' which undoubtedly they should have done had they boldly and faithfully discharged the ministry which they impudently assumed.

^d Ἐν τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ σαρκί, 'in your flesh,' i. e., 'your circumcision.' Bagge understands thereby, "in *your carnality*—i. e., in the fact that you have yielded to their influence, and followed their example; 'quod dicant (Morus): hic quoque per me factus est Judæus.'" But its immediate connexion with περιτέμνεσθαι would seem to fix its signification otherwise. So also thinks Ellicott, who paraphrases it, "your bodily and ritualistic mutilation." The annexation of ὑμετέρα clearly takes σαρκί out of the more comprehensive meaning attributed to it in the preceding verse. Ellicott conceives a contrast to exist in this place between '*your* flesh' and '*their own* observances;' as if the Apostle had said, 'their ground of rejoicing is in "your flesh, not their own observances of that law for which they are affecting so zealously to contend." But that were a ground of rejoicing no less objectionable than the other. There is no comparison of any kind instituted in these words but a simple and positive averment that 'their only object in enforcing circumcision is, that they may glory in your flesh.'

Those who intrude themselves into the sacred ministry, unmoved by the Holy Ghost can have but one object in view—self; either self-aggrandizement or self-glorification. Such characters would, in our day, plume themselves, probably, upon the intelligence and respectability of their hearers, the order and decorum observed in their religious assemblies, the soundness of their doctrinal views, and the zeal and constancy with which they maintained them—such things, in short, as constitute, in the world's estimation, the evidences of a successful public ministry. But the false teachers in the Galatian church boasted of the multitude of their adherents—the numbers whom they had induced to submit to the ordinance of circumcision; thus, in the language of the Apostle, 'glorying in their flesh.'

There is no discrepancy between the motives assigned in verses 12 and 13 for the enforcement of circumcision. The general object which the judaizers proposed to themselves was, as we have just seen, self-exaltation. That object they pursued, according to one statement, by imposing circumcision upon the Gentiles; and this mode they adopted, according to the other, only that they might not suffer persecution for the cross of Christ. There is no discrepancy between these statements, the one being supplementary to the other.

VERSE 14.—^a Ἐμοὶ δὲ μὴ γένοιτο καυχᾶσθαι, 'but to me, may it not happen to glory,' or 'far be it from me to glory'—contrasted statement of the feeling by which the Apostle desired to be animated, and that which presently prevailed in the breast of the judaizing teachers. Ἐμοὶ emphatic, as contrasting with the parties before mentioned.

ἃ Ἐν τῷ σταυρῷ, 'in the cross;' but whether 'in the cross' as 'an instrument of conversion,' or 'as a ground of hope,' is the question. Two distinct meanings have been attributed to these words, first, "God forbid that *I* should feel proud of *the inculcation of any doctrine*, except the plain unmixed one of justification, not by mine own merits, but by the atonement of a crucified Redeemer."—BLOOMFIELD. In this sense Paul would express himself as a Christian *minister*, comparing himself with the judaizers as *teachers* in the church, and contrasting the different methods which he and they respectively pursued in bringing sinners to salvation, *they* inculcating the virtue of circumcision, *he* repudiating every other method but the preaching of the cross of Christ—a good and competent meaning, unquestionably, if only it were sustained by the context. But the judaizers did not boast of *the inculcation of the doctrine of circumcision*, which, according to this explanation, would be the contrast naturally suggested by the words; but in the success of their ministry resulting in a multitude of converts to ritual observances; nor was it *the inculcation of the doctrine of the cross* by which the world was crucified unto Paul, and he unto the world.

A second meaning is as follows:—'God forbid that I should glory, save in the cross of Christ,' "i. e., in the principle of the sufferings and death of Christ, being the only means whereby we are justified and reconciled unto God."—ELLICOTT. And this is the interpretation generally and rightly preferred. In this sense Paul contrasts himself with the judaizers, not as *teachers*, but as *men*. 'They glory in perishable objects—the admiration and applause of men—reputation for zeal and godliness—station and authority in the church—favour and influence with the state—general success and prosperity in the world—fading honours! unsatisfying acquirements! but *he* gloried in the cross of Christ, whereby he was redeemed from all iniquity and presented spotless before the throne of the Eternal;—the foundation of all his hopes for time and for eternity;—the unfailing fountain of peace here, and the earnest of "an inheritance incorruptible, undefiled, and that fadeth not away," reserved for him hereafter.'

To glory in the cross, is to glory, not merely in those circumstances attendant upon the person and office of the Redeemer, which arrest the attention, and excite the admiration of mankind—the Divinity of His nature—the majesty of His power—the number and mightiness of His angels—the vastness of His dominions; but in those parts of His work, which are the most distasteful to the pride of the human heart, and the wisdom of the human mind. We glory in *the cross* of our Lord Jesus Christ; in that agony and bloody sweat, that cross and passion in which our Lord bore the especial penalty of sin, and which never can be called to mind, without recalling, at the same time, the hopeless, helpless misery from which He saved us. "Where man's highest good exists (says Calvin), there is his glory." And surely, if deliverance from condemnation to acceptance—from despair to hope—from death to life—from misery to peace, and joy, and glory—from the companionship of devils to the fellowship of angels and archangels—from the deathless

worm and the fire that never shall be quenched, to the beatific vision of God, and the fruition of the glories of heaven—if these things constitute the *summum bonum* of mankind, then, certainly, the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ is deserving of all our praise and all our glorying, for in ‘the cross’ are these things found, and nowhere else.

‘Δι’ οὗ, ‘by which.’ It is a question whether the relative pronoun refers to Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ as its antecedent, or to σταυρῷ, and, consequently, whether it is to be translated ‘by whom’ or ‘by which.’ Recent commentators (Ellicott and Alford) adopt the former view. “The greater antecedent τοῦ Κυρ. ἡμ. Ἰ. Χ. coming after σταυρῷ has thrown it into the shade.”—ALFORD. But though “the greater” in point of dignity, it certainly is not ‘the principal’ in respect of syntax, to which more naturally the relative should refer. Nor, though the work of Christ is so frequently, and in such a multiplicity of form referred to in the New Testament, does the idea of our being ‘crucified by Christ’ ever once present itself; but, on the contrary, it sounds harsh and grating to the believer’s ear. Besides, indeed, it would seem to be the especial purpose of the Apostle in this place, to magnify *the cross* in the sight of those false teachers who, for the sake of the world’s ease and the world’s mammon, were tempted to turn their back upon, and disown, its power: and how could it be more effectually done, than by attributing to *it* that mighty influence whereby ‘the world was crucified unto him, and he unto the world’?

Though to Christ *effectively* the triumph must be referred, yet it is by the cross, *instrumentally*, the victory is achieved. It is the light which beams from Calvary which pales the lustre of all earthly grandeur. It is as we sit at the foot of the cross, and contemplate with uplifted eye, the victim that hangeth thereon “for us men, and for our salvation,” that we acquire strength and resolution to break the fetters of the flesh, to resist the devil and all his wiles, and to trample under foot the world and its delusive joys. Upon these considerations, I am constrained to think that the crucifixion unto the world is attributed in this passage, not to Christ directly, but to Christ through the instrumentality of the cross.

‘Κόσμος, ‘the world.’ In its most comprehensive signification κόσμος comprises ‘the whole framework of nature and all that it contains, all creatures animate and inanimate, with all their peculiar modes of thinking, feeling, acting, being, and all circumstances connected with their existence.’ But seeing that ‘the world’ is here said ‘to be crucified’ to the Christian, it is plain that it is to be understood in a more limited sense, as comprehending only so much of the world as “is opposed to the spiritual kingdom of Christ—that which belongs to the old man, in a word, the object and aim of the old man.”—CALVIN.

‘Ἐσταύρωται, ‘is crucified’—a strong figure, to depict the abhorrence and contempt with which the world, when in opposition to God, is regarded by the true Christian: as a man would turn away with disgust and loathing, and shrink from the contamination of a ghastly and disfigured corpse, so does the believer avert his eyes from the sinful al-

lurements, and refrain his hand from the guilty practices, of a world "that lieth in the wicked one."

‘Κἀγὼ τῷ κόσμῳ, ‘and I unto the world,’ the same figure repeated. As the world was despised and loathed by the Apostle, so likewise was he a detested and abominated object in its sight. How different from the case of his adversaries! They courted the world, and were received into its arms, because “the world loveth its own.” He disregarded alike its smiles and its frowns, and was treated as a degraded and mutilated corpse—because “he was not of the world.”

VERSE 15.—* ‘Εν γὰρ Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, κ. τ. λ., ‘for in Christ Jesus,’ &c.—explanatory clause in reference to the preceding exclamation. It had been attributed to the false teachers (ver. 13), that their zeal in making proselytes was merely with a view to ‘glorying in their circumcision.’ But God forbid (exclaims the Apostle, contrasting his case with their’s) that *I* should glory in circumcision, or in any other thing, save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ; “for (continuing in explanation) in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, but—a new creature”—the intervening words, “by which the world is crucified unto me, and I unto the world,” being introduced, not only to establish *the excellency of the cross*, that it was worthy of all his praise, but moreover, and principally, to disclose *the secret of his strength*, whereby he was enabled to rise superior to the world, its fascinations and its frowns.

ᵇ Καινὴ κτίσις, ‘a new creature.’ Κτίσις properly denotes ‘the act of creation’ (Rom. i. 20), but is frequently used in the New Testament, by metonymy, for ‘the thing created;’ “whether personal and individual (2 Cor. v. 17), or impersonal and collective (Rom. viii. 19): either meaning will suit the present passage; the latter, perhaps, is most probable.”—ELLICOTT.

VERSE 16.—* Καὶ ὅσοι, κ. τ. λ., ‘and as many as,’ &c. Specification of the subjects upon whom the benediction following is invoked—“as many as shall walk by this rule.” “The nominative clause standing isolated, and passing κατ’ ἀνακολουθίαν into another structure.”—ELLICOTT. But whether we are to understand “as many,” of mankind generally, or only of the particular class (the false teachers) whom the Apostle had lately in view, must depend upon the construction which we may see fit to give to καὶ (καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν Ἰσραὴλ) in the conclusion of the sentence. If it be taken *explicatively* (even), the former interpretation will prevail—if *conjunctively* (and), the latter.

ᵇ Τῷ κανόνι τούτῳ στοιχήσουσιν, ‘shall walk by this rule’—τῷ κανόνι dative normæ. Κανὼν, primarily ‘a reed or directing rod’—‘a rule;’ hence figuratively, ‘a maxim or rule of life.’ ‘*This maxim*,’ to wit, that enunciated in the preceding verse, ‘that in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature.’ Many copies read στοιχοῦσιν, but external authority is not conclusively in its favour; and if the clause be limited (as possibly it should be) to the judaizing teachers, internal evidence would be decidedly against it; for at the time when the Apostle wrote, not one of them was walking by that rule.

* Εἰρήνη ἐπ' αὐτοὺς καὶ ἔλεος, 'peace be upon them and mercy'—εἰρήνη not merely in the sense of 'concord,' the opposite to 'strife and discord' which unhappily prevailed amongst them (ch. v. 13): the association with ἔλεος, and both being regarded as coming down from above *upon* them, or resting *upon* them (the force of the preposition), discountenances such interpretation. Εἰρήνη is a salutatory term, familiar in the usage of all countries; to which custom, perhaps, it is that allusion is made, when our Saviour, in taking leave of his disciples, says—"My peace I leave with you; not as the world giveth (i. e., in hollow, heartless form), give I unto you." In this view εἰρήνη represents that happy state of mental tranquillity which is the privilege of the true believer—the sensible enjoyment of God's favour abidingly in the heart. Ἐλεος, in an active sense, implies, "not merely a *feeling* of the evils of others (sympathy, οἰκτιρμός), but also an active desire of removing them (see Tittm. de Synon. N. T., p. 69, sq.)."—ROB., *Lex.* In which sense it is here used to denote 'the communication of all those blessings, spiritual and temporal, which are the fruit of God's infinite compassion towards His elect and adopted children.'

Ἄ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν Ἰσραὴλ τοῦ Θεοῦ, 'and upon the Israel of God.' The meaning of this passage, as we have before hinted, must depend entirely upon the force ascribed to καὶ. If καὶ be taken as a mere explicative, then we have but one party before us, 'those who count regeneration to be everything in religion'—"even the Israel of God;" when there can be no question that the designation must apply to the hidden church of Christ, gathered out of all nations, and peoples, and languages, which constitutes 'the true Israel,' of which the Israel of old were the type and representative. But though, doubtless, καὶ is of frequent occurrence in the New Testament as an explicative particle, yet (as Ellicott remarks) "it is doubtful whether it is ever used by St. Paul in so *marked* an explicative force as must here be assigned to it." The simple copulative meaning is therefore to be preferred, which moreover yields a sense more appropriate to the subject in hand.

But first we must ascertain, in what way are we to understand the phrase, "the Israel of God"? Is it applied by St. Paul to his brethren according to the flesh, either in their unconverted or their converted state? Not, certainly, in the former; for how much soever he may have borne them upon his heart, and desired their conversion to God (see Rom. x. 1), it would have been perfectly anomalous to pronounce upon them that blessing which is the peculiar privilege of the adopted church, and which is incapable, in fact, of being enjoyed outside of its pale (see ch. i. 4^d). And no less anomalous would it be, in pronouncing that blessing upon *Christians*, to regard the Jews as a distinct body from their fellow-heirs amongst the Gentiles, seeing that in Christ Jesus "there is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female, for ye are all one in Christ Jesus" (ch. iii. 28); a unity so scrupulously to be observed and maintained, in thought, word, and deed, that the Apostle himself, in contemplation of that blessed truth, that Jesus Christ gave himself a ransom *for all* (Jew and Greek indis-

criminally), exclaims—"Wherefore henceforth know we no man after the flesh; yea, though we have known Christ after the flesh (that is, with any peculiar love and veneration, as being of the stock of Israel, and a kinsman after the flesh), yet now henceforth know we Him no more."—2 Cor. v. 16. So that the application of this phrase to the Jewish people distinctively, whether converted or unconverted, must be unhesitatingly abandoned.

Ellicott expresses a doubt 'whether Christians generally could be called "the Israel of God."' But how any doubt can be entertained upon that subject after the many intimations to that effect to be met with in Scripture, is to me, I must say, matter of surprise. St. Paul tells us (Rom. ii. 28, 29), "He is not a Jew which is one outwardly, neither is that circumcision which is outward in the flesh; *but he is a Jew* (in the high and holy acceptation of the term) which is one inwardly, and circumcision is that of the heart—in the spirit, and not in the letter—whose praise is not of men, but of God." Though to *an objector* this passage may not be deemed conclusive, yet the following would seem to be beyond all controversy:—"They are not all Israel (the Israel of God) which are of Israel, neither because they are the seed of Abraham are they all children; but in Isaac shall thy seed be called: that is, they which are the children of the flesh, these are not the children of God, *but the children of the promise are counted for the seed*" (Rom. ix. 6-8). This, with St. Paul's comment (Gal. iv. 28), "*We, brethren, as Isaac was, are the children of promise,*" would seem to set the matter at rest. But again, in the Epistle before us, the same intimation is distinctly made:—"And if ye (Galatians) be Christ's, *then are ye Abraham's seed*, and heirs according to promise" (ch. iii. 29). In a note to Pringle's translation of Calvin's commentaries, I find the following quotation from Justin Martyr, upon this passage:—"We who have been taught of God by this crucified Christ, are the true spiritual Israel, and the seed of Judah and of Jacob, and of Isaac and of Abraham, whose faith was attested, and who was blessed by God, and called the father of many nations, while he was in uncircumcision." So that, independently of our own conclusions, we have the testimony of antiquity to the effect that "the Israel of God" is an expression applicable to the whole Christian church (believers, of course), and, in the spiritual acceptation of the term, only applicable to them.

But a further inquiry remains to be answered; assuming *καὶ* in its copulative sense (which, from the reason above assigned, we are probably bound to do), how are the conformers to that rule (*ὅσοι τῷ καν. τοῦτ. σπουχ.*), that is, 'they who give a hearty assent to this truth, that spiritual regeneration is the one thing needful to salvation,' to be discriminated from the party here designated "the Israel of God"? The answer is at hand; the blessing is invoked respectively upon '*the teachers*' and upon '*the taught*.' The Apostle, having adverted in this context to the judaizing teachers, 'as many as desire to make a fair show in the flesh, they compel you to be circumcised, only that they may glory in your flesh,' and having repudiated with a holy vehemence any such un-

worthy motive as animating his breast, upon the ground, that “in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything nor uncircumcision, but a new creature,” goes on to say, “as many (of the party contemplated, teachers of course,) as shall walk according to this rule (believing this truth in their hearts, and inculcating it in their lessons), peace be upon them and mercy,” and upon all those who shall become their disciples, Israelites, not by ritualistic mutilation, but ‘Israelites *indeed*’—not of man’s making, but of God’s.

Such appears to be the only satisfactory solution of this difficult passage. The subjects of the benediction being by the use of the copulative (*καὶ*) distinguished into two parties, and Jews, *as a distinct body*, whether in a converted or an unconverted state, being absolutely excluded from either, it remains that the Christian community must be contemplated as divided into two parts; and what division could be more feasible in itself, or more adapted to the Apostle’s purpose as it appears on the face of the context, than that into which they had been already distinguished (v. 15)—*the teachers* and *the taught*?

It is worthy of notice, in confirmation of the view which is here presented, that Calvin, though not following up the contrast in the second member (—“the Israel of God”), has been so struck with the application of the first (—“as many as walk according to this rule”) to *the teachers* in the church, that he writes thus:—“This is not merely a prayer in their behalf, but a token of approbation. His meaning, therefore, is, that *those who teach* this doctrine are worthy of all esteem and regard, and those who reject it do not deserve to be heard.” And certainly, if “as many as walk by this rule” be a designation of *the teachers*, there can be little difficulty in assigning “the Israel of God” to *the taught*, especially where the point of the allusion is so plain and so striking—‘they who are Israelites, not by the rite of circumcision, but by the calling of God.’ But Calvin proceeds:—“The word ‘rule’ denotes the regular and habitual course which all godly *ministers of the gospel* ought to pursue;” and so satisfied is he of the correctness of the application, that he deduces the following inference:—“*Faithful and upright teachers*, and all who allow themselves to conform to this rule, must derive singular encouragement from this passage, in which God, by the mouth of Paul, pronounces *on them* a blessing.” Calvin’s testimony upon this point is the more valuable, inasmuch as, having no theory of his own (in reference to “the Israel of God”) to support, his opinion of ὅσοι τῇ καν. τοῦτ. στοιχ. is derived from a general view of the requirement of the context.

VERSE 17.—^a Τοῦ λοιποῦ, ‘for the future.’ According to Calvin, ‘as to everything else;’ that is, ‘as to everything besides the new creature;’—“this one thing is enough for me; other matters are of no importance, and give me no concern; let no man question me about them.”—CALVIN. But it seems preferable to understand it, as most commentators do, of ‘time’—Τοῦ λοιποῦ, “the correct temporal genitive, denoting ‘the time within which,’ or, at some epoch of which the action is represented as taking place.”—See Ellicott’s note. ‘After the

proof which I now give, &c. &c., let no man *at any time hereafter* trouble me.'

^b Κόπους μοι μηδεὶς παρεχέτω, 'let no man trouble me.' "Theodt. al., understand this expression 'of the trouble of writing many epistles' (Alford); Calvin, 'of obstacles thrown in the way of his ministry'—"Let them cease to throw hindrances in the way of my preaching;" Bloomfield, 'of trouble,' "by either my doctrine, or my sincerity and integrity being questioned;" Alford, 'of trouble,' "by rebellious conduct, and denying his apostolic authority;" Ellicott, "by troubling his spirit by their instability (σαλευόμενοι), and still more, as the next clause shows, by thwarting his apostolic authority." But none of them appear to have caught precisely the idea of the Apostle. The subject upon which he evidently feels most sore—against which he directs the whole force of his argument in the second chapter—to which he again reverts, ch. v. 11, 12, and dismisses with an indignant petulancy unexampled elsewhere in his writings—is the insidious and unfounded representation of the false teachers, that he was a preacher of circumcision as well as themselves. This seems to have been one of their most successful devices in the perversion of the gospel of Christ, and, consequently, proportionately abominated by him. This subject having turned up again in the postscript, where he contrasts the dastardly behaviour of the judaizers with his own chivalrous and self-sacrificing conduct,—they insisting upon circumcision, only that they might escape the persecution of the cross—he glorying in the cross as the only effectual means of salvation—he concludes the subject with the spirited exclamation—'henceforth let no man trouble me—let me hear no more of these slanderous and disgusting imputations—this is my refutation once for all;—"I bear in my body the marks of our Lord Jesus Christ."' See a similar argument, ch. v. 11 ^d.

^c Ἐγὼ γάρ, 'for I'—ἐγὼ emphatic, contrasting with the false teachers who had no such evidence to adduce of their faithfulness to Christ. This clause assigns, not precisely "the reason for the command" (Ellicott), but 'the reason why the command should be attended to;' 'for he bore in his body the proofs that by no subterfuge, such as they attributed to him, had he evaded the consequences of a faithful delivery of the doctrine of the cross.'

^d Τὰ στίγματα τοῦ Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ, 'the marks of the Lord Jesus'—gen. of possession. The marks in question, being bodily marks, are obviously intended of those wounds, and scars, and other external evidences exhibited upon his body, of the chains, and scourgings, and beatings, and stonings, which he had from time to time endured in the discharge of his apostolic duties: comp. 2 Cor. xi. 24, 25. Τὰ στίγματα, an allusion to the marks branded upon the persons of slaves to denote the ownership of their masters; so by these scars and disfigurements was Paul attested to be a faithful and devoted servant of his Lord and Master, Jesus Christ.

^e Βαστάζω, 'I bear'—not simply equivalent to περιφέρω, 'I carry about with me' (Bloomfield), nor yet significant of 'that proud bearing

by which a man carries upon his person some trophy or royal symbol' (Chrys.). But, being spoken of wounds and bruises, ignominiously though cheerfully, sustained in the service of his heavenly master, more probably in the unfavourable sense in which the word occurs ch. v. 10—vi. 5. This exposition of the passage not only removes the expression *κόπους μοι μηδεὶς παρεχέτω* out of the vague field of conjecture as to its proper reference, but also assigns to *στίγματα* its appropriate meaning, not as 'the credentials of Paul's *authority* as an Apostle,' as would seem to be intimated by Alford, but as the marks and tokens of his faithful adhesion to the truth.

VERSE 18.—^a *Ἡ χάρις τοῦ Κυρ. ἡμ.* 'I. X., 'the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ.' We have now arrived at the valedictory benediction, where *χάρις* with the article denotes not merely 'favour' generally, from God, but 'that peculiar favour' which came into the world by Jesus Christ (John, i. 17)—"the manifold grace of God" (1 Pet. iv. 10), which imparts strength to the weak—joy to the sorrowful—patience to the afflicted—hope to the desponding—light to those who sit in darkness—and life to the dead—a grace, as St. Paul terms it in his Epistle to the Hebrews (Heb. iv. 16) *εἰς εὐκαιρον βοήθειαν*, 'unto every seasonable aid,' which supplieth all our wants out of the fulness which is in Christ Jesus.

^b *Μετὰ τοῦ πνεύματος ὑμῶν*, 'with your spirit;' the regenerated spirit of man, in which the work of grace is especially carried on. *Πνεύματος* singular, in recognition of the profound theological truth, that though Christ's members are *many*, their spirit is but *one*. See verse 8 ^a.

^c *Ἀδελφοί*, 'brethren.' The unusual position of this word is unquestionably emphatic, "parting from them, after an epistle of much rebuke and warning, in the fulness of brotherhood in Christ."—ALFORD.

^d *Ἀμήν*, "an Hebrew word, signifying truth. With this word the Jews ended all their prayers, and most solemn speeches; in which they were followed by the first Christians, who thus signified, that the things which they had spoken, whether to God or men, were their real sentiments and desires."—M'KNIGHT, *in loco*. In no more fitting form could the Apostle conclude this Epistle, full of truth and earnestness, of affectionateness and love.

APPENDIX I.

Χριστὸς ἡμᾶς ἐξηγόρασεν ἐκ τῆς κατάρας τοῦ νόμου, γενόμενος ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν κατάρα.—GAL. iii. 13.

Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law, having become a curse for us.

THE reasoning of Dr. M'Knight upon this passage (referred to in the Commentary) appears to be founded altogether upon a fallacy. "The curse (he says) of the law of nature, which was published in the law of Moses, being *eternal* death, is a curse which no man can suppose Christ to have suffered." And hence he infers that Christ did not suffer it, but only in part—"ignominiously" indeed, but not eternally.

But from what source did he derive his information that the curse of the law of nature, or the curse of the law of Moses, was, in the sense which he ascribes to it, "*eternal* death"? God said, indeed, to Adam, "In the day that thou eatest thereof *thou shalt surely die*;" and we have many exhortations and admonitions in the law of Moses, not to offend against the ordinances of the law, "*lest thou die*"; but where do we find any words of perpetuity annexed? Granted, that had not God, in His undeserved mercy and unfathomable love to Adam and his guilty race, provided a remedy, *that* death should have been perpetual, for no man had power to raise himself to life again; but permanence is but *an accident* of death, not *an essential element*. Natural death is the separation of soul and body, whereby the soul is divested of its earthly covering; and the body reduced to an inanimate and inert mass. Spiritual death is the severance of the soul from Him "*in whose favour is life*," whereby the soul becomes destitute of all spiritual comfort, and at the same time incapable to please God, or to do Him any laudable service. When this separation has taken place in either case, then death in such case is complete; and, whether the separation be for a day, or for a thousand years, or for the endless ages of eternity, it matters not—death is not more perfected at one period than at another.

Now, this separation of soul and body Christ did, unquestionably, undergo upon the cross, when, as we are informed, "He bowed his head, and gave up the ghost." And at the same time, or at the moment immediately preceding, we have reason to apprehend, took place the severance of his soul from God as a soul-supporting, soul-comforting,

spiritual-life-sustaining Being, an intimation of which we have in that bitter cry of horrid import—"My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?"

It would be a terrible and fatal error to forego for a single moment the notion of *the legal completeness* of the satisfaction of the death of Christ; for if one part of the penalty could be dispensed with, why not the whole? and if the denunciations could be remitted, who can answer for the stability of the promises? And if the truthfulness of God be questionable, where is the hope of man?—where the security of angels? Better far that ten thousand worlds perish than that "one jot or one tittle should pass from the law until all be fulfilled." The idea advanced by M'Knight is theologically untenable; and were it otherwise, and followed out to its legitimate consequence, it would plunge the universe in the profoundest depths of misery and despair.

Christ, then, having suffered *the extreme penalty* of the broken law for man, are we to infer therefrom that he endured in soul and body the bitter pains of hell-fire? Assuredly not; such an inference is wholly unwarranted by Scripture: the exclamation of David, which affords the strongest ground for the assumption, being rightly assigned to Christ—"thou shalt not leave my soul in hell"—has been understood and expounded by the ablest theologians, of Hades the receptacle of disembodied spirits, into which our blessed Lord is supposed to have descended during the interval in which his body lay in the grave. But that he suffered any torture of soul or body subsequent to the inscrutable agonies of the cross, has been discredited by the church in all ages. Such, then, being the case, the question again presents itself—can it be with truth alleged that the Redeemer endured *the unmitigated penalty* of sin?

And here a distinction applies, to which I have indirectly adverted before. Hell-fire, though unquestionably a scriptural verity, the extreme punishment of the unrepentant sinner, is no part whatever of the penalty of the broken *law* to which Christ conformed in His death. There is no trace of it to be found in the Adamic covenant; nor in that which is a republication of it, the Mosaic. The infringement of that covenant (for it is the covenant of works throughout) did indeed involve the penalty of death; but not one word of any material suffering after death—no intimation of a resuscitation and reunion of soul and body, to be plunged together into a lake of fire, which appears to be *a consequence* of redemption, not *a ground*. *That* extreme infliction of the wrath of the Almighty is reserved for the *irrevocably lost*—those unhappy beings who despise, or reject "the great salvation" proffered to them in the gospel of Jesus Christ; and those, doubtless, who in all ages, and under every dispensation, are, in the sight of a just and omniscient Deity, involved in the same category of obduracy and unbelief.

Though numerous intimations of such a place of torment are found scattered over the pages of the Old Testament, yet, confessedly, the full revelation of it was reserved for the New: and there it is palpably connected with the rejection of the grace of Christ. In the following passage it would seem to be distinctly contrasted with the penalty of the

Mosaic covenant; and it is shown that, whereas the penalty of the law is *death* (and the exigency of the argument required it to be stated in its fullest extent), the “sorer punishment,” the “*fiery* indignation,” is reserved for ‘those who have trodden under foot the Son of God, and have counted the blood of the covenant, wherewith they were sanctified, an unholy thing, and have done despite to the Spirit of grace;’ for ‘those, indeed, who have sinned wilfully after that they had received the knowledge of the truth, there “remaineth no more sacrifice for sins, but a certain fearful looking for of judgment and fiery indignation, which shall devour the adversaries.”’—Heb. x. 26–29.

The death of Christ extended to “the redemption of the transgressions which were under the first covenant” (Heb. ix. 15). By virtue of that atoning sacrifice, no child of Adam shall perish simply and exclusively by reason of original sin, nor of his own manifold transgressions or delinquencies (the fruit of a corrupt nature inherited from Adam), committed against the covenant of works. For all such offences He made “a full, perfect, and sufficient sacrifice, oblation, and satisfaction,” having exhausted to the last dregs the bitter cup which, according to the tenor of that covenant, was put into His hand. His blood was a fountain opened for sin and for uncleanness, in which the most polluted criminal of every age and nation, and the most inveterate backslider may wash again and again, and be clean. But it is a redemption to be availed of through faith.* For those who, through the hardness and impenitency of their hearts, unheeding the motions of the Spirit in their consciences, drawing them, according to the mode and measure of His divine influence, to purity of thought and practice, turn their backs upon, unconsciously though it be to themselves, the great salvation provided for them in Christ; or those who, under gospel teaching, having “tasted of the heavenly gift, and the powers of the world to come,” have fallen away

* It is my firm conviction, founded upon various intimations in holy Scripture, that in all ages of the world, among all nations, and kindreds, and peoples, and tongues, and under every dispensation of God, there has been in operation an undercurrent of salvation according to the election of grace, characterized, as now, by *faith*—faith, not necessarily exercised in Christ as its object; nor in any promise of the revealed word; nor, indeed, in any external revelation at all; but, in the broad truth, whencesoever derived, that God “is, and that He is a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him” (Heb. xi. 6);—a salvation, at the same time, wholly resulting from the mediatorial work of Christ, and the grace of the Holy Spirit; though either as to its source or as to its effects, unnoticed in the present life (except so far as a divine revelation has been vouchsafed) by those who are the happy recipients of its benefit. Several of the instances (most signally that of Rahab the harlot in verse 31) recorded in the eleventh chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews, where it is testified that “these all obtained a good report *through faith*,” though not having obtained the promise, “God having provided some better thing for us, *that they without us should not be made perfect*,” most clearly, to my mind, establish the fact. I cannot but think that a candid and prayerful investigation of this remarkable chapter would go far to divest the mind of the thoughtful student of much of that illiberality of sentiment and narrowness of view which prevail to an unaccountable degree in the Christian church, upon this most interesting topic—the salvability of the heathen world.

from grace, apostatized from the living God; for all such inveterate offenders, "Tophet is ordained of old; He hath made it deep and large: the pile thereof is fire and much wood; the breath of the Lord, like a stream of brimstone, doth kindle it." From this place of intolerable anguish there is no redemption. The ransom of Christ hath delivered untold myriads from spiritual death and the grave; but from the inexorable jaws of hell, not one. Consequently, when our Lord Jesus Christ suffered *the unmitigated penalty of the law*, He did not endure the bitter pains of "*the second death*."

APPENDIX II.

Μαρτυρῶ γὰρ ὑμῖν ὅτι, εἰ δυνατόν, τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ὑμῶν ἐξορύξαντες ἀν
ἐδῶξατέ μοι.—GAL. iv. 15.

For I bear you record, that, if it had been possible, ye had plucked out your eyes, and given them unto me.

THE nature of St. Paul's 'temptation in the flesh' has been an interesting subject of inquiry from the earliest ages, and will continue, in all probability, so to be until the question is cleared up in eternity. However, the elements for a strong conjecture are not wanting in Scripture. Whatever it may have been, it was, probably, the same thing which, in the Epistle to the Corinthians (2 Cor. xii. 7), is represented as "a thorn in the flesh," sent to humble him, "lest he should be exalted above measure through the abundance of *the revelations*": an allusion, without doubt, to a circumstance previously narrated—that he had been snatched up into Paradise, "and heard unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter." It is by no means inconceivable that, as it happened to him on the road to Damascus, when he was struck to the ground, and blinded by the Divine effulgence which shone around his path, so may it have been with him upon his rapture into the third heavens; his mortal orbs, unequal to the glare of "light inaccessible" in which the Majesty of heaven dwells, may thereupon have sustained a shock which they never afterwards recovered. Certain, at least, it is that no bodily ailment has a more direct effect to disfigure the human countenance, and to impart to it a mean and contemptible appearance, than bleared and rheumy eyes.

Whatever may have been the occasion of the infliction, that it was an affection of the eyes under which the Apostle laboured is strongly suggested by the text under consideration. When the Apostle reminds the Galatians that so great was their attachment to him that, "if it were possible, they would have plucked out their eyes and given them unto him," he uses a very strong and unusual expression, coupled too, as it is, with an immediate allusion to his "temptation in the flesh," which they are said neither to have despised nor loathed. Would it not seem as though, in the exuberance of their early love, they were ready to make so great a sacrifice, if it had been possible, for his sake, in return for the unspeakable blessedness which they were sensible of having

received, instrumentally, at his hands? But it is replied that "this is a proverbial and highly hyperbolical expression, not unfrequent in classical writers, denoting 'the strongest affection'; of which Wells adduces numerous examples."—BLOOMFIELD. So it may be; but, notwithstanding, there is a peculiarity about this text which I question if all the examples that can be brought forward will be able satisfactorily to account for.

In the first place, it occurs to me that the introduction of such a proverb at all—a vulgarism, to say the least of it—would be unbecoming the dignity of sacred Scripture in the polished era of the world in which the Apostle wrote. Certainly we have no example of a similar license being taken in the New Testament; and it might be supposed that a writer of acknowledged taste and refinement, as St. Paul was, would be the last to have recourse to it.

But, further, are not the words themselves *too precise* for the proverb? The expression, 'ye would have given your eyes to serve me,' might have been a familiar, though certainly not a refined, expression; but the formidable notion of 'rooting out your eyes (the exact force of ἐξορύξαντες), and giving them unto me,' is something more than proverbial. And if the Apostle has deviated in ever so small a degree from the accustomed formula, by what consideration could he have been moved, if not by a desire to divest it of its parabolical import, and to present it in a literal sense? The very addition—"if it were possible"—seems to add strength to this surmise. In the ordinary application of the proverb, which is a manifest hyperbole, who ever thought of contemplating the possibility or the impossibility of the performance? It is uttered as a mere trope or figure of speech, conveying in forcible, though homely, language the strongest protestation of friendship, but never for a moment associated in any man's mind with the idea of performance. But here the Apostle has so presented it, that we are induced to believe that, if such a sacrifice had been practicable, it would have been unhesitatingly made in token of their affection towards him. A large measure of significancy, I must say, does in my mind attach to the peculiar and unprecedented phraseology of this passage.

But, independently of the considerations arising out of the text, there are other and distinct grounds in Scripture for entertaining the conjecture here advanced, that 'the temptation' was an infirmity of the eyes. That St. Paul employed an amanuensis permanently is matter of universal acknowledgment. Doubtless the supervision of all the churches, in addition to the ordinary duty of preaching (and woe to him if he preached not the gospel of Jesus Christ), was a burden too heavy for any man to bear, and would justify any alleviation of toil which could possibly be resorted to. But, after all, what did the Apostle gain by the employment of a deputy? Not *time*, assuredly; for it will be readily conceded that more time would be expended in dictation than in any ordinary process of writing. The Epistles of St. Paul, unlike a legal or commercial correspondence, were not to be handed over to a practised official for the sake of ease or expedition, and requiring only the super-

vision and signature of the principal. They needed to be dictated line upon line and sentence upon sentence, with the most scrupulous and deliberate exactness, that no error or omission of any kind might creep inadvertently into the text. And such dictation would require at least as much patience, anxiety, and time for its performance, as if he had committed it to paper in his own handwriting. Nothing appears to me more evident than that the employment of an amanuensis habitually on the part of the Apostle was the result, not simply of convenience, but of necessity, and of necessity arising from no imaginable cause but that which has been already suggested—infirmity of vision.

Again, what are we to conclude from the annexation of these words, “So I write”? In ordinary cases, when attestation is requisite, a principal, having satisfied himself of the accuracy of the contents, attaches his signature to a document, and there the matter rests; and doubtless the Apostle would have followed the same course had there not been an especial reason for his departure from it—in all probability, some peculiar and uncouth formation of his letters, unusual in a person of his education and intelligence, and demanding a more than an ordinary attestation. We have before remarked, that in almost every instance ‘the salutation’ alone appears in the handwriting of St. Paul. The Epistle before us—a short Epistle, and written under peculiar circumstances—appears to be the solitary exception; and mark how the Apostle calls attention to the fact—“Ye see with what large letters (πηλίκους γράμμασιν) I have written to you with mine own hand;” a circumstance not to be overlooked in an inquiry of this sort, and to be accounted for, apparently, upon no better or more probable ground than that here contended for, namely, ‘indistinctness of vision.’

The Galatians, at the time that this Epistle was addressed to them, were in a very critical position as to their spiritual estate—upon the brink of an abyss of heresy, into which had they fallen, all their past sufferings should have been to no account, and the Apostle’s labour expended upon them in vain. Into that peril they were conducted by the misrepresentations of artful and unscrupulous hypocrites, who had alienated their affections from Paul, in order that they might fall a more easy prey into their own net. Now, what procedure could be more prudent, or more likely to effect the object at heart—the recovery of their estranged affections—than to break through his established custom, and with his own hand, indifferently as he might perform the task, uncouth and disproportioned as the characters might be, to indite the Epistle before us? Such appears to me to be a feasible account of the writing of this Epistle, and the object to be attained by inviting attention to the style in which it was executed.

Upon the whole, I submit that there are abundant intimations in Scripture to warrant *a strong conjecture* that “the temptation in the flesh” was an infirmity of vision, accompanied with some unsightly and disgusting concomitants, which imparted to this distinguished Apostle a mean and contemptible presence; and that it may have been, not improbably, the natural result of the excessive brightness of the heavenly

glory to which he was graciously admitted. As, in the ways of Providence, cause and effect are so naturally linked together, that the one is not unfrequently discerned in the light of the other, so may it have been in the case of the Apostle Paul. The occasion upon which it was contracted was so indelibly associated in his recollection with the infirmity which followed, that he could confidently assert that it was a messenger of Satan to buffet him, lest he should be exalted above measure *by the revelations* which were vouchsafed him.

APPENDIX III.

Εὐφράνθητι στειῖρα ἢ οὐ τίκτουσα, ῥῆξον καὶ βόησον ἢ οὐκ ὠδίνουσα· ὅτι πολλὰ τὰ τέκνα τῆς ἐρήμου μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς ἐχούσης τὸν ἄνδρα.—Gal. iv. 27; Isai. liv. 1.

Rejoice, thou barren that bearest not; break forth and cry, thou that travailest not: for the desolate hath many more children than she which hath an husband.

It is worthy of observation that, though the passage from Isaiah which heads these remarks is quoted by the Apostle Paul in his Epistle to the Galatians, in evidence that *the Christian church* is the constituency of "Jerusalem which is above," neither in the passage itself, nor in the prophecy from which it is taken, is there the most remote allusion made, distinctively, to the church of the present dispensation. A careful investigation of the fifty-fourth chapter of Isaiah will satisfy any impartial inquirer that the Jews only are the objects, ostensibly, in contemplation. According to Bloomfield—"in *its literal sense* it represents *the Jewish state*, though then labouring under great distress, as to be hereafter restored to its pristine glory." But, more accurately interpreted, it represents *the Abrahamic covenant* (and inclusively, no doubt, the children of the covenant), in its unproductive and its subsequently productive relation to God. In its former state, under the character of an unprolific spouse, bearing the shame of her youth (childless and unhonoured), rejected and forsaken of her husband, but afterwards with great mercies received again into favour, reinstated in the affections of Jehovah, now become (i. e. acknowledged to be) the God of the whole earth, and in her now favoured condition breaking forth on every side, lengthening the cords, and strengthening the stakes, and stretching forth the curtains of her tabernacle to make room for a multitudinous offspring, exceeding far in number the thousands and the ten thousands of Israel; for 'more are the children of the once-desolate (Sarah) than the children of her who had the husband (Hagar).'

Under which beautiful and expressive imagery is prefigured the condition of the Jewish church in the days of her servitude, and in her future glorious liberty in Christ. In the early stage of her history (that is, during the continuance of the Sinaitic dispensation), she is represented as a wife forsaken and forlorn, having no spiritual communion with her husband, bringing forth, consequently, no children unto

God; her offspring during the entire of that period being gendered unto bondage, 'differing nothing from servants, though being lords of all,' destitute of all those spiritual privileges which accompany, and are the characteristic features of, the adopted family in Christ; few in number, also, when compared with the goodly company of proselytes which are hereafter to call her—mother: but subsequently, in her latter-day glory, received into favour with God, blessed with a national conversion, all her children righteous, partakers of the Spirit of adoption, her religious polity extending itself over the face of the whole earth, thousands out of every tribe, and people, and nation, under the influence of the Holy Spirit, springing up like willows by the water courses, subscribing with the hand unto the Lord, and calling themselves by the name of Israel, until finally, through the universal spread of religion, "the knowledge of the Lord shall cover the earth as the waters cover the sea." Such are the truths depicted in the fifty-fourth chapter of Isaiah, referring, as we have just said, to the Jewish people, in their earlier state of bondage and degradation under the law, and in their subsequent freedom and magnificence in the Messianic age, when admitted to the privileges of the covenant of grace.*

Indeed, in no part of the Bible have we any intimation of a distinct and especial covenant established with the church of the present dispensation. In the eighth chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews, where, if anywhere, we might expect to find it, where St. Paul is especially engaged in pointing out the covenant mediated by Christ in behalf of His believing people, he adduces the prophecy of Jeremiah (ch. xxxi. 31,

* There is considerable difficulty, it must be confessed, in attaining to a clear conception of the bearing of this chapter, owing in a great measure to an erroneous assumption naturally originating in verses 7, 8. For a long period, I was under the impression that these verses were descriptive of the dispersion and subsequent restoration to their own land of the Jewish people; and the difficulty was to reconcile such an exposition of the passage with the manifest design of the author in the opening verses of the chapter, namely, to depict the history of the Abrahamic covenant in the several stages of its existence, in its earlier sterility, and its latter-day productiveness to God. But further investigation convinced me that the verses in question had no reference to the dispersion and restoration of the Jewish people (except so far as the outward condition of the people may be supposed to be a type of their inward and spiritual estate), but to the rejection and subsequent receiving into favour by her heavenly spouse of the personified and here apostrophized covenant of grace. The expression, "with great mercies will I gather thee," which naturally attracted the application to the ingathering of the Jews to their own land, from the several places of their dispersion, is by Louth rendered, "with great mercies will I receive thee again"—terms most appropriate in an address to the forsaken, but now-to-be-accepted, wife; and which are farther explained, in the responsive style of Oriental poetry, "In a short wrath I hid my face for a moment from thee; but with everlasting kindness will I have mercy on thee, saith thy Redeemer ЈВНОВАН."

In this view of the chapter, it is divested of all difficulty, being a consistent prophecy throughout, representing the conversion of the Jewish people to God, after a long period of unfruitfulness, and the happy consequences resulting therefrom to the whole Gentile world, when the promise to Abraham—"in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed," shall receive its final and most comprehensive fulfilment.

et seq.) “Behold, the days come, saith the Lord, when I will make a new covenant with *the house of Israel and with the house of Judah*; not according to the covenant that I made with *their fathers*, in the day when I took them by the hand to *lead them out of the land of Egypt*; . . . for this is the covenant that I will make with *the house of Israel* after those days, saith the Lord;” and then he proceeds to unfold the covenant of grace which Jesus Christ mediates for the benefit of His elect church,—“I will put my laws into their mind, and write them in their hearts; . . . and their sins and their iniquities will I remember no more.” Now, it must be admitted, that, according to the express terms of this prophecy, the beneficiaries of the covenant are none other than “the house of Israel and the house of Judah,” whom, in days gone past, God had taken by the hand to “lead out of the land of Egypt”—a prophecy which should in no wise have been resorted to in that place, had there been found within the whole compass of Old Testament Scriptures a passage distinctly appropriated to the setting forth of the covenanted mercies of *the elect church* of Christ.

But, in truth, the testimony of Scripture is explicit upon this subject, that the covenants belong to *the Jewish people*, the kinsmen of Paul according to the flesh, “who are Israelites, to whom pertaineth the adoption, and the glory, and *the covenants*.” The united church of Jew and Gentile, under the headship of an unseen Lord, in the present dispensation is, if I may so call it, an excrescence or offshoot from the Jewish church, consisting, indeed, of a remnant of the Jewish people “according to the election of grace” (Rom. xi. 5), but for the most part of Gentile believers, an element which so vastly preponderates in the present dispensation, that the period of its continuance is designated in Scripture “the times of the Gentiles.”

The description of the elect church given by St. Paul in New Testament Scripture is in strict accordance with this statement—“If some of the branches be broken off, and thou, being a wild olive tree, wert grafted in among them, and with them partakest of the root and fatness of the olive tree, boast not against the branches: . . . for if God spared not the natural branches, take heed lest He also spare not thee: . . . and they also, if they abide not in unbelief, shall be grafted in; for God is able to graff them in again. For if thou wert cut out of the olive tree, which is wild by nature, and wert grafted contrary to nature, into a good olive tree, how much more shall these which be the natural branches, be grafted into their own olive tree!” Rom. xi. 17, et seq. According to the tenor of these words, the good olive tree is the Jewish church, springing out of the root Abraham; some of the branches of which being, by reason of unbelief, broken off at the first advent, we are grafted in in their stead, being made partakers of the root and the fatness of the olive tree, to be in our turn displaced to make way for the reinstatement of the original branches (the twelve tribes of Israel), at the second advent, into their native olive tree—the privileges which we now enjoy being the covenanted mercies of the Israelitish nation, to be enjoyed by them hereafter in their Abrahamic state, when they shall

break forth on the right hand, and on the left, and "their seed shall inherit the Gentiles."*

That no distinct covenant is recorded in Scripture as appertaining to the elect church of the present day, is further deducible from the line of argument pursued by the Apostle Paul, in his controversy with the unbelieving Jews, who, in the Epistle to the Romans, are represented as arraigning the faithfulness of God in His dealings with them in respect to His covenant. Had any direct and explicit declaration been forthcoming in the Jewish Scriptures of God's intention to admit the church of the present day to covenant mercies in Christ, it should have been the Apostle's business to have pointed it out, and not to have rested his defence of the truthfulness of God upon such obscure and indeterminate passages as the following:—"I will call them my people who were not my people, and her beloved who was not beloved: and it shall come to pass, that in the place where it was said unto them, ye are not my people, there shall they be called the children of the living God."—Rom. ix. 35.†

From these and sundry other considerations, it is plainly to be inferred, that no covenant is recorded in the Old Testament as distinctly appertaining to the elect church of Christ; that during the period of Jewish apostacy, that church is admitted to a participation of the benefits of the Abrahamic covenant; that, the apostacy being terminated by the second advent of Christ, the present dispensation shall be brought to a close, and the Jewish church be engrafted into their native olive tree, to flourish and to bring forth fruit unto God in their Abrahamic

* When it is affirmed above that the church of the present dispensation will be displaced to make way for the reinstatement of the Jewish people in the covenanted favour of God, the nature and extent of the affirmation is this, that at the period of the second advent of the Lord Jesus Christ, the time of the conversion of the Jews, nationally, the present dispensation will be brought to a close, the unbelievers (the larger portion, it is to be feared) of the church being destroyed, the elect few, whether sleeping or waking, being caught up to meet the Lord in the air, the Jews will be left behind to inherit (though doubtless, from the presence of Messiah and his risen saints, the binding of Satan, and a more abundant effusion of the Holy Ghost, in an infinitely enhanced degree) those privileges which constitute, at the present day, the birthright of the adopted church.

† The terms "obscure and indeterminate" are applied to this prophecy in reference only to the point at issue. There could be no question, even in Jewish apprehension of it, that the calling of the Gentiles, and their admission into the church of God, are therein distinctly foretold; but the uncertainty was with respect to *the time* and *the mode* of their admission. The Jews looked forward, themselves, to the conversion of the Gentiles through the instrumentality of the Jewish church, "when the law shall go forth of Zion, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem," and "the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea." But, by the accommodation of the Apostle, the prophecy is referred to a period when the Gentiles should be admitted, through the instrumentality indeed of the Jewish church, but to the almost total exclusion of the members of that church; a remnant only being saved "according to the election of grace:"—a construction which, no doubt, the words will bear, but which need not to have been resorted to here, had any distinct and explicit intimation of the calling of the elect church been found within the compass of Scripture.

state; and that this temporary substitution, though committed to the keeping of holy Scripture in obscure and figurative terms, for the purpose of future reference, and future conviction, was kept a profound secret in the breast of the Omniscient until the period of its accomplishment had arrived, when it was given to Paul, as the apostle of the uncircumcision, to make known unto all men "the mystery of Christ, which in other ages was not known unto the sons of men as it is now revealed unto His holy apostles and prophets by the Spirit, that the Gentiles should be fellow-heirs, and of the same body, and partakers of His promise (the Abrahamic promise, ch. iii. 8) *in Christ* by the gospel"—to him who was the least of all saints was this grace given, that he should "preach among the Gentiles the unsearchable riches of Christ, and to make all men see what is the fellowship of the mystery, which from the beginning of the world hath been hid in God, who created all things by Jesus Christ."—Eph. iii. 4–9.

When, therefore, in the Epistle to the Galatians, St. Paul would establish the fact that "Jerusalem above is the mother of us all" (Christians), he had no alternative but to adduce a prophecy (Isai. liv.), which had no distinct, or indeed apparent, reference at all to the church of the present day—in which not one word is to be found expressly significant of its covenant position in Christ, but which treats simply and exclusively, to all human apprehension, of the Jewish church, and is descriptive of a period yet to come, when the Jews, in their Abrahamic state, shall inherit the Gentiles, and the whole world shall, through their instrumentality, be brought to the knowledge of the one true and only God, and His Son Jesus Christ—a prophecy only by the accommodation of an inspired writer (tantamount to a new inspiration) applicable to us, as being admitted during the temporary displacement of the favoured race, to the enjoyment of those privileges which shall be theirs in perpetuity after their restoration to their own land.

APPENDIX IV.

Ἐν γὰρ Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ οὔτε περιτομή τι ἰσχύει οὔτε ἀκροβυστία, ἀλλὰ πίστις δι' ἀγάπης ἐνεργουμένη.—GAL. v. 6.

For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, but faith working by love.

WERE this the only passage in Holy Writ where righteousness is represented as dependent upon the performance of good works, I confess that, ungrammatical and illogical as I might deem it to be, I should be almost tempted to leave undisturbed the interpretation ordinarily assigned to these words,—namely, “a faith which worketh by love”—rather than subject myself to the imputation (and with, I fear, a large proportion of my readers, the disrepute) of being at issue upon a material point of doctrine with so many profound scholars and exemplary divines, for whose learning and piety, in common with the church at large, I entertain the most unaffected respect. But the passages in the sacred writings are so frequent in their occurrence, and so varied in their enunciation, where the future condition of man is made, apparently, to hang upon deeds done in the body, that I feel, were I to evade the inquiry as to the sense in which such passages are to be understood, when fairly and naturally brought before me in the course of my exposition, not only would my Commentary be incomplete, but it would be a virtual renunciation of that office which I have voluntarily assumed to myself, and expose me to the no less unenviable imputation of having undertaken a duty which I feel myself incompetent to perform. I consider, therefore, that I am called upon in self-respect, and for the completion of the work which I have taken in hands, to inquire, what saith the Scripture upon this momentous subject? At the same time, so thoroughly am I persuaded of the truth and value of the doctrine of ‘justification by faith only, irrespective of legal works,’ and the absolute necessity which exists, for the well-being and security of the church, that it should be set forth and maintained in all its simplicity and all its integrity, that I hesitate not to declare, that any professed system of theology subversive of that doctrine, or tending in the remotest degree to shake its foundations or to impair its influence, should not only be viewed with suspicion and distrust, but rejected with indignation and contempt, as irreconcilable with the truth of God, and derogatory to the

glory of the Redeemer. With this short but candid preamble, I now proceed to state what appears to me to be the testimony of the Spirit, as it may be collected from sundry passages in Holy Writ, upon this important subject—the efficacy of works wrought through the operation of faith, to our future justification.

Christ, by His death upon the cross, has made a full and sufficient sacrifice and expiation for the sins of the whole world. As many as are spiritually baptized into Christ are partakers with Him of all that is His, and all that He has suffered. As such they are crucified with Him for sin, and are dead to the law; and as such they are risen again with Him, and participate in His perfect and everlasting righteousness. The claims of the law being satisfied by the death of Christ, the covenant of works is for the believer annulled, and taken out of the way for ever; and he is at once transferred into a covenant of grace, wherein he stands engaged to fulfil the whole will of God with the same punctiliousness of performance, though not, indeed, under the same severity of sanction, as before, being, as St. Paul expresses it, “not without law to God, but under law to Christ.” This law of the new covenant is indifferently styled in Scripture, according to the aspect in which it is viewed, “the law of faith”—“the law of righteousness”—“the law of liberty”—“the royal law”—“the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus”—in a word, “the law of Christ.” And according to our conformity with this law, I doubt not, we shall be dealt with, not only in this world, but in that which is to come.

St. Peter informs us that “for this cause was the gospel preached to the dead (i.e. the spiritually dead—“dead in trespasses and sins”), that they might be *judged* according to men (i.e. as men are judged) in the flesh, but live according to God (i.e. as God liveth) in the spirit,” 2 Pet. iv. 6—a declaration of similar import with that of St. Paul to the Corinthians—“For this cause (namely, their delinquency in the matter of the Lord’s supper) many are weak and sickly among you, and many sleep: for if we would judge ourselves, we should not be judged; but, when we are *judged*, we are chastened of the Lord, that we should not be condemned with the world,” 1 Cor. xi. 30–32—an intimation in strict accordance with the account given of New Testament discipline in the prophetic writings—“I will be his Father, and he shall be my son. If he commit iniquity, I will chasten him with the rod of men, and with the stripes of the children of men; but my mercy shall not depart away from him,” 2 Sam. vii. 14, 15—language which is referred, by the general consent of commentators ancient and modern, to Christ and His church.

That the church of Christ, though delivered from the condemnation of the law, is subjected to *judgment*, is plainly inferrible from the testimony already advanced; but whether that judgment is confined to the period of the present life, or whether it extends also into that which is to come, is not distinctly affirmed; nor is there the slightest intimation given as to the system under which, and in accordance with which, the judgment is to be dispensed. Upon this latter point, however, St.

James supplies the lacking information—"So speak ye (he says), and so do, as they that shall be *judged by the law of liberty*." "The law of liberty," then, or, in other words, "the law of Christ," is the rule whereby we shall be judged. But still our information is not fully complete; for it does not yet appear whether the sentence which is to consign us to our everlasting condition is included in that judgment, or whether it is to be regarded only as having reference to the discipline of the present day. It is reasonable, however, to conclude that the system under which we are governed and disciplined here will be the same by which we shall be judged hereafter—a conclusion strongly corroborated by the testimony of St. Paul, who in one passage declares that 'in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything (to the hoped-for righteousness), nor uncircumcision, but *faith working by love*;' while in another he affirms that "*love is the fulfilling of the law*;" by a comparison of which statements we conclude, that to the attainment of future righteousness nothing contributeth but *the fulfilling of the law of Christ* (see ch. v. 14^b); in other words, that according to our proficiency, as measured upon that standard, will be the righteousness conferred upon us hereafter—a conclusion most important to be attained, for it at once determines the character of *the works* which are then to be taken into account—not the works of the flesh, performed in order to justification (legal works), but the works of the Spirit, emanating from the principle of love.

The righteousness of which the believer partakes in Christ is, as we have just said, a perfect and an everlasting righteousness, even the righteousness of Christ himself, to which nothing can be ever added, and from which nothing can be ever taken away. They who are invested with that seamless robe of spotless purity are, in the estimation of God, 'perfect even as Christ himself is perfect,' and shall never come into condemnation, or suffer the diminution of one atom of that perfection. They are members of His body, of His flesh, and of His bones, and all the powers of the universe cannot wrest the weakest of them from Christ. Nevertheless, as in the body all members have not the same office, nor does the same dignity appertain unto all, so is it with the body of Christ: all members shall not be equally glorious; but, "as star differeth from star in glory, so also is the resurrection of the dead." We read of "a righteous man's reward," and of "a prophet's reward"—the one to "shine as the firmament," the other "as the stars for ever and ever." All indeed in Christ shall be saved, and saved with "a great salvation;" nay, all are in a manner already saved, having received "the Holy Ghost, which is the earnest of our inheritance, until the redemption of the purchased possession." But the excellency of the condition of all is not alike; there are grades of glory, and those grades allotted to every man severally, according to the will of Christ; and they shall be adjusted, I firmly believe, *proportionately to the measure of the "obedience of faith."*

Let it not be hastily objected to this position, that it involves the principle of man's destiny in the future state being the fruit of his own imperfect deservings; were such a consequence to ensue, it should be instantly and unhesitatingly abandoned as heretical and

unsound. But, consistently with this statement, it may be confidently affirmed that “it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy.” When St. Paul would impress upon his readers the importance of energy in their heavenly calling, he exhorts them—“Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling” (a passage involving very much the same character of truth which is under consideration here); and to guard against any such misapprehension as is above supposed, he immediately subjoins, “for *it is God which worketh in you* both to will and to do, of His good pleasure.” So that the salvation to which we severally attain, is not, accurately speaking, of our own achievement, but from God—not only His gift, unconditionally bestowed upon us in Christ, irrespective of any merit, fitness, or qualification whatsoever upon the part of the recipient, but His gift wrought out and made effectual to the well-being of our souls by the inworking of His gracious Spirit.

The admonition of St. Peter is to be similarly understood—“make your calling and election sure.” Unquestionably, “the gifts and calling of God are without repentance,” incapable of being revoked. From the moment that we are elected in Christ, our salvation is as sure as ‘sure’ can be; “Whom He did foreknow, He also did predestinate; and whom He did predestinate, He also called; and whom He called, them He also justified; and whom He justified, them He also glorified.” The chain is whole and entire; there is no break in it from election to glory. Those who are the objects of His electing love shall neither stumble nor fall, till every one of them appears before God in glory. What means, then, the admonition, “make your calling and election sure.”?

When God elects a weak and sinful creature to a place in His heavenly glory, He elects him at the same time to the qualification requisite to the establishment of His gracious purpose, that is, He elects him “to obedience and the sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ;” which obedience is as sure to the believer as the electing love of God from which it springs, or the glory of God to which it tends; for it is not left to his own unaided powers to effect, but is wrought in him by the effectual working of God’s Holy Spirit, “being elect *through sanctification of the Spirit* to obedience.” So that the elective purpose of God is invariably and unfailingly carried out and made sure to every soul who is interested therein, through a course of obedience and holy living, the result of motives (threats, precepts, exhortations such as the one before us, hopes and fears, and, above all others—love), adapted by God Himself to the purpose, and blessed by the grace of His Holy Spirit to its accomplishment.

Consistently with this theory of justification, with the utmost freeness of divine grace (which must never be for one moment lost sight of, if we would stand in the liberty whereunto Christ hath made us free), the judgment of every man will be “according to his deeds: to them who, by patient continuance in well-doing, seek for glory, and honour, and immortality, eternal life; but unto them who are contentious, and

do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness (the obstinately rebellious and unbelieving, who have no part in the covenant of grace), indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that doeth evil; but glory, honour, and peace, to every man that worketh good." The deeds of the righteous wrought in them by God, who, having "begun a good work" in them, "will perform it until the day of Jesus Christ," being *the measure* of the judgment, not *the ground*, that is, they shall be justified, not by reason of their good works, but their good works were wrought in them, because before the world was they were chosen unto justification, in Christ: the good works of the believer being not meritorious of, but instrumental to, salvation.

In this view of the subject, we have light also reflected upon an obscure passage in St. James's Epistle:—"Ye see, then, how by works a man is justified, and not by faith only," James, ii. 24—a passage which has subjected its inspired author, at the hands of presumptuous critics, to the senseless and unfounded imputation of antagonism to the grace of God. When God passes the final sentence or act of justification upon the believer, in Christ, He justifies him, as St. James informs us (ἐξ ἔργων) 'out of his works,' not, as we have before explained, 'by reason of his works,' but, 'out of,' or consequentially upon, them: these works being "the work of faith, and labour of love, and patience of hope," wrought in him under the covenant of grace, whereof God Himself is the author, and not man. Prospectively to these works of righteousness, before ever they were or could be performed, upon the communication of the gift of faith, God is said to impute to the believer for righteousness that faith from which as certainly and as necessarily do these good works proceed (according to the proportion of faith), as fruit from a good and healthy tree; the works which follow, when they do appear, being the vindication of God's judicial sentence, pronouncing the sinner righteous in His sight, while as yet there were none of them. Upon this principle it is that the offering of Isaac upon the altar has been represented by the apostle (James) as 'the fulfilment' or verification of the Scripture which said, "Abraham believed God, and it was imputed unto him for righteousness."

The propriety, then, or the impropriety of the expression that "by works a man is justified, and not by faith only," is dependent altogether upon the subject to which it is applied, and the aspect in which it is viewed. If it be applied to a sinner under the law, of whom St. Paul treats in his Epistle to the Romans, and if it purport to describe the method whereby such an one is delivered from the condemnation of the law, and brought into a state of acceptance with God, then nothing can be imagined more unscriptural, more faulty, or more perilous, than such a statement; the language of St. Paul being religiously to be observed "by the deeds of the law shall no flesh be justified in His sight?" or,—“we conclude that a man is justified by faith without (χωρίς, independently of) the deeds of the law.” But if, on the other hand, it be predicated of a person who is "not under law, but under grace"—such an one as is the subject of St. James's Epistle, upon whom all *legal*

demands have been satisfied by the death, and who has been made partaker of the risen life, of Jesus; and its object be, to depict the mode whereby God deals with such a character, in Christ; accepting his imperfect services, wrought in God, in the exercise of a living faith—a faith operating through love—and washed in the precious blood of the Lamb; and awarding to him, proportionately to the same, that meed of glory which was his in Christ, before ever the world was—then no language could be devised more appropriate, or more in accordance with the grace of the gospel, than this, “Ye see, then, how by works a man is justified, and not by faith only.”

To recapitulate what has been now said—The doctrine of the Bible upon this most interesting and important subject appears to be briefly this:—Justification, irrespective of any thing in man; from first to last purely of grace. Believers, through their union with Christ, delivered from the law of sin and death, and invested with eternal life and righteousness. The faith by which they are united to Christ, and which subsequently worketh by love, being the gift of God, their justification is altogether of grace. But, delivered from the law as a covenant of works, they are not delivered from it as a rule of life—a law of liberty, under which, though there may be disobedience, and shortcoming, and sin, yet there is (blessed be God) no death; imperfections of every kind being atoned for and swallowed up in the boundless ocean of the Saviour’s blood. Under the Christian covenant, every man perfect—perfect in his divine Head—but hereafter to be endued also with a personal perfection according to the position assigned him in the body of Christ; for there shall be various stations, and various *modes* of perfection in Christ; but all these righteousnesses, the effect of the energy of God’s Holy Spirit, preparing every man and qualifying every man, severally, for the post assigned him before the world was, in Christ.*

* It may be easily perceived that the righteousness here contemplated is not the righteousness of the law, in which the whole body of believers stand already invested collectively and individually, in Christ; which, being one and indivisible in its nature, is the same to all who partake of it; but a righteousness which is yet future, to be conferred upon each member of the body of Christ severally and distinctively, according to the deeds done in the flesh; and consequently above referred to as ‘many righteousnesses.’

‘Righteousness’ is an essential attribute of ‘perfection,’ and so nearly equivalent to it that St. Paul treats them as though they were practically identical. The question at issue in the Galatian church was with respect to ‘perfection’—‘how is perfection to be attained?’ And yet, throughout the whole course of his argument, the Apostle substitutes the word ‘righteousness’ in the place of ‘perfection’—thus evincing his estimate of their equivalence.

‘Perfection’ is ‘the state or condition of being in exact conformity with the requirements of the law under which we are placed.’ ‘Righteousness’ (*δικαιοσύνη*), though used in a secondary sense for ‘the fulfilment of,’ is, in its primary acceptation, ‘the quality of fulfilling’ that law. Hence they are inseparable in their connexion, and both alike incapable of *degrees*. The smallest deviation from the requirements of that law is incompatible with ‘righteousness;’ neither is it consistent with ‘perfection.’ Nevertheless, though incapable of *degrees*, there are as many *modes* of righteousness and of perfection as there are distinct orders of being in the universe, or distinct conditions

When, therefore, "the Father, without respect of persons, *judgeth according to every man's work*," there is in that procedure no departure from the revealed method of grace; for every man's work is wrought in him by God, and the extent of that work is his qualification for glory, which is, consequently, apportioned to every man according as his work may be—being predestinated not only to adoption in Christ, but to that station which is assigned to him individually in the body of Christ, and by the inworking of Almighty power qualified for that position which he is predestined to occupy. So that salvation is of grace, from beginning to end, nothing but grace.

Applying now the doctrine herein laid down to the passage upon which the discussion arose, the exposition is easy and effective. The Galatians, having received the Holy Ghost through faith, were desirous to perfect themselves—that is, to qualify themselves for their future justification—by the works of the flesh, the observance of the ceremonial law. The Apostle expostulates with them upon the senselessness of the attempt, and warns them that the course they were pursuing involved in it a positive departure from grace; 'for we (he says) who are of grace

of personal responsibility. Every creature of God, as it proceedeth out of His hands, is perfect, and consequently, every creature is righteous—all God's works answering completely the purpose for which they were designed—all fulfilling the laws impressed upon them by their Creator. The only exception which we know of in the created universe to perfection is "the angels which *kept not their first estate*," who are for ever and irretrievably lost; and man and his attendant world, which, though *fallen from "original righteousness*," are still within the sphere of mercy, and consequently within the reach of help: God having provided a way, by the use or disuse of which they shall either degrade themselves to the lowest depths of hell, to be the companions of the devil and his angels for ever, or, not only regain their lost righteousness which was Adamic, but attain to a far higher and nobler order of righteousness than that from which they have fallen, even the righteousness of God's own Son.

In both these modes of righteousness the believer has a *present* interest, in Christ. As many as are baptized into Christ are baptized into his *death*, which, being a complete satisfaction for sin, leaves the sinner in the condition of having perfectly fulfilled the law, investing him thereby with the righteousness of Adam. But the baptism which invests him with the righteousness of Adam baptizes him at the same time into *the risen life* of Jesus—which, being a life of more than creature-devotedness unto God, is the righteousness of the second Adam, in which also the believer participates, in Christ.

But still the righteousness attainable by the believer in this present life is not in himself, but in his Head. In himself he is a poor, miserable, hell-deserving sinner; but in Christ he is perfect even as He is perfect. But when the happy period shall arrive—when He shall have accomplished the number of His elect—when, through gospel agency and the various instrumentalities which in the hands of an all-wise and an almighty Providence have been at work throughout the lapse of ages for the salvation of mankind, we shall have "all come unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ"—then shall the mystic Christ be manifested, every member appearing in his proper place, perfect in his Divine Head, and perfect *henceforth and for ever* in himself, in that *order* of perfection which shall be assigned to each according to the measure of the obedience of faith.

In that mighty aggregate of human beings, redeemed by the blood of the Lamb, and sanctified by the grace of the Spirit, and now arrayed in resurrection glory, there will be displayed tier above tier of righteousness, order upon order of perfec-

expect the hoped-for righteousness (that is, final justification), not by the flesh through legal observances, but by the Spirit operating through faith; for in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth any thing (to the end proposed), nor uncircumcision, but faith working by love.'

It may possibly facilitate the reception of the above explanation to observe that the question at issue in the Galatian church was not as to *primary justification*, but as to *perfection*. "Are ye so foolish? having *begun with the Spirit* (primary justification), are ye now *being made perfect* by the flesh?" And, having arrived at that stage of the argument precisely (see ch. iv. 31 *), where their folly might be expected to be exposed, the Apostle characterises it, not without proof, as an absolute departure from Christ, and concludes his observations in the passage under consideration by contrasting the Christian with the legalist—"We who are of grace expect the hoped-for righteousness, not by a carnal performance of the works of the law, but by the Spirit operating through faith;" thus concluding their course in the same manner as they commenced it—with "the Spirit, through faith."

tion—ascending up, like the successive steps of Jacob's ladder, from the humblest individual in the body to the divinely exalted Head—every one of them, like the stones in Solomon's temple, prepared and made meet by previous discipline in this lower world, for the inheritance assigned to him in Christ, and endowed with qualifications suited to the enjoyment of his inheritance. To each individual will be given "a white stone," emblem of purity, "and in the stone a new name written, which no man knoweth, save he that receiveth it"—a new and heavenly nature imparted, of which none can be cognizant but he that owneth it. All happy—unspeakably, eternally happy; but, nevertheless, in diverse orders of happiness;—every cup full, full even to overflowing, but in the capacity of the cups a wide disparity: each, however, serving God in the vocation whereunto he is called with a cheerful and an unswerving obedience. Such are the 'many righteousnesses' alluded to above.

What a wondrous prospect is thus opened to the eye of the believer! what "an eternal and exceeding weight of glory"!—the mind of man staggers under the bare conception of it. Well might the Apostle Paul entreat for us that the eyes of our understanding be enlightened, "that we may know what is the hope of His calling, and what the riches of the glory of His inheritance in the saints;" and well does it become every thoughtful Christian to give diligence to make his calling and election sure, that so "an entrance may be administered unto him *abundantly* into the everlasting kingdom of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ."

THE END.



